life, remainder to the heirs of B: now, if A dies before B, the remainder is at an end; for during B's life he has no heir, nemo eſt haeres viventis: but if B dies firſt, the remainder then immediately veſts in his heir, who will be entitled to the land on the death of A. This is a good contingent remainder, for the poſſibility of B's dying before A is potentia propinqua, and therefore allowed in law[1]. But a remainder to the right heirs of B (if there be no ſuch perſon as B in eſſe) is void[2]. For here there muſt two contingencies happen; firſt, that ſuch a perſon as B ſhall be born; and, ſecondly, that he ſhall alſo die during the continuance of the particular eſtate; which make it potentia remotiſſima, a moſt improbable poſſibility. A remainder to a man's eldeſt ſon, who hath none (we have ſeen) is good; for by common poſſibility he may have one; but if it be limited in particular to his ſon John, or Richard, it is bad, if he have no ſon of that name; for it is too remote a poſſibility that he ſhould not only have a ſon, but a ſon of a particular name[3]. A limitation of a remainder to a baſtard before it is born, is not good[4]: for though the law allows the poſſibility of having baſtards, it preſumes it to be a very remote and improbable contingency. Thus may a remainder be contingent, on account of the uncertainty of the perſon who is to take it.
A remainder may alſo be contingent, where the perſon to whom it is limited is fixed and certain, but the event upon which it is to take effect is vague and uncertain. As, where land is given to A for life, and in caſe B ſurvives him, then with remainder to B in fee: here B is a certain perſon, but the remainder to him is a contingent remainder, depending upon a dubious event, the uncertainty of his ſurviving A. During the joint lives of A and B it is contingent; and if B dies firſt, it never can veſt in his heirs, but is for ever gone; but if A dies firſt, the remainder to B becomes veſted.
