ing, or suffers any thing, it is not making because it may be made; but because it is making it may be made. Nor because it may suffer does it suffer ; but because it suffers it may suffer. Or do you not admit this to be the case ?
Euth. I do.
Soc. Is not this therefore also the case with that which is beloved, or making, or suffering something from some one ?
Euth. Entirely so.
Soc. This therefore subsists in the same manner as the things before mentioned : it is not beloved by those by whom it is beloved, because it may be beloved; but because it is beloved, it may be beloved.
Euth. It is necessary.
Soc. What then do we say concerning holiness, O Euthyphro ? Is it not this, that it is beloved by all the gods, according to your assertion ?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Is it therefore beloved on this account, because it is holy, or for some other reason ?
Euth. For no other reason but on this account.
Soc. Because it is holy, therefore, it is beloved ; but not because it is beloved, on this account it is holy.
Euth. It appears so.
Soc. Because however it is beloved by the gods, it may be beloved, and be dear to divinity.
Euth. Undoubtedly.
Soc. That which is dear to divinity, therefore, is not holy, O Euthyphro, nor must holiness be defined to be that which is dear to divinity as you say, but it is something different from this.
Euth. How is this, Socrates ?
Soc. Because we have acknowledged that holiness is on this account beloved because it is holy ; and not that it is holy because it is beloved. Did we not ?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. But that which is dear to divinity, because it is beloved by the gods, from this very circumstance that it is beloved, is dear to divinity ; but not because it is dear to divinity, on this account is it beloved.
