Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 3
PROPOSITION III.
THE INSEPARABILITY OP THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE.
DEMONSTRATION.
If the objective part of knowledge were separable in cognition from the ego or subjective part, it could be apprehended without the ego being apprehended along with it. But this has been proved by Proposition II. to be impossible. Therefore the objective part of the object of knowledge is not separable in cognition from the subjective part, or the ego.
Again, The unit or minimum of cognition is such an amount of knowledge that if any constituent part of it be left out of account, the whole cognition of necessity disappears. But the objective plus the subjective constitutes such a unit or minimum: because if the objective part be entirely removed from the object of our knowledge, and if the mind be left with no thing or thought before it, it can have no cognition—so if the subjective part, or itself, be entirely removed from the mind's observation, the cognition equally disappears, to whatever extent we may suppose the mere objective part of the presentation to be still before us. All cognisance of it is impossible by Proposition I. Therefore the objective and the subjective do together constitute the unit or minimum of cognition.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Reasons for giving this proposition a prominent place in the system.1. Although this proposition is rather a corollary of the second than a new and distinct proposition, still there are good reasons for assigning to it a formal and prominent position in the system. Its enunciation affords us an opportunity of explaining what is meant by inseparability in cognition, and by the unit or minimum of knowledge—two important but ill-understood points in philosophy. And further, it is to be suspected that, notwithstanding the clearness and certainty of Proposition II., doubts may still be entertained as to the inviolable unity in cognition of the objective and the subjective parts of our knowledge. Moreover, it may be doubted whether the popular delusion, which is largely shared in by psychology—namely, that subject and object are two units, and not merely one unit or minimum of cognition—is combated and exploded in our second proposition in terms sufficiently express. On these accounts it has appeared advisable to give to Proposition III. a distinct and leading place in the system.
What is meant by separability and inseparability in cognition.2. Two things are properly said to be separable from each other in cognition, when they can be separated in such a way that the one of them can be known or apprehended without the other. Thus a tree and a stone are separable from each other in cognition, because a tree can be apprehended without a stone being apprehended, and conversely. But when two things cannot be separated in such a way that the one of them can be apprehended without the other, but only in such a way that the one is never confounded with the other—these two things cannot with any propriety be said to be separable, but only to be distinguishable in cognition. This is the predicament in which subject and object, self and surrounding things, are placed. The two can at all times be intelligently distinguished from each other. They cannot at any time be intelligently separated from each other. They are clearly distinguishable; they are absolutely inseparable in cognition.
3. Both this and the second proposition affirm A possible misapprehension obviated.that self or the subject is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition. But the reader is requested to bear in mind that this does not mean that he is a part of that part of the objects of his cognition, which he calls chairs, and tables, and trees. It means quite the contrary. It means that he is not, and cannot be, a part of that part. The table before you, good reader, is only a part of the object of your cognition. You yourself are the other part. The true and total object of your mind is the table, or whatever else it may be,—and yourself. The latter part, therefore, cannot by any possibility be a part of the former part; for to suppose that it can, would be equivalent to holding that a thing, instead of being what it was, was something which it was not. The two factors of cognition—the two constituents of every known object (to wit, the ego and the non-ego), are for ever contradistinguished—for ever sundered by a fatal law which holds them everlastingly apart, and prevents either of them from being its opposite. But it is precisely this inexorable severance which also keeps them together as inseparably united in cognition.
