Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 4
IV. NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK[edit]
WE have so far been dealing primarily with the methods of diplomacy. During the old regime both the methods and the general policy of diplo- matic action were controlled by the secret coun- cils of the monarch and of a few ministers. With the growth of representative government public opinion began to concern itself more directly with foreign affairs. There grew up gradually, al- though with many relapses and with many breaks of continuity, a consensus that while the methods of diplomatic action might be secret, the general trend of policy should regularly be laid before the representatives of the people who should also be informed of any individual action involving the responsibilities of the nation. When, therefore, in contemplating the history of the last one hun- dred years, secret diplomacy is spoken of in con- demnatory terms, the attempted secrecy of na- tional foreign policy, rather than of methods, is usually thought of. When important engage- ments are undertaken which involve the nation in
responsibility to others, particularly for the use of armed forces; when by a series of specific acts a tendency is given to foreign policy which is not avowed to the representatives of the people; then there exists secret diplomacy in a reprehensible sense. A further method of concealment works through a false statement of motives. Often nar- rowly selfish action has been camouflaged with the avowal of noble aims and high ideals; or there has been fencing for position in order that at the be- ginning of a war the opprobrium of being the assailant could be thrown on the other party. Undoubtedly sometimes statesmen may persuade themselves of the presence of high motives in matters in which their specific action or that of their successors, working with the same materials, takes on a contrary direction.
At the conclusion of the Crimean war, Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Clarendon (March 1, 1867) as follows:
"... the alliance of England and France has de- rived its strength not merely from the military and naval power of the two states, but from the force of the moral principle upon which that union has been founded. Our union has for its foundation resistance to unjust aggression, the defence of the weak against the strong, and the maintenance of the existing balance of power. How, then, could we combine to become un
provoked aggressors, to imitate in Africa the partition of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of Egypt for England? And, more especially, how could Eng- land and France, who have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire, turn round and wrest Egypt from the Sultan? A coalition for such a purpose would re- volt the moral feelings of mankind, and would certainly be fatal to any English Government that was a party to it. Then, as to the balance of power to be main- tained by giving us Egypt, but we do not want the bur- den of governing Egypt, and its possession would not, as a political, military, and naval question, be con- sidered, in this country, as a set-off against the posses- sion of Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all these countries by the general influence of our com- merce, but let us all abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call upon us the condemnation of all other civilized nations."
This program of liberal principles applied to for- eign affairs, of high-toned and high-minded di- plomacy, one reads with mixed feelings in view of the things which have come thereafter.
In the period between the Crimean and the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon pursued a policy, or a series of policies, which fitly illustrate the worst features of secret diplomacy. In 1858 Napoleon III obtained from Cavour a promise that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France. These arrangements, made without the knowledge
or the desire of the French people, involved Napo- leon in the war of 1859 and led to a fatal weak- ening of his position. In 1864 Napoleon se- cretly suggested to Prussia that she might take Schleswig-Holstein, thus greatly encouraging her to undertake the war of 1864. France at this time was under treaty obligations to Denmark which made such action doubly dishonest. When the war between Austria and Prussia broke out in 1866, Napoleon concluded a secret treaty with Austria which contained a bargain that he would assist Austria to recover Silesia in return for a cession of Venetia to Italy, to compensate the lat- ter for Savoy and thus to eradicate the evil ef- fects of the arrangement of 1858. As this treaty became known, it absolutely alienated Prussia from France. At the same time Napoleon had se- cretly demanded from Prussia the cession of the Rhenish Palatinate which belonged to Bavaria; this would mean of course that Prussia and France together would first have to take it from Bavaria. Bismarck secretly informed Bavaria of this demand and thus turned her decisively against Napoleon; so that he was enabled to make secret treaties of alliance not only with Bavaria but with Wurtemberg and Baden for their mili- tary support in case of war. Napoleon had thus
managed unwittingly to bring about the coalition of German states which proved disastrous to him in 1870. Had the French government known of these three German treaties, it would probably have avoided war; as it was, France did not know that she would have all Germany against her. In 1866 Napoleon, through Benedetti, submitted to Bismarck a draft treaty according to which, in case the French Emperor should decide to send his troops to enter Belgium, the King of Prussia would grant armed aid to France and support her with all his forces, military and naval, in the face of and against every other power which might in this eventuality declare war. Though this draft treaty, which became known in Great Britain and caused high excitement there, was not adopted in this form, a secret compact was made between France and Prussia in 1867, one article of which stated that Prussia would not object to the an- nexation of Belgium by France. The fact that both of these powers had signed the treaty of 1839, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, ag- gravates the noxiousness of this conspiracy. Early in 1870 Napoleon was secretly negotiating with Austria with a view to a joint war against North Germany. The negotiations were in prog- ress when the war of 1870 broke out. Probably
Bismarck was informed of what was going on and was therefore the more anxious to face at once what he considered an inevitable war. As already stated, Napoleon did not communicate to his responsible minister his decision to require of the King of Prussia the absolute assurance that no German prince should ever again be nominated for the throne of Spain. In doing so he put him- self in a position where Bismarck could manceuver him into a dilemma from which there seemed no exit except war.
This was done by the famous editing of the Ems dispatch through which, taking advantage of King William's permission to modify and eliminate, Bismarck gave to the report sent by the king the appearance that nothing further could be said between the king and the French envoy and that therefore the only alternative to the French was retreat or war. This act illus- trates one of the most terrible dangers of secret diplomacy in that just at the time when inflam- mable material is at hand in abundance, one word or phrase may give a decisive turn to develop- ments and force an issue, in a certain direction, without allowing a chance for calm consideration of all that is involved.
