cious conſequence: I mean the cuſtom, by ſome ſo very warmly recommended, to drop all liberal education, as of no uſe to ſtudents in the law; but to place them, in it’s ſtead, at the deſk of ſome ſkilful attorney; in order to initiate them early in all the depths of practice, and render them more dextrous in the mechanical part of buſineſs. A few inſtances of particular perſons, (men of excellent learning, and unblemiſhed integrity) who, in ſpight of this method of education, have ſhone in the foremoſt ranks of the bar, have afforded ſome kind of ſanction to this illiberal path to the profeſſion, and biaſſed many parents, of ſhortſighted judgment, in it’s favour: not conſidering, that there are ſome geniuſes, formed to overcome all diſadvantages, and that from ſuch particular inſtances no general rules can be formed; nor obſerving, that thoſe very perſons have frequently recommended by the moſt forcible of all examples, the diſpoſal of their own offſpring, a very different foundation of legal ſtudies, a regular academical education. Perhaps too, in return, I could now direct their eyes to our principal ſeats of juſtice, and ſuggeſt a few hints, in favour of univerſity learning[1]:—but in theſe all who hear me, I know, have already prevented me.
Making therefore due allowance for one or two ſhining exceptions, experience may teach us to foretell that a lawyer thus educated to the bar, in ſubſervience to attorneys and ſolicitors[2], will find he has begun at the wrong end. If practice be the whole he is taught, practice muſt alſo be the whole he will ever know: if he be uninſtructed in the elements and firſt principles upon which the rule of practice is founded, the leaſt variation from eſtabliſhed precedents will totally diſtract and bewilder him: ita lex ſcripta eſt[3] is the utmoſt his knowlege will arrive at; he muſt never aſpire to form, and ſeldom expect to comprehend, any arguments drawn a priori, from the ſpirit of the laws and the natural foundations of juſtice.
