this very circumstance, you should in like manner do that which is approved by the one and hated by the other.
Euth. But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another in this affair, and assert that it is not proper for him to suffer punishment who has unjustly slain any one.
Soc. But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, O Euthyphro, whether he who has unjustly slain another, or has done any thing else unjustly, ought to be punished ?
Euth. They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For those that act unjustly in a very great degree, say and do every thing in order to escape punishment.
Soc. Do they also, O Euthyphro, confess that they have acted unjustly ? And confessing this, do they at the same time say, that they ought not to be punished.
Euth. They by no means say this.
Soc. They do not, therefore, say and do everything. For I think they dare not say, nor even doubt this, that if they act unjustly punishment must be inflicted on them : but, as it appears to me, they deny that they have acted unjustly. Do they not ?
Euth. You speak the truth.
Soc. They are not, therefore, dubious about this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished ; but they perhaps doubt who he is that acts unjustly, and by what action, and when, his conduct may be considered as unjust.
Euth. True.
Soc. Will not, therefore, the very same things happen to the gods if they oppose each other concerning things just and unjust, according to your assertion ; and will not some of them say, that they act unjustly by each other, and others again deny this. Since, O wonderful man, no one, either of gods or men, dares to assert that punishment ought not to be inflicted on him who acts unjustly.
Euth. They will : and what you now say, Socrates, is summarily true.
Soc. But those who are dubious, as well gods as men, will be dubious respecting each of the transactions ; if the gods disagree about any action,
