Page:William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768, vol II).djvu/136

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124
The Rights
Book II.

for life, is alſo law with regard to his under-tenant, who repreſents him and ſtands in his place[1]: and greater; for in thoſe caſes where tenant for life ſhall not have the emblements, becauſe the eſtate determines by his own act, the exception ſhall not reach his leſſee who is a third perſon. As in the caſe of a woman who holds durante viduitate; her taking huſband is her own act, and therefore deprives her of the emblements: but if ſhe leaſes her eſtate to an under-tenant, who ſows the land, and ſhe then marries, this her act ſhall not deprive the tenant of his emblements, who is a ſtranger and could not prevent her[2]. The leſſees of tenants for life had alſo at the common law another moſt unreaſonable advantage; for, at the death of their leſſors the tenants for life, theſe under-tenants might if they pleaſed quit the premiſes, and pay no rent to any body for the occupation of the land ſince the laſt quarter day, or other day aſſigned for payment of rent[3]. To remedy which it is now enacted[4], that the executors or adminiſtrators of tenant for life, on whoſe death any leaſe determined, ſhall recover of the leſſee a ratable proportion of rent, from the laſt day of payment to the death of ſuch leſſor.

II. The next eſtate for life is of the legal kind, as contradiſtinguiſhed from conventional; viz. that of tenant in tail after poſſibility of iſſue extinct. This happens, where one is tenant in ſpecial tail, and a perſon, from whoſe body the iſſue was to ſpring, dies without iſſue; or, having left iſſue, that iſſue becomes extinct; in either of theſe caſes the ſurviving tenant in ſpecial tail becomes tenant in tail after poſſibility of iſſue extinct. As, where one has an eſtate to him and his heirs on the body of his preſent wife to be begotten, and the wife dies without iſſue[5]; in this caſe the man has an eſtate-tail, which cannot poſſibly deſcend to any one; and therefore the law makes uſe of this long periphraſis, as abſolutely neceſſary to give an adequate idea of his eſtate. For if it had called him barely tenant in fee-tail ſpecial, that would

  1. Co. Litt. 55.
  2. Cro. Eliz. 461. 1 Roll. Abr. 727.
  3. 10 Rep. 127.
  4. Stat. 11 Geo. II. c. 19. §. 15.
  5. Litt. §. 32.
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