Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone (S/1997/80)

by United Nations

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the letter dated 17 December 1996 (S/1996/1050) by which the President of the Security Council expressed the support of the Council for the proposal of my predecessor to send an assessment team to Sierra Leone in order to develop recommendations on ways in which the United Nations could assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996 (S/1996/1034, annex).

2. The Assessment Team, working under the guidance and overall authority of my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, was led by Brigadier-General Yogesh K. Saksena, Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). It arrived in Sierra Leone on 22 December 1996 and returned to New York on 6 January 1997. During its stay in the area, the team met officials of the Government of Sierra Leone, both in Freetown and in the northern and eastern provinces, as well as with representatives of United Nations agencies, members of the diplomatic community and non-governmental organizations. The team was received by President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 27 December 1996. On 2 January, my Special Envoy and General Saksena travelled to Abidjan, where they met the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Amara Essy. On 3 January, they met the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh.

3. The present report reflects the findings of the Assessment Team and its recommendations regarding the assistance the United Nations could extend to the parties in implementing the Abidjan Accord.

II. The Implementation of the Abidjan Accord

4. Several encouraging developments have occurred during the past year in Sierra Leone. The holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in February and March 1996 resulted in the inauguration of a new Government on 29 March. While these elections and their results were not accepted by the RUF, on 25 March, representatives of the outgoing Government and the RUF entered into a ceasefire agreement. They also agreed that negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict should take place between the new Government and the RUF. Such negotiations began in earnest shortly thereafter, with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth acting as facilitators. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Abidjan Accord on 30 November, marking the end of five years of civil war.

5. The Abidjan Accord addressed the roots of the conflict by providing a framework to further the process of democratization and equitable social and economic development in Sierra Leone. Under the Accord, the parties declared an immediate end to the armed conflict and reaffirmed their commitment to observing the ceasefire and to undertaking every effort to ensure the full implementation of its provisions.

6. The political provisions of the Accord stipulate inter alia, that immediately following the signing of the Accord, the RUF will commence to function as a political movement and that the necessary conditions will be created to enable it to register as a political party. They also include the provision of amnesty for members of the RUF and the release of any prisoners of war. The Accord provides measures to encourage the consolidation of a fair and representative political process, including the holding of Citizens Consultative Conferences and the reconstitution of the National Elections Commission. In addition, it addresses the necessity to ensure respect for human rights; the promotion of a professional code of ethics and eradication of all forms of nepotism and corruption; as well as strengthening of the judiciary and vetting of the national police.

7. The military provisions of the Accord call for the disarmament and demobilization of RUF combatants; the downsizing and restructuring of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); the withdrawal of the private security firm, Executive Outcomes; and steps to bring about the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country in a manner consistent with existing treaty obligations.

8. In accordance with the Abidjan Accord, the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) held its first session at Freetown on 19 December 1996. The Commission, which is comprised of four representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone and four representatives of the RUF, is to act as a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions of the Agreement. In accordance with the Agreement, the Commission is to establish a Joint Monitoring Group and a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee, composed of representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, to monitor the withdrawal of forces and the disarmament of combatants and to coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of the RUF combatants, respectively.

9. The Assessment Team reviewed with their interlocutors the type of assistance that the United Nations, in cooperation with OAU and the Commonwealth, could provide to facilitate the implementation of the Abidjan Accord. The team emphasized that it would be imperative for the parties to abide by a strict timetable in implementing the Peace Agreement, noting that its political provisions must be carried out hand in hand with its military provisions, so as to create the confidence necessary to proceed with the peace process. In this connection, the Team provided to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, for its consideration, a draft timetable for the implementation of the Accord (see annex I).

10. The Abidjan Accord stipulated that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth would act as moral guarantors that its provisions are implemented by the parties with integrity and good faith. Following the signing of the Peace Agreement, the President of Sierra Leone and the leader of the RUF wrote to the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth requesting their assistance in the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

11. On 2 January 1997, I wrote to the Secretaries-General of OAU and the Commonwealth to inform them that in response to the request of the parties to the United Nations, I had dispatched an Assessment Team to Sierra Leone. I also informed them that I would share with them the findings of the Assessment Team, with a view to developing a concerted programme of action by the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth. I invited them, in the meantime, to share with the United Nations their views on how they saw the role of their respective organizations in support of the peace process in Sierra Leone.

