Shivaji and His Times/Chapter 5
CHAPTER V.
Shivaji and Jai Singh, 1665.
§1. Jai Singh sent against Shivaji.
The failure of Shaista Khan and the sack of Surat caused bitter mortification to Aurangzib and his Court, and he decided to send his ablest Hindu and Muhammadan generals to the Deccan. Among the promotions and transfers on his birthday, 30th September, 1664, the Emperor appointed Mirza Rajah Jai Singh to put down Shivaji. Under him were deputed Dilir Khan, Daud Khan Qureshi, Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia, Ihtisham Khan Shaikhzada, Qubad Khan, Rajah Sujan Singh Bundela, Kirat Singh (a son of Jai Singh), Mulla Yahia Nawaiyat (a Bijapuri noble who had come over to the Mughals), and many other officers, with 14,000 troopers. (A. N. 868; Storia, ii. 120.)
After making the necessary preparations, and collecting his subordinates, Jai Singh left Upper India and crossed the Narmada at Handia on 9th January, 1665. He pushed rapidly on, never wasting a day by halting, except when strong necessity compelled him. On 10th February he arrived at Aurangabad, where Prince Muazzam was holding Court as viceroy of the Deccan. In three days Jai Singh finished the work of waiting on the Prince, receiving and returning the visits of the local officers and nobles, and settling some points connected with the expedition. Then, leaving Aurangabad on 13th February, he arrived at Puna on 3rd March and took over charge from Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who immediately afterwards (7th) started for Delhi, as commanded by the Emperor. (H. A. Paris MS. 110b, 112a, 114b, 116a.)
§2. Character of Jai Singh.
Jai Singh's career had been one of undimmed brilliancy from the day when he, an orphan of twelve, received his first appointment in the Mughal army (1617.) Since then he had fought under the imperial banner in every part of the empire, — from Balkh in Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, from Qandahar in the west to Mungir in the east. Hardly a year had passed during the long reign of Shah Jahan when this Rajput chieftain had not seen active service somewhere and received some promotion for conspicuous merit. His marked ability had found recognition in his being given the command of the Van or one of the wings in the Mughal armies led by princes or the blood in campaigns beyond India. Latterly he had commanded in chief. In diplomacy he had attained to a success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and patience, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, besides Urdu and the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindusthanis, that followed the crescent banner of the sovereign of Delhi.
Age and experience had cooled the impetuous ardour of his youth, — he had once led a forlorn hope, at the storming of Mau, — and he now employed stratagem in preference to force, and bribe in preference to war. His foresight and political cunning, his smoothness of tongue and cool calculating policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness, and impolitic chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput character.
And now this veteran of a hundred fights donned his armour at the age of sixty to crush a petty chieftain, who in less than ten years had grown great enough to baffle all the resources of Bijapur and to challenge the prestige of the empire of Delhi.
§3. Jai Singh's anxieties and jar-sighted preparations.
It was, however, with no light heart that Jai Singh*[1] set himself to the task of subduing Shivaji, against whom Bijapuris and rival Maratha chiefs, Shaista Khan and Jaswant Singh, had toiled in vain. The Deccan had been the grave of many a reputation, and he had the failures of his predecessors before him. Shiva had already established a name for stratagem, and his Mavles had measured swords with the best regular troops on more than equal terms. Then, again, there was the likelihood that the arrival of a large Mughal force in the Deccan would alarm Bijapur and Golkonda and throw them into the arms of Shiva to make a common cause against the invader from the north. Jai Singh, therefore, could not give undivided attention to the Marathas: he had to keep an eye on Bijapur too. The problem before him was no easy one. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Not for a moment, in day or night, do I seek rest or ease from being busy about the task on which I have been sent." We see from his letters how he employed every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how wide-awake and full of many-sided activity he was, how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his
miscellaneous Delhi MS.) and certain other letters given in Khatut-i-Shivaji (R.A.S. MS.) Some of these have been translated by me in the Modern Review. A.N. 887-907, though contemporary and authentic, has no independent value after the use of the above materials. Storia, ii. 120-125, 132-137, gives Manucci's personal experience of the war. Bernier, 190 (meagre.) The Marathi chronicles, Sabh. 38-46, Chit. 101-107, and Dig. 236-241, contain later and partly legendary accounts, but are our only authority for the doings of the Marathas. force so as to cause distraction to the enemy or deal a concentrated blow at a vital point.
In view of his two enemies, Jai Singh very wisely decided to take up a position between both, i.e., in the eastern part of Shivas dominion, whence he could also easily threaten Bijapur, Instead of pushing the war into the Western Ghats or the Konkan plaint further west. So convinced was he of the wisdom of this plan that when Aurangzib urged him to make a descent into Konkan, he strongly objected and succeeded in carrying his point. He knew that if he could strike fatally at the heart of the Maratha kingdom, the distant limbs would drop down of themselves.
§4. Coalition of all the enemies of Shivaji.
Secondly, he played skilfully upon the hopes and fears of the Sultan of Bijapur, holding forth the chance of reduction of tribute and removal of the Emperor's displeasure, if Adil Shah aided the Mughals and thus clearly proved his want of connection with Shivaji. Thirdly, he arranged to combine s against Shivaji all his enemies and distract his attention by attacks from all possible quarters. As early as January he had sent two Europeans named Francis Mile and Dick (or Diego) Mile,*[2] to the western coast with letters to the chiefs of the European settlements, inviting them to help the imperialists by obstructing Shiva, who had collected a fleet of his own. In May he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Shiva is quite negligent and free from anxiety about the west coast, if our ships from Gujrat make a sudden descent on his maritime possessions much booty can be gained." He also wrote to the Siddis of Janjira inviting their co-operation. (H. A. Paris 114a; Ben. 78a.)
