formance of a lawful act, the party ſtands excuſed from all guilt: but if a man be doing any thing unlawful, and a conſequence enſues which he did not foreſee or intend, as the death of a man or the like, his want of foreſight ſhall be no excuſe; for, being guilty of one offence, in doing antecedently what is in itſelf unlawful, he is criminally guilty of whatever conſequence may follow the fiſt miſbehaviour[1].
V. Fifthly, ignorance or miſtake is another defect of will; when a man, intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. For here the deed and the will acting ſeparately, there is not that conjunction between them, which is neceſſary to form a criminal act. But this muſb be an ignorance or miſtake of fact, and not an error in point of law. As if a man, intending to kill a thief or houſebreaker in his own houſe, by miſtake kills one of his own family, this is no criminal action[2]: but if a man thinks he has a right to kill a perſon excommunicated or outlawed, wherever he meets him, and does ſo; this is wilful murder. For a miſtake in point of law, which every perſon of diſcretion not only may, but is bound and preſumed to know, is in criminal caſes no ſort of defence. Ignorantia juris, quod quifque tenetur fcire, neminem excufat, is as well the maxim of our own law [3] as it was of the Roman[4].
VI. A sixth ſpecies of defect of will is that ariſing from compulſion and inevitable neceſſity, Theſe are a conſtraint upon the will, whereby a man is urged to do that which his judgment diſapproves; and which, it is to be preſumed, his will (if left to itſelf) would reject. As puniſhments are therefore only inflicted for the abuſe of that free-will, which God has given to man, it is highly juſt and equitable that a man mould be excuſed for thoſe acts, which are done through unavoidable force and compulſion.
