Schwabacher v. United States/Opinion of the Court

by Robert H. Jackson

United States Supreme Court

334 U.S. 182

Schwabacher  v.  United States

 Argued: Jan. 6, 7, 1948. --- Decided: May 3, 1948

This controversy grows out of the voluntary merger of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and Pere Marquette Railway Company, which companies, together with Alleghany Corporation, sought approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Pere Marquette is incorporated under the laws of Michigan, while Chesapeake & Ohio is chartered by Virginia. Chesapeake & Ohio acquired and for some years exercised active control of Pere Marquette, whose properties and operations complement rather than compete with those of Chesapeake & Ohio. Late in 1945 merger proceedings were commenced under enabling statutes of the two states and were consummated with approval of considerably more than the number of shares made necessary by statutes of the respective states. The Interstate Commerce Commission found, and there is no attack upon the findings, that the public interest is served by merger and unification of these properties and operations. The Commission also concluded that the plan as a whole, and as applied to each group of shareholders, is just and reasonable, and there is no attack upon this conclusion except that by the appellants which is treated fully herein. Consequently, details of the plan are of little importance to this litigation.

Appellants are owners of 2,100 shares of $100 par 5% cumulative preferred stock of Pere Marquette. Their interests aggregate a little less than 2% of the outstanding stock of this class. Dividends on this stock have been unpaid since 1931 and, as of the commencement of this controversy, were in arrears in the sum of $72.50 per share, an amount that is increasing with time. The Pere Marquette charter provides for full payment of the stock at par, plus accrued unpaid dividends, 'in the event of dissolution, liquidation, or winding up of the company, voluntary or involuntary * * * before any amounts are paid to holders of the * * * common stock.' The appellants contend that the merger hereinafter described terminates the corporate existence and, under this clause as construed by Michigan law, amounts to a 'winding up.' They insist that since the merger makes provision for some compensation to common stockholders these appellants have the right, under Michigan law, to have their shares recognized on the basis of at least $172.50 each. The Commission found the market value per share ranged, at different times, from $87 to.$99, while the merger terms give stocks in exchange which would have realized about $90 and $111 per share on the same dates. Appellants dissented from the merger, but Michigan law provides no specific right or procedure for appraisal and retirement of the holdings of a stockholder dissenting from a railroad merger.

When application was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended (49 U.S.C. § 5, 49 U.S.C.A. § 5), for approval and authorization of the merger, ^[1] as well as for other relief, appellants intervened and asked that body to determine, recognize and protect their asserted right to the full legal liquidation figure. The Commission approved the merger and the merger terms, finding them just and reasonable as to each class of stockholders. However, it disclaimed jurisdiction to pass upon the further claims of the appellants asserted on the basis of their interpretation of Michigan law. It reviewed at some length the economic position of the stock. It recited that these shares had received no dividends since 1931 and that appellants' witnesses agreed that these stockholders could not expect to receive any dividends for many years, apart from the merger. The Commission also pointed out the deficit in operations of Pere Marquette for the first quarter of 1946 as contrasted with the net income of Chesp eake and Ohio, and concluded that 'On the whole it would seem that the prospects of Pere Marquette stockholders for returns on their investments would be enhanced by the merger of their company into Chesapeake & Ohio.' The Commission did not question that the stockholders, on liquidation, dissolution or winding up of Pere Marquette, would be entitled to be paid in full the par value of their shares and accumulated dividends before any payment to holders of common stock. It did not undertake to determine the ultimate worth of these stocks in case of an actual liquidation, but it considered their present intrinsic value on a capitalized earnings basis, an actual yield basis, and its present market position and concluded: 'Accordingly, considering Pere Marquette's investment according to its books, other property values, the company's history as to earnings, its future prospects, and the market appraisal of its stocks, all as set forth above, we find that as to the stockholders of both parties generally the proposed ratios of exchange, stock issues and assumptions of indebtedness, are just and reasonable.'

