and the landlord before the corn is ripe, or before it is reaped, puts him out, yet the tenant ſhall have the emblements, and free ingreſs, egreſs, and regreſs, to cut and carry away the profits[1]. And this for the ſame reaſon, upon which all the caſes of emblements turn; viz. the point of uncertainty: ſince the tenant could not poſſibly know when his landlord would determine his will, and therefore could make no proviſion againſt it; and having ſown the land, which is for the good of the public, upon a reaſonable preſumption, the law will not ſuffer him to be a loſer by it. But it is otherwiſe, and upon reaſon equally good, where the tenant himſelf determines the will; for in this caſe the landlord ſhall have the profits of the land[2].
What act does, or does not, amount to a determination of the will on either ſide, has formerly been matter of great debate in our courts. But it is now, I think, ſettled, that (beſides the expreſs determination of the leſſor's will, by declaring that the leſſee ſhall hold no longer; which muſt either be made upon the land[3], or notice muſt be given to the leſſee[4]) the exertion of any act of ownerſhip by the leſſor, as entring upon the premiſes and cutting timber[5], taking a diſtreſs for rent and impounding them thereon[6], or making a feoffment, or leaſe for years of the land to commence immediately[7]; any act of deſertion by the leſſee, as aſſigning his eſtate to another, or committing waſte, which is an act inconſiſtent with ſuch a tenure[8]; or, which is inſtar omnium, the death or outlawry, of either leſſor or leſſee[9]; puts an end to or determines the eſtate at will.
The law is however careful, that no ſudden determination of the will by one party ſhall tend to the manifeſt and unforeſeen prejudice of the other. This appears in the caſe of emblements
