Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 2
PROPOSITION II.
THE OBJECT OF ALL KNOWLEDGE.
DEMONSTRATION.
It has been already established as the condition of all knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided the intelligence which apprehends it knows itself at the same time. But if a thing can be known only provided oneself be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or thought) and oneself together must, in every case, be the object, the true and complete object, of knowledge; in other words, it follows that that which we know always is and must be object plus subject, object cum alio,—thing or thought with an addition to it,—which addition is the me. Self; therefore, is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition.
Or, again. Suppose a case in which a thing or a thought is apprehended without the me being apprehended along with it. This would contradict Proposition I., which has fixed the knowledge of self as the condition of all knowledge. But Proposition I. is established; and therefore the me must in all cases form part of that which we know; and the only object which any intelligence ever has, or ever can have any cognisance of is, itself-in-union-with-whatever-it-apprehends.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Reason for printing "itself-in-union-with-whatever-it-apprehends" as one word.1. By printing as one word the seven last words of the Demonstration, a higher degree of intelligibility seems to be secured for what is here laid down as the universal object of knowledge, than might have been attained by printing these words as separate. Whether our position should be agreed with or not, it can scarcely be misunderstood.
2. By the object of knowledge, we are, of course, to understand the whole object of knowledge, By the object of knowledge is meant the whole object of knowledge.whatever that may be at any particular time. It is quite possible for the mind to attend more to one part of any given presentation than to another. The mind does indeed usually attend most to that part of every presentation which is commonly called the thing. But the part so attended to is not the whole object; it is not properly the object of our knowledge. It is only part of the object, the object being that part together with the other part of the presentation (self; namely, or the subject) which is usually less attended to, but which is necessary to complete every datum of cognition. In other words, the object, usually so called, is only part of the object of the mind, although it may be that part which is most attended to. The object, properly so called, is always the object with the addition of the subject, because this alone is the whole object of our apprehension. That which is usually termed the object may be sometimes conveniently termed the objective part of the object of knowledge, and that which is usually called the subject may be sometimes conveniently called the subjective part of the object of knowledge. But the ordinary distinction of subject and object in which they are contrasted as the knowing and the known, and in which the subject is virtually denied to be any part of the object of our knowledge, is erroneous and contradictory, and has had a most mischievous effect on the growth and fortunes of philosophy.
Change which an attention to the condition of knowledge effects upon the object of knowledge.3. The ascertainment of the condition of knowledge as fixed in Proposition I. necessarily effects a great change in our conception of the object of knowledge. This change is expressed in Proposition II. But in our ordinary moods we regard the object of knowledge as something very different from what this proposition sets forth. Whatever it may be, we regard it as that thing or thought without anything more—without that addition which we call the subject or the me. Heretofore our conception of the object was the conception of object sine alio; now it is the conception of object cum alio, i.e. mecum.
Further illustrated by the speculative, as distinguished from the ordinary mode of enumeration.4. The change which the condition of knowledge effects upon the object of knowledge may be further understood by considering how very different the speculative enumeration of ourselves and things as based on Proposition II., is from the way in which we usually but erroneously enumerate them. We are cognisant of ourselves and of a number of surrounding objects. We look upon ourselves as numerically different from each of these things, just as each of them is numerically different from its neighbours. That is our ordinary way of counting. The speculative computation is quite different. Each of the things is always that thing plus me. So that supposing the things to be represented by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and ourselves by the figure 5, while following the ordinary ciphering, we should count them and ourselves as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; we should, following the speculative ciphering, count them and ourselves as l+5, 2+5, 3+5, 4+5. And the result in each case equals me-in-union-with-the-thing, whatever it may be. Me-in-union-with-it—this synthesis is always the total datum or object which I know. This 5 (illustrative of the ego) is the standard factor in every reckoning, is always part of the object apprehended, and is the necessary condition of its apprehension. If we consider the things 1, 2, 3, 4, as forming one complexus in that case, it is still 1 + 5 = me-in-union-with-things.
Second counter-proposition.5. The second counter-proposition, embodying the inconsiderate result of ordinary thinking, and brightening, by contrast, the truth of Proposition II., may be laid down as follows: Second counter-proposition.—"The object of knowledge is not, or, at any rate, need not be anything more than what is usually regarded as the object. It may be the object without the mind's self, a thing (or a thought) sine me." The inadvertency of ordinary thinking here pointed out, and corrected by Proposition II., is, that it overlooks a part of the object of knowledge, and gives out a part as the whole; just as, in counter-proposition I., it overlooks the condition of knowledge, and entertains an obscure notion that knowledge might take place without this condition being complied with.
It is false, because Counter-proposition I. is false.6. This counter-proposition is grounded on a rock, if the first counter-proposition be true; but without this stay it has no support whatever. If it were possible for an intelligent being to apprehend anything without complying with the condition which declares that he must apprehend himself as well, it would, of course, be possible for him to know an object without knowing anything more—i.e., without knowing himself along with it. But the first counter-proposition is false, because it contradicts Proposition I., which is a necessary and axiomatic truth of reason; and, therefore, the second counter-proposition, which depends entirely upon the first counter-proposition, must likewise be set aside as false and contradictory. It is scarcely necessity to call attention to the circumstance, that the maintenance of the second counter-proposition is quite incompatible with the admission of Proposition I. Those who have conceded our starting-point cannot stand by the deliverance of ordinary thinking in regard to the object of knowledge, but must embrace the doctrine laid down in Proposition II.
7. The second counter-proposition is not only the expression of the ordinary notion of mankind in It expresses the ordinary notion, and also, generally, the psychological opinion as to the object of knowledge.general with regard to the object of knowledge; it is, moreover, the exponent of the popular psychological doctrine on this point. In the science of the human mind, subject and object are not contrasted as two things, both of which are known, and must be known together; they are not laid down as two things which, in their synthesis, constitute the only object which any intelligence can apprehend. They are contrasted simply as that which knows, and as that which is known—the former being the subject, and the latter the object. This is the second step in the procedure of our ordinary psychology. Just as, in its first position, it agrees with common thinking in overlooking the condition of all knowledge, and starts from the doctrine set forth in the first counter-proposition; so in its second position it also coincides with common opinion in overlooking a part of the object of knowledge, and in representing a mere part as the whole of that object. Here, again, however, its teaching is ambiguous. Our ordinary psychology does not expressly affirm that the object can be known without the subject or self being known; but by laying all its emphasis on the consideration, that in the constitution of knowledge the subject is the factor which knows, while the object is the factor which is known, it virtually teaches that doctrine. At any rate, our subsequent articles will make it plain that the psychology now in vogue virtually embraces the second counter-proposition, and denies by implication, if not directly, the truth of our second proposition, which declares, as a necessary truth of reason—as a conclusion which admits of no exception, and the reverse of which is nonsensical and contradictory—that the mind (i.e., every mind) can have no object of any kind, except an object bound up and apprehended along with itself.