4. Inseparability in cognition does not mean inseparability in space. The necessary laws of knowledge admit of our apprehending things as separable, and as separate, in space from ourselves to any extent we please; but they do not admit of our Inseparability in cognition not to be confounded with inseparability in space: the external and the internal.apprehending things as separate or as separable in cognition from ourselves in any sense whatever. It is to be suspected that some misconception on this point has been pretty general among the cultivators of philosophy, and that some who may have had a glimpse of the truth have shrunk from advocating, and even from contemplating, the inseparability in cognition of subject and object, from confounding this idea with the idea of their inseparability in space. Subject and object may be separated from each other in space more widely than the poles; it is only in cognition that they are absolutely inseparable. They may very well be separated in space; but space itself cannot be separated in cognition from the subject—space is always known and thought of as my cognisance of space—therefore a separation in space has no effect whatever in bringing about a separation in cognition, of object from subject. The cultivators of philosophy just referred to seem to have been apprehensive lest, in denying the separability in cognition of subject and object, they might appear to be calling in question the existence of external things, and thereby falling into idealism. As if any genuine idealism ever denied the existence of external things,—ever denied that these things were actually and bonâ fide external to us. Idealism never denied this: it only asks what is the meaning of "external" considered out of all relation to "internal," and it shows that, out of this relation, the word "external" has, and can have, no meaning.
The unit of cognition explained. How it is determined.5. The unit or minimum of cognition is such an amount (and no more) of cognition as can be known. The knowable must mount up to a certain point before it can become the knowable least. In this respect the magnitude of the knowable is quite different from visible or ponderable magnitude. The visible or ponderable least cannot be determined absolutely, because there is no necessary law of reason fixing it. It is a varying quantity contingent on the capacities of the seer or the weigher. But the knowable least is determined absolutely by an essential law of all intelligence; it cannot be less than some thing or thought, with the addition of oneself. It cannot be less than object + subject; because anything less than this is absolutely unknowable by a necessary law of reason. No necessary law of knowledge fixes that the capacity of seeing or hearing or weighing shall not go below a certain limit: because with finer organs or with finer instruments a new minimum of sight or of sound or of weight might, for ever and ever, be revealed. But the capacity of knowing is sternly and everlastingly, and universally prohibited from going below a certain limit: it cannot descend to the apprehension of less than object + subject. This, therefore, is the least, the ultimate that can be known by itself. Object (whatever the object may be, for this of course is not fixed by any necessary law of reason) plus subject is the minimum scibile per se.
Importance of the words "by itself," or per se6. It is of importance to attend to the words by itself or per se. Object plus subject is not the knowable least or minimum scibile without any qualification, because the objective part of knowledge, which is, of course, less than both the objective and subjective parts, can undoubtedly be known; and the subjective part of knowledge (the ego), which is, of course, less than both the objective and subjective parts, can also be known. But object plus subject is the least that can be known by itself or per se, or in an isolated state; because the objective cannot be known without the subjective, or the subjective without the objective. Hence object plus subject is the minimum scibile per se. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a grain was the ponderable least. To remove all ambiguity, it would be necessary to add "by itself." Because the half-grain would also be ponderable-it would be ponderable along with the other half. But (on the supposition) it would not be ponderable by itself. Therefore to avoid all misconstruction, we should require to say that the grain was the ponderable least "by itself." So in regard to the unit or minimum of cognition.
7. It matters not how many elements or factors The unit of cognition further explainedthe unit or minimum of cognition may consist of: it matters not how clearly we may be able to distinguish these elements from each other when the whole unit or minimum is before us. These circumstances do not make the unit of cognition more than a unit or minimum. However numerous its elements may be, the unit is still a mere unit, if the whole of them are required to make up one datum of knowledge. The only circumstance which could prove the unit of cognition, consisting of the two factors subject and object, to be more than a unit, would be the entire removal of either of its factors, and the continuance of the other factor by itself as a unit or minimum of cognition. But such a removal and such a continuance have been seen to be impossible. Therefore, subject and object, though capable of being discriminated as the two elements of our knowledge, are, in their duality, still a single unit of cognition: because the one of them cannot be removed from any datum of knowledge without extinguishing the datum altogether.
