as when they were little better than tenancies at the will of the landlord.
Every eſtate which muſt expire at a period certain and prefixed, by whatever words created, is an eſtate for years. And therefore this eſtate is frequently called a term, terminus, becauſe it's duration or continuance is bounded, limited, and determined: for every ſuch eſtate muſt have a certain beginning, and certain end[1]. But id certum eſt, quod certum reddi poteſt: therefore if a man make a leaſe to another, for ſo many years as J. S. ſhall name, it is a good leaſe for years[2]; for though it is at preſent uncertain, yet when J. S. hath named the years, it is then reduced to a certainty. If no day of commencement is named in the creation of this eſtate, it begins from the making, or delivery, of the leaſe[3]. A leaſe for ſo many years as J. S. ſhall live, is void from the beginning[4]; for it is neither certain, nor can ever be reduced to a certainty, during the continuance of the leaſe. And the ſame doctrine holds, if a parſon make a leaſe of his glebe for ſo many years as he ſhall continue parſon of Dale; for this is ſtill more uncertain. But a leaſe for twenty or more years, if J. S. ſhall ſo long live, or if he ſhall ſo long continue parſon, is good[5]: for there is a certain period fixed, beyond which it cannot laſt; though it may determine ſooner, on the death of J. S. or his ceaſing to be parſon there.
We have before remarked, and endeavoured to aſſign the reaſon of, the inferiority in which the law places an eſtate for years, when compared with an eſtate for life, or an inheritance: obſerving, that an eſtate for life, even if it be pur auter vie, is a freehold; but that an eſtate for a thouſand years is only a chattel, and reckoned part of the perſonal eſtate[6]. Hence it follows, that a leaſe for years may be made to commence in futuro, though a leaſe for life cannot. As, if I grant lands to Titius to hold from
