tenants is not only equal or ſimilar, but alſo is one and the ſame. One has not originally a diſtinct moiety from the other; but, if by any ſubſequent act (as by alienation or forfeiture of either) the intereſt becomes ſeparate and diſtinct, the joint-tenancy inſtantly ceaſes. But, while it continues, each of two joint-tenants has a concurrent intereſt in the whole; and therefore, on the death of his companion, the ſole intereſt in the whole remains to the ſurvivor. For the intereſt, which the ſurvivor originally had, is clearly not deveſted by the death of his companion; and no other perſon can now claim to have a joint eſtate with him, for no one can now have an intereſt in the whole, accruing by the ſame title, and taking effect at the ſame time with his own; neither can any one claim a ſeparate intereſt in any part of the tenements; for that would be to deprive the ſurvivor of the right which he has in all, and every part. As therefore the ſurvivor's original intereſt in the whole ſtill remains; and as no one can now be admitted, either jointly or ſeverally, to any ſhare with him therein; it follows, that his own intereſt muſt now be entire and ſeveral, and that he ſhall alone be entitled to the whole eſtate (whatever it be) that was created by the original grant.
This right of ſurvivorſhip is called by our antient authors[1] the jus accreſcendi, becauſe the right, upon the death of one joint-tenant, accumalates and increaſes to the ſurvivors; or, as they themſelves expreſs it, "pars illa communis accreſcit ſuperſtitibus, de perſona in perſonam, uſque ad ultimum ſuperſtitem." And this jus accreſcendi ought to be mutual; which I apprehend to be the reaſon why neither the king[2], nor any corporation[3], can be a joint-tenant with a private perſon. For here is no mutuality: the private perſon has not even the remoteſt chance of being ſeiſed of the entirety, by benefit of ſurvivorſhip, for the king and the corporation can never die.
