Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 8
VIII. THE SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR[edit]
WHILE the war lasted, the demands of self -pro- tection required the careful concealment of nego- tiations and policies from enemy knowledge. But though it is easy to understand the need of se- crecy at such a time, yet the spirit displayed in these negotiations had but little in common with the ideals professed in the same breath. More- over, there was a lack of complete sincerity among the Allies themselves, and particularly was there a concealment from some of them of important facts and agreements affecting their interests. How- ever, the most baneful effect of secret diplomacy during the war is found in the undermining of pub- lic confidence in a moral foundation of public ac- tion. As Lord Loreburn says: "It was not wholesome that while our people were stimulated to unparalleled exertions by a parade of lofty mo- tives there should be at the same time in existence agreements of this kind, of which no public men- tion could be made, and from which little has re- sulted except the right of foreign Powers to demand their fulfilment on our part." That at a time when the people in the vast armies were actually fighting for ideals of freedom and peace, common to humanity, the chief care of responsi- ble statesmen should have been the division of prospective spoils, did certainly not lay solid foundations for peace.
Japan in her action with respect to Shantung and in secretly making the twenty-one demands on China, was first in the attempt to utilize the great struggle for narrowly selfish gain, in this case not entirely at the expense of the enemy but of a neutral and of her allies. Nor did other gov- ernments keep themselves free from the tempta- tions of prospective conquest, with the risk of making war interminable and putting the world face to face with revolution, anarchy and famine. As early as February, 1915, the Russian Foreign Minister informed the French and British am- bassadors of the territorial acquisitions which Russia desired to make through the war, includ- ing a great part of Turkey in Europe and in Asia. The French and British Governments expressed their readiness to agree, provided a number of claims made by France and England were satis- fied. Italy entered the war, as is well known, on condition of her claims for territorial annexations being satisfied. She agreed to the Russian de- mands on the same condition.
On March 9, 1916, the Russian Foreign Minister instructed the Russian Ambassador at Paris to the following effect: "It is above all necessary to demand that the Polish Question should be ex- cluded from the subjects of international negotia- tion, and that all attempts to place Poland's fu- ture under the guarantee and control of the Powers should be prevented." Thus did the Rus- sian Government attempt secretly to lock the door against any chance of Poland regaining her lost national rights. The entry of Roumania in 1916 led to additional arrangements. These agree- ments were kept strictly secret and the millions who were laying down their lives in the war had no conception of this intricate web of bargains.
An effort to settle at a time when the Allies were united in their main aim in the furnace heat of the war, questions which might divide them when peace had come in sight, could be under- stood; and that such agreements should be kept secret during the war, might have been consid- ered a necessity. However, the necessity of war in this case was stretched to cover arrangements which in themselves went diametrically contrary to the publicly professed principles for which the
war was being fought, and gave rise to the just suspicion that in several cases at least, very spe- cific advantages had been the controlling incen- tive for entering the war. But these agreements have aroused the greatest resentment because they were in several cases directed against the inter- ests of third parties, and particularly because when the United States was making its enormous and unselfish sacrifices, these treaties were kept from its knowledge. That the American Govern- ment should not have been informed of the secret treaties made at the instance of Japan in which American interests were most seriously affected, and that just after these agreements had been concluded the statesmen who had been closely con- nected with acceding to these arrangements on the part of Great Britain, at the price of the British control of the islands of the South Pa- cific, came to the United States to stimulate the practical devotion there to the cause of the Al- lies, is a fact that will unfortunately help to give munition to those who are unfavorable to any real friendly understanding between the two great English-speaking powers. The secret commer- cial policy pursued by Great Britain during the war is also justly subject to severe criticism as giving food and subsistence to the growth of deep suspicion on the part of even the most faithful of friends.
The secret treaties relating to the division of territories in Europe did not come to the knowledge of the public until 1918. At that time they were republished by one or two British papers, but were suppressed by the remainder. The treaties were, however, distributed in innumerable copies by their own governments among the troops of the Central Powers in order to stimulate them to fight in a spirit of self-defense. It is reported from various reliable sources that the Slovenes were the most eager to fight, of any part of the Austrian army, after the Pact of London had become known to them, with its various promises to Italy.