12. In this connection, I met with the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, on 16 January. Mr. Salim expressed the view that the international community should proceed quickly in assisting the parties to implement the Abidjan Accord and that the United Nations should take the lead role in that regard. He felt that assistance from OAU for the peace process should be coordinated by the United Nations.

13. In a letter dated 10 January 1997, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, informed me that in response to the request from the parties, he had written to the eight members of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration to ascertain their interest in providing personnel to assist in the implementation of the Accord under the auspices of the United Nations. A number of Commonwealth countries had indicated that any decision in that regard would be taken in light of the type of assistance to be provided by the United Nations for the implementation of the Accord.

14. In a meeting on 27 December, the President of Sierra Leone assured my Special Envoy and the Assessment Team of the full commitment of his Government to ensuring the timely implementation of the Abidjan Accord and to providing its full cooperation to the United Nations in that regard. He reaffirmed this commitment in a letter to me dated 16 January 1997.

15. On 3 January, my Special Envoy and members of the Assessment Team met Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF. Corporal Sankoh assured the team that he was committed to the peace process and welcomed the support of the United Nations, in cooperation with OAU and the Commonwealth, in the implementation of the Abidjan Accord. He stated, however, that he could not discuss those issues in detail in the presence of my Special Envoy, whose neutrality he questioned. Despite the best efforts of my Special Envoy and the Assessment Team, and the intervention of the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire, Corporal Sankoh could not be persuaded to discuss the implementation of the Agreement before the Team's departure from Abidjan.

16. In a letter addressed to me dated 13 January, Corporal Sankoh indicated that he wished to discuss the modalities for the implementation of the Abidjan Accord, including the deployment of neutral international observers, with its moral guarantors. He also requested that the international community assist not only in the implementation of the military provisions of the Accord, but also in its political provisions, including in the transformation of the RUF into a political party. Corporal Sankoh felt, however, that there was no need for a traditional peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, as long as other military groups were demilitarized before the RUF started to disarm and demobilize. He thus appeared to question the sequence of implementation for some of the provisions of the Accord. However, in a second letter to me dated 17 January, Corporal Sankoh confirmed his willingness to receive neutral international monitors, as provided for in the Accord, and to cooperate fully with them in their work.

III. Present Security Situation in Sierra Leone

17. Over the past five years, the strength of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) grew from a total of about 3,000 to approximately 13,000, all ranks. Many of the troops recruited in recent years did not have the advantage of formal military training. As a result, some elements in the army have not always shown the necessary discipline. During the last period of the conflict, the former Government engaged a private security firm, Executive Outcomes, to train its security forces and assist its efforts against the RUF. This firm was maintained by the new Government. In addition, in the months before the signing of the Abidjan Accord, village-based hunters, known as Kamajors, were organized by paramount chiefs to protect their villages, mostly against looting from both the RUF and undisciplined RSLMF elements. The Government estimates both the number of Kamajors, who are armed mainly with light weapons, to be approximately 2,500. Reports have been received, however, that Kamajors are still being recruited; their actual number could, therefore, be somewhat higher than the Government's current estimates.

18. While precise figures on the size of the RUF are not available, its strength is estimated at approximately 5,000 armed and 5,000 non-armed combatants. The RUF forces are concentrated mainly in the eastern and central parts of the country around Mekeni, Bo and Kenema, as well as at Kailahun and Bradford (see annex III). During the course of the conflict, the RUF employed small arms, light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, which were reportedly pooled and distributed to combatants only during times of actual fighting.

19. With the signing of the Abidjan Accord on 30 November 1996, both the RSLMF and the RUF have been ordered to refrain from hostile action, remain confined to their current locations and dismantle roadblocks. The Kamajors have also been requested to refrain from hostile action against the RUF. While the ceasefire has generally held, the overall security situation in Sierra Leone remains somewhat tenuous. Since 30 November, there have been some clashes between the various forces, as armed elements have left their bases in search of food and medicine. National police are deployed at the district level to provide security, but their effectiveness is severely hampered by manpower and logistic constraints.

