Potential Links Between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Origin of the COVID-19 Pandemic/Coronavirus Research
(U) CORONAVIRUS RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES PERFORMED AT THE WIV
Prior to the pandemic, we assess WIV scientists conducted extensive research on coronaviruses, which included animal sampling and genetic analysis. We continue to have no indication that the WIV’s pre-pandemic research holdings included SARS- CoV-2 or a close progenitor, nor any direct evidence that a specific research-related incident occurred involving WIV personnel before the pandemic that could have caused the COVID pandemic.
(U) WIV Coronavirus Research and Holdings
The WIV probably maintains one of the world’s largest repositories of bat samples, which has enabled its coronavirus research and related public health support. Information available to the IC indicates that the WIV first possessed SARS-CoV-2 in late December 2019, when WIV researchers isolated and identified the virus from samples from patients diagnosed with pneumonia of unknown causes.
- In 2013, the WIV collected animal samples from which they identified the bat coronavirus RaTG13, which is 96.2 percent similar to the COVID-19 virus. By 2018, the WIV had sequenced almost all of RaTG13, which is the second closest known whole genome match to SARS-CoV-2, after BANAL-52, which is 96.8 percent similar. Neither of these viruses is close enough to SARS-CoV-2 to be a direct progenitor.
- Since 2019, some WIV researchers analyzed pangolin samples to better understand disease outbreaks in these animals.
- By the end of 2019, the WIV maintained distinct teams focused on MERS and SARS-related coronaviruses. Both teams separately used transgenic mouse models to better understand how the viruses infect humans as well as related vaccine and therapeutics research. The WIV then shifted to support broader public-health efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.
(U) WIV Genetic Engineering Capabilities
We assess that some scientists at the WIV have genetically engineered coronaviruses using common laboratory practices. The IC has no information, however, indicating that any WIV genetic engineering work has involved SARS-CoV-2, a close progenitor, or a backbone virus that is closely-related enough to have been the source of the pandemic.
- Scientists at the WIV have created chimeras, or combinations, of SARS-like coronaviruses through genetic engineering, attempted to clone other unrelated infectious viruses, and used reverse genetic cloning techniques on SARS-like coronaviruses.
- Some of the WIV’s genetic engineering projects on coronaviruses involved techniques that could make it difficult to detect intentional changes. A 2017 dissertation by a WIV student showed that reverse genetic cloning techniques—which are standard techniques used in advanced molecular laboratories—left no traces of genetic modification of SARS-like coronaviruses.
(U) Biosafety Concerns at the WIV
Some WIV researchers probably did not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time prior to the pandemic in handling SARS-like coronaviruses, increasing the risk of accidental exposure to viruses. Before the pandemic, the WIV had been working to improve at least some biosafety conditions and training. We do not know of a specific biosafety incident at the WIV that spurred the pandemic and the WIV’s biosafety training appears routine, rather than an emergency response by China’s leadership.
- (U Nearly a year after the accreditation of the WIV’s BSL-4 laboratory in 2017, China’s decisions of which pathogens required higher biocontainment protocols remained opaque, while the facility had a shortage of appropriately trained personnel.
- In mid-2019, WIV officials were evaluating and implementing biosafety improvements, training, and procurements in the context of a growing body of broader biosecurity PRC legislation. In November 2019, the WIV, in cooperation with other CAS entities, hosted a biosafety training course for WIV and non-WIV personnel that included speakers from the China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Given the timing of the event, this training appears routine, rather than a response to a specific incident.
- As of January 2019, WIV researchers performed SARS-like coronavirus experiments in BSL-2 laboratories, despite acknowledgements going back to 2017 of these virus’ ability to directly infect humans through their spike protein and early 2019 warnings of the danger of this practice. Separately, the WIV’s plan to conduct analysis of potential epidemic viruses from pangolin samples in fall 2019, suggests the researchers sought to isolate live viruses.
- An inspection of the WIV’s high-containment laboratories in 2020—only months after the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak’s emergence—identified a need to update aging equipment, a need for additional disinfectant equipment, and improvements to ventilation systems. As this inspection occurred in the midst of the WIV’s crisis response to the COVID-19 outbreak, these findings are not necessarily indicative of WIV’s biosafety status prior to the outbreak.