Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Letter on some Objections to the Institutes
LETTER ON SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE
'INSTITUTES.'
1860.
The point at issue between Mr G. and me is this: He holds that the present self is never the object, or any part of the object, of our consciousness. I venture to hold the opposite opinion, and have given expression to it in my opening proposition, in which it is maintained that the self and the not-self are always apprehended simultaneously, although I admit that the self is usually no prominent or explicit portion of the cognition.
In Mr G.'s paper there is a certain ambiguity (as I daresay there are plenty on my side of the question), something at least about which I am in doubt, and which must be cleared up before any progress can be made in the discussion; in fact, before there can be either any disagreement or any agreement between us. I shall endeavour, at the outset, to explain what this ambiguity or inconsistency is.
In every case of cognition more is implied than is expressly known. For instance, when I look at a tree, all that I am expressly cognisant of is the tree. This at least is usually the whole—the whole that is explicit. But much more is implied. I am implied, seeing is implied, a retina is implied, a brain is implied. All these are implicated in the process. They are present and instrumental, but the tree alone is expressly known. So far, I think, Mr G. and I will agree; so far there is no ambiguity.
But a question here arises. Are these implicated elements not known at all, or are they only not known expressly? In other words, may not that which is not known expressly or explicitly be nevertheless known—known implicitly?
This is an important question. In reference to the present discussion it is all-important, and it must be answered unambiguously. For myself, I answer the question in the affirmative. I argue for implicit, as well as for explicit cognition. And I maintain that some of the elements above referred to, as implicated in my cognition of the tree, are known implicitly, and that others of them are not known at all. "I" and "seeing" are known implicitly in and along with my explicit knowledge of the tree; "retina" and "brain" are not known at all. And the ground of the distinction is this, that reflection enables me to recover and render explicit "me" and "seeing"—a circumstance which to my mind proves that these were already known implicitly, although overlooked at the time; whereas no power of reflection can reveal to me a retina or brain as having been concerned in the operation. To discover these I must have recourse to renewed observation and anatomy.
But what I am at a loss about is the answer which Mr G. gives to this important question. This is the article in regard to which I venture to think that he is ambiguous. From the general purport of the remarks in which he controverts my position, I would conclude that he is opposed to the doctrine of "implicit cognitions." But there are expressions in his note which seem to point to the opposite conclusion. He says that the ego "is understood in all propositions," understood, of course, by itself and to itself; that is to say, known implicitly and in the present time. And in his last sentence he says," In practice men lose sight of it (the ego) because of its universality; but these forgotten but distinct elements are the very matters which the analysing philosopher should take the most pains to bring clearly into view." On this I would remark that it is not possible for the analysing philosopher to bring clearly into view any element of consciousness which was not known obscurely beforehand. Reflection is his only instrument; and reflection cannot originate knowledge: it can only make us know clearly and explicitly what we already know confusedly and implicitly.
The result is, that I am in doubt as to the ground occupied by Mr G. in reference to implicit cognitions. Does ha deny them altogether? Must all cognition be either express or null? In that case, he will find it very difficult, or rather impossible, to explain how a reflective analysis can go to work upon its materials, these being, on this supposition, the absolutely unknown. On the other hand, does he admit implicit cognition? In that case, I think that there cannot be any very great difference between us; and that, with a little explanatory coaxing, he might be brought round to my side of the question: for if a man admits any implicit cognitions, or, I should rather say, implicit elements of cognition, he may surely accept the ego as among the number. But until I know whether, and to what extent, Mr G. accepts or rejects the doctrine of implied cognitions, I do not see how he and I can properly join issue, either in the way of agreement or disagreement. So much in reference to the ambiguity of which I complain.
For the reason given I shall not go much into argument on the point more particularly in dispute. Let me just say that Mr G.'s doctrine, that we have no cognisance of our present, but only of our past self, is, in my opinion, untenable, for these among other reasons:—
First, I cannot have any cognisance of my past self without distinguishing myself as past from myself as present. But I cannot make this distinction without being cognisant of my present self. Therefore, in being cognisant of my past self, I must always be cognisant (implicitly it may be) of my present self. Secondly, would the words "I am" have any meaning, except in reference to a self cognised in the present ? Thirdly, it would not be possible for a man to be cognisant of his past self unless he had been cognisant of his present self. What a man remembers is, that certain sensations were his, that certain events befell him; that is, he remembers both himself and those events, and the connection between him and them. If he had not been cognisant of himself in the present (which is now past) he either would remember only the events, and their having happened to nobody, at least not to him (which is absurd), or he would not have remembered them at all, which is the more probable alternative. But he does remember them; and he remembers, moreover, that they happened to him, which seems to me to prove that he was cognisant (however inexplicitly) of himself at the time. But I have exhausted my paper, and I daresay your patience, so I shall say no more at present, except that I cannot think that Mr G.'s position is not blasted, or that mine is shaken, by anything that has been as yet advanced. Perhaps he thinks that a contradiction is involved in supposing that the cognoscens can be in the same instant the cognition. But that is precisely the idea and definition of the ego, that it is at once its own subject and its own object—not, however, without a contrasting element, the non-ego.
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