20. The main security concern at present involves the situation at Kailahun, a district largely controlled by the RUF, which has become somewhat tense, as displaced persons, supported by Kamajors, have insisted upon returning to their homes to harvest their crops. The Government and the RUF have made efforts to defuse the tensions in Kailahun and other areas by seeking ways to provide food to combatants and displaced persons. Nevertheless, recent reports indicate that the Kamajors have overrun Kailahun town and pushed RUF elements toward Koindu. According to these reports, the Government has deployed RSLMF troops to protect the town, pending the encampment and disarmament of RUF elements in the area.

21. The Abidjan Accord foresees not only the disarmament and demobilization of RUF, but the downsizing of the RSLMF and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. As the peace process unfolds, and as demobilized RUF and RSLMF elements, as well as displaced persons and refugees, begin to resettle into their home communities, the security situation in the country will continue to be a matter of concern. In order to defuse tensions, efforts will have to be made to address continued feelings of hostility between former adversaries, as well as among civilians who suffered human rights abuses during the conflict. It will also be imperative that resettlement assistance for all groups is in place, so that those with no secure means of livelihood are given the opportunity to find employment and are not enticed into banditry.

22. Prior to the signing of the Abidjan Accord, the Government established a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme Unit within the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (MNRRR). This Unit is responsible for preparing and implementing a demobilization and resettlement plan for RUF combatants. The MNRRR disarmament and demobilization plan recommends the establishment and management by non-governmental organizations, with the assistance of United Nations agencies, of four assembly sites at Bo, Kenema, Mekeni and Mile 38. The plan envisions that RUF combatants would be disarmed by a local security force, under the observation and monitoring of neutral international observers, and then encamped, pending either their return to civilian life, their integration into the RSLMF and other government services, or the provision of training and other assistance to help them resettle.

23. While this plan has been fully agreed with the concerned United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, which would assist in its implementation, it has not yet been discussed with the RUF. It is expected that once the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace is established, the plan will be finalized. Nevertheless, neither the provision of security for the sites, nor the mechanism for disarming RUF combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life, have yet been satisfactorily addressed.

24. In this connection, the Government informed the Assessment Team that, in its view, the handing over of weapons to either the RSLMF or the Kamajors would not be acceptable to the RUF, nor would it be acceptable to the RUF if either of these forces were charged with the provision of security for assembly sites. The Government had therefore considered the possibility of using the Special Security Division (SSD) of the national police to carry out these responsibilities. The Government informed the Assessment Team, however, that it did not have the logistic or financial resources necessary for SSD to carry out this task. Furthermore, SSD did not have the manpower to take it on without redeploying units rom their present security duties, thus diminishing its capacity to fulfill its day-to-day law enforcement responsibilities. Finally, the Government was not sure that SSD, which had been involved in the conflict, would be acceptable to the RUF.

25. The full and timely implementation of the disarmament and demobilization plan is dependent not only on the necessary decisions being taken by the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee of CCP, but also on the provision of voluntary funding by donor Governments for the establishment and management of assembly sites and on finding a satisfactory solution with regard to the provision of security at the sites. To date, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has provided $1.5 million for disarmament and demobilization, which will cover the establishment and operation of three sites for a period of three months. These funds are projected to cover the cost of demobilizing 3,000 combatants. They do not, however, cover the costs of providing security at the sites.

26. It will be recalled that in their letters of 30 November and 9 December 1996 to my predecessor (S/1996/1049, annexes I and II), the parties requested the United Nations to provide neutral international observers to monitor the peace process. The Assessment Team determined, however, that a capable security presence would also be required to deter undisciplined elements from impeding the peace process. Such a presence would help to provide the confidence necessary for the RUF to leave its bases, turn over its arms and demobilize for the RSLMF to withdraw to barracks; and for the Kamajors to return to their villages and traditional roles.

27. The Government has indicated, however, that it does not at present have the means to ensure an adequate security presence for encampment and disarmament. Accordingly, after a careful review, the Assessment Team concluded that the required tasks could not be carried out by a mission composed only of unarmed military observers. The Team felt, however, that, under the present conditions in Sierra Leone, a peacekeeping operation, combining military observers with a limited number of formed troops, would be able to assist the parties to implement the Abidjan Accord effectively. The role of such a mission and its concept of operations are set out in annex II. The related cost estimates will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

IV. Humanitarian Aspects

28. The five-year conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in the displacement of over 1.6 million people, of a total pre-war population estimated at 4.5 million. Of these, only 210,000 took refuge in displaced persons camps. The rest sought the safety of district towns, placing tremendous pressure on social services. The conflict also resulted in the destruction of schools, health facilities, water supply systems and transport infrastructure, mostly in the rural areas. On the economic front, Sierra Leone witnessed a serious deterioration in performance and the erosion of an already weak productive capacity.

