Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 4
PROPOSITION IV.
MATTER PER SE.
DEMONSTRATION.
The whole material universe by itself; or per se, is a mere collection of objects without a subject or self. But it was proved in Proposition II. that the only objects which can possibly be known are objects plus a subject or self. Therefore the whole material universe by itself; or per se is of necessity absolutely unknowable.
Again. Object plus a subject is the minimum scibile per se (by Proposition III.) But the whole material universe, per se, being a mere collection of objects without a subject, is less than the minimum scibile per se. Therefore the whole material universe being less than the minimum scibile per se—being less than the least that can be known by itself—is, of necessity, absolutely unknowable.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Idealism and materialism have their roots here.1. At this stage light begins to break in upon the great controversy between idealism and materialism. This is the point at which the controversy branches off from the main stem of speculation. Idealism, rightly understood, is founded on this fourth proposition, which again is founded on our third or second, which again are firmly rooted in our first. Materialism—that is, the doctrine which advocates the absolute Being, the existence per se of matter—is founded on the following counter-proposition, which, it will be observed, rests upon the third or second counter-proposition, which again are supported by the first, and have no other stay when this ground is cut away from them.
Fourth counter-proposition.2. Fourth counter-proposition.—"The material universe per se is not of necessity absolutely unknowable. It may be, and it is, the object of our knowledge."
It expresses common opinion as to our knowledge of matter per se.3. There can be no doubt that this counter-proposition expresses the natural opinion of all mankind respecting our knowledge of material things. In our ordinary moods we conceive that we know material things by themselves. When we gaze on rivers, woods, and mountains, or handle stocks and stones, we think that we are apprehending these things only, and not them together with something else (to wit, ourselves), which we neither see nor hear, and on which we cannot lay our hands.
Oversight of self only apparent—not real and total.4. In such cases the oversight which we commit is not real and total; it is only partial and apparent, and it is to be explained on the principles already expounded under Proposition I.,—the law of familiarity,—and the circumstance that the me, though always a part, is never a sensible part of the object of our knowledge. However strongly the natural judgments of mankind may run in favour of the fourth counter-proposition, it is utterly incompatible with the necessary dictates of reason, which declare that an intelligent soul can never know anything except an intelligent soul apprehending whatever it apprehends.
Psychological opinion as to our knowledge of matter per se.5. Although here, as in the preceding instances, psychology speaks its opinion somewhat ambiguously and reservedly as to our knowledge of matter per se, still there can be little doubt that its doctrine to a large extent, and in so far as it presents a logical aspect, is virtually coincident with this fourth counter-proposition. Our ordinary psychology advocates the existence of matter per se. And on what ground? Surely on the ground that we know it to exist per se. The knowledge of its independent existence would undoubtedly be sufficient evidence of its independent existence. But failing this knowledge, it is difficult to understand on what ground its existence per se can be advocated or established. Of course, its existence per se is, at the present stage of the discussion, neither admitted nor denied. But this much may be said, that it would be a monstrous fallacy—and one which we would very unwillingly charge our popular psychology with—to conclude that matter which was only known, and could only be known to exist cum alio, or not independently, therefore existed per se, or independently. That, assuredly, would be a nonsequitur. We must therefore hold that the teaching of psychology is, in its scope and tendency at least, identical with the fourth counter-proposition, which declares (in opposition to a strict demonstrated truth) that matter per se is, or can be, known.
Psychological materialism as founded on the four counter-propositions.6. Observe, in further corroboration of what has been announced as the psychological doctrine, what a consistent scheme of materialism arises out of our four counter-propositions. Firstly, It is not necessary that we should know ourselves in order to know other things. Secondly, Any object, therefore, may be known by us, without ourselves being known along with it. Thirdly, Therefore the mere objective part of our knowledge is, or may be, a unit of cognition. Fourthly, Therefore matter per se, which is the mere objective part of our knowledge, is or may be known by us. Fifthly, Therefore matter per se exists. The logic of that sorites which, we believe, contains the sole psychological argument in favour of the existence of matter per se, is impregnable. Unfortunately the starting-point and the three subsequent counter-propositions are false and contradictory, and are therefore altogether incompetent to support the conclusion—however true that conclusion may be in itself.