The Commission then noted the contention of the appellants that as to them the terms were not just and reasonable, because they are deprived of contract rights under Michigan law, which they have not waived. It is contended that the Commission should not remit the dissenting stockholders to remedies in state courts as the Commission would thereby decline the jurisdiction conferred by § 5 and § 20a of the Act. ^[2] But the Commission considered that it was entrusted with authority to decide the public interest aspects of the merger of these transportation facilities and that it could not be expected to enter into the question of 'compensation of dissenting stockholders on specified bases' before approval and merger. It thought that, having found the treatment of each class to be just and reasonable, it had done its full duty 'when we make certain that all stockholders of the same class are to be treated alike.' It declined to decide the Michigan law question as to what rights of dissenting stockholders were, and whether the merger was equivalent to a liquidation, but said: 'This does not mean that the Chesapeake & Ohio and the Pere Marquette do not remain free to settle controversies with dissenting stockholders through negotiation and litigation in the courts.' Taking into account the small percentage of the dissenting shares, the current assets position of the Chesapeake & Ohio, and the maximum possible cost to the merged company of the settlement of these claims on the basis most favorable to appellants, it considered that the company was amply able to bear 'any probable expenditure of cash that it might be required to make in connection with the merger. Accordingly it appears that consummation of the merger will not involve a burden of excessive expenditure.' The Commission thus left in a state of suspense, subject to further litigation or negotiation, these claims concerning the extent of the capital obligations of a constituent company, after examining them sufficiently to determine only that, however settled, they did not involve enough to affect the solvency of the new company or jeopardize its operations.

The Commission denied appellants' petition for rehearing and they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to set aside the order authorizing the merger. A court of three judges, convened as required by law, ^[3] sustained the Commission, 72 F.Supp. 560. Appellants bring to us ^[4] the question whether the Commission, in view of its authority over mergers, which is declared to be exclusive and plenary, could decline to determine just what the dissenting stockholders'l egal rights were under the Michigan law and the Pere Marquette charter, and to recognize them in full by the terms of the merger.

The disposition of appellants' claims, as well as the nature of the claims themselves, requires consideration of the relative function and authority of federal and state law in regulating and approving voluntary railroad mergers. The appellants contend that their share in the merged company is to be measured by, or their remedies as dissenters are to be found in, state law, but that the federal agency is bound to determine and apply that law. The Commission on the other hand refuses either finally to foreclose or to allow these claims. It apparently leaves it open to the state courts, or to the parties by negotiation, to add to the surviving carrier's capital obligations which the Commission has found to be just and reasonable, others founded only in state law and as to which it has made no such findings. We conclude that neither position is wholly consistent with the federal statutory plan for authorization and approval of mergers.

It is not for us to adjudicate the existence or the measure of any rights that Michigan law may confer upon dissenting stockholders. Neither the Commission nor this Court can make a plenary and exclusive decision as to what the law of a state may be, for the function of declaring and interpreting its own law is left to each state of the Union. But the effect of the state law in relation to a constitutional Act of Congress, in view of the constitutional provision, art. 6, cl. 2, that the latter shall be 'the supreme Law of the Land,' 'Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,' is for us to determine. Our first inquiry here, therefore, is whether the Interstate Commerce Act accords recognition to those state law rights, if any exist. To determine this federal question we assume, but do not decide, that Michigan law would consider this merger to be a liquidation, and would regard the recognition given to the common stock as entitling these dissenters to 'full payment' in cash or its equivalent for both the par value of their preferred shares and accrued unpaid dividends thereon. Assuming such to be their rights under the law of the State, we must decide whether approval of a railroad merger under the Transportation Act of 1940 ^[5] is conditioned upon observance of such state law rights or can be made by the Commission contingently subject to them. A resume of the history of that Act throws light on the problem dealt with by that legislation.

The basic railroad facilities of the United States were constructed under state authorization and restrictions by corporations whose powers and limitations were prescribed by state legislatures, or resulted from limitations on the states themselves. Construction in reference primarily to local or regional transportation needs created duplicating and competing facilities in some areas and provided inadequate ones in others. Expansion necessary to serve advancing national frontiers was stimulated by extensive subsidies from the Federal Government, largely in the form of land grants. But the stress and strain of World War I brought home to us that the railroads of the country did not function as a really national system of transportation. That crisis also made plain the confusions, inefficiencies, inadequacies and dangers to our national defense and economy flowing from the patchwork railroad pattern that local interests under local law had created.

