Russia & The Struggle for Peace/Chapter 20

by Michael S. Farbman

CHAPTER TWENTY

THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

THE conflict on Miliukov's note, which led to such a sharp crisis, at the same time revealed the true spirit of the Revolution. In the first place, it showed that in two months the political education of the masses had made gigantic strides. Petrograd, which reacted so strongly to the convulsions of imperialism, was in no way isolated from the rest of Russia in its fight against imperialism. Throughout Russia the ill-intentioned note of the Foreign Office gave rise to the most lively dissatisfaction. On all sides it was understood as an attempt of the provisional Government to return to the policy of conquest and annexation which had been repudiated and condemned by the nation. But the conflict had a deeper significance. It revealed an approaching split between the revolutionary democracy and the liberal and bourgeois elements.

The workers, the peasants, and the army throughout Russia loudly and decisively expressed their adherence to the Soviet. The propertied classes no less definitely revealed their readiness to support the Provisional Government. And it is a most remarkable thing that the split took place, not on any question of internal politics, but on the question of the war. The war became the centre, the key to future developments. Russia was in the grip of the most awful financial crisis and economic exhaustion. The difficulties of transport led to an absolute breakdown, and famine was threatening. There could be no successful struggle with these evils while the war lasted. On the contrary, with every day that the war continued the financial and economic exhaustion increased, and the country came nearer and nearer to the abyss. The will to peace alone had the power to save the country and its hard-won freedom. It was necessary to stop the war, which was threatening to destroy the gains of the Revolution as it had destroyed the Tsardom. "If the war was not to kill the Revolution, the Revolution must kill the war:" such was the cry of all democratic Russia. The propertied classes, who had been trusted to accomplish this chief and greatest task of the Revolution, were reluctant and unable to fulfil it. The democracy could not trust them any longer. Miliukov's attempt to revive the imperialistic aims of the old regime had for the time being- destroyed the power of the bourgeoisie in Russia. A new power had to be created, one which would be able to fulfil the aims of the Revolution. But of what elements was this new power to consist? The left wing of the revolutionary democracy decided without hesitation that it should consist purely of the Soviet elements: "All power to the Soviets!" But the overwhelming majority of the Soviet (the Bolsheviks at that time were in a minority of less than one in ten) definitely rejected the idea of a Soviet Government and decided for a coalition. To-day, after the event, there can be little doubt that the decision of the Soviet was by no means the best. A Soviet Government at that time would have been a blessing for Russia, and probably for the world as well. The decision to form a purely democratic and Socialist Government could not at that time have led to civil war, as it did six months later, when the Bolsheviks took the power of the State into their hands. In the first place, a Soviet Government at that time would have aimed, not at the realisation of a Socialist State, but at the fulfilment of the general aims of the Revolution. Secondly, the Soviet at that time united not only the workers, peasants, and soldiers, but also large circles of radical and intellectual liberalism. The popularity of the Soviet was so great and so extensive that no one class would have dared to stand out in open opposition to a Soviet Government. Undoubtedly a Soviet Government would have known how to adopt a suitable tone in its negotiations with the Allies, and the question of the revision of treaties and war-aims would at last have been established on a practical footing. But the Soviet was an advocate of adjustment and conciliation. It decided to create a Coalition Government. Moderation unfortunately is not always a virtue. In this case the Soviet was making a grave political mistake, for the Coalition Government bungled the question of peace and the negotiations with the Allies still more than the first, purely bourgeois, Government had done.^[1] Probably it was not so much the principle of coalition which was at fault as the structure and organisation of the actual coalition which was formed. In fact the crisis had taken place on the question of foreign policy. The Socialists decided to participate in the Government in order to see that democratic principles were carried out in the foreign policy of the country. They might naturally have been expected to take over the Foreign Office. But in reality foreign affairs were left in the hands of the same party whose policy had, only just before, brought the country to the verge of disaster. I have already said that the democracy were ready to compromise with the bourgeoisie on every question of internal policy if only the Government would energetically pursue a more democratic line in its foreign policy. But they were fooled. The propertied classes preferred to see a Social Revolutionist as Minister of Agriculture, a Social Democrat as Minister of Labour, a Socialist Food Controller, and even a Socialist War Minister, if only they could keep the foreign affairs in their own hands, which they did. As soon as the new Government was formed the public began to discuss what its policy would be. There was a repetition of the same discussion as had taken place two months before, as to whether the party of peace or the party of war had been victorious. Considering the definite programme on which the new Government was based, this discussion should have been unnecessary. On the basis of its adopted programme it was definitely a Government for the liquidation of the war. Its programme was harmonious, a consistent programme of peace, based on the one hand on the struggle for peace, and on the other hand on the strengthening of the fighting power of the Russian army. And yet its formation was greeted with great joy by the imperialists of Russia and of all other countries. They rubbed their hands and said: "The Russian Socialists have set to work to strengthen the Russian army. It follows that they are pro-war. It is a red-letter day for us." It was so indeed; but, as far as the democracy was concerned, the strengthening of the army did not mean war for them. Referring to this joy "on the imperialist street," the Izvestia of May 13th, about a week after the Coalition Government was formed, said: "Peace is the aim of the revolutionary democracy, nor does it intend to make for peace by way of war. Not by military victories does it seek the way out from the blind alley of bloodshed. … Our comrades have entered the Coalition Government for the business of peace. They will make it their concern to see that the Governments of all countries are compelled openly to say their thoughts on the actual aims of the war, without any prevarications, before their own peoples and the whole world. The delegates of the Soviet will work out the great task of reviving the international brotherhood of workers, in their post in the Government, even as they have done in the Soviet itself." These were proud and sincere words, but it all turned out to be an illusion.

