117 Twitter Inc is not a party to the present proceeding. The present proceeding is an application by X Corp for relief, substantially in the nature of a declaration that X Corp is not subject to a particular liability. It is thus the status of X Corp, not Twitter Inc, that is in issue.
NRS § 92A.250 is a law that governs the "status" of X Corp
118 As I have noted, prior to the enactment of the Foreign Corporations (Application of Laws) Act, the common law had long recognised bodies that were created under foreign laws as juristic entities: Lazard Brothers at 297 (Lord Wright), citing Henriques v Dutch West India Co (1728) 2 Ld Raym 1532 at 1535; 92 ER 494 at 496. Questions as to the creation, existence, status, powers, and dissolution of a foreign corporation were determined by reference to the laws of the place of domicile, which was the place of incorporation.
119 For these purposes, the status of a foreign corporation extended beyond its mere existence, and included all the attributes with which the corporation was invested under the laws of its domicile, including the identification of liabilities that attached to it, at least at the point of its creation: National Bank of Greece and Athens SA v Metliss [1958] AC 509 (Metliss) at 525 (Viscount Simonds) and 529 (Lord Tucker).
120 Once engaged, s 7 of the Act supplies the content of the choice-of-law rule to the questions set out in the section. But the reference to the status of a foreign corporation in s 7(3)(a) should be understood in the same way as the common law choice-of-law rule was formulated. As Davies J observed in La Mancha Group International BV v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2020] FCA 1799; 112 ATR 660 (La Mancha) at [21], the relevant common law principle finds expression in s 7(3)(a) of the Act.
121 Choice-of-law rules for determining the status of foreign corporations may be applicable to private causes of action. Metliss itself concerned the recovery of moneys due under a guarantee of bonds governed by English law against a Greek company that was held to be the "universal successor" under Greek law of the bank that had originally guaranteed payment. It is important to identify that universal succession is a concept that was known to Roman law, which has been adapted to juristic entities incorporated under the laws of several civil law countries. It is a label that describes a complex doctrine, with many exceptions. It is often explained by the metaphor that the successor entity "stands in the shoes" of the old entity, noting the limitations on metaphors as complete expressions of legal principle: see, for example, Adams v National Bank of Greece SA [1961] AC 255 at 274 (Viscount Simonds) and 279 (Lord Reid); Duro Felguera Australia Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corp [2015] WASC 484 at [82] (Le Miere J);