In January he had sent his Brahman emissaries to various Deccani chieftains, to stir them up against Shiva. The zamindars of Karnatak were asked to help the Mughals by threatening Bijapur from the south; and agents from two such chiefs, namely Shivappa Nayak and the zamindar of Basavapattan, reached Jai Singh's camp with offers of service in April (Paris MS. 132a.)*[3] Towards the end of January an envoy from the Rajah of Jawhar had met Jai Singh at Burhanpur with a proposal to join the Mughal side; he had been conciliated, promised a mansab, and asked to send his son or brother with a contingent of troops. Every one who bore a grudge to Shivaji or envied the sudden rise of the Bhonslas, had been approached by the Mughal general's spies. Baji Chandra Rao and (his brother?) Ambaji Govind Rao More, — the family from which Shivaji had wrested Javli, — in response to Jai Singh's invitation, sent to him a Brahman named Mudha, asking for a safe conduct and money help, (middle of February.) These were given, and they reached his camp, along with Mankoji Dhangar, and were enlisted in the Mughal army (4th week of March) (Paris MS. 113a, 123a.) Similarly, Afzal Khan's son, Fazl Khan, solicited from Jai Singh a command and an opportunity of avenging his slaughtered father on Shivaji. (120b.) The adhesion of the petty Rajahs of the Koli country north of Kalian was secured through Niccolao Manucci, then chief of Jai Singh's European artillery. (Storia, ii. 132-133.)
Money and promises of high rank in the Mughal service were lavishly employed on Shivaji's officers to corrupt their loyalty (Ben. MS. 54b.), and with some success, as in February Atmaji and Kahar Koli and two other brothers of the former, who commanded 3,000 cavalry and were posted by Shiva at the foot of Purandar in charge of artillery, sent their agent to Jai Singh agreeing to desert to him. (Paris MS. 113a & b.) Rama and Hanumant, two captains descended from an ancient line of jagirdars of the Supa subdivision, were called away from the service of the Rajah of Chanda and employed under Jai Singh on account of their familiarity with the seat of war and local influence. (122a.)
Above all, Jai Singh concentrated all authority in his own hands, as an indispensable condition of success in war. The Emperor had at first given him the command of the field-operations only, while all administrative work, like the promotion, punishment and transfer of officers, the payment of the troops, and the regulation of jagirs, was left in the hands of the viceroy at Aurangabad. Jai Singh rightly insisted that in war there should be only one head, and that the 'man on the spot' should be given full authority, or else the work would suffer. The Emperor yielded to the argument and Jai Singh gained absolute civil and military authority alike. The commandants of the Mughal forts at Ahmadnagar and Parenda were also placed under his orders.
In Western Maharashtra with its heavy rainfall, campaigning is impossible during the monsoons. It was already 3rd March when Jai Singh reached Puna, and if he was to effect anything it must be done in the next three months. From his despatches we learn how he utilised every day, how he struck swiftly and hard, and how he followed up every success to the utmost. The mariner does not scan the sky for the storm-cloud with more anxiety than did this general for the herald of the monsoons which must interrupt his work in the middle and drive him into the forced inactivity of cantonments.
§5. The theatre of war described.
The Western Ghats form a long towering wall running north to south along the western side of the Deccan. They have thrown off a number of short spurs eastwards, every two of which enclose a valley, the bed of some stream rolling east to join its sisters and form the mighty rivers of the south, the Godavari and the Krishna. Towards the east the spurs end, the valleys widen out and merge in the vast plains of the kingdom of Bijapur. This land, almost locked among the hills, is the cradle of the Maratha kingdom. Open; and therefore vulnerable, on the east, it is almost impenetrable from the west on account of hills and jungles . And it is in the west that the historic forts of Shivaji are situated, almost every peak being crowned with the Maratha eagle's eyrie.
Going southwards from Junnar (which is 55 miles west of Ahmadnagar) and crossing the old Mughal frontier, we have first the valley of the Indrayani, overlooked by the hill-forts of Lohgarh and Tikona in the west and Chakan in the centre. Next comes the valley of the Bhima, in which Puna stands. Further south, across a long range, lies the valley of the slender brook Karha, with the cities of Saswad and Supa in the plain and the forts of Singh-garh on the western hills and Purandar on its southern rocky barrier. Beyond these hills lies the valley of the Nira, with the town of Shirwal on its bank and the forts of Rajgarh and Torna in the west and Rohira in the south-west.
Puna is almost the same distance (about 26 miles) from Lohgarh in the north-west and Singhgarh in the south. Saswad was admirably situated for attacking Purandar (6 miles south of it), Singhgarh and Rajgarh (18 and 24 miles in the west), and Puna (18 miles north-west of it), — while the widening plain east of it enabled cavalry to make an easy and rapid dash into Bijapur territory, or bar the path of reinforcements coming from that side. Even now five main roads meet at Saswad.
§6. Mughals set up outposts.
Jai Singh, therefore, with a true general's eye for the ground, made Saswad his base. Puna was strongly garrisoned. An outpost was established opposite Lohgarh to observe and blockade it and guard the road leading north to the Mughal frontier near Junnar. A flying column was organised to ravage the Maratha villages embosomed among the hills to the west and south-west of Saswad. On his eastern side he was quite secure from attack, from the nature of the ground, the position of Saswad close to the boundary line between Shiva's dominion and Bijapur, and the existence of a Mughal advanced post at Supa.
