Page:Works of John C. Calhoun, v1.djvu/319

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make, the benefit, in the end, would accrue, not to itself, but to the President — as the head of the executive department. Every enlargement of the powers of the government which may be made, every measure which may be adopted to aggrandize the dominant combination which may control the government for the time, must necessarily enlarge, in a greater or less degree, his patronage and influence. With their enlargement, his power to control the other departments of the government, and the organs of public opinion, and through them, the community at large, must increase, and in the same degree. With their increase, the motive to obtain possession of the control of the government, in order to enjoy its honors and emoluments, regardless of all considerations of principle or policy, would become stronger and stronger, until it would stand alone, the paramount and all-absorbing motive. And — to trace further the fatal progress — just in proportion as this motive should become stronger, the election of the President would be, more and more, the all-important question — until every other would be regarded as subordinate to it. But as this became more and more paramount to all others, party combinations, and party organization and discipline, would become more concentrated and stringent — their control over individual opinion and action more and more decisive; and, with it, the control of the President, as the head of the dominant party. When this should be increased to such a degree, that he, as its head, could, through party organs and party machinery, wield sufficient influence