4
YEGIAZARYAN v. SMAGIN
Syllabus
at the plaintiff’s residence—and to the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam—which generally locates intangible property at the domicile of its owner—and argue that both principles locate Smagin’s alleged injury at his residence. Petitioners fail both to explain the relevance of these principles and to show that they were principles settled at common law at the time of RICO’s enactment. The core problem with petitioners’ reliance on legal fictions concerning the situs of injuries in other areas of the law is that the justifications of that approach do not necessarily translate to the presumption against extraterritoriality, with its distinctive concerns for comity and discerning congressional meaning. Indeed, petitioners’ approach generates results counter to comity and far afield from any reasonable interpretation of what qualifies as a domestic application of §1964(c). Consider two U. S. businesses targeted by racketeering activity, one owned by a U. S. resident and one owned by someone living abroad. There is no evidence that Congress intended that only the former business owner can bring a §1964(c) suit, especially since doing so runs the risk of generating international discord. Finally, petitioners argue that a contextual approach is unworkable because it does not provide a bright-line rule. Such concerns about a fact-intensive test cannot displace congressional policy choices, where a more nuanced test is true to the statute’s meaning. Pp. 11–14.
37 F. 4th 562, affirmed and remanded.