No essential but only an accidental difference between the minimum and the maximum of cognition8. The minimum scibile per se, consisting of subject and object, is only accidentally but not essentially enlarged by augmenting the objective factor. Popularly considered, the universe plus me is greater than a grain of sand plus me. But this difference is altogether trivial, and of no account in philosophy. Let Y represent the subject, and X the object. So soon as Y apprehends Y + X the whole business of knowing is accomplished. The unit of knowledge, the minimum scibile per se, is constituted and compassed. We may add to this X as many other X's as we please. But that makes no difference in the eyes of reason. A million X's plus Y is only accidentally but not essentially more than the minimum scibile per se. Although in the ordinary intercourse of life it may be convenient to regard the minimum and the maximum of cognition as diverse, yet, speculatively considered, they are coincident.
Third counter-proposition9. Third counter proposition.—"The objective and the subjective parts of knowledge are separable in cognition. The ego and that which is presented to it as not itself, or as the non-ego, are each of them a unit of cognition. Object and subject, oneself and the thing with which one is engaged, are not one unit or minimum, but are two units or minima of knowledge. In other words, either of them can be known without the other being known."
It embodies an inadvertency of natural thinking.10. That this counter-proposition embodies the inadvertency of popular thinking with regard to the constitution of knowledge is undoubted. Every man in his ordinary moments conceives that he can and does separate in cognition the thing which he knows from himself the knower of it. He looks upon it as something which he can and does apprehend without apprehending himself. Hence he sees no difficulty whatever in separating it intelligently from himself. Hence, too, he fancies that it is a unit of knowledge, and that he is another unit of knowledge. This supposition, which contradicts the necessary laws of all reason, is no worse than an inadvertency on the part of common opinion, although it is one of the most inveterate of those natural oversights which metaphysic exists for the sole purpose of correcting.
The psychological position more false and ambiguous than the natural inadvertency.11. As usual, the psychological teaching on this head is more ambiguous and more erroneous than the popular inadvertency. It certainly does not embrace Proposition III., and in so far as it dissents from the counter-proposition, it dissents only to fall into a deeper error. It sometimes embraces a middle alternative, in which the contradiction already involved in the third counter-proposition is complicated with an additional contradiction: something to this effect—object and subject, though inseparable in cognition, are nevertheless two separate units or minima of cognition, and not merely one! It is quite unnecessary to argue against this proposition, so portentous is the twofold contradiction it involves. But it may be worth while to point out its origin.
12. The psychologist finds himself in a dilemma. He sees that if he expressly denies the inseparability The psychological error accounted for.in cognition of the objective and the subjective elements of knowledge, he mistakes and misstates the laws of cognition; and he sees that if he admits that object and subject form the unit or minimum of cognition, he deprives himself of the best or only argument by which he may prove that each of them is a separate unit of existence. This consideration shocks him; and he endeavours to salve the point by admitting that subject and object are inseparable in cognition (this saves the phenomena in so far as the laws of knowledge are concerned), and by denying that they constitute only a single unit of cognition; (this enables him to keep in his hands a valid argument for their duality of existence). But he retains it at a considerable expense—by swallowing a contradiction of his own brewing, which no palliatives will ever enable him, or any one else, to digest. Such, we may be assured, is the secret history of the psychological deliverance on this point. The psychologist has not the firmness to stand to the truth, be the consequences what they may.
Distinction of science of mind and science of matter characterised.13. The common division of the sciences into the two leading categories,—the science of mind and the science of matter,—when regarded as more than a mere verbal, and to a certain extent convenient distinction, is founded on the fallacy contained in this psychological deliverance, and partakes of its fallaciousness. Indeed, to lay down the dualism of subject and object as complete and absolute, (that is, as an out-and-out duality which is not also a unity), which psychology not unfrequently does, is to extinguish every glimmering of the scientific reason; for this implies that the dualism is laid down in cognition, as complete and absolute, which it can only be when intelligence can act in opposition to its own necessary and insuperable laws. In case it should be thought that psychology is rather unsparingly dealt with throughout this work, it may be here observed that it is only in so far as psychology ventures to treat of the fundamental question in regard to knowledge, and to intrude into the region of the prima philosophia, that her procedure is reprehended, and her insufficiency exposed. Within her own proper sphere—the investigation, namely, of such mental operations as memory, association of ideas, &c.—the performances of psychology are by no means to be slighted.
