Page:Works of John C. Calhoun, v1.djvu/117

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better judge, than one individual or a few, what burdens the community can bear — and how it can be most equally distributed, and easily collected.

In the British government, the king constitutes an estate, because he is the head and representative of this great interest. He is the conduit through which, all the honors and emoluments of the government flow — while the House of Commons, according to the theory of the government, is the head and representative of the opposite — the great tax-paying interest, by which the government is supported.

Between these great interests, there is necessarily a constant and strong tendency to conflict; which, if not counteracted, must end in violence and an appeal to force — to be followed by revolution, as has been explained. To prevent this, the House of Lords, as one of the estates of the realm, is interposed; and constitutes the conservative power of the government. It consists, in fact, of that portion of the community who are the principal recipients of the honors, emoluments, and other advantages derived from he government; and whose condition cannot be improved, but must be made worse by the triumph of either of the conflicting estates over the other; and, hence, it is opposed to the ascendency of either — and in favor of preserving the equilibrium between them.

This sketch, brief as it is, is sufficient to show, that these two constitutional governments — by far the most illustrious of their respective kinds — conform to the principles that have been established, alike in their origin and in their construction. The