After arriving at Puna (3rd March), Jai Singh spent some days in settling the country and establishing outposts, which he regarded as the "first of the pillars supporting the work of this expedition." Qutbuddin Khan was sent with 7,000 cavalry with orders to guard the country from Junnar in the north to the foot of the hills (painghat) of Konkan opposite Lohgarh, to set up one permanent outpost facing Lohgarh (to be garrisoned by 3,000 men), another facing fort Nar-durg*[4] (which is also known as Dabhar) with a strong force, and other outposts to bar the paths usually followed by the enemy, and to be constantly touring through his jurisdiction and inspecting his outposts. Ihtisham Khan with 4,000 cavalry was left to guard Puna and its surrounding district. Between Puna and Lohgarh, a distance of some 28 miles, is a difficult pass, where a guard of 2,000 cavalry was posted. Sayyid Abdul Aziz was appointed with 3,000 horse to hold the thanah of Shirwal and prevent aid from reaching Purandar from the south. With him went Baji Chandra Rao, Ambaji Govind Rao (zamindars of Javli), and Mankoji Dhangar. who had joined the Mughals.
There was already another thanah at Supa, in charge of Sayyid Munawwar Khan of Barha, and some other Muslim and Hindu officers.
§7. Jai Singh opens the campaign.
Deciding, for the reasons given above, to take up his position at Saswad and besiege Purandar, Jai Singh marched out of Puna on 14th March. But he had immediately afterwards to make a long halt in its environs, as news came to him that Qutbuddin had gone to Junnar to escort treasure and Shiva had come to Lohgarh to make a dash into the imperial territory as soon as Jai Singh's back would be turned on Puna. Jai Singh quickly recalled Qutbuddin to his post opposite Lohgarh to watch Shiva's movements and resumed his march on the 23rd. Loni,*[5] some 12 miles east of Puna, was next reached; here a block-house or enclosure for sheltering the troops was built in 3 days, and a thanah established under Rama and Hanumant, with 300 cavalry and 300 foot musketeers, to guard the line of communication with Puna and the two roads which led to the imperial territory.
Arriving on 29th March at a place one day's march short of Saswad, he sent on Dilir Khan with the Vanguard and the artillery to cross the pass lying in the way, advance four miles up the hill, and then halt.
Next day the Rajah crossed the hill and pushed on to Dilir Khan's camp, leaving Daud Khan below the pass to see to the safe transit of the army up to noon. The rear-guard were to bring up the stragglers.
On this very morning (30th March) Dilir Khan went with the Van to select a proper place for encampment. In this reconnaissance he approached fort Purandar. A large body of Maratha musketeers, who occupied an enclosure in the waist of the hill — called vadi in the local language, — now came down and attacked the imperialists, who, however, routed them and captured the vadi. The houses there were burnt and the Mughal Van very boldly improved their victory by at once pushing on as near Purandar as they could and entrenching just beyond the fire of the fort-guns.
Jai Singh on hearing of it, at once sent up 3,000 of the troops of his command under Rai Singh, Kirat Singh, Qubad Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and other officers at a gallop. He also despatched an urgent order to Daud Khan to come to him, take charge of the camp, and enable the Rajah to go to supervise the siege. But Daud Khan, on hearing the news, had hastened to join Dilir Khan, without coming to Jai Singh.
The day was far spent; there was no high officer left to guard the camp, and so Jai Singh had to stay there perforce. He had already sent forward a party of pioneers and water-carriers, shot, powder, gun munitions, and entrenching tools for the use of Dilir Khan.
Next morning (31st March), Jai Singh carefully escorted the baggage to a permanent camp serving as a base, between Saswad and Purandar, only 4 miles from the latter. Then he reconnoitred the fort from the position of Daud Khan and Kirat Singh. It was not a single fort, but a fortified mass of hills hence to surround and closely blockade it was impossible.
§8. Purandar described.
Six miles south of Saswad rises the stupendous mountain mass of Purandar, the highest point of which towers 4,364 feet above sea-level and more than 2,500 feet above the plain at its foot. It is really a double fort, with an independent and very strong sister enclosure, named Vajragarh. on a ridge running out east of it. Purandar consists of an upper fort or citadel with precipitous sides all around and a lower fort or machi, 300 feet or more below it. The latter is a ledge running round the waist of the hill with many a winding, the entire circuit being four miles. On the north side the ledge widens out into a broad terrace, containing the barracks and offices of the garrison. This terrace is bounded on the east by the high spur named Bhairav Khind, which starts from the base of the steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called Khand-kala or the Sky-scraper)*[6] of the upper fort, and runs for about a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge, ending in a small tableland (3,618 feet above sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramala, (now called Vajragarh.)
This Vajragarh commands the machi or lower fort of Purandar on its northern and most important face, as the garrison has to live here. It was by seizing Vajragarh that Jai Singh in 1665 and the English in 1817 made Purandar untenable for the Marathas. Jai Singh, like a true general, decided to attack Vajragarh first. (Bom. Gaz. xvii. pt. iii, po. 428-435.)
§9. Mughals open the siege.