Fallacy of materialism. Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions.7. The fallacy of this argument will be still more apparent, and the grounds of idealism will be further opened up, if we set against it the first four propositions of the system. Firstly, it is necessary that self should always be known, if anything is to be known. Secondly, Therefore no object can be known without self being known. Thirdly, Therefore the mere objective part of knowledge is always less than the unit or minimum of cognition. Fourthly, Therefore matter per se, which is the mere objective part of our knowledge and less than the unit of cognition, cannot by any possibility be known by us. Fifthly, Therefore no argument in favour of the existence of matter per se can be deduced from our knowledge of matter per se—because we have, and can have, no such knowledge. Of course, no conclusion is deducible from these premises to the effect that matter per se does not exist. All that the premises do is to cut away the grounds of materialism, and afford a presumption in favour of the possibility of some kind of idealism.
A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist.8. Both the materialist and the idealist have tacitly prejudged an important preliminary question in their discussions respecting the existence of matter. The question is this—Is there, or is there not, any necessary and invincible law of knowledge and of reason which prevents matter per se from being known? The materialist, prejudging this question in the negative, silently decides that there is nothing in the nature of intelligence, or in the constitution and essence of knowledge, to prevent matter per se from being known. Holding, therefore, the knowledge of matter per se to be possible, and surrounded by the glories of a wonderful creation, he very naturally concludes that this knowledge is actual; and holding this knowledge to be actual, he cannot but conclude that matter per se exists. The inference from knowledge to existence is always legitimate. It is not surprising, therefore, that he should be bewildered and irritated by the speculations of those who have called in question the existence of matter per se. But the idealist also has his grounds of justification. He has silently decided this preliminary question in the affirmative. He has seen that in the very nature of reason, in the very constitution of knowledge, there is a necessary and insuperable law which renders any apprehension of matter per se a contradiction and an impossibility. Hence his doubts, and even his denial, of the existence of matter per se are not altogether so unreasonable as they are liable to appear to those who are ignorant of the answer which he has tacitly and only half-consciously returned to the preliminary question referred to.
Cause of this precipitate judgment. Its evil consequences.9. This preliminary question has been prejudged—that is, has been settled in opposite ways without examination—by the materialist and by the idealist, owing to their having proceeded to ontology (the science of Being) before they had proposed and exhausted the problems of a rigorous and demonstrated epistemology (the science of Knowing). Owing to this reversal of the right method of philosophy, while the materialist has tacitly returned a wrong answer to this preliminary question, the idealist has obtained only a glimpse of the truth. The materialist rejects the law with an emphasis all the more strong, because the question which inquires about it can scarcely be said to have occurred to him. He never even dreams that there is an invincible law of reason which prevents all intelligence from knowing matter per se. He has silently decided in his own mind that there is no such law; and hence he has no difficulty in coming to a decision in favour of independent material existence. On the other hand, the idealist has certainly got some perception of this law; but having passed on to the question of existence before he had thoroughly ascertained the laws of knowledge, and in particular before he had mastered the condition of all knowledge, as laid down in Proposition I., he has reached an ontological conclusion affirming the non-absolute existence of matter, which, however true it may be, is ambiguous, precipitate, and ill-matured,—and indeed not intelligible; for nothing which is ambiguous is intelligible.
How Prop. IV. decides this preliminary question. How Counter-proposition IV. decides it.10. It is obvious that this system decides this preliminary question in the affirmative, declaring unequivocally that there is a necessary law which prevents all intelligence from knowing matter per se,—just as the counter-proposition decides it in the negative, declaring that there is none. The affirmative answer follows by a very short remove from Proposition I., in which the primary condition of all knowing is fixed. The negative answer is based on a denial of Proposition I.,—in other words, on the rejection of a necessary truth of reason.
