Report on the Historical Record of U.S. Government Involvement with Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena/Volume 1/Section 3

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SECTION III: Scope & Assumptions


Scope

This HR2 is provided by DoD in response to a requirement established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2023, Section 6802(j), which states: "Not later than 540 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the Director of the Office shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional leadership a written report detailing the historical record of the United States Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena." This report, pursuant to the legislation, is based upon the records and documents of the IC and DoD, oral history interviews, open source analysis, interviews of current and former government officials, and classified and unclassified archives.

AARO will provide its findings to Congress in two volumes:

  • Volume I contains AARO's findings from 1945 to 31 October 2023 based on the requirements, and:
  • Volume II will include any findings resulting from interviews and research completed from 1 November 2023 to 15 April 2024.

AARO interviewed approximately 30 people who claimed to have insight into alleged USG involvement in off-world technology exploitation or to possess knowledge of UAP that have allegedly disrupted U.S. nuclear facilities in the past.

Assumptions

AARO and DoD assume that individuals convey their accurate recollection of their perception of the events they observed or heard. It is important to note that AARO cannot discount nor rely on interviewee accounts alone because of the extraordinary claims contained in their reports. Although individual accounts are important, they are only one element of the larger picture and provide AARO with the opportunity to initiate an investigation. However, any final assessment on the veracity of these accounts must be accompanied by provable facts.

  • Some literature suggests individual accounts can be unreliable as they are subject to a person's interpretation of sensory data through the filter of their experiences, beliefs, or state of mind during the event. A person who reports a case might be credible, in that they believe the elements of their account to be accurate. However, their reliability, which is their ability to accurately interpret events—as well as to recall and convey those events due to a range of factors—is altogether different from their inherent sincerity.[1]
  • Similarly, confirmation bias is a recognized subconscious cognitive process whereby a person tends to seek and believe information that supports their hypothesis and to discount information that undermines their hypothesis.[2]
  • AARO remains open to additional, verifiable information that may alter the conclusions rendered in Volume I and will note any changes to the findings in this report in Volume II.

Note on "UAP" Nomenclature

Use of the UAP naming convention, while imperfect, is the best manner in which to characterize the multitude of unidentified reported sightings. AARO understands that the use of "UAP" to refer to all potential possibilities provides a false sense of commonality; such as their origins, identity, purpose, type, and threat they may pose. The only commonality that they all share, at least initially, is that they are each unidentified. Beyond initially being unidentified or misidentified, drones, balloons, aircraft, rockets, rocket exhaust plumes, satellites, infrared (IR) aberrations, sensor artifacts, birds, stars, planets, indistinct lights, vague radar returns, meteors, and optical effects—such as parallax—have nothing in common.

Congressional Oversight

DoD is committed to providing timely and thorough reporting to Congress and to transparency with the American public. Since its establishment, AARO has endeavored to keep Congress fully and currently informed of its activities and findings at all levels of classification. AARO and DoD will continue to share the status and findings of its research at the appropriate level of classification with Congress.

AARO's HR2 Program of Analysis

AARO established six complementary lines of effort (LOEs) to conduct the HR2 research with the goal of ensuring this report conveys an accurate and complete picture. LOEs were conducted in parallel and reinforced each another; a lead in one LOE drove new research and pursuits in another. AARO's goal was to conduct thorough cross-checks to vet all information to discover and close gaps in its understanding. These LOEs were to:

  • Conduct open-source research on claims (through historical interviews) about USG investigations of, contact with, and recovery of UAP, as well as exploitation of alleged UAP material and technology.

  • Conduct classified program research across the IC, DoD, and interagency to validate or invalidate any claims of classified programs derived from historical interviews.
  • Conduct historical interviews of individuals who claim knowledge of alleged USG activities related to UAP.
  • Partner with the U.S. National Archives on locating UAP data, refining requests based on the discovery of new leads derived from historical interviews, as well as open-source and classified research.
  • Engage with commercial entities on named companies alleged to have worked with the USG on UAP recovery and alleged exploitation of UAP technology.
  • Partner with the archives of key intelligence and national security agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Energy (DOE), National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Services, and DoD Combatant Commands.