Dilir Khan with his nephews and Afghan troops, Hari Bhan and Udai Bhan Gaur, entrenched between Purandar and Rudramal. In front of him were the chief of the artillery, Turktaz Khan, and the party sent by Jai Singh. Kirat Singh with the 3,000 troopers of the Rajah and a few other mansabdars made a stockade opposite the north gate of Purandar. On the right were the trenches of Rajah Narsingh Gaur, Karn Rathor, Jagat Singh of Narwar, and Sayyid Maqbul Alam. Behind Purandar and facing its postern gate (khirfy) was the position of Daud Khan, Rajah Rai Singh, Md. Salih Tarkhan, Ram Singh [Hada ?] , Sher Singh Rathor, Raj Singh Gaur and others. To the right of this position were posted Rasul Beg Rozbhani and his Rozbhani followers. Opposite Rudramal, Chaturbhuj Chauhan with a party of Dilir Khan's followers entrenched, and behind these Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and some other officers.
Jai Singh removed his quarters from the camp to the foot of the hill to be nearer the besieged fort, while the soldiers pitched their tents along the hill-side. He visited the trenches every day, encouraged his men, and supervised the progress of the siege. At first all his efforts were directed to dragging guns to the top of the steep and difficult hill. It took three days to raise a gun, named Abdullah Khan, and mount it opposite Rudramal. In 3½ days more a second gun, named Fath Lashkar, was taken there. A third, named Haheli, was painfully approaching the summit. The incessant bombardment of the Mughals demolished the bases of the tower in front, and pioneers were sent to its foot to dig a hole underneath.
§ 10. Capture of Vajragarh.
At midday, 13th April, Dilir Khan's division stormed the tower and drove the enemy into an enclosure behind it, leaving on the field seven slain and four wounded. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan with a party of his own Rajputs. Next day, the victorious Mughals pushed on to the inner enclosure and tried to capture it by escalade. The garrison, oppressed by their fire, capitulated in the evening (14th April), left the fort, and were disarmed. But Jai Singh very wisely allowed them to return home in order to tempt the garrison of Purandar, by this example of leniency, to surrender instead of fighting to the last. The heroic leaders of the defence were chivalrously given robes of honour by Dilir Khan and Jai Singh alike. The imperialists lost 80 killed and 109 wounded, as the price of this success. (Paris MS. 1266.)
§11. Flying columns ravage Shivaji's villages.
The possession of Vajragarh was the stepping-stone to the capture of Purandar, or in Jai Singh's own language, "the key that would unlock Purandar." Dilir Khan now turned to the latter fort, while Jai Singh organised raids into the Maratha country, in order, as he wrote to the Emperor, to convince Shiva and the Sultan of Bijapur that the Mughal army was large enough to be able to spare troops from the siege, and also to prevent any concentration of forces round Shivaji by creating constant terror and disturbance in various parts of his kingdom. (Paris MS. 133a.)
There was also a secret reason for thus sending away certain generals from the siege-camp. He had some disloyal officers under him, whose presence was worse than useless. Daud Khan Qureshi was posted to watch the postern gate (khirki) of the fort; but after a few days it became known that a party of Marathas had entered the fort by that gate, without being opposed by him. Dilir Khan severely rebuked Daud Khan for his failure, and a bitter quarrel broke out between the two. Jai Singh then transferred Daud Khan to his own division and posted Purdil Khan and Subh-Karn Bundela opposite the postern. But matters did not improve: "SubhKarn did not at all give his heart to the work, but preferred above everything else to favour Shiva!" Daud Khan, too, was a source of mischief in his new station. He constantly declared that the capture of Purandar was beyond the range of possibility, and that the siege was a waste of men and money. His intention in talking in this way was, as Jai Singh detected, to discourage the commander-in- chief from heartily supporting the siege-operations, so that Dilir Khan would be left to bear the burden of the fight unaided and would have to retire with failure and disgrace. Jai Singh removed the mischief-maker from the camp by creating an independent flying column and sending him at its head, to make raids daily, or on alternate days, on different places in the district. (Ben. MS. 191b, Faiyyaz. 592.)
On 25th April, the flying column six thousand strong under Daud Khan, accompanied by Rajah Rai Singh, Sharza Khan (a Bijapuri general), Amar Singh Chandawat, Achal Singh Kachhwa (the principal officer of Jai Singh's household troops), and 400 of Jai Singh's own troopers,marched out with orders to enter the region of Rajgarh, Singh-garh and Rohira from two sides and "not to leave any vestige of cultivation or habitation, but make an utter desola- tion." (Paris MS. 133b.) At the same time Qutbuddin Khan and Ludi Khan were ordered to harry the district from the north and thus distract and wear out Shivaji.
Daud Khan's party arrived near fort Rohira on the 27th and burnt and totally ruined about 50 villages. A body of Mughal skirmishers entered four populous villages hidden among the hills, which had never before been visited by an enemy; the invaders soon received reinforcements, overcame the opposition, occupied the villages, razed them to the ground, and brought away many of the peasants and their cattle and other property as spoils of war. After a day's halt here, the Mughals marched towards Rajgarh on the 30th, burning the villages on the way. Without stopping to besiege the fort (for which they were not prepared), they sacked the villages around it, — the garrison watching the work of ruin from the shelter of the fort-guns, without venturing to make a sally.
The ground in the neighbourhood was hilly and uneven. So, the column retreated four miles to a level place, near the pass of Gunjankhora, where they encamped for the night, and next day (1st May), reached Shivapur. Thence Daud Khan marched towards Singh-garh and harried its environs, returning to Puna on 3rd May, by order of Jai Singh.
Meantime Qutbuddin Khan, in the midst of his raids into the passes of Pur-khora and Tasi-khora, near fort Kumari, was urgently recalled to Puna, where he joined Daud Khan. The cause of this new order was that Jai Singh had learnt that Shivaji had mustered a large force near Lohgarh, which required to be immediately broken up.