The new Government had two pivots: the task of reviving the spirit and increasing the fighting strength of the army, which was entrusted to Kerenski, and the task of preparing the way to peace and negotiating with the Allies, which was given to Tereshchenko. The army was to be strengthened, not to continue the war, but to have, if necessary, a strong military argument against Germany. For equilibrium and a harmonious elaboration of the country's policy, it was necessary for these two elements to supplement each other. Kerenski set himself to his task with his accustomed energy and with a real revolutionary inspiration. He really enlarged the revolutionary outlook of the soldiers; it was a very promising beginning. But the more Kerenski inspired the army with new vigour and force, the more his success served to whet the imperialistic appetites of the bourgeoisie. The Cadets and their supporters on the Right began to speak, not only about the sacred interests of Russia, about war till victory, and so forth, but even about their hopes of arresting the Revolution. The High Command drew its own conclusions from the efforts to revive the army and from Kerenski's success. The Commander-in-Chief, Alexeiev, made speeches to the soldiers scorning the idea of the democratic peace programme and proclaiming that Russia needed "victory, not peace." The attitude of the High Command began to make the democracy very uneasy, and Kerenski had to dismiss Alexeiev. But that did not stem the tide of imperialism in the High Command, and Kerenski attempted to mitigate matters still further. General Gurko was dismissed from his command and degraded. But these were only half measures, and the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the High Command continued to grow.

Meanwhile Tereshchenko, who was under the direct obligation to hasten the negotiations with the Allies and to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion, began instead to make every possible effort to "reassure " the Allies that Russia would "fulfil her duties" towards them. The democracy disapproved of the line which Tereshchenko was taking-, but their protests were ineffective. They felt quite clearly that the issue was being befogged. They saw that the Government was beginning to put more weight on the strengthening of the army than on the other equally important component part of their policy.

The Government was evidently beginning to put another interpretation on the "strengthening of the army." The conception of the democracy was that the army must be ready for an offensive in case Germany should reject the revised peace platform of the Allies. The offensive was to be the "last argument." But the Government was drifting to the idea of an immediate offensive before the war-aims of the Allies had been cleared up. The democracy was conscious of the danger, for the army would interpret such an offensive as an imperialist and capitalist war, and the struggle for peace would be endangered by Russia's military collapse: such a course was bound to lead to disaster. But this time the democracy could not assert itself. The internal situation was becoming more and more complicated, and absorbing all attention. The Right was raising its head and counter-revolution was being openly prepared. A very serious process was developing in the ranks of the democracy itself. In the factories and in the garrison the watchword "All power to the Soviets" began to assume the character of an opposition not only to the bourgeoisie but to the more moderate elements of the Soviet itself.

The bourgeois classes began to scream, "Anarchy!" In the economic sense the situation was indeed very dangerous. Russia was balancing on the edge. Industry was hopelessly dislocated through lack of fuel and transport difficulties. Many factories closed down; lock-outs were made under the pretext of the excessive demands of the workers; the railways and trams were giving out, and even the water supply was getting scarce through lack of fuel. But to these realities a variety of fantastic fictions and exaggerations were added. Every little incident was magnified and made a subject of excitement. Many sheer inventions were circulated and wildly discussed in the Press—for instance, the "republic of Schüsselburg," which never existed. It is true that such inventions and exaggerations lived, in each case, only for a day or two, or sometimes only for a few hours, but they did their work in stirring up agitation and fear among the citizens. Needless to say that every lie and every baseless accusation, every absurd exaggeration, was diligently circulated abroad. But subsequent corrections and denials were seldom even mentioned afterwards in the foreign Press.

The meaning of all this super-induced agitation and excitement was on the one hand to arouse the Government to fight the more consistent and decisive elements in the democracy, and on the other hand to frighten the people and split the democracy. The propertied classes themselves had not the power to "fight anarchy," and had they tried to do so would only have revealed their counter-revolutionary intentions and welded the democracy together against them. Instead, they paid every compliment to the moderate elements of the democracy, and tried to inspire them firmly to resist the demands of the Left. Unfortunately the course of events favoured the tendency to split. The extreme elements in the Soviet, whose popularity was growing, ventured to emphasise their differences with the moderates in face of the counter-revolutionary danger. On the other hand, the moderate elements began to be influenced more and more by the Machiavellian whispers of the bourgeoisie, and there began an open feud within the democratic camp, to the unconcealed delight of all imperialists in Russia and in the Allied countries. The imperialist papers in the Allied countries cautiously suggested the dawn of a "renaissance" in Russia.

1. Baron Rosen, former Russian Ambassador at Tokyo and Washington, refers to the mistakes of the Coalition Government in the following terms, in a letter to the Novaia Zhizu, October 10th: "This equivocal attitude of the Russian Government has done the interests of the country irreparable harm, because the voice of Russian diplomacy grows weaker with every month of war, and disorganisation goes on increasing. This duplicity of Russian policy on the question of peace and war reveals to the whole world the division of the nation into two camps, the more important of which ardently desires peace, while the other, which comprises an influential minority, obstinately clings to war to the bitter end."