have as abſolute a property of ſuch things in action, as of things in poſſeſſion.
And, having thus diſtinguiſhed the different degree or quantity of dominion, or property to which things perſonal are ſubject, we may add a word or two concerning the time of their enjoyment, and the number of their owners; in conformity to the method before obſerved in treating of the property of things real.
First, as to the time of enjoyment. By the rules of the antient common law, there could be no future property, to take place in expectancy, created in perſonal goods and chattels; becauſe, being things tranſitory, and by many accidents ſubject to be loſt, deſtroyed, or otherwiſe impaired, and the exigencies of trade requiring alſo a frequent circulation thereof, it would occaſion perpetual ſuits and quarrels, and put a ſtop to the freedom of commerce, if ſuch limitations in remainder were generally tolerated and allowed. But yet in laſt wills and teſtaments ſuch limitations of perſonal goods and chattels, in remainder after a bequeſt for life, were permitted[1]: though originally that indulgence was only ſhewn, when merely the uſe of the goods, and not the goods themſelves, was given to the firſt legatee[2]; the property being ſuppoſed to continue all the time in the executor of the deviſor. But now that diſtinction is diſregarded[3]: and therefore if a man either by deed or will limits his books or furniture to A for life, with remainder over to B, this remainder is good. But, where an eſtate-tail in things perſonal is given to the firſt or any ſubſequent poſſeſſor, it veſts in him the total property, and no remainder over ſhall be permitted on ſuch a limitation[4]. For this, if allowed, would tend to a perpetuity, as the deviſee or grantee in tail of a chattel has no method of barring the entail; and therefore the law veſts in him at once the entire dominion of the goods, being analogous to the fee-ſimple which a tenant in tail may acquire in a real eſtate.