The two Mughal columns were, therefore, diverted to that side (the north-west.) Leaving Puna they halted at Chinchwad (10 or 12 miles north) on the 4th and reached Lohgarh on the 5th. When the Mughal skirmishers arrived near the fort, 500 Maratha horse and 1,000 infantry sallied forth and attacked them. But the imperialists held their ground, were soon reinforced, and routed the enemy with heavy loss after a severe fight. Then they burnt the houses on the skirt of the hill, taking many prisoners and cattle. The villages enclosed by the four forts, — Lohgarh, Visapur, Tikona, and Tangai, — were devastated, and much of Balaghat (highlands) and Painghat (lowlands) harried. Thereafter they returned, Qutbuddin Khan and his party taking up an outpost near Puna, and Daud Khan and his comrades rejoining the main army on 19th May, after a fortnight's absence.
§12. Maratha efforts to raise the siege.
Meantime the Maratha captains had not been idle, but tried hard to harass the Mughals and raise the seige. Early in April, Netaji Palkar, Shiva's kinsman and cavalry leader, made a dash on Parenda, but a Mughal detachment from Supa hastened in pursuit, and the Maratha host melted away at the news and offered no fight. Late in May, Qutbuddin Khan had to advance up to fort Urouda,*[7] to break up a gathering of the enemy of which he had got news. The villages on the way were plundered, and the enemy dispersed wherever they assembled round any of their forts. The hill of Lohgarh was scaled, and a body of Marathas on the top slain or routed, Daud Khan returning with 300 captives and nearly 3,000 cattle. Then, again, a body of 300 Maratha cavalry, who were sheltering at Narkot, were dislodged by a detachment sent by Qubad Khan, the new thanahdar of Puna (vice Ihtisham Khan deceased), the victors returning with the captured peasants and cattle.
But the Marathas did not invariably fail. As Jai Singh admits, "sometimes we have failed to prevent the enemy from accomplishing their hostile designs." (136b.) Khafi Khan is more explicit: " The surprises of the enemy, their gallant successes, attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and difficult passes, and burning of jungles, made it very hard for the imperialists to move about. The Mughals lost many men and beasts." (ii. 180.)
After the capture of Vajragarh in the middle of April, Dilir Khan advanced along the connecting ridge and laid siege to the machi or lower fort of Purandar. His trenches approached the tower of Khand-kala at the north-eastern angle of the fort. At first, the garrison made sorties to drive back the besiegers. One night they attacked Kirat Singh, who was quite prepared and repulsed them with slaughter. Another attack was made in a dark night on the trenches of Rasul Beg Rozbhani: he was caught napping, the guns in his trenches were spiked, and 15 of his soldiers wounded. But reinforcements, attracted by the din of battle, poured in from the neighbouring trenches, and the enemy were repulsed with loss. Next day there was a sharp skirmish over the removal of the corpses, in which the Mughals lost 8 men.
But Dilir Khan sat down before Purandar like grim Death, his men "doing in a day what could not be achieved elsewhere in a month."
§ 13. Outworks of Purandar stormed.
When, in the course of May, the Mughal trenches reached the foot of the two White Towers, which had been dismantled by bombardment, the garrison began to throw down lighted naphtha oil, leather bags full of gunpowder, bombs and heavy stones which effectually stopped the further advance of the Mughals. Jai Singh ordered a high wooden platform of logs and planks to be made, on which guns were to be mounted and parties of gunners and musketeers placed, to command the enemy's position. His first two attempts were frustrated: on the first occasion the upright posts had been just set up, on the second the cross-pieces had been joined, when the enemy burnt them down. On 30th May, however, the parts of the third tower were joined together in the rear and sent to the appointed place in front of the White Tower, in charge of Rup Singh Rathor and Giridhar Purohit, with orders to set up a defensive wall in front first of all, and then plant the two rows of posts. Next some Rajput marksmen were to climb to the top and keep the enemy down with their bows and matchlocks while the tower was being completed. This was done two hours before sunset.
Then the general's hands were forced by the impetuosity of his men. Before artillery was mounted on the wooden tower and the enemy opposite crushed, with only two hours of daylight remaining, some Rohila soldiers, without informing Dilir Khan, tried to storm the White Tower. The enemy crowded the wall in large numbers and checked them. But reinforcements rapidly arrived: the men of the trenches on both hands scaled the wall with ladders, and ran towards the enemy. Jai Singh's officer Bhupat Singh Puar, a commander of 500, was slain on the right side of the smaller White Tower, with several other Rajputs. On the left side Balkrishna Sakhawat and some Afghans of Dilir Khan carried on the fight. Just then the line of supports, under Achal Singh and Kirat Singh, arrived on the scene of battle from their shelter behind the wooden structure. After an obstinate struggle at close quarters, the Marathas lost heavily, retreated to behind the Black Tower (formerly known as Shah Burj or Royal Tower), and began to gall the Mughals by discharging bombs, kettles full of gunpowder. rockets, stones, etc. Finding further advance impossible, Jai Singh was contented with the capture of the three bastions made that day and ordered his men to dig trenches exactly where they had reached and to hold the White Tower, without attempting to push on to the Black Tower.
In the course of the next two days the wooden structure was completed and two small pieces of cannon were mounted on it. The enemy, unable to reply to this fire from a superior height, evacuated the Black Tower and another bastion near it and took refuge in a stockade adjoining the wall of the tower. But they could not show their heads. The stockade was untenable, and they retired to the trenches behind it. (Ben. MS. 187b— 189a.) Thus five towers and one stockade of the lower fort fell into the hands of the Mughals.
