to his eldeſt ſon; but by denization it acquires an hereditary quality, which will be tranſmitted to his ſubſequent poſterity. Yet, if he had been naturalized by act of parliament, ſuch eldeſt ſon might then have inherited; for that cancels all defects, and is allowed to have a retroſpective energy, which ſimple denization has not[1].
Sir Edward Coke[2] alſo holds, that if an alien cometh into England, and there hath iſſue two ſons, who are thereby natural born ſubjects; and one of them purchaſes land, and dies; yet neither of theſe brethren can be heir to the other. For the commune vinculum, or common ſtock of their conſanguinity, is the father; and, as he had no inheritable blood in him, he could communicate none to his ſons; and, when the ſons can by no poſſibility be heirs to the father, the one of them ſhall not be heir to the other. And this opinion of his ſeems founded upon ſolid principles of the antient law; not only from the rule before cited[3], that ceſtuy, que doit inheriter al pere, doit inheriter al fits; but alſo becauſe we have ſeen that the only feodal foundation upon which newly purchaſed land can poſſibly deſcend to a brother, is the ſuppoſition and fiction of law, that it deſcended from ſome one of his anceſtors: but in this caſe as the immediate anceſtor was an alien, from whom it could by no poſſibility deſcend, this ſhould deſtroy the ſuppoſition, and impede the deſcent, and the land ſhould be inherited ut feudum novum; that is, by none but the lineal deſcendants of the purchaſing brother; and, on failure of them, ſhould eſcheat to the lord of the fee. But this opinion hath been ſince overruled[4]: and it is now held for law, that the ſons of an alien, born here, may inherit to each other. And reaſonably enough upon the whole: for, as (in common purchaſes) the whole of the ſuppoſed deſcent from indefinite anceſtors is but fictitious, the law may as well ſuppoſe the requiſite anceſtor as ſuppoſe the requiſite deſcent.