The demand for an integrated, efficient and coordinated system of rail transport, equal to the needs of our national economy and defense, resulted in the Transportation Act of 1920. ^[6] In a series of decisions on particular problems, this Court defined the general purposes of that Act to be the establishment of a new federal railway o licy ^[7] to insure adequate transportation service by means of securing a fair return on capital devoted to the service, restoration of impaired railroad credit, and regulation of rates, security issues, consolidations and mergers in the interest of the public. The tenor of all of these was to confirm the power and duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission, regardless of state law, to control rate and capital structures, physical make-up and relations between carriers, in the light of the public interest in an efficient national transportation system. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. 1086; New England Divisions Case, (Akron, C. & Y.R. Co. v. United States,) 261 U.S. 184, 43 S.Ct. 270, 67 L.Ed. 605; Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 44 S.Ct. 169, 68 L.Ed. 388, 33 A.L.R. 472; Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 264 U.S. 331, 44 S.Ct. 376, 68 L.Ed. 713; Texas & P.R. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 46 S.Ct. 263, 70 L.Ed. 578. ^[8]

As a means to this end, the 1920 Act required ^[9] the Commission to prepare and adopt a plan for nationwide consolidations of the railway properties of the country. It made this master plan the governing consideration in approving voluntary consolidations of railroads which were permitted only if in harmony with and in furtherance of the Commission's overall plans. ^[10] If they met that test, Congress provided that mergers could be consummated notwithstanding any restraint or prohibition by state authority. ^[11]

By 1940 it had become apparent that the ambitious nation-wide plan of consolidation was not bearing fruit. Various studies and investigations ^[12] led to the conclusion that it was a case where the best was an enemy of the good and waiting for the perfect official plan was defeating or postponing less ambitious but more attainable voluntary improvements. The Transportation Act of 1940 relieved the Commission of formulating a nationwide plan of consolidations. Instead, it authorized approval by the Commission of carrier-initiated, voluntary plans of merger or consolidation if, subject to such terms, conditions and modifications as the Commission might prescribe, the proposed transactions met with certain tests of public interest, justice and reasonableness, in which case they should become effective regardless of state authority. ^[13] The Act does not specify every consideration to which the Commission must give weight in determining whether or not any plan meets the tests. Section 5(2) provides only that 'among others,' the Commission shall consider the effect upon adequate transportation service, the effect of inclusion or failure to include other railroads, total fixed charges, and the interests of the carrier employees affected. This Court has recently and unanimously said in reference to this Act, 'Congress has long made the maintenance and development of an economical and efficient railroad system a matter of primary national concern. Its legislation must be read with this purpose in mind.' Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, 68 S.Ct. 426, 430. ^[14]

So reading the legislation relevant to this merger, we find that approval of a voluntary railroad merger which is within the scope of the Act is dependent upon three, and upon only three, considerations: First, a finding that it 'will be consistent with the public interest.' (§ 5(2)(b).) Second, a finding that, subject to any modification made by the Commission, it is 'just and reasonable.' (§ 5(2)(b).) Third, assent of a 'majority, unless a different vote is required under applicable State law, in which case the number so required shall assent, of the votes of the holders of the shares entitled to vote.' (§ 5(11).) When these conditions have been complied with, the Commission-approved transaction goes into effect without need for invoking any approval under state authority, and the parties are relieved of 'restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transactions so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchise acquired through such transaction.' (§ 5(11).)

The Commission, under this Act as well as the Act of 1920, was also given complete control of the capital structure to result from a merger. ^[15] The carrier, even if permitted by state law which creatd it, may issue no stock, bond or evidence of indebtedness without approval. It may assume no obligation in respect of the securities of another person or corporation except with approval. And the approval is to be given only on a finding that it '(a) is for some lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose.' 49 U.S.C. § 20a(2), 49 U.S.C.A. § 20a(2).

The jurisdiction of the Commission under both § 5 and § 20a is made plenary and exclusive and independent of all other state or federal authority. § 5(11); ^[16] § 20a(7). ^[17]

The Commission, as we have seen, has found that the liabilities asserted by appellants, if settled by litigation or negotiation, will not impair the carrier's ability to perform its service, but it has not found the assumption of such liabilities to be compatible with the public interest under § 5 and § 20a. Indeed, since these claims exceed what the Commission has found to be just and reasonable, it could hardly find that assumption of such claims would be compatible with the public interest.

It appears to us inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act ^[18] for the Commission to leave claims growing out of the capital structure of one of the constituent companies to be added to the obligations of the surviving carrier, contingent upon the decision of some other tribunal or agreement of the parties themselves. We think that the Commission must pass upon and approve all capital liabilities which the merged company will assume or discharge as a result of merger. If some greater amount than that specified in the agreement is to be allowed to any class of stockholders, it must either deplete the cash or inflate the liabilities or capital issues of the new company. It may be that in this case the merged company will be strong enough to carry this burden and still perform its public service. But that is not the sole purpose of the supervision provided by statute. It is also in the public interest that no capitalization or indebtedness be carried over except that which meets the test of the Act in all other respects. We think the Commission was in error in assuming that it did not have, or was at liberty to renounce or delegate, power finally to settle the amount of capital liabilities of the new company and the proportion or amount thereof which each class of stockholders should receive on account of its contributions to the new entity.

