the Court, I formed the view that his allegiance to the opinions expressed in his report made him reluctant in oral evidence to make all the concessions that might have been made if he had been given more time to consider the questions, and analyse them in a more rigorous way. These considerations lead me to conclude that Mr Bogatz's opinions on disputed issues relating to the operation of Nevada's merger laws do not carry much weight.
Mr Pyle
152 The central opinion of Mr Pyle that falls for consideration is his opinion that the word "liabilities" in § 92A.250(1)(d) is broad enough to encompass non-pecuniary regulatory obligations.
153 Mr Pyle gave his evidence in a straightforward and confident manner. The reasoning in his reports was clear, and particularly succinct. However, a product of his succinct reasoning was that, like Mr Bogatz, some of his opinions were not supported by rigorous analysis. Despite this, I formed a generally positive impression of Mr Pyle as a witness who was doing his best to explain the content of the applicable law.
154 Mr Pyle has broad experience in mergers. As Chair of the corporate transaction group at Sheehan Phinney Bass & Green PA, and previously as a lawyer and partner at Foley Hoag LLP, Mr Pyle has handled over 100 United States merger and acquisition transactions. His confidence in his understanding of the applicable law across jurisdictions in the United States was apparent during cross-examination.
155 Mr Pyle's testimony during the concurrent evidence session stood in contrast from that of Mr Bogatz in some respects. By way of example, Mr Pyle accepted that the definition of "liability" in Black's bore two separate meanings, including one that related to pecuniary obligations only, despite his opinion that in NRS § 92A.250(1)(d) the word "liabilities" bears a broader meaning. This concession was entirely appropriate and, indeed, necessary.
156 During cross-examination, Mr Pyle was challenged on his view that both Nevada law and Delaware law were relevant to the legal effects of the merger of Twitter Inc into X Corp. More than once, senior counsel for X Corp put to Mr Pyle that the merger was a "Nevada merger". Mr Pyle observed that this formulation carried with it the implication that the merger was really a matter of Nevada law, but that the very issue raised during cross-examination was whether that implication was correct. Mr Pyle referred to his view that the law of both Delaware and Nevada could provide for the consequences of a merger, and that in the case of substantial
