Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Lectures on Greek Philosophy (1888)/The Successors of Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus
THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,
ZENO AND EPICURUS.
1. After the deaths of Plato and Aristotle, of Zeno and Epicurus, the schools founded by these philosophers continued to be known as the Academic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean. These schools, of which the Academic and the Peripatetic preceded the other two by some forty or fifty years, existed in a state of greater or of less animation until the very close of the Greek philosophy. But the period when they principally flourished was in the interval between their birth, say, in round numbers, about 300 years B.C. or somewhat earlier, and the rise of the Alexandrian or Neoplatonic philosophy about 200 years after Christ, an interval of about 500 years. During this protracted period, philosophy, although illustrated by some eminent writers, exhibited no very great accession of originality, and put forth few evidences of power. Athens continued to be the headquarters of the schools I have enumerated. But, by degrees, a more general diffusion of philosophical opinions took place. About the year 146 B.C., Greece was reduced to the condition of a Roman province. And then the arms of Rome, we may say, began to be interchanged for the arts of Athens. Philosophy now migrated for the first time to the Eternal City.
2. Panætius, who was born at Rhodes, was the philosopher who indoctrinated the Romans with the principles of Stoicism. At this time (that is, about 145 or 150 B.C.) the Republic was in its most flourishing condition. It was the era of the third Punic war. The arms of Rome were everywhere victorious; and the rudeness of her primitive manners had begun to be tempered by more polished tastes. Literature had sprung up in the poetry of Ennius and Lucilius, and in the plays of Plautus and Terence, the latter of whom was but recently dead. Scipio Africanus the younger, the conqueror of Carthage, and Lælius, whom Cicero has immortalised in his treatise 'De Senectute,' were warm patrons of philosophy and all liberal accomplishments. Under the auspices of these illustrious men, with whom he lived on terms of intimate friendship, Panætius introduced Stoicism to the Romans. This happened, as I said, about 145 B.C. The antiphilosophical party, with Cato at their head, protested in vain against the importation of Greek philosophy. Fostered by the great names of Scipio and Lælius, the doctrines of Panætius took root and flourished. His Stoicism was of a modified and moderate character. He avoided the extreme opinions of the early Stoics. He softened their severity and harshness; he abjured their "insensibility and apathy" (Aulus Gellius, 12, 5), and skilfully incorporated with their doctrines many of the opinions of Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus. In opposition to the credulity of most of his sect, he scouted the predictions of astrologers, and exercised in everything a sound judgment, no less than an eloquence, which fitted him to recommend the doctrines he professed to so practical a people as the Romans. This philosophy was, in itself, peculiarly adapted to their genius, whether in their greatness or in their decline. In the palmy days of the Republic, it animated them with the fortitude of power; in the tragic gloom and sinking fortunes of the Empire, it upheld them with the fortitude of despair. It is with the spring-time of Roman Stoicism that the name of Panætius is associated. None of his writings have come down to us; but how highly they were esteemed in their day is proved by the fact that so great a writer as Cicero thought it not beneath him to copy his own treatise, 'De Officiis,' from one of the works of Panætius. Panætius died at Athens about 112 B.C.
3. Cicero, as indicated in the last sentence, was an admirer and expounder of the doctrines of the Stoics. He was, at the same time, an adherent of the Academical philosophy, a philosophy which inculcated the necessity of great caution, not to say scepticism, in the deliverance of scientific judgments. The fame of Cicero as an orator and statesman has overshadowed his reputation as a philosopher. In philosophy, indeed, he has no pretensions to originality: he was rather an amateur than one of the regular and professional fraternity. Yet his philosophical writings are able and eloquent digests of the opinions of preceding philosophers, and are well worthy of our study. His dialogues, 'De Amicitia' and 'De Senectute,' have a deep ethical interest, and have besides "a fine mellow tone of colouring, which sets them, perhaps, above all his other works in point of originality and beauty." Cicero was born 106 B.C., and died, or rather was murdered, 43 B.C., during the troubled times of the triumvirate between Augustus, Antony, and Lepidus. In regard to the Epicurean philosophy, its tenets were adopted and its praises sounded by the Roman poet Lucretius (b. 95 B.C., d. 51 B.C.) And no doubt many of the luxurious Romans adopted the creed of Epicurus.
