Euth. That, therefore, which is dear to the gods is holy, but that which is not dear to them is unholy.
Soc. You have now answered, O Euthyphro, most beautifully, and in such a manner as I wished you to answer. Whether truly or not however, this I do not yet know. But you will doubtless in addition to this teach me that what you say is true.
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Come then, let us consider what we say. That which is dear to divinity, and the man who is dear to divinity, are holy ; but that which is odious to divinity, and the man who is odious to divinity, are unholy. But the holy is not the same with the unholy, but is most contrary to it. Is it not so ?
Euth. It certainly is so.
Soc. And these things appear to have been well said.
Euth. I think so, Socrates.
Soc. But has it not, O Euthyphro, also been said that there is sedition among the gods, and that they oppose and are enemies to each other ?
Euth. It has been said.
Soc. But let us thus consider, excellent man, about what particulars discord produces enmity and wrath. If, therefore, I and you differed in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were more in quantity, would this difference make us enemies, and should we be enraged with each other ? Or, betaking ourselves to computation about things of this kind, should we not be quickly liberated from this dissension ?
Euth. Entirely so.
Soc. Hence also, if we differed concerning the greater and the lesser, should we not, by applying ourselves to measuring, soon bring our disagreement to an end ?
Euth. We should.
Soc. And, as I think, by betaking ourselves to weighing, we should be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.
Euth. Undoubtedly.
Soc. About what then disagreeing, and not being able to recur to a certain criterion, should we become enemies to, and be enraged with, each