Symbols illustrative of the position maintained by the Institutes.11. A few more explanations may be offered. Attention to the following symbols will enable the reader to understand exactly the position advocated by these Institutes in regard to our knowledge of material things, as contrasted with the position occupied by ordinary thinking, and also maintained by psychology. Let X represent the material universe, and let Y represent self or the subject: the law is that Y can apprehend X only provided, and when, it apprehends Y as well. (It shall be proved farther on[1] that Y can conceive or think of X only provided, and when, it conceives Y as well; meanwhile this is assumed.) So that what Y apprehends, or thinks of, is never X per se, but always is, and must be, X plus Y. The synthesis of X and Y—that is, the only universe which the laws of knowledge permit Y (i.e. any intelligence) to know or conceive—this is the thesis maintained in these Institutes.
The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position.12. Let this position be now contrasted with the ordinary and psychological opinion. Let X, as before, represent the material universe, and let Y represent self or the subject; the law is that Y can apprehend X only provided, and when, it is present to X. Here nothing is said about the necessity of Y apprehending Y, or itself, whenever it apprehends X; but all that is held to be necessary is that Y should be present to X whenever it apprehends X. But this position is entirely different from that set forth in the preceding paragraph, and it leads to a directly opposite conclusion; because if all that is required to enable Y to apprehend X be that Y should be present to X, there is nothing to prevent Y from being cognisant of X per se: indeed, in that case, it must be cognisant of X per se; because, not being cognisant of Y, or itself; it must be cognisant of X without Y; but X without Y is X per se. So that the psychological position, which contends merely for the presence of Y along with X as the condition on which Y may know X, but not for the cognisance by Y of its own presence along with X, leaves the knowledge of X per se not only possible, but necessary. On this basis, which is occupied by ordinary thinking as well as by psychological science, our knowledge of matter per se may very well be vindicated.
Different conclusions from the two positions.13. A very different conclusion flows from the initial principle on which this work is founded. Our position is not simply that Y must be present to X in order to be cognisant of X: nothing can come of such a truism as that; it is barren as a cinder. Our position is that Y must, moreover, be cognisant of Y or itself, in order to be cognisant of X, and that Y can apprehend X only when it also apprehends Y. That seed bears fruit, which, whether acceptable or not, is at any rate legitimately raised, because it leads at once to the conclusion that all knowledge of X per se—that is, of X without any Y being known along with it—is altogether impossible.
14. Lest it should be supposed that this conclusion Difference farther explained.is also deducible from the other position, a few words may be added to show that this is not the case. Suppose we merely affirm, with psychology, that Y must always be along with X in order that X may be apprehended; there would be nothing in that position to prevent X per se from being apprehended—nothing to support the conclusion that all knowledge of X per se is impossible; the only inference (which, however, would be a mere restatement of the position) would be that wherever X was known there must always be a Y present to know it. That is undoubted; but this inference is very far from being equivalent to the conclusion that X per se cannot be known. X per se can be known, if Y can know it without being cognisant of itself at the same time; for to say that X per se is known, simply means that X is known without Y being known along with it. But the conclusion that X per se cannot be known, is irresistible on the other premises; because if Y must not only be along with X in order to know X, but must also be known along with X in order to know X, it is obviously impossible that X per se can be known, or that Y can know X without knowing Y—i.e., itself—at the same time.