4. At a somewhat later period Stoicism was upheld at Rome by the example and writings of Seneca, one of the most distinguished adherents of whom this sect can boast. Seneca was a person of some importance as the tutor of Nero, and his history is connected with the dark reign of that hideous tyrant. He was falsely charged with being privy to the conspiracy of Piso, and the emperor's commands were conveyed to him, signifying that he must prepare for death. He heard his doom unmoved, and his bearing showed that he could practise, as well as preach, the principles of an exalted Stoicism. His veins were opened, and he expired in a warm bath, endeavouring, as his life ebbed away, to assuage by his exhortations the sorrow of his surrounding friends, and to confirm their virtue by his example. He died A.D. 65.—(Tacit. Annal., xv. 62.)
5. In regard to the character of Seneca opinions have been divided. By some he has been represented as vain and avaricious, as a time-server and a hypocrite. It is truer, as well as more charitable, to suppose that his faults were incident to his situation rather than indigenous to himself; that in circumstances the most inimical to virtue he preserved his virtue, if not spotless, still tolerably entire; and that, true to the principles of his philosophy, he succeeded in making the best of a very bad position. Stoicism, as expounded by Seneca, and as practised by him and other noble Romans, was the one redeeming feature in this, the worst of times. It inculcated a reliance on the wisdom, and an acquiescence in the decrees, of Providence; and at a time when the lives, the liberties, and the possessions of men were in the highest degree unstable and precarious, when the whole Roman Empire was broken-hearted and in despair, it taught that to overcome the fear of death was to stand superior to every earthly calamity; and that to be conscious of an inner and spiritual freedom as the true life of the soul, and as a possession which the power of the imperial tyrant and his minions could never reach, was to enjoy a peace which the world could neither give nor take away. Such is the purport of the philosophy which Seneca enforces, often with eloquence and solemnity, although his style is generally deficient in natural grace, and somewhat too antithetical. The work in modern times which most closely resembles the writings of Seneca, both in thought and in expression, is Young's 'Night Thoughts.'
6. Having made these slight observations on the influence of Epicurism and Stoicism among the Romans, I must now say a few words in regard to the followers of Plato and Aristotle, the frequenters of the Academy and the Lyceum. Of Plato's immediate successors, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, I have already spoken. These, with their master, may be reckoned as constituting what is called the old Academy. They were succeeded by what is called the second or middle Academy, the founder of which was Arcesilaus, who lived from about 318 to 250 B.C. The Academy was again renovated by Carneades, who lived from about 213 to 129 B.C. So that the philosophical school called the Academy comes before us under three modifications. First, the old Academy; secondly, the middle Academy; and, thirdly, the new Academy. In regard to their differences of doctrine, it may be sufficient to remark, that the second Academy was more sceptical than the first, and that the third seems to have been more sceptical than the second. Of the Peripatetics or disciples of Aristotle I shall merely signalise his immediate successor, Theophrastus, who ably expounded the opinions of his master. Some of his writings have come down to us, but they relate principally to physics. Among them, however, is a small work of more general interest, entitled 'Ethical Characters.' It contains many vivid but coarsely-painted portraits, and presents curious illustrations of the manners of the time.
7. Contemporary with these four sects there was a fifth, of which some mention must now be made. This was the Sceptical school of philosophy. The founder of this sect was Pyrrho, a native of Elis in the Peloponnesus. When he was born is uncertain, but as he is said to have accompanied the expedition of Alexander the Great into India, it is probable that his birth took place near the middle of the fourth century B.C., and that he flourished about 300 B.C. Pyrrho, as the founder of the Sceptics, was thus contemporary, or nearly so, with Zeno and Epicurus, and but little later than the early Academics and Peripatetics. We may regard the five schools as existing simultaneously.
