Page:William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768, vol II).djvu/352

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336
The Rights
Book II.

pugnant and therefore void[1]. And therefore, on a feoffment to A and his heirs, to the uſe of B and his heirs, in truſt for C and his heirs, they held that the ſtatute executed only the firſt uſe, and that the ſecond was a mere nullity: not adverting, that the inſtant the firſt uſe was executed in B, he became ſeiſed to the uſe of C, which ſecond uſe the ſtatute might as well be permitted to execute as it did the firſt; and ſo the legal eſtate might be inſtantaneouſly tranſmitted down, through a hundred uſes upon uſes, till finally executed in the laſt ceſtuy que uſe. Again; as the ſtatute mentions only ſuch perſons as were ſeiſed to the uſe of others, this was held not to extend to terms of years, or other chattel intereſts, whereof the termor is not ſeiſed, but only poſſeſſed[2]; and therefore, if a term of one thouſand years be limited to A, to the uſe of (or in truſt for) B, the ſtatute does not execute this uſe, but leaves it as at common law[3]. And laſtly, (by more modern reſolutions) where lands are given to one and his heirs, in truſt to receive and pay over the profits to another, this uſe is not executed by the ſtatute: for the land muſt remain in the truſtee to enable him to perform the truſt[4].

Of the two more antient diſtinctions the courts of equity quickly availed themſelves. In the firſt caſe it was evident, that B was never intended by the parties to have any beneficial intereſt; and, in the ſecond, the ceſtuy que uſe of the term was expreſſly driven into the court of chancery to ſeek his remedy: and therefore that court determined, that though theſe were not uſes, which the ſtatute could execute, yet ſtill they were truſts in equity, which in conſcience ought to be performed. To this the reaſon of mankind aſſented, and the doctrine of uſes was revived, under the denomination of truſts: and thus, by this ſtrict conſtruction of the courts of law, a ſtatute made upon great deliberation, and introduced in the moſt ſolemn manner, has had little other effect than to make a flight alteration in the formal words of a conveyance[5].

  1. 1 And. 37. 136.
  2. Bacon law of uſes. 335. Jenk. 244.
  3. Poph. 76. Dyer. 369.
  4. 1 Equ. Caſ. abr. 383, 384.
  5. Vaugh. 50. Atk. 591.
However,