Invalidity of counter-proposition III. Its origin, §§ 14, 15, 16, 17.14. It comes very much to the same thing whether the ordinary psychological deliverance be identical with the opinion propounded in paragraph 11, or with the less illogical doctrine set forth in the third counter-proposition. The invalidity of the latter has been already sufficiently exposed. It cannot possibly be established, except upon the overthrow of Proposition I. A few remarks may be offered, not in refutation but in explanation of the origin of the third counter-proposition.
Many things are distinguishable, which are not separable, in cognition.15. The circumstance that the object and subject of knowledge, the thing and the me, can be distinguished in cognition, seems to have led to the mistake embodied in this counter-proposition. People seem to have supposed that because these were distinguishable, they were also separable in the mind. They, perhaps, fancy that the assertion that the ego and non-ego are inseparable in cognition, is equivalent to the assertion that thought confounds and identifies them with each other. Such a supposition, if ever entertained, indicates merely a confusion of ideas. Many things are distinguishable in cognition, which it is yet impossible to know in separation from each other; and many things are inseparable in cognition, which it is yet impossible to confound or identify with each other. A stick has two ends. Its one end is quite distinguishable in cognition from the other end; but it is absolutely inseparable in cognition from the other end. A stick with only one end is altogether incogitable. Again,—a stick has two ends. These are absolutely inseparable in cognition. But the one end is not the same as the other end. It is impossible for the mind to separate them; it is equally impossible for the mind to confound them. Of course, any given end of a stick can be cut away; but not in such a manner as to leave it with only one end, either for itself or for cognition. The end removed always is, and must be, replaced by a new end.
Illustrations applied to subject and object.16. So in regard to subject and object. Any given subject may be removed from any given object, and any given object may be removed from any given subject. But the necessary law of every apprehended object is, that an ego or subject must be apprehended along with it; and the necessary law of every apprehended subject is, that an object or thought, of one kind or other, must be apprehended along with it. This is what the law of all intelligence necessitates; in other words, both subject and object are required to make up the unit or minimum of cognition. The object, by itself, is less than this unit or minimum, and the subject, by itself, is less than this unit or minimum; and, therefore, each of them, by itself, is absolutely in-apprehensible. Yet no one is ever so insane as to confound the objective part of his knowledge with the subjective part of it, or to mistake a thing for himself.
Further illustration.17. The circumference of a circle and its centre furnish another example of two elements of cognition, which, though perfectly distinguishable, are altogether inseparable in the mind. The circumference of a circle cannot be known without the centre being known, and the centre of a circle cannot be known without the circumference being known; yet who ever supposes that the circumference is the centre, or the centre the circumference? In the same way, why should our proposition lead people to infer that that part of the total object of knowledge which is called the subject is that other part of it which is usually called the object, or that that part of it which is usually called the object is that other part of it which is called the subject? One would think that the distinction might be understood and kept clearly in view without running even into the smallest degree of confusion. At any rate, these remarks, taken along with the explanation given in the third paragraph of this article, may be sufficient to obviate the main misconceptions which have prevented our third proposition from occupying its rightful place in speculative science, and have led generally to the adoption of the third counter-proposition.
Short statement of what this proposition contends for.18. All that this proposition contends for may be expressed very shortly and simply by saying—that it is impossible for a man to consider any of the objects of his consciousness, whatever these may be, as at any time the objects of no consciousness—
" Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
Testa diu."
No opinion offered as to existence.19. It is to be observed that under this article no opinion is expressed as to whether the subject and object of knowledge are two separate units of existence. All that is at present affirmed is, that they are not two units, but only one unit, of cognition. To offer any opinion on the subject of Being, in that department of our science which treats merely of Knowing, would be as irrelevant as to start an anatomical doctrine when expounding the principles of astronomy. Let us find out what we can know, and cannot know, before we talk of what is, or is not. In the two next propositions; the absolutely unknowable is more particularly condescended upon.