8. Pyrrho left no writings behind him, at least none that have come down to our times. Indeed, if we except a few incidental notices which occur in the writings of Cicero, the only record of the Sceptical opinions which we possess is the work of Sextus Empiricus, a physician who lived in the first half of the third century of the Christian era, that is to say, several centuries after Pyrrho and his followers. Sextus, however, must have had access to sufficient sources of information, for his compilation is ample, and appears to give a faithful and authentic expression to the opinions which it registers. It is an immense repository of doubts. Part of the work is entitled 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism, or Sceptical Commentaries.' The other part is entitled 'Disputations against the Mathematicians.' It is an attack on all positive or dogmatic philosophy. Sextus was himself an advocate of the opinions which he recorded.
9. The principle on which the Pyrrhonic Scepticism, as expounded by Sextus, is founded, is the relativity of all knowledge, feeling, and sensation, the relativity of all truth, sensible, moral, and intellectual. Scepticism is in fact merely a more fully developed, more systematic, and more thoroughgoing Sophistic. Substantially the Sceptics added but little to the maxim which expresses the relativity of all human cognition, that man is the measure of the universe; but they carried out this maxim into a multiplicity of directions and details, and enforced it with abundant and superabundant illustrations. They dwelt more than the Sophists had done on the uncertainty and utter ignorance as to objective and independent truth under which we labour, in consequence of the relative character of all our sensible, intellectual, and moral impressions. It was rather to magnify the power and supremacy of man that the Sophists, or some of them at least, represented him as the measure of the universe; it was rather to convict him of an ignorance altogether irremediable, and to prove that he was utterly incompetent to attain to any degree of objective certainty and truth, that the Sceptics represented him in the same light.
10. Stated plainly, the question which Pyrrho, or we may say the Sceptic generally, raises is this: Are our faculties competent to give us any certain information as to what anything is in itself, and out of its relation to us? And the answer is, that our faculties are not competent. They can only declare what a thing is in relation to themselves. And further, our faculties do so alter and modify things in conformity with their own structure, that it is impossible for us to know them as they are in themselves. Hence real and objective truth is placed altogether beyond our reach. We can be certain of the phenomenon, we can be certain that the appearance is as it appears, but we can have no certainty as to the νοούμενον or transcendental something which lies at the back of the phenomenon. We cannot know what this is in itself. For instance, when I look at a laurel leaf, I am certain that I see what I see,—viz., a smooth and shining surface. No Sceptic ever doubted that. I certainly see a smooth and shining surface, but is this leaf in itself a smooth and shining surface? Most probably it is not, indeed we may say with certainty it is not; because, alter the structure of my eyes, or place the leaf under a powerful magnifier, and it will become rough and dull. Is it then rough and dull in itself? Not one whit more than it was smooth and shining. Its dullness and roughness are just as phenomenal as its shining and smoothness, because to a differently constituted eye it would present an appearance quite different from either of the other two. And this new appearance would, of course, not bring us one whit nearer to what the leaf was in itself. All that sentient beings can be certain of, is the appearance which the leaf presents to them: in short, all that we can be certain of is, what it is in relation to us, not what it is in itself; that is to say, not what it is verily and in truth.
11. The Sceptics may be supposed to put their case in this way: Nothing is hot in itself, because, what one being regards as hot, another being regards, or may regard, as cold. Nothing is cold in itself, because, what one being regards as cold, another regards, or may regard, as hot. Nothing is green or blue in itself, because, to a retina of a different degree of susceptibility, the green would not be green, but some other colour; and the blue would not be blue, but some other colour. Again, nothing is large in itself, because, what a small being thinks large, a being of much greater dimensions would regard as small. Nor is anything small in itself, because, what a large being thinks small, will appear large to a very diminutive creature. These may be accepted as illustrations of the manner in which the Sceptics deprived the qualities of things of all objective reality, and made them merely relative, or dependent on the different sentient or intellectual structures of the beings to whom they were presented. What the reality of things was in itself, and out of relation to sentient observers, or whether there was any such in-dependent reality at all, the Sceptic held that all men were for ever debarred from knowing, or from even remotely conjecturing. I may just remind you parenthetically, and in passing, that the division of the qualities of matter into primary and secondary, was devised chiefly as a means of overruling the conclusions of the Sceptics. It was thought that the primary qualities, extension, figure, and solidity, were objective, and belonged to things themselves; while the secondary, such as colour, heat, cold, sound, and so forth, were mere subjective sensations. Opinions, however, have differed as to the value and importance of this distinction. It may be doubted whether it has accomplished the purpose which it had in view.