We think it is equally clear that the Commission must look for standards in passing on a voluntary merger only to the Interstate Commerce Act. In matters within its scope it is the supreme law of the land. Its purpose to bring within its scope everything pertaining to the capital structures of such mergers could hardly be made more plain. Indeed, the very fact on which appellants rely heavily, that the Commission's jurisdiction is 'plenary' and 'exclusive,' argues with equal force that federal law is also plenary and exclusive. The Commission likely would not and probably could not be given plenary and exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply any state's law.W hatever rights the appellants ask the Commission to assure must be founded on federal, not on state, law.

Apart from meeting the test of the public interest, the merger terms, as to stockholders, must be found to be just and reasonable. These terms would be largely meaningless to the stockholders if their interests were ultimately to be settled by reference to provisions of corporate charters and of state laws. Such charters and laws usually have been drawn on assumptions that time and experience have unsettled. Public regulation is not obliged and we cannot lightly assume it is intended to restore values, even if promised by charter terms, if they have already been lost through the operation of economic forces. Cf. Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770, 89 L.Ed. 1171. In appraising a stockholder's position in a merger as to justice and reasonableness, it is not the promise that a charter made to him but the current worth of that promise that governs, it is not what he once put into a constituent company but what value he is contributing to the merger that is to be made good.

In construing the words 'fair and equitable' in a federal statute of very similar purposes, we have held that although the full priority rule applies in liquidation of a solvent holding company pursuant to a federal statute, the priority is satisfied by giving each class the full economic equivalent of what they presently hold, and that, as a matter of federal law, liquidation preferences provided by the charter do not apply. We said that, although the company was in fact being liquidated in compliance with an administrative order, the rights of the stockholders could be valued 'on the basis of a going business and not as though a liquidation was taking place.' Consequently the liquidation preferences were only one factor in valuation rather than determinative of amounts payable. Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 323 U.S. 624, 65 S.Ct. 483, 488, 89 L.Ed. 511.

The appellants here, although the enterprise is to continue, insist on a valuation according to the letter of the charter. By this method the longer their stock is in default of dividends or earnings, the greater interest it would have in the merged properties if the common stock was to be recognized at all. The Commission, however, did not consider that a long continued default and the prospect of further default added greatly to the present intrinsic or market value of the stock in exchange. Its measuring rod was an economic rather than a legalistic one. The Commission considered the stock's past yield, present market value, and future prospects. It found that, all things considered, the merger terms gave to these appellants in new stock the fair economic equivalent of what they already held. It considered the deal just and reasonable on an exchange basis for a continuing enterprise. But it did not undertake to say whether, under the letter of their charter as construed under the law of Michigan, the preferred stockholders may not have a contract that would exact more than an economic equivalent.

Since the federal law clearly contemplates merger as a step in continuing the enterprise, it follows that what Michigan law might give these dissenters on a winding-up or liquidation is irrelevant, except insofar as it may be reflected in current values for which they are entitled to an equivalent. It would be inconsistent to allow state law to apply a liquidation basis to what federal law designates as a basis for continued public service. Federal law requires that merger terms be just and reasonable to all groups of stockholders, in contemplation of the continued use of their capital in the public calling to which it has been dedicated. Congress has made no provision by which minority stockholders, dissatisfied with a proposed railroad merger, may block it or compel retirement of their capital, as statutes often permit to be done in the case of private corporationsw here the public interest is not much concerned with its effect on the enterprise. And since Congress dealt with the subject of stockholders' consent, its failure to provide for withdrawal of nonconsenting capital cannot be considered an oversight to be supplied by us. A part of the capital dedicated to a railroad enterprise cannot withdraw itself without authorization any more than all of the capital can withdraw itself and abandon the railroad without approval. It must submit to regulations and to readjustments in the public interest on just and reasonable terms.

