Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 2/Proposition 7

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Theory of Ignorance, Proposition 7 (1875)
by James Frederick Ferrier
2384493Theory of Ignorance, Proposition 71875James Frederick Ferrier



PROPOSITION VII.


IGNORANCE OF THE EGO PER SE.


We cannot be ignorant of the ego per se; in other words, there can be no ignorance of the mind in a state of pure indetermination, or with no thing or thought present to it.


DEMONSTRATION.

There can be no ignorance of the ego or mind per se, because (by Prop. IX. Epistemology) there can be no knowledge of it; and because (by Prop. III. Agnoiology) there can be no ignorance of that of which there can be no knowledge.


OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

Design and effect of this proposition.1. This proposition, which is the obverse of the ninth of the epistemology, is designed to protect the reader, whom the latter proposition has saved from the contradiction involved in the supposition that there can be any knowledge of the ego per se from falling into the opposite contradiction of supposing that there can be any ignorance of it.

Seventh counter-proposition.2. Seventh Counter-proposition.—"We can be ignorant, and are ignorant, of the ego per se; in other words, there can be, and there is, an ignorance of the mind in a state of pure indetermination, or with no thing or thought present to it." This counter-proposition is sufficiently demolished by the antagonist proposition, and may be left to expire without further comment.

What the agnoiology does next.3. The present and preceding propositions (IV. V. VI. VII.) have fixed what there can not be an ignorance of: the next article settles what alone there can be an ignorance of.