12. The arguments by which Pyrrho, as expounded by Sextus, enforced the conclusions of Scepticism, were called τρόποι, a word sometimes translated tropes, although that term is more frequently employed to express a figure of speech. Of these tropes or Sceptical arguments Sextus enumerates ten as belonging to the earlier Sceptics, of whom Pyrrho was the chief, and five as belonging to the later Sceptics, fifteen in all. Of the ten tropoi of Pyrrho, I may cite two or three specimens. The first is, that the tribes of living creatures, including man, are so various, and are organised so differently, that they must and do derive very different impressions from the same objects, that no one of these impressions has a better title than any other to be regarded as representing the real nature of the object, and that, therefore, we must remain for ever in ignorance of what the object in itself is. A second argument is, that, putting other creatures aside, the senses and intelligences even of human beings are found to differ widely, and therefore, inasmuch as the reports of all of them cannot be true in reference to the same objects, and further, inasmuch as no one man has a better title than any other to set himself up as the standard of what is true, the conclusion is that objective reality is beyond our grasp. A third argument is, that our senses are not consistent with themselves, for one sense will relish what another sense dislikes, and conversely. Hence we cannot say whether the thing is agreeable or disagreeable in itself, (This argument seems a poor one.) A fourth argument is, that things affect us differently, according as we are in health or out of health. To a man suffering from jaundice, all things taste bitter. They are not bitter, however, in themselves; he makes them bitter. For the tenth tropos the same sort of argument is applied to morals. Morality is entirely conventional and acquired. Different nations differ widely in their estimate of moral distinctions. Hence these distinctions are altogether relative. We can form no conception of anything as good or as bad in itself, but only a conception of it as good or as bad in relation to ourselves. These specimens may be sufficient as examples of the Sceptical line of argumentation. Some of them, it may be owned, are rather frivolous, and on that account, as well as from the consideration that they are all reducible as I have said, to the principle of relativity, it is not necessary to make any further mention of the τρόποι, either of the earlier or of the later Sceptics.
13. The Sceptical conclusions may be summed up thus: first, There is no possibility of knowledge, in the strict sense of the word, because we can never know things as they are in themselves, but only as they are coloured and modified by our faculties of cognition, that is, we cannot know them as they are, but only as they are not; secondly, There is no standard or criterion of truth, because the senses and understanding of different beings differ widely, and no one of them has a better title than any other to set itself up as the criterion of the truth; thirdly, There is no stability in definitions, because a definition of a thing which may recommend itself to one intelligence will not recommend itself to a differently constituted intelligence; fourthly, The object of thought or cognition is different from the thought or cognition of which it is the object; the thought or cognition is that alone of which we can be certain; we can have no certainty in regard to the object, for here there is a wide interval between the objective and the subjective; fifthly, There is no standard of morality, because this will shift with the varying tastes and sensibilities of individuals or of nations.
14. You may ask for what end or purpose these arguments leading to these conclusions have been set on foot? The answer is, that these arguments are designed to bring us into a condition of indisturbance or quietude of mind, ἀταραξία. Seeing the fact established by good reasons, that nothing is to be known, that certainty is unattainable, we shall be disposed to settle down in placid contentment with a lot from which there is no escape, and an ill for which there is no remedy. Perceiving our ignorance to be inevitable, we shall live in a state of ἀταραξία, or mental indisturbance; and of μετριοπάθεια, or moderation of the desires. That, say the Sceptics, is the good end which is brought about by our Sceptical exercitations.
15. In this paragraph I shall merely enumerate the names of the schools which flourished between the death of Aristotle and the rise of the Neoplatonic or Alexandrian philosophy. These schools were the Academic, founded by Plato; the Peripatetic, founded by Aristotle; the Stoic, founded by Zeno; the Epicurean, founded by Epicurus; and the Sceptical, founded by Pyrrho. These schools continued to exist until the very close of the Greek philosophy in 529 A.D.; but their independence was probably merged or eclipsed in the vast and mystical splendour of the Alexandrian philosophy, of which I now propose to give you some account.