29. Over the past year, conditions in war-affected areas of Sierra Leone have slowly evolved to reflect the improved security situation. In recent months, at least 100,000 displaced people, including 45,000 who were living in camps, have spontaneously returned to their areas of origin, primarily in Pujehun district in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone. Relief agencies now have greater access to a wider territory and are beginning to provide assistance in the form of food and non-food items for resettlement at the community level. Nevertheless, insecure conditions continue to impede resettlement in some areas.

30. The total number of Sierra Leonean refugees in asylum countries in the subregion is approximately 361,000, of whom 232,000 are in Guinea, 123,000 in Liberia and 6,000 in other countries. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 289,000 Sierra Leonean refugees will opt to repatriate, and it is preparing a repatriation programme to facilitate their voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity. The implementation of this programme will depend on security and other conditions in the country.

31. To meet the emergency humanitarian needs of the war-affected population, especially those who are displaced, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issued a one-year consolidated appeal for Sierra Leone in March 1996, followed by an update in September 1996. Of the $57.8 million requested in the appeal, $37.2 million has been pledged to date.

32. In April 1996, the Government of Sierra Leone created the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation to oversee and coordinate humanitarian assistance and post-war recovery efforts. The Ministry took the lead in developing the National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, which was launched at a round table meeting in September 1996 sponsored by the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

33. The National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme is designed to address the short-term needs of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement of displaced people and refugees, and restoration of basic social services, as well as the medium-term reconstruction necessary to lay the foundation for long-term growth and development. While donors pledged approximately $232 million at the round-table meeting, only a small percentage of these pledges have been received to date, severely limiting implementation of the Programme.

34. The World Bank is in the process of finalizing an Emergency Recovery and Reintegration Credit in support of the Government's National Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme. A large portion of this $15 million credit will fund community-based assistance for the resettlement of ex-combatants, displaced people and refugees and for the restoration of basic social services and infrastructure in war-affected areas. While most funds from the Credit will not be available in-country until the second half of this year, some grants will be made available by the end of February 1997 for pilot projects in resettlement, veterans assistance and institutional support to the Ministry of National Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The European Union will also provide support to resettlement by funding projects related to food security, water and sanitation and rehabilitation of infrastructure, among others.

35. As regards the resettlement of ex-combatants, to date the Government has screened some 1,500 RUF elements who have spontaneously demobilized. However, only 200 of them were classified as ex-combatants in accordance with Government criteria. The vast majority of these former RUF members have since returned to their areas of origin. Since demobilization has only been undertaken on an ad hoc basis up to now, there are no currently active official programmes for the resettlement of ex-combatants.

V. Concluding Observations

36. The people of Sierra Leone have suffered greatly over the five years of conflict in their country. The economy has been weakened and administrative structures remain fragile. Unless the needs of the war-affected are addressed promptly and effectively, the security situation in the country could again deteriorate. Nevertheless, there is a strong desire on the part of the civilian population for peace and the creation of conditions that would enable them to look forward to a better future. Furthermore, the physical infrastructure, civil administration and social fabric of Sierra Leone have not been extensively affected by the conflict. United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions are presently putting in place programmes to assist in the implementation of the resettlement and rehabilitation plans. These efforts are essential to the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone.

37. The achievement of a durable peace does not depend only on the successful demobilization and resettlement of RUF combatants. It also depends on the establishment of a professional national army. In this connection, the Government has committed itself, under the Abidjan Accord, to downsizing and restructuring the RSLMF and to strengthening the civilian police, so that it can effectively carry out its responsibilities. The downsizing of the RSLMF will be a sensitive endeavor. The Government has therefore requested the assistance of the United Nations in developing a plan for demobilizing and restructuring the RSLMF and monitoring the withdrawal to barracks of those units not required for normal security duties.

