the Notice in a manner different from any other legal obligations of Twitter, Inc.
98 In support of this opinion, Mr Pyle referred to decisions of the Supreme Court of Nevada which have held that courts should interpret statutory language in accordance with its plain meaning, unless there is a clear reason to do otherwise: Cote H v Eighth Judicial District Court 124 Nev 36 (2008). However, I note that the Court in Cote H also said that "[s]tatutes with a protective purpose should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the benefits intended to be obtained". Mr Pyle said that Delaware courts also applied the "plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation, citing an unreported decision of the Delaware Chancery Court in Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, Del Ch 80 A.3d 155 (2013) (Great Hill) in which the Court, in interpreting s 259 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, stated: "If a valid statute is not ambiguous, the court will apply the plain meaning of the statutory language to the facts before it". Mr Pyle said that he had not identified any case law that specifically bore upon the proper interpretation of "liabilities" in the context of a merger, but relied on the "plain meaning" rule of interpretation referred to in the cases that he cited, noting that Great Hill concerned the interpretation of s 259 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
99 Mr Pyle disagreed with Mr Bogatz's opinion in relation to the proper interpretation of the term "liabilities" in NRS § 92A.250(1)(d). Mr Pyle was of the opinion that "liabilities" should be read to mean any type of legal responsibility, and not only monetary obligations. In his first report, Mr Pyle referred to a definition of liability in the Britannica Dictionary as "the state of being legally responsible for something: the state of being liable for something". He stated that Mr Bogatz's reference to a definition of "liability" in an insurance statute was in an entirely different context.
100 In cross-examination by senior counsel for X Corp, Mr Pyle did not agree that "liabilities" in NRS § 92A.250(1)(d) referred only to financial liabilities. He accepted that § 92A.250(1)(d) did not operate on a fictitious premise that the constituent entities continued in existence. When asked to explain his opinion as to how in this circumstance the surviving entity inherited regulatory requirements to which it had not been subject, Mr Pyle reiterated his view, which rested on giving "liabilities" a broad interpretation.
101 As for Mr Bogatz's reference to the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in Quixtar, Mr Pyle expressed the opinion that it demonstrated that Nevada courts understand that the surviving corporation in a merger becomes responsible for all obligations
