Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 3/Proposition 7

by James Frederick Ferrier

PROPOSITION VII.

WHAT ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE IS NOT.

Absolute existence is not the particular by itself nor is it the universal by itself; in other words, particular things prescinded from the universal have no absolute existence, nor have universal things prescinded from the particular any absolute existence.

DEMONSTRATION.

There can be no knowledge of the particular by itself (Prop. VI. Epistemology). There can be no ignorance of the particular by itself (Prop. VI. Agnoiology). But absolute existence is that of which there is either a knowledge or an ignorance (Prop. V. Ontology). Therefore absolute existence is not the particular by itself. Again, there can be no knowledge of the universal by itself (Prop. VI. Epistemology). There can be no ignorance of the universal by itself (Prop. VI. Agnoiology). But absolute existence is that of which there is either a knowledge or an ignorance (Prop. V. Ontology). Therefore absolute existence is not the universal by itself. And thus particular things prescinded from the universal have no absolute existence, nor have universal things prescinded from the particular any absolute existence.

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

Seventh counter-proposition.1. Seventh Counter-proposition.—"Particular things by themselves, or prescinded from the universal, have, or may have, an absolute existence—although it is absurd to suppose that universal things prescinded from the particular have any existence, or at least any existence out of the mind which fabricates them." This counter-proposition carries out into ontology the sixth counter-proposition of the epistemology. Both of them are false, and are subverted by their corresponding propositions.