Bismarck considered that the unification of Ger
many required a war because only thus could the feeling of unity among the German people, until then divided into numerous small states, be molded into political oneness. But in bringing on the Franco-Prussian war, no matter how in- evitable he might consider such a struggle, he was too confident of his ability to play the part of a Providence and to cut short the slow proc- esses of historic development. Therefore, though he attempted to work in the interest of outstand- ing national factors, his policy was not of a na- ture to develop that public confidence in the aims of his nation on which alone a statesman can per- manently build. His was the diplomacy of au- thority, often announcing its aims with great frankness, indeed, but always retaining the old method so that the public mind remained often in the dark. His politics directed German devel- opment into a dangerous course. He abhorred German disunion, but tried to cure it with means too forceful and artificial. The solutions brought about further problems. The taking of Alsace- Lorraine was the cause of future war. In 1871, Bismarck offered Mulhouse to Switzerland se- cretly, but the gift was declined. In the years after 1871, Bismarck always threatened Parlia
ment with the danger of war whenever he wanted to put anything through.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1878, being in its na- ture a conflict about the merits of which only vague ideas could be current among the Western nations, produced a whole nest of secret treaties.. The treaty of San Stefano itself was kept secret by Russia and Turkey. The British Foreign Sec- retary in a diplomatic note which was much ad- mired at the time, demanded that the treaty must be submitted to the European powers.
Meanwhile a second secret treaty had been made between Russia and Austria wherein, as is cus- tomary in such transactions, "compensations" were distributed out of property belonging to neither of the contracting parties, at the cost of somebody else; it was agreed that Austria should have Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile the British Foreign Office, though it had just de- claimed in indignant tones against the secret terms of San Stefano, made an agreement, equally secret, with Russia (May 30, 1878), concerning the points on which Great Britain would insist in the final adjustment. Through the wrongful action of an employee of the Foreign Office this agree- ment leaked out and a summary of it was pub
lished on May 31st. When questioned in the House of Lords, the Marquis of Salisbury, who at all times had a well-deserved reputation for sincerity, nevertheless qualified the statement in the Globe as "wholly unauthenticated and not de- serving of any confidence on the part of the House of Lords.'* The full text of the agreement was published by the Globe on June 14th, and when challenged by Lord Rosebery concerning his dementi, Lord Salisbury calmly stated: "I de- scribed it as unauthentic simply because it was so, and because no other adjective actually described it, and I shall be able to state why I so described it." The explanation which followed was, how- ever, quite lame, and consisted mainly in stating that the document as published did not give a com- plete view of the situation. The impression pro- duced by these tactics was far from favorable. Lord Granville, with a great deal of justice, wanted to know "where the House of Lords would have been had it not been for the immoral action of the man who gave the secret treaty to the news- paper. They would have had blue books and cop- ies of instructions, protocols and other docu- ments, but they would have been perfectly duped as to the way in which the government had actu- ally proceeded."
But there followed another, a fourth secret treaty, growing out of the Turkish situation, an agreement between Great Britain and Turkey con- cluded on June 4th, at Constantinople. As a re- sult of erroneous information having been tele- graphed from Constantinople by Mr. Layard, the British envoy, to the effect that in spite of the armistice the Russians were moving on Constan- tinople, a large war credit was voted in the Brit- ish House, although against the opposition of the Liberals under Gladstone and Bright. Orders were also given to the Indian Government to send troops to Cyprus. A secret treaty was then con- cluded in which Great Britain received a protec- torate over Cyprus in return for the engagement on her part to protect the Asiatic domains of Turkey. Never was the blood of a nation with- out its own knowledge and consent risked in a more doubtful adventure than in this famous transaction of Lord Beaconsfield. Gladstone, on July 20th, analyzed the treaty as providing for three things: the occupation and annexation of Cyprus, the defense of Turkey in Asia against any attempt Russia may make ("to go two thou- sand miles from your own country, alone and sin- gle handed, in order to prevent Russia making war at any time upon Turkey in Asia"), and re
sponsibility for the government of Turkish terri- tory in Asia; and all that was undertaken without the consent and knowledge of the British people, to be done at their expense by the blood of their children. Mr. Gladstone concluded: " There is but one epithet which I think fully describes a covenant of this kind. I think it is an insane cove- nant.'*
Disraeli had formerly said of Palmerston: "With no domestic policy, he is obliged to divert the attention of the people from the consideration of their own affairs to the distraction of foreign politics. His scheme of conduct is so devoid of all political principle that when forced to appeal to the people, his only claim to their confidence is his name." The same language could with equal justice have been applied to Beaconsfield himself. His speeches in defense of his foreign policy are usually a superficial appeal to imperialist passion, and deal in such phrases as "What is our duty at this critical moment?" "To main- tain the empire of England." (Loud cheers.) "Empire" is taken for granted as covering every- thing desirable, but the actual relationship of these adventurous foreign policies to the welfare and true development of the English people is never reas oned out. While Beaconsfield had opposed the first Afghan war, he readily changed his views when he came into power and began the second war in 1878 on the avowed ground that the Ameer had refused to receive a British mission. But with a sudden change of tactics, at a dinner at the Man- sion House on November 9, Lord Beaconsfield sol- emnly announced that the war had been made be- cause the frontier of India was ' ' a haphazard and not a scientific one." Yet a little before, when condemning the first Afghan war, he had de- scribed the frontiers of India as "a perfect bar- rier." He did not give to any organization of public opinion a chance to influence him in this matter, or even to be heard. On December 9, Lord Derby said in the House of Lords: "We are discussing, and we know we are discussing, an issue upon which we have no real or practical in- fluence. ' '