Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 2/Proposition 6

by James Frederick Ferrier

PROPOSITION VI.

IGNORANCE OF THE UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.

We cannot be ignorant either of the universal element of cognition per se, or of the particular element of cognition per se.

DEMONSTRATION.

We cannot be ignorant of the universal element apart from the particular element, or of the particular element apart from the universal element of cognition, because (by Prop. VI. Epistemology) there can be no knowledge of the universal apart from the particular, or of the particular apart from the universal. But what there can be no knowledge of; there can be no ignorance of (Prop. III. Agnoiology). Therefore we cannot be ignorant of the universal element of cognition per se, or of the particular element of cognition per se.

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

1. Just as the preceding propositions (IV. and V.) are the obverse of the second and fourth of the Effect of this proposition.epistemology; so this proposition is the obverse of the sixth of the epistemology. It excludes from our ignorance the universal and the particular elements of cognition, when unaccompanied by each other—just as Proposition VI. of the epistemology excluded them from our knowledge.

Sixth counter-proposition.2. Sixth Counter-proposition.—"We can be ignorant of the universal element of cognition per se, and also of the particular element per se."

The error which it involves.3. Like Counter-proposition VI. of the epistemology, this counter-proposition makes no distinction between elements of cognition and kinds of cognition; or rather it mistakes elements for kinds, and hence it falls into a contradiction. If the particular and the universal were kinds of cognition, it would be quite possible for us to be ignorant of either without being ignorant of the other; because, in that case, it would be possible for either to be known without the other being known. But, since the particular and the universal are not kinds, but are mere elements of cognition, it is not possible for us to be ignorant of either without being ignorant of the other, because it is not possible for either to be known without the other being known.