Purandar now seemed doomed. And, as if to complete its destruction, the Emperor had at Jai Singh's request despatched a train of very heavy artillery which were now on the way to the fort. The garrison had originally numbered only 2,000*[8] against at least ten times that number of Mughals, and they had suffered heavy casualties during two months of incessant fighting. Early in the siege they had lost their gallant commandant Murar Baji Prabhu.
§14. Death of Murar Baji Prabhu.
Taking seven hundred select men with himself Murar Baji made a sortie on Dilir Khan, who was trying to climb the hill with 5,000 Afghans and some more troops of other races. The Marathas dashed forward, mingled with the enemy on all sides, and there was severe fighting at close quarters. Murar Baji with his Mavles slew 500 Pathans besides many Bahlia infantrymen, and at the head of sixty desperate followers cut his way to Dilir 's camp.
His comrades were slain by the overwhelming body of the Mughals, but Murar Baji rushed straight on towards Dilir. The Khan, in admiration of his matchless courage, called upon him to yield and promised him his life and a high post under him. Murar indignantly refused, and was going to strike at Dilir when the latter shot him down with an arrow. Three hundred Mavles fell with him, and the rest retreated to the fort. But the garrison, with a courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas the Spartan, continued the struggle, undismayed by their leader's fall and saying," What though one man Murar Baji is dead We are as brave as he, and we shall fight with the same courage!" (Sabh. 43-44; T. S.)
§ 15. Shivaji negotiates for submission.
But at last the steady pressure of Jai Singh bore fruit. Purandar was closely invested, the garrison had been wofully thinned by two months of fighting, and now the capture of five bastions of the lower fort made the stronghold untenable. Its fall was only a question of time. Shiva found it futile to prolong the resistance. The families of the Maratha officers were sheltered in Purandar, and its capture would mean their captivity and dishonour. He had also failed to prevent the Mughal flying columns from ravaging his country. Failure and ruin stared him in the face wherever he looked.
With his usual foresight, he had for some time past been sending envoys to Jai Singh to beg for terms, but the astute Rajput did not take him seriously.*[9] Then, as the Mughal success became more and more evident, Shiva began to rise in his offer of tribute and forts as the price of peace; but his terms were not proportionate to the military advantage gained by Jai Singh, and were therefore uniformly rejected. The Mughal victory of 2nd June, and the impending fall of the lower fort decided Shivaji. He resolved to interview Jai Singh and offer fresh terms for peace with the imperialists, and if these were rejected he would make an alliance with Adil Shah by restoring Konkan and continue the war with the Mughals with renewed vigour. He had about 20th May sent his Chief Justice Raghunath Ballal (Pandit Rao) on a secret mission to learn Jai Singh's terms, which were that Shiva must come in person and make an unconditional surrender, after which imperial mercy would be shown to him.*[10]
Shivaji next demanded and secured from Jai Singh an assurance, confirmed with solemn oaths, that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and return home in safety, whether his terms were accepted or not. This visit was to be made in strict secrecy, as "the Emperor had forbidden Jai Singh to hold any negotiations whatever with Shiva ."
§ 16. Shivaji interviews Jai Singh.
Raghunath Ballal returned to his master on 9th June. On the 10th he sent word that Shivaji would come next day. On the 11th, at 9 o'clock in the morning, while Jai Singh was holding Court in his tent at the foot of Purandar, Raghunath came in and reported that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a palki accompanied by six Brahmans only. Jai Singh immediately sent his secretary Udairaj and Ugrasen Kachhwa to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, otherwise he should turn back from the place. Shiva agreed to the terms in general and proceeded forward with the two officers. At the door of the tent he was welcomed by Jai Singh's Paymaster and ushered in. The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced Shiva, and seated him by his side, while armed Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacherous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal Khan!
Jai Singh had got up a little scene to conquer any lingering reluctance that Shiva might still have had. In anticipation of the Maratha chief's arrival he had sent word to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh, whose trenches were the most advanced, to be ready to deliver an assault on Purandar. After Shiva had entered, Jai Singh gave the signal, the Mughals attacked and captured the remaining part of the Khand-kala defences. The garrison made a sortie to check them, but were driven back with the loss of 80 killed and many wounded. The fighting could be distinctly seen from the interior of the Rajah's tent. Shiva then offered to surrender the fort in order to prevent the useless slaughter of his men. Jai Singh, therefore, sent his Mir Tuzuk, Ghazi Beg, to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh with an order to stop the fight and allow the garrison to depart unmolested. An officer of Shiva was sent with Ghazi Beg to order the garrison to capitulate. They begged respite for the night. (A. N. 903.)
§ 17. Terms of the Treaty of Purandar 1665.
Shiva had travelled without any baggage or retinue, and therefore Jai Singh lodged him in his office-tent as his guest. Up to midnight the two sides higgled for the terms of a permanent peace. But Jai Singh knew the strength of his position. As he wrote in his despatches to the Emperor, "I declined to abate a single fort. Gradually, after much discussion, we came to this agreement: — (a) That 23 of his forts, the lands of which yielded 4 lakhs of hurt as annual revenue, should be annexed to the empire; and (b) that 12 of his forts, including Rajgarh, with an annual revenue of 1 lakh of hun,should be left to Shiva, on condition of service and loyalty to the imperial throne."
