Page:William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768, vol I).djvu/207

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Ch. 3.
of Persons.
191

ſciences of private men, that this rule ſhould be clear and indiſputable: and our conſtitution has not left us in the dark upon this material occaſion. It will therefore be the endeavour of this chapter to trace out the conſtutional doctrine of the royal ſucceſſion, with that freedom and regard to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and reſpect, which the principles of liberty and the dignity of the ſubject require.

The grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus coronae, or right of ſucceſſion to the throne of theſe kingdoms, depends, I take to be this: “that the crown is, by common law and conſtitutional cuſtom, hereditary; and this in a manner peculiar to itſelf: but that the right of inheritance may from time to time be changed or limited by act of parliament; under which limitations the crown ſtill continues hereditary.” And this propoſition it will be the buſineſs of this chapter to prove, in all it’s branches: firſt, that the crown is hereditary; ſecondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itſelf; thirdly, that this inheritance is ſubject to limitation by parliament; laſtly, that when it is ſo limited, it is hereditary in the new proprietor.

1. First, it is in general hereditary, or deſcendible to the next heir, on the death or demiſe of the laſt proprietor. All regal governments muſt be either hereditary or elective: and, as I believe there is no inſtance wherein the crown of England has ever been aſſerted to be elective, except by the regicides at the infamous and unparalleled trial of king Charles I, it muſt of conſequence be hereditary. Yet while I aſſert an hereditary, I by no means intend a jure divino, title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have ſubſiſted under the theocratic eſtabliſhments of the children of Iſrael in Paleſtine: but it never yet ſubſiſted in any other country; ſave only ſo far as kingdoms, like other human fabrics, are ſubject to the general and ordinary diſpenſations of providence. Nor indeed have a jure divino and an hereditary right any neceſſary connexion with each other; as ſome have very weakly imagined. The titles of David and Jehu were equally

jure