The secret assurances which had been given to Italy in the Compact of London were probably the cause of prolonging the war, with its enormous slaughter, for more than a year. In the Spring of 1917, secret negotiations were pursued between the Emperor of Austria, the President and Premier of Prance, and the British Prime Minister. The intermediaries in these negotiations were the Bourbon Princes Sixtus and Xavier, brothers of the Empress of Austria. The negotiations were carried on from Switzerland with a confidential envoy of the Emperor of Austria. Only the Emperor, the Empress and the Duchess of Parma were in the secret. Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs at this time, at first knew only of the general fact, not of the details. A note of Count Czernin, with a secret personal note written by the Emperor, were brought to Prince Xavier and taken by him to Paris. The proposals in Count Czernin's note related to the restoration and indemnification of Belgium, and the German renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine, which "Austria-Hungary naturally would not oppose." Count Czernin stated that Austria-Hungary could not make a separate peace; that it had no idea of crushing Servia, but needed guarantees against such affairs as led to the murder at Sarajevo; that Austria-Hungary had no desire of crushing Roumania, etc. The secret addenda made by the Emperor, without the knowledge of Count Czernin, stated: "We will support France and exercise pressure on Germany with all means [in connection with Alsace-Lorraine]. We are absolutely not in Germany's hands; it was against Germany's will that we did not break with America."
When President Poincaré received the Prince's report he stated that the secret note afforded a basis for discussion, that he would communicate the two notes, with arrangements of absolute secrecy, to the Premier, and inform the Czar by personal letter, as well as the King of England, and Mr. Lloyd George, "who is a discrete man." But the President thought that Italy would be the stumbling block. After this interview the Princes proceeded to Vienna for a personal interview with the Emperor, which took place on the night of March 23rd. The Emperor discussed the whole situation, saying that Servia was naturally the friend of Austria, and that all that Austria needed was the suppression of revolutionary propaganda there. He stated that one of the Entente Powers was secretly conversing with Bulgaria; Bulgaria does not know that the secret has leaked out. "It has not much importance, because all these dreams of empire of the East will have to end in the status quo, or very nearly that." Count Czernin later joined in the conversation, which is described as "rather glacial." He expressed his belief that peace must be made at any price, and that it might be necessary for Austria to secure a divorce from Germany because the latter would never abandon Alsace-Lorraine. After a second visit, the Emperor
gave Prince Xavier an autographed letter, en- joining absolute secrecy because "an indiscre- tion would force him to send troops to the French front." The autographed letter of Emperor Charles, dated March 24th, contains the following proposals: That he will support the just French claims to Alsace-Lorraine by all means, using all his personal influence with his allies; Belgium and Servia are to be restored to full sovereignty; Bel- gium is to secure indemnities for her losses; and Servia is to have access to the Adriatic Sea. On the basis of this letter, discussions took place among the men concerned in France and in Eng- land. But Italy remained the obstacle.
Another trip was taken by Prince Xavier to Vienna, where he met the Emperor on May 8th. The question now was, What compensations should Austria receive for ceding its territory to Italy in accordance with the Pact of London? Count Czernin joined the meeting and on the following day prepared a memorandum, which was based upon the principle, "Austria-Hungary can cede no territory without compensation; but if the ter- ritorial question is arranged, then a separate peace with the Entente might be concluded." When the matter was taken up again at Paris, the Italian difficulty remained. M. Ribot strongly
adhered to the idea that without Italy, no result could be had. Meanwhile, the unsuccessful Ital- ian offensive of July, 1917, had supervened, and the war had to go on for another sixteen months, although the acceptance of the proposals of the Emperor would undoubtedly have brought it to an early end.