Shivaji, however, begged to be excused from attending the Emperor's Court like other nobles and Rajahs, and proposed to send his son, as his representative, with a contingent of 5,000 horse, (to be paid by means of a jagir), for regular attendance and service under the Emperor or the Mughal governor of the Deccan. This was exactly the favour shown to the Maharana of Udaipur. As he pleaded with Jai Singh, "By reason of my late unwise and disloyal acts, I have not the face to wait on the Emperor. I shall depute my son to be His Majesty's servant and slave, and he will be created a Commander of Five Thousand with a suitable jagir.... As for me sinner, exempt me from holding any mansab or serving in the Mughal army. But whenever in your wars in the Deccan, I am given any military duty, I shall promptly perform it."
In addition to the above terms, Shivaji made another and a conditional engagement with the Mughals: "If lands yielding 4 lakhs of hurt a year in the lowlands of Konkan and 5 lakhs of hun a year in the uplands (Balaghat Bijapuri), are granted to me by the Emperor and I am assured by an imperial jarman that the possession of these lands will be confirmed in me after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 lakhs of hun in 13 yearly instalments." He was expected to wrest these lands from the Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops. (H. A. Ben. MS. 66b-67a.)
Here we detect the shrewdness of Jai Singh's policy in throwing a bone of perpetual contention between Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur. As he wrote to the Emperor, "This policy will result in a threefold gain: first, we get 40 lakhs of hun or 2 krores of Rupees; secondly, Shivaji will be alienated from Bijapur; thirdly, the imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Shiva will himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijapuri garrisons from them." In return for it, Shiva also agreed to assist the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur with 2,000 cavalry of his son Shambhuji's mansab and 7,000 expert infantry under his own command. (Ben. MS. 70a & b.)
§ 18. Shivaji receives Mughal favours.
Dilir Khan was greatly offended at this pacific end of the siege, which robbed him of the chance of military glory, and at Shiva's not having made him the intermediary of the Emperor's pardon. So he refused to move from his trenches or consent to an armistice. The politic Jai Singh now turned to soothe him. On the 12th, as the public did not yet know of Shiva's arrival, he was mounted on an elephant and sent with Rajah Rai Singh to wait on Dilir Khan, who, mollified by this attention, presented him with two horses, a sword, a jewelled dagger, and two pieces of precious cloth. Then Dilir Khan conducted Shiva back to Jai Singh, took his hand, and entrusted him. to the Rajah. The Rajah now presented Shiva with a robe of honour, a horse, an elephant, and an ornament for the turban (jigha.) Shiva, who had come unarmed, with cunning policy girt on the sword for a short time and then put it off saying, "I shall serve the Emperor as one of his devoted but unarmed servants."
That day (12th June) according to the agreement, 7,000 men and women, (of whom 4,000 were combatants), left Purandar, and the Mughals entered into possession of it; all the stores, weapons, artillery, and other property found within were attached by the Government. Mughal officers were sent with Shivaji's men to take charge of five other forts to be surrendered by the Marathas.
Some time before this, while Shiva had been sending Brahman envoys to Jai Singh, the latter with his usual foresight had written to the Emperor begging him to send to him a gracious imperial farman (letter) addressed to Shiva. This was to be delivered to Shiva in the event of his making submission. By a happy coincidence the farman and an ordinary robe of honour sent by the Emperor arrived on the day following Shiva's surrender. By the Rajah's advice he followed the Court etiquette, advanced six miles on foot to welcome the jarman on the way, and put on the robe of honour. (A. N. 904; but I doubt its accuracy here, as Jai Singh is silent about this episode.)
On the 14th Shiva was presented by Jai Singh with an elephant and two horses, and sent away to Rajgarh with Kirat Singh, after paying a ceremonious visit to Daud Khan. As he begged hard for the full suit of tyielat (robe of honour) worn by Jai Singh, the latter presented it to him.
Reaching Kondana at noon of the 14th, Shivaji delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and left for Rajgarh, where he arrived on the 15th. On the 17th he sent away Shambhuji from Rajgarh, in charge of Ugrasen Kachhwa and they arrived in Jai Singh's camp on the 18th. The Maratha forts surrendered to the Emperor by the treaty of Purandar (A. N. 905) were: — in the Deccan: (1) Rudramala or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondana, (4) Rohira, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isagarh, (7) Tanki, (8) Tikona; in Konkan : (9) Mahuli, (10) Muranjan, (11) Khirdurg, (12) Bhandardurg, (13) Tulsi-khul, (14) Nar-durg, (15) Khaigarh or Ankola. (16) Marg-garh or Atra, (17) Kohaj, (18) Basant, (19) Nang, (20) Karnala, (21) Songarh, (22) Mangarh, (23) Khand-kala near Kondana.
These terms were reported to the Emperor for ratification, together with a letter of submission and prayer for pardon from Shiva (but really drafted by Jai Singh's secretary Udairaj) and a despatch from Jai Singh recommending the acceptance of the terms and the granting of a robe of honour to Shiva. They reached Aurangzib at Delhi on 23rd June and he was pleased to accede to them all. (Parasnis MS. No. 8.)
Thus, in less than three months from the date when he opened the campaign, Jai Singh succeeded in bringing Shiva down on his knees had made this haughty chief cede a large part of his dominions and consent to serve as a dependent vassal of the Emperor. It was a splendid victory. Shiva loyally carried out his promises: in the war with Bijapur he with his contingent rendered distinguished service under the Mughal banner and was mentioned in the despatches.
§19. Shivaji assists the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur.