38. In order to create a climate of confidence conducive to the demobilization and reintegration of RUF forces, I would also urge the Government to consider the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure the return of the Kamajors to their villages and traditional roles. The success of the disarmament and demobilization process will also depend upon combatants knowing that they have some means of supporting themselves once they give up their arms. I therefore urge donors to ensure that the assistance they have pledged to support the reintegration process is made available as soon as possible.

39. The success of any peacekeeping operation depends first and foremost on the clear consent of the parties and on their commitment to cooperate fully with one another and with the United Nations in the implementation of the agreements they have freely entered into. By signing the Abidjan Accord, the parties to the conflict have committed themselves to a negotiated settlement. The Government of Sierra Leone confirmed to the Assessment Team its readiness to ensure the timely implementation of the Accord and to extend its full cooperation to a United Nations peacekeeping operation as described in annex II to the present report. As explained in paragraphs 15 and 16 above, while it was not possible for the Assessment Team to get the same assurances from the RUF before it left Abidjan, I have received from Corporal Sankoh two letters, dated 13 and 17 January respectively. In his second letter, Corporal Sankoh confirmed his willingness to receive the peace monitors foreseen under the Abidjan Accord and to cooperate fully with them. In the light of that letter, I am taking steps to bring to the attention of Corporal Sankoh the concept of operations described in annex II to the present report. At the earliest opportunity, I shall then submit to the Council the appropriate recommendations regarding the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone.

40. In concluding, I should like to commend my Special Envoy, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, OAU and the Commonwealth for the assistance they have provided to the parties in facilitating a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Foreign Minister of Côte d'Ivoire for the invaluable assistance and support he provided to the Assessment Team during its stay in Abidjan.

Annex I. Abidjan Peace Accord Proposed Schedule of Implementation

30 November 1996

Peace Agreement signed in Abidjan

RUF to begin functioning as a political movement (art. 13)

14 December 1996

CCP established (art. 3)

14 December 1996 to D-Day

CCP establishes subcommittees (arts. 3, 6 and 11)

- Joint Monitoring Group (JMG)

- Demobilization and Resettlement Committee (DRC)

CCP finalizes schedule of implementation

CCP determines location of assembly sites in consultation with the United Nations

The Government of Sierra Leone informs the RUF of the steps necessary to register as a political party (art. 13)

The Government grants amnesty to the RUF and defines the steps required to adopt related legislation (art. 14)

The Government defines the steps and timing necessary to establish the Office of the Ombudsman (art. 16)

CCP finalizes the disarmament and demobilization plan in consultation with the United Nations

CCP and concerned agencies commence/continue work on operational aspects of the disarmament and demobilization plan, including the establishment of assembly sites in three areas and the intensification of the sensitization campaign

RUF registers as a political party

RUF prepares combatants to move to assembly sites

D-Day

The Security Council authorizes the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to assist the parties in the implementation of the Abidjan Accord

D-Day + 1

The United Nations establishes a trust fund for the consolidation of peace

D-Day + 7

Deployment of the advance United Nations Headquarters/military observer group begins

The Government adopts amnesty legislation and establishes the Office of the Ombudsman

D-Day + 14

The United Nations peacekeeping operation/JMG finalize joint working procedures, including for, inter alia:

- Observation/verification of the ceasefire and reporting/investigating alleged violations;

- Observation/verification of disarmament and demobilization;

- Supervision/verification of confinement to barracks and withdrawal of Executive Outcomes

The United Nations/CCP and concerned agencies update operations plans for demobilization/resettlement and related issues

CCP establishes additional subcommittees (art. 3)

- Socio-Economic Forum (also art. 27)

- Citizens' Consultative Conference

- Multi-partisan Council

- National Budget and Debt Committee

D-Day + 15

The United Nations/JMG commence formal observation and monitoring of the ceasefire

Joint United Nations/JMG groups begin deployment to assembly sites, established by the Government, depending on security conditions

Executive Outcomes confined to barracks under United Nations/JMG supervision (art. 12)

United Nations/CCP commence discussions on return of the RSLMF to barracks (art. 10)

The Government begins consultations with political parties on the reconstitution of the National Elections Commission (art. 18)

D-Day + 17

Disarmament/encampment of the RUF commences under government auspices, with United Nations/JMG observation and verification

D-Day + 30

The United Nations begins an information campaign, based on local radio, focusing on the peace process, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and resettlement

Executive Outcomes withdraws under United Nations/JMG supervision and verification (art. 12)

