will. But we have ſeen[1] how this evaſion was cruſhed in it's infancy, by ſtatute 15 Ric. II. c. 5. with reſpect to religious houſes.
Yet, the idea being once introduced, however fraudulently, it afterwards continued to be often innocently, and ſometimes very laudably, applied to a number of civil purpoſes: particularly as it removed the reſtraint of alienations by will, and permitted the owner of lands in his lifetime to make various deſignations of their profits, as prudence, or juſtice, or family convenience, might from time to time require. Till at length, during our long wars in France and the ſubſequent civil commotions between the houſes of York and Lancaſter, uſes grew almoſt univerſal: through the deſire that men had (when their lives were continually in hazard) of providing for their children by will, and of ſecuring their eſtates from forfeitures; when each of the contending parties, as they became uppermoſt, alternately attainted the other. Wherefore about the reign of Edward IV, (before whoſe time, lord Bacon remarks[2], there are not ſix caſes to be found relating to the doctrine of uſes) the courts of equity began to reduce them to ſomething of a regular ſyſtem.
Originally it was held that the chancery could give no relief, but againſt the very perſon himſelf intruſted for ceſtuy que uſe, and not againſt his heir or alienee. This was altered in the reign of Henry VI, with reſpect to the heir[3]; and afterwards the ſame rule, by a parity of reaſon, was extended to ſuch alienees as had purchaſed either without a valuable conſideration, or with an expreſs notice of the uſe[4]. But a purchaſor for a valuable conſideration, without notice, might hold the land diſcharged of any truſt or confidence. And alſo it was held, that neither the king or queen, on account of their dignity royal[5], nor any corporation aggregate, on account of it's limited capacity[6],