In determining whether each class of stockholder receives an equivalent of what it turns in, the Commission, of course, is under a duty to see that minority interests are protected, especially when there is an absence of arm's length bargaining or the terms of the merger have been imposed by management interests adverse to any class of stockholders. The Commission indicates both awareness and discharge of this duty in this case. Its finding that this plan is just and reasonable is not challenged here except on the basis of Michigan law. When stockholders are given what it is just and reasonable they should have, the Interstate Commerce Act does not permit state law to impose greater obligations on the financial structure of the merging railroads with consequent increased calls upon their assets or earning capacity.

We therefore hold that no rights alleged to have been granted to dissenting stockholders by state law provision concerning liquidation survive the merger agreement approved by the requisite number of stockholders and approved by the Commission as just and reasonable. Any such rights are, as a matter of federal law, accorded recognition in the obligation of the Commission not to approve any plan which is not just and reasonable. In making that determination, those rights are to be considered to the extent that they may affect intrinsic or market values. While the Commission has found that what the appellants are given in this plan is just and reasonable, the record indicates that it may have declined to consider these claims, even if they are found to have some effect on the intrinsic value of the stock, because it thought it lacked jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we cannot be sure that in arriving at its conclusion that the plan was just and reasonable it did not exclude some factors that it should consider under the views set out in this opinion. We therefore reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Commission for reconsideration under the principles herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice REED took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

Notes

1. Section 5 as amended provides in part as follows:
2. For pertinent provisions of § 5 and § 20a, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 5, 20a, see notes 1 and 15 respectively.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 47, 28 U.S.C.A. § 47.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 47a, 28 U.S.C.A. § 47a; 28 U.S.C. § 345, 28 U.S.C.A. § 345.
5. Act of September 18, 1940, 54 Stat. 898.
6. Act of February 28, 1920, 41 Stat. 456.
7. 'It is manifest * * * that the act made a new departure. * * *' Chief Justice Taft, in Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 585, 42 S.Ct. 232, 236, 66 L.Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. 1086.
8. In Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 478, 44 S.Ct. 169, 172, 68 L.Ed. 388, 33 A.L.R. 472, in referring to the Wisconsin case, 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. 1086, and the New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 43 S.Ct. 270, 67 L.Ed. 605, the late Chief Justice said: 'In both cases it was pointed out that the Transportation Act adds a new and important object to previous interstate commerce legislation which was designed primarily to prevent unreasonable or discriminatory rates against persons and localities. The new act seeks affirmatively to build up a system of railways prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic of the country. It aims to give the owners of the railways an opportunity to earn enough to maintain their properties and equipment in such a state of efficiency that they can carry well this burden. To achieve this great purpose, it puts the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under the fostering guardianship and control of the Commission which is to supervise their issue of securities, their car supply and distribution, their joint use of terminals, their construction of new lines, their abandonment of old lines, and by a proper division of joint rates, and by fixing adequate rates for interstate commerce, and in case of discrimination, for intrastate commerce, to secure a fair return upon the properties of the carriers engaged.'
9. § 407(4), 49 U.S.C.A. § 5(4).
10. § 407(6)(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 5(6)(a).
11. § 407(8), 49 U.S.C.A. § 5(8).
12. See, for example, report and recommendations by the President's Committee of Six, appointed September 20, 1938, whose report dated December 23, 1938, is considered part of the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 1940.
13. See note 1, supra.
14. The Act itself included a statement of the 'National Transportation Policy' in these terms: 'It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions;-all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.' 49 U.S.C.A. preceding section 1.
15. Repeated recommendations of the Commission that the federal government occupy the field of regulation of railroad security issues and assumption of obligations were followed in 1920 by addition of § 20a to the Interstate Commerce Act (§ 439 of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 494).
16. For text of § 5(11) see note 1.
17. For text of § 20a(7) see note 15.
18. In an early case (Pittsburgh & W.V.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 54 App.D.C. 34, 293 F. 1001, 1004, appeal dismissed 266 U.S. 640, 45 S.Ct. 124, 69 L.Ed. 483) in which the constitutionality of § 20a had been upheld, the Court said: 'If 'a fair return on capital devoted to the transportation service' (New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 189, 43 S.Ct. 270, 273, 67 L.Ed. 605) was to be insured the railway companies, and at the same time proper service and equitable rates accorded the public, the supervision of the issuance of stock, the incurring of bonded indebtedness, the extension and consolidation of railway lines, becomes of the utmost importance. Without this power to supervise the issue of stocks and bonds, and thus limit the dividend and interest obligations of the carriers, as well as the expenditures in extensions and improvements, the fixing of adequate rates to insure a just return to the carrier, and at the same time equitable protection to the public, would be impossible. * * *'