GOSL establishes the Human Rights Commission (art. 20)

First Citizens' Consultative Conference (art. 4)

D-Day + 60

Deployment of United Nations troops begins

D-Day + 75

Disarmament/encampment of the RUF commences under United Nations auspices, with United Nations/JMG observation and verification

D-Day + 75 to D-Day + 240

The Government releases all political prisoners and prisoners of war (art. 19)

The Government repatriates foreign troops in accordance with existing treaty obligations (art. 12)

The United Nations and the Government finalize the schedule of withdrawal to barracks and demobilization plans for the RSLMF

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission expanded (art. 15)

Disarmament/encampment of the RUF, under United Nations monitoring and verification, completed

RSLMF commence withdrawal to barracks under United Nations monitoring and verification (art. 12)

Demobilization of excess RSLMF troops commences

D-Day + 240

United Nations mandate completed

Annex II. Concept of Operations

1. Should the Security Council, on the basis of possible recommendations by the Secretary-General, decide to authorize an operation on the basis of the Assessment Team's findings, the following concept of operations is envisaged. This approach is based on the assumption that the parties are committed to the peace process and prepared to cooperate fully with one another and the United Nations to ensure its timely implementation.

A. Political role

2. The United Nations would use its good offices, in cooperation with OAU and the Commonwealth, to facilitate the implementation of both the political and military provisions of the Accord. To this end, the United Nations would have observer status at the meetings of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. It would hold regular joint meetings with the leaders of the CCP delegations of both parties to consult directly with them on progress in the implantation of the peace process and to provide advice on measures to be taken to promote the timely implementation of the provisions of the Abidjan Accord. The United Nations would also consult the other moral guarantors to the Accord on a regular basis.

3. In addition, any United Nations operation in Sierra Leone would include a public information unit to ensure that objective and factual information on the peace process, as well as on the United Nations role in Sierra Leone, is disseminated widely throughout the country. The unit would focus, in particular, on providing information to combatants to encourage them to give up their arms and return to civilian life.

4. Experience has shown that the parties to a peace agreement often require logistic or financial support to be able to fulfill their responsibilities in its implementation. It would therefore be my intention to establish a Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace in Sierra Leone. The United Nations would thus be in a position, subject to the availability of the necessary funds, to assist both parties in the many aspects of the peace process which are critical to its success, but for which resources would not be provided under an assessed budget. Contributions to the Trust Fund would be used, inter alia, to support the work of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the Joint Monitoring Group and the Demobilization and Resettlement Committee, especially in terms of the logistic resources necessary for them to carry out their responsibilities. Voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund would also be used to assist the transformation of the RUF into a political party and for civic activities in support of the peace process.

B. Military role

5. As noted earlier, the Government of Sierra Leone has undertaken some initial planning to facilitate the implementation of disarmament and demobilization. These plans, and the resources provided for them, only partially meet the requirements of the Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, the Government and the RUF should proceed as quickly as possible with the finalization and implementation of these plans. United Nations involvement in the implementation of the military provisions of the Abidjan Accord would be designed in such a way as to support the efforts of the parties. Hence, the first stage of deployment would include military observers, who would assist the parties in observing and monitoring the ceasefire and disarmament at assembly sites established by the Government. The second stage of deployment would include formed troops, which would be tasked primarily with the establishment of, and provision of security for, those assembly sites which the Government was not in a position to establish during the first stage.

6. In this connection, immediately following a Security Council decision to establish a United Nations operation in Sierra Leone, an advance Headquarters and military observer group would be deployed to the country. The first task of these personnel would be to undertake preparations for the setting up of a force headquarters and, in accordance with the provisions of the Abidjan Accord, to develop working procedures, in consultation with the Joint Monitoring Group, for monitoring and verification of the ceasefire, investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire, monitoring and verifying disarmament and demobilization, as well as the confinement to barracks, and eventual withdrawal from the country, of Executive Outcomes. Teams of six military observers each would be deployed to each assembly site established by the Government, depending upon the provision of adequate security.

7. The United Nations would also assist the Government to develop a plan for the downsizing of the RSLMF and would monitor the withdrawal to barracks of RSLMF forces not required for normal security duties. In addition, if requested, United Nations military observers would monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone.