15. Another point of essential difference between the views maintained in this system and the ordinary psychological opinions is this: It is possible Another point of difference between this system and psychology.that psychology may assent to the position that Y (to continue these symbols) cannot know X without knowing Y, or itself, as well. It is indeed by no means certain that psychology distinctly disavows this principle (so vacillating is her procedure), although it is quite inconsistent with the general scope of her instructions, and with the conclusions at which she arrives. But supposing it to be conceded, psychology may still contend that this position does not prove X per se to be absolutely and universally unknowable. She may argue—indeed does argue—that although X per se (matter by itself) may not be known by us (the human Y), it may, nevertheless, be known by other intelligences, actual or possible; that is, by some Y differently constituted from us. Psychology thus attributes our incompetency to know matter per se to some peculiarity or special limitation in our faculties of cognition. Not to speak of lesser men, even Kant has fallen into this mistake. But a very moderate degree of reflection might have convinced them that we are prevented from knowing matter per se by no such cause. The imperfection or limitation of our faculties can only prevent us from knowing how, or under what modes of apprehension different from ours, matter may be known by other intelligences, supposing such to exist. Matter per se is unknowable by us on a very different account. It is unknowable, not on account of any special disability under which we may be supposed to labour (and surely we have a sufficiency of imperfections without increasing their number through a miscalculation), but in virtue of a law binding upon all intelligence. The law is that all intelligence (every Y, actual or possible) must know itself along with whatever it is cognisant of, (Prop. I.) Therefore matter per se cannot possibly be known by any intelligence, be its constitution what it may; for every intelligence in knowing matter must know itself as well. X per se is thus fixed as absolutely unknowable all round,—all round the circle of intelligence; and here, at least, we lie under no special disadvantage, if disadvantage it be. "Know me," says X per se to one Y.—"I cannot," says that Y "for I must know myself as well." "Know me," says X per se to another and differently constituted Y.—"I cannot," says this other Y, "for I must know myself as well." "Know me," says X per se to a third and again differently constituted Y.—"I cannot do it," says this third Y, "for I am under the necessity of knowing myself along with you:" and so on, round the whole circle. Thus X per se meets with a rebuff from every quarter—cannot get known on any terms by any intelligence. Independent matter is thus shut out from all cognition by a necessary law of all reason. The primary condition of all knowledge closes the door in its face. So much for the psychological averment that matter per se may be known by other intelligences, though perhaps not known by us. Psychology professes to deal not with necessary, but only with contingent, truth—and the mischievous error now under consideration (for error it is, inasmuch as it attributes our incompetency to a wrong cause,—and how mischievous it is will afterwards appear in the agnoiology) is the offspring of that timidity. These Institutes deal only with necessary truth; and one of the advantages of this restriction is, that while it saves us from the mistake alluded to, it enables us to prove, as an easy and legitimate deduction from their first principle, that all cognisance of the material universe per se is not only impossible to us, but that it is universally impossible. This conclusion, which here is only in the bud, shows blossom in the agnoiology, and bears fruit in the ontology.
Matter per se reduced to the contradictory16. By these considerations matter per se is reduced to the predicament of a contradiction: it is not the simply inconceivable by us, but the absolutely inconceivable in itself. This reduction, the importance of which will be apparent by-and-by, could not have been effected upon any principle of psychological strategy. It is a manœuvre competent only to the dialectic of necessary truth. "Matter per se," says psychology, "may not be known by us, but what of that? If it can be possibly known by any intelligence, it is not to be laid down as the contradictory." True, if it can be known by any intelligence. But what if it can not be known by any intelligence, actual or possible? In that case it undoubtedly becomes the contradictory. For what is a contradiction but that which cannot be known or conceived on any terms by any possible intelligence? Whatever is of this character is a contradictory thing. Why is a two-sided triangle a contradiction? Just because the laws of all thinking prevent such a figure from being known or conceived. Why is matter per se a contradiction? For precisely the same reason. The laws of all thinking intercept it on the way to cognition, and compel something else to be known in its place; to wit, matter cum alio, i.e., mecum. That the one of these contradictions should appear more palpable than the other, is a mere accident of words. Matter per se is thus cut off from all means of escape from the category of the contradictory, inasmuch as a loophole is to be found only in the supposition that, if one kind of intelligence cannot be cognisant of it, another kind may. Psychology endeavours to open that outlet: our first proposition shuts it; so that matter per se must just submit to the doom which consigns it to the limbo of the contradictory.