Count Czernin has given in his book, In the World War, an unimpassioned and coldly-bal- anced view of the diplomacy of the time. He does not relate the details of the secret negotiations of 1917, but he evidently did not approve of the man- ner in which they were carried out because their effect was to suggest to the Entente a willingness of Austria-Hungary to separate from her allies, without strengthening her position in any way. In a letter written to Count Tisza in the summer of 1917, Czernin said: "It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully. Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not carrying it out; we should lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing either in London or Paris. ' '
The policy pursued by Japan throughout the war made use of all the devices of secret diplo- macy for the attainment of ends narrowly na
tional. After having possessed herself of Tsing- tau, with a marked cold-shouldering of her Brit- ish allies, Japan set about an attempt to arrange things in China so that no effective resistance might be offered there to Japan's expansionist desires. In January, 1915, the Japanese minis- ter in an interview with the President of China, after enjoining the strictest secrecy on the pain of most disagreeable consequences, proposed the famous twenty-one demands. That it should have been attempted to dispose of matters so funda- mentally important, involving the national rights of a population of 350,000,000 people, through de- mands secretly forced upon a President, at a time when the national representative body did not function, that is one of the startling facts of mod- ern history. Strange as it may seem, the Japa- nese Foreign Office had apparently persuaded itself that secrecy could be maintained in a mat- ter of such transcendent importance. For when contrary to that expectation and in accordance with nature and with the salutary fact that, after all, such tremendous issues can not be thus se- cretly disposed of, the facts of the case began to leak out, categorical denials were made by the Japanese Foreign Office and by various embas- sies. In this case, those who had the right to
object to the disposal of important interests in which they themselves had a share, were not mere neutrals or outsiders but the allies of Japan, en- gaged in a life and death struggle at the time. As the twenty-one demands aimed at the estab- lishment of a predominant position in China through control of finance and armament, every other nation there interested would have been ad- versely affected by the proposed arrangement. The Chinese, though isolated, would not immedi- ately yield to the threatening attitude of their neighbor and the negotiations were strung out over months. Though they were assiduously kept secret, the nature of the transaction in general and in detail became quite well known outside, so that the results could not be kept hidden; yet the whole procedure constituted an affirmation that it was proper to deal with the destinies of a people in a secret council chamber, where the demandant backed by strong military forces, confronted the first official of a vast, peaceful but unmilitant na- tion, which would never in the world agree to such procedure and the resultant undertakings. Japan did indeed get certain concessions, but at the cost of making her diplomacy and policy universally suspected on account of the methods which had been used.
The policy of Japan at the time did not look with favor upon China associating herself with the Allies. Demarches which were made to bring about the entry of China into the alliance were negatived by Japan. This in itself might have been based on sound reasons, yet the real inward- ness of this policy was revealed at the time when the United States had broken off relations with Germany and when the Chinese Government in the days immediately thereafter was considering whether to follow the example of the United States. From a report of the Russian Ambassa- dor at Tokio concerning an interview with the Foreign Minister of Japan, which took place on February 10, 1917, we learn that the Minister for Foreign Affairs alluded to a rumor that an at- tempt might be made to induce China to join the Allies to the extent of breaking off relations with Germany. The Foreign Minister said in ef- fect: "It would be unwise and dangerous to at- tempt to bring China to the side of the Allies unless we can be sure that it can be carried through. This is, however, doubtful. Yet the Japanese Government is willing to undertake the task of inducing China to take the step. But be- fore making any such proposal, the Japanese Gov- ernment desires to be informed as to the attitude
of the Russian Government in the matter of Shan- tung and the Pacific Islands. Will the Russian Government support Japan at the Peace Confer- ence in these matters? ' ' The Russian ambassador was requested to get the opinion of his govern- ment on this point. In other words, in return for a commission paid largely by China herself, the Japanese Government was ready to permit that China should join the Allies in the Great War. It was assumed by the Foreign Minister that Japan's persuasion should be necessary to induce China to take this step; but in fact, at the very time when this conversation between the minister and ambassador was going on, the Cab- inet of China was in the all-day session from which resulted the decision to follow the United States in breaking off relations with Germany. This step was taken without compulsion, urgency or the promise of advantages, upon a careful con- sideration of the underlying conditions and equi- ties, without assurances of gain, merely in the ex- pectation of fair treatment as an ally and as- sociate.