Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 2/Proposition 2
PROPOSITION II.
IGNORANCE REMEDIABLE.
All ignorance is possibly remediable.
DEMONSTRATION.
No kind of knowledge is absolutely inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence. But unless all ignorance were possibly remediable, some kind of knowledge would be inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence, to wit the knowledge by which the ignorance in question might be remedied. Therefore all ignorance is possibly remediable.
Or again, All defects are possibly remediable, otherwise they would not be defects. But ignorance is a defect (Prop. I.) Therefore all ignorance is possibly remediable.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
All that this proposition proves.1. This proposition does not prove that all ignorance is actually remedied: in other words, that omniscience pervades the universe; but only that every form of ignorance is of such a character that it may possibly be removed; and that if certain kinds of ignorance are incident to certain orders of the intelligence, they are not, of necessity, incident to other orders of intelligence. The subsequent movements of the system do not require that more than this should be proved. Neither does this proposition prove that all human ignorance is possibly remediable. It only proves that what man or any other intelligence may happen to be ignorant of, need not, of necessity, be unknown to all other intelligences (supposing that other intelligences exist). In other words, it merely proves that whatever any intelligence is ignorant of, may nevertheless be known—known actually if an intelligence exists competent to know it,—and known potentially even although no such intelligence should exist. Unless this were true, all ignorance would not be possibly remediable; and if all ignorance were not possibly remediable, some kind of knowledge would be inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence—in which case, ignorance would be no defect, because a defect is always the privation of some quality or attribute which is consistent with the nature of the being who is deprived of it.
Second counter proposition.2. Second Counter-proposition.—In this case, too, the counter-proposition is wanting; but its place is thus marked for the reason already assigned.