particularized injury. For example, perhaps a candidate or political party would have standing to challenge the settlement agreement or other alleged irregularities. Or perhaps election monitors would have standing to sue if they were denied access to the recount. But Wood cannot place himself in the stead of these groups, even if he supports them. Cf. Glanton ex rel. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan v. AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “associational standing… does not operate in reverse,” so a member cannot represent an association). He is at most a “concerned bystander.” Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). So he is not “entitled to have the court[s] decide the merits of [his] dispute.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
B. Wood’s Requested Relief Concerning the 2020 General Election Is Moot.
Even if Wood had standing, several of his requests for relief are barred by another jurisdictional defect: mootness. We are “not empowered to decide moot questions.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (alteration rejected) (internal quotation marks omitted). And an issue can become moot at any
16