8. Formed troops would be deployed about 60 days after the deployment of the Headquarters and military observer group. Prior to the date of their deployment, I would undertake a careful review of developments on the ground and make any adjustments to the deployment plan which may be necessary. This review would be based on the ability of the Government to establish assembly sites and provide security for them. In this connection, if the Government is in a position to establish and secure some assembly sites, the total requirement for United Nations troops would decrease accordingly. The deployment plan would also be refined on the basis of more precise data on the exact number of RUF combatants, their locations and their weapons and ammunition. In any event, the number of troops would not exceed 720 all ranks, including support elements.

9. United Nations troops would assist in the establishment of, and provision of security for, assembly sites, and take custody of the arms and ammunition handed over by RUF combatants. They would also provide security for the transportation of RUF combatants to assembly sites. Subject to a decision by CCP in this regard, United Nations troops would also supervise the destruction of weapons collected. In addition, the troops would provide security for United Nations personnel and property in areas where they are deployed.

10. The troops would include three infantry companies of 100 all ranks each, which would be deployed at three assembly sites (300 all ranks). These units would also carry out disarmament at up to three additional temporary sites. A reserve infantry company would be stationed at Freetown (100 all ranks). The Force would also include engineering (32 all ranks), transport (40 all ranks) and medical detachments (20 all ranks), a motorized infantry platoon (40 all ranks), battalion support personnel (139 all ranks) and headquarters staff (49 all ranks).

11. A total of 60 military observers would be required. As noted earlier, the observers would be deployed in teams of six at each of the three assembly sites to observe, monitor and verify disarmament and demobilization, as well as the ceasefire. Teams of five observers each would also be deployed at Bo, Kabala, Kailahun, Koidu and Pujehun to monitor and verify the ceasefire. Two mobile teams of five observers each will be deployed at Freetown.

12. As I indicated in annex I to the present report, the military tasks would be completed within eight months of a Security Council decision to authorize a United Nations operation in Sierra Leone. In summary, these tasks would include the following:

(a) Monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and investigating reported violations thereof;

(b) Monitoring and verifying the confinement to barracks of Executive Outcomes and, subsequently, its withdrawal from the country;

(c) Monitoring and verifying the disarmament and demobilization of RUF combatants;

(d) Assisting in the establishment of assembly sites and providing security for them, as well as for weapons handed over by the RUF;

(e) Monitoring the withdrawal to barracks of RSLMF troops not required for normal security duties and assisting the Government in developing a plan for their demobilization;

(f) If so required, monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone;

(g) Providing security for United Nations personnel and property.

13. In order to fulfill the above tasks in a timely manner, United Nations personnel must be operational from the very start of the mission. However, owing to the lead time required, under existing rules and regulations, to contact the necessary civilian administrative support, it would take several months to establish the necessary logistic and administrative infrastructure for the operation. Therefore, the initial logistic requirements of the mission would be covered by a military logistics unit, which would contain transport, supply, communications and engineering capability. This military unit would be gradually reduced as United Nations civilian administrative support becomes operational. The total military strength of the mission would not, at any time, exceed the 720, all ranks, indicated in paragraph 8 above.

14. Air support for the operation, consisting of two medium-lift helicopters, would be provided by a civilian contractor. With regard to vehicles, only 40 of the required number would be available from the United Nations global fleet. Steps are being taken to ensure that they are provided in a timely manner. Additional vehicle requirements will be covered by local rental and purchase, as necessary.

C. Organizational structure

15. Should the Security Council decide to establish such an operation, it would be headed by a Special Representative and its headquarters would be located in Freetown. The Special Representative would have an office headed by a Director and composed of a small number of Political Affairs Officers. The office of the Special Representative would also include a Legal Officer, a Human Rights Officer and a public information unit. In addition, the Mission's headquarters would include personnel who would assist in the establishment and operation of the assembly sites, in cooperation with the United Nations resident coordinator. The military component of the operation would be headed by a Force Commander. The Mission would also have an administrative component, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer.

16. The Special Representative, acting on my behalf, would exercise executive authority over all aspects of the operation, which would be carried out in accordance with the overall time-frame set out in annex I to the present report and completed within eight months of a decision by the Security Council to authorize it. The Special Representative would also be responsible for the coordination of all United Nations activities geared to the furtherance of the peace process in Sierra Leone.

Portal:United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)