17. Perhaps it may be thought that the contradiction here spoken of does not attach to matter per se, but only to our knowledge of it; and that it amounts This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter per se,to no more than this, that things cannot be known unless they are presented in some way or other to an intelligent mind. A few remarks, therefore, must be made to obviate this natural but very serious misunderstanding, and to show that the contradiction in question affects not merely knowledge, but its objects. To speak first of merely contradictory knowledge: Suppose it to be laid down as a necessary truth of reason, that a man can be cognisant of things only when they are present either really or ideally, to his consciousness; that position would merely fix all knowledge as contradictory in which the things to be known were not presented to the mind. It would leave the things themselves unaffected. They would not be contradictory; they would still be possible, though not actual, objects of knowledge. Matter per se (supposing it cognisable) would not be itself contradictory because the cognisance of it, except upon certain conditions, was contradictory. It would be rather hard upon matter per se to visit it with the consequences of our refusal to comply with the conditions of cognition, or to suppose that it was an absurdity, because we happened to be asleep, or occupied with something else. Here, then, the contradiction attaches only to the knowledge of matter per se. That is absurd and impossible, unless the conditions requisite to its attainment are complied with. The thing itself is untouched; it remains unknown, but not unknowable.
but to matter per se itself.18. But the case is very different in regard to the contradiction at present under consideration. These Institutes differ entirely from psychology in their doctrine as to the primary condition of all knowledge. They contend, not simply that a man can know things only when they are presented to his mind, but that he can know them when only he himself is presented to his mind along with them. This position, in fixing the knowledge of self as the condition of all knowledge, fixes self, moreover, as an integral and essential part of every object of cognition (see Prop. III., obs. 3). When that integral part, therefore, is supposed to be withdrawn, as it is in the case of matter per se, the inevitable effect is, that the remaining part of the object of cognition—to wit, matter per se—lapses into a contradiction. It becomes a mere absurdity. It is not simply unknown, it is absolutely unknowable; because, upon the terms of this system, the only object knowable by any mind is an object made up of a thing (the element called non-ego) and a mind or self (the element called ego). Here, then, the contradiction besieges not merely the knowledge of the thing, but the thing itself. The difference between the two contradictions may be illustrated in this way. The cognisance of a circle is contradictory, unless that figure be presented, either really or ideally, to the mind. This contradiction, however, is limited exclusively to the cognisance; it does not extend to the circle. A mere contradiction of this kind would leave matter per se altogether unaffected. But the cognisance of a centreless circle is not only a contradictory cognisance; the object of it is, moreover, a contradictory object. A centreless circle is absolutely incogitable in itself. The contradiction which attaches to matter per se is of this character. Matter per se is a contradictory thing, just as much as a circle without a centre is a contradictory thing. In the case of the centreless circle, the object is contradictory, because it lacks an element (to wit, the centre) which is essential to the constitution not only of every know; but of every knowable circle; and in like manner, matter per se is contradictory, because it wants the element (to wit, the me) which is essential to the constitution not only of every known, but of every knowable thing, (Prop. II.) It is thus certain that matter per se is a contradictory thing, and that the contradiction (as these remarks have been introduced to show) cleaves not only to the cognition but to its object. A thing which can be known or conceived only when something else is known or conceived along with it, must surely present a contradiction to the mind whenever an attempt is made to know or conceive it by itself.
19. This position being secured—the reduction, namely, of matter per se to a contradiction—the Advantage of this reduction. New light on the problem of philosophy.first triumph of philosophy is achieved. This operation turns the flank of every hostile scheme, and breaks down the most formidable impediment with which speculation has to struggle. Her course is now comparatively smooth. One advantage of this reduction is that it brings before us, in a new light (and the more lights it can be viewed in the better), the leading question of the epistemology. That problem is, What is the essential condition and constituent of all knowledge; or what is that which enters, and must enter, into the composition of every object of knowledge? But another form of the question might be, What is every object of knowledge without this essential constituent? And the answer is, that it must be the contradictory; because it is obvious that if the objects of knowledge be deprived of the necessary element which makes them objects of knowledge, the remaining part must be universally unknowable and inconceivable—in other word; contradictory. But the next question is, What is this incogitable remainder, this contradictory caput mortuum? For it is idle to talk of this contradictory element unless we are able to say what it is; and the answer is, that it is matter per se, or, carried to a higher generality, objects without any subject. This is the contradictory element in all knowledge—the contradiction which intellect has to overcome—the wastes and wilds of absurdity which are given over to the reclaiming processes of reason, and which have to be redeemed into cognition.
