context indicates otherwise" (emphasis added). Mr Bogatz did not analyse the purpose or content of Chapter 92A, as opposed to the other provisions regarding risk retention groups for the purposes of liability insurance. As Mr Pyle pointed out, "liability" in an insurance context is apt to refer to pecuniary liability, since insurance policies represent an obligation to pay monetary amounts. I do not accept Mr Bogatz's evidence in seeking to align the meaning of "liabilities" in § 92A.250(1)(d) in a corporate merger context with the use of the same term in the patently different context of insurance.
145 Nor did Mr Bogatz grapple with the significance of § 92A.270(7), a provision he cited in this context. That section relevantly provides that, when a non-Nevada corporation becomes domesticated in Nevada –
all debts, liabilities and duties of [that company] attach to the domestic entity resulting from the domestication and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if the debts, liability and duties had been incurred or contracted by the domestic entity.
146 Mr Bogatz appeared to assume, without analysis, that "liabilities" in this context refers to pecuniary obligations only. But without analysis, that is far from obvious. While debts are obviously pecuniary, the term "duties" — even on Mr Bogatz's own analysis of the term in his report — is not limited to pecuniary obligations. I do not accept Mr Bogatz's assumption that § 92A.270(7) uses the term "liabilities" in a purely monetary sense.
147 Moreover, there were gaps in reasoning even in respect of §§ 92A.250(3)(h) and 92A.270(8). These provisions do refer to pecuniary liabilities, because they assume that the liabilities may be paid. But Mr Bogatz proffered no analysis of why the use of the word "liabilities" in these sections should shape the meaning of the word in other sections. I have already noted Mr Bogatz's reference to Savage, which requires words to be given consistent meanings in statutes, where their purpose and content are aligned, and subject to contextual indications to the contrary. Mr Bogatz did not explain the purpose of §§ 92A.250(3)(h) or 92A.270(8), or whether there were any indications of context that bore on his construction. Indeed, the fact that § 92A.270(7) may well use the term "liabilities" in a broader sense may be a critical piece of context that would weigh on the analysis.
148 Further, there were occasions when it appeared that Mr Bogatz's evidence was moulded to support the conclusions he expressed in his report. An example came when Mr Bogatz was taken to the two definitions of the word "liability" in Black's, set out at [83] above. The first definition defined "liability" as "[t]he quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or
