ceaſe, and "ceſſante ratione ceſſat et ipſa lex:" for the male is well known, by his conſtant aſſociation with the female; and for the ſame reaſon the owner of the one doth not ſuffer more diſadvantage, during the time of pregnancy and nurture, than the owner of the other.
II. Other animals, that are not of a tame and domeſtic nature, are either not the objects of property at all, or elſe fall under our other diviſion, namely, that of qualified, limited, or ſpecial property: which is ſuch as is not in it's nature permanent, but may ſometimes ſubſiſt, and at other times not ſubſiſt. In diſcuſſing which ſubject, I ſhall in the firſt place ſhew, how this ſpecies of property may ſubſiſt in ſuch animals as are ferae naturae, or of a wild nature; and then, how it may ſubſiſt in any other things, when under particular circumſtances.
First then, a man may be inveſted with a qualified, but not an abſolute, property in all creatures that are ferae naturae, either per induſtriam, propter impotentiam, or propter privilegium.
1. A qualified property may ſubſiſt in animals ferae naturae, per induſtriam hominis: by a man's reclaiming and making them tame by art, induſtry, and education; or by ſo confining them within his own immediate power, that they cannot eſcape and uſe their natural liberty. And under this head ſome writers have ranked all the former ſpecies of animals we have mentioned, apprehending none to be originally and naturally tame, but only made ſo by art and cuſtom: as, horſes, ſwine, and other cattle; which, if originally left to themſelves, would have choſen to rove up and down, ſeeking their food at large, and are only made domeſtic by uſe and familiarity, and are therefore, ſay they, called manſueta, quaſi manui aſſueta. But however well this notion may be founded, abſtractedly conſidered, our law apprehends the mod obvious diſtinction to be, between ſuch animals as we generally ſee tame, and are therefore ſeldom, if ever, found wandering at large, which it calls domitae naturae; and ſuch crea-