Importance of finding the contradictory.20. The next question is, How is this redemption effected? How does the contradictory cease to be contradictory; how does the incogitable become cogitable; how does the absolutely unknowable become known? That was the form in which the problem of philosophy usually presented itself, although not very clearly, to the thinkers of antiquity. That was the form under which Plato viewed it, when he described philosophy as the means by which the human soul was converted from ignorance to knowledge. His description would have been more exact had he said that philosophy was not so much this conversion itself, as an explanation of the process by which the conversion was effected—in other words, was explanatory of the way in which the contradictory element contained in every object of cognition was overcome, not by philosophers only, but by all mankind,—the only difference being that the philosopher overcame the contradiction, and knew the process how, while the common man equally overcame it, without being conscious of the means which he employed. But whatever the explanation may be—whether by calling attention, as Plato did, to his "ideas," or, as this system does, to the "me," as the redeeming element—it is obvious that the question as to the conversion of the contradictory cannot be distinctly answered until we have found our contradictory, our incogitable, our unknowable. Until that is done, we can have nothing definite to work upon. Hence the importance of reducing matter per se to a contradiction. This reduction is equivalent to a finding of the contradictory; and we have now something under our hands. We can now exhibit the process of conversion by which the unintelligible is translated into the intelligible. This exhibition is indeed the business of every part of the first section of this work. But the explanation could scarcely have proceeded, had the unintelligible or contradictory element of all cognition remained unfound.
In what sense the contradictory is conceivable.21. In speaking thus of the finding of the contradictory, we are very far from insinuating that the contradictory can be known or conceived. It can be conceived only as the absolutely inconceivable. To find it as this is all that is necessary for the purposes of rational truth. In one sense, and when properly explained, nothing is easier than to conceive the contradictory. Conceive the one end of a stick absolutely removed, and the other end alone remaining, and you have a conception of something contradictory. "I cannot conceive that," the reader will say. True, in one sense you cannot conceive it, but in another sense you can conceive it distinctly,— you can conceive it as that which neither you nor any other intelligence can conceive. This is the whole amount of the conceivability which is claimed for matter per se. It is to be conceived only as that which no intellect can conceive, inasmuch as all intellect, by its very nature as intellect, can conceive it only cum alio.
Matter per se is not a nonentity.22. Does this contradictory nondescript exist? The answer to that question had better be allowed to ripen a little longer. Philosophers, ere now, have got into trouble by plucking it prematurely. One point the reader may make himself quite easy about. This system is as far as any system can be from maintaining that matter per se is a nonentity—a blank. All blanks, all nonentities, require to be supplemented by a "me" before they can be cogitable, just as much as all things or entities require to be thus supplemented. But matter per se is, by its very terms, that which is unsupplemented by any "me;" therefore it, certainly, is not to be conceived as a nonentity. If idealism be a system which holds that matter per se is nothing, we forswear and denounce idealism. True idealism, however, never maintained any such absurd thesis. But does not true idealism reduce every thing in the universe to a mere phenomenon of consciousness? Suppose it does,—does it not also reduce every nothing in the universe to a mere phenomenon of consciousness? The materialist supposes that, according to idealism, when a loaf of bread ceases to be a phenomenon of consciousness, and is locked away in a dark closet, it must turn into nothing. He might as well fancy that, according to idealism, it must turn into cheese. Idealism does not hold that when a thing ceases altogether to be a phenomenon of consciousness, it becomes another phenomenon of consciousness, as this supposition would imply. No—in the absence of all consciousness, the loaf, or whatever it may be, lapses, not into nothing, but into the contradictory. It becomes the absolutely incogitable—a surd—from which condition it can be redeemed only when some consciousness of it is either known or conceived. But the question is,—Is our reason competent to conceive the abstraction of all consciousness from this, or from any other, object in the universe? This competency may very well be doubted: perhaps hereafter good grounds may appear for denying it.
- ↑ Propositions XI., XII.