The war with Shiva having been thus happily ended and the terms of the Treaty of Purandar having been faithfully carried out, Jai Singh now began to make preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, in order to prevent his large army from eating its bread in idleness after its recent victorious campaign against Shivaji. In September he received the Emperor's despatch accepting all his recommendations about Shiva together with a gracious farman (stamped with the impression of his palm) and a robe of honour for the latter. Jai Singh invited Shiva to come and receive these marks of imperial favour with befitting solemnity. "Shivaji, then in Adil-Shahi Konkan, immediately on hearing of it, travelled quickly and reached my camp on 27th September, 1665. On the 30th, I sent him, with my son Kirat Singh and my Paymaster Jani Khan, to advance and welcome the imperial letter on the way."
A little mummery was acted on this occasion, to satisfy the etiquette of the Mughal Court: "As Shiva had worn no weapon on his person from the day when he had come like a penitent offender to wait on the Rajah up to this date, Jai Singh now gave him a jewelled sword and dagger and pressed him to put them on." (A. N. 907.) The ceremony completed his restoration to the good grace of the Emperor. Jai Singh then dismissed Shivaji to enable him to gather his contingent of 9,000 men and make the necessary preparations for the coming campaign, offering him two lakhs of Rupees from the imperial treasury for the purpose. Shiva promised to join Jai Singh the day before he started.
At last, on 20th November, 1665, Jai Singh set out on the invasion of Bijapur,*[11] from the fort of Purandar. The Maratha contingent, 9,000 strong, under Shiva and his kinsman (khwesh) Netaji Palkar, — "whom the Deccanis regard as a second Shivaji," — formed the Left Centre of the Mughal army.
During the first month of the campaign, Jai Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From Purandar to Mangalbirah (Mangalvedhe), a fort 52 miles north of Bijapur, the invaders advanced without meeting with any opposition ; the Bijapuri forts on the way were either evacuated in terror or surrendered at call to Shiva's troops, who had been sent ahead by Jai Singh to capture them. Phaltan, about forty miles south-east of Purandar, was entered on 7th December; Thathora, 14 miles south-west of Phaltan, on the 8th; Khawan about a week later; and Mangalbirah itself on the 18th. For these services Shivaji received a letter of praise, a robe of honour, and a jewelled dagger from the Emperor. (Parasnis MS. No. 9.)
The invaders marched on, and then, on 24th December, they came into touch with the enemy for the first time. Next day, a Mughal detachment under Dilir Khan and Shivaji marched 10 miles from their camp and fought a Bijapuri army of 12,000 under the famous generals Sharza Khan and Khawas Khan and their Maratha auxiliaries under Jadu Rao [Ghorpare?] of Kalian and Vyankoji, the half-brother of Shivaji. The Deccanis evaded the charge of the cavaliers of Delhi, but harassed them by their "cossack tactics," dividing themselves into four bodies and fighting loosely with the Mughal divisions opposite. After a long contest, Dilir Khan's tireless energy and courage broke the enemy force by repeated charges, and they retired in the afternoon, leaving one general (Yaqut the Abyssinian) and 15 captains dead on the field and many flags, horses and weapons in the Mughal hands. But as soon as the victors began their return march to camp, the elusive enemy reappeared and galled them severely with rockets from the two wings and rear. The Maratha rear-guard under Netaji bore the brunt of the attack, but stood its ground well. When the Deccanis hemmed Neta round and pressed him hard, he called for reinforcements from Kirat Singh and Fath Jang Khan, and with their aid repulsed the enemy. Jadav Rao of Kalian received a musket shot, of which he died in five or six days. Shivaji and his brother Vyankoji fought on opposite sides
After a two days' halt, Jai Singh resumed his march on the 27th. The next day, after reaching the camping-ground in the evening, he detached a force to attack and expel the Bijapuri army from the neigh- bourhood. The fight soon became general, and Jai Singh himself had to charge the enemy's largest division. Shivaji and Kumar Kirat Singh, seated on the same elephant, led his Van and dashed into the Deccani ranks. After a hard fight, the enemy were put to flight leaving more than a hundred dead and many more wounded.
On 29th December, 1665, Jai Singh arrived at Makhnapur,*[12] ten miles north of Bijapur fort. Here his advance was stopped, and after waiting for a week, he was forced to begin his retreat on 5th January, 1666, as he found his fondly hoped-for chance of taking Bijapur by a coup de main gone. He was not prepared for a regular siege, because his eagerness "to grasp the golden opportunity" of attacking Bijapur while undefended and torn by domestic factions, he had not brought any big artillery and siege-materials with himself. On the other hand, Adil Shah had put the fort of Bijapur in a strong posture of defence; its walls had been repaired, large quantities of provisions and material laid in, its regular garrison augmented by 30,000 Karnatak infantry, and the country round for a radius of seven miles laid waste, drained of its water-supply, and denuded of its trees. At the same time he had sent a picked force under Sharza Khan and Siddi Masaud to invade the Mughal dominions and make a diversion in Jai Singh's rear.
On 27th January, the retreating Mughal army reached a place 16 miles from Parenda, and there halted for 24 days. Here we shall leave it, as the historian of Shivaji is not concerned with its operations any further.
§ 20. Shivaji fails at Panhala, 1666.
On receiving the unexpected check before Bijapur, Jai Singh looked round, to create a diversion. As he writes in a despatch to the Court, "At my request the Emperor had [on 25th Dec] sent a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger for Shiva, who was ready to co-operate at the siege of Bijapur, but I did not deem it expedient. Shiva said to me, — 'If you detach me, I can go- and capture for the Emperor Panhala, of which I know all the exits and entrances, while the garrison are off their guard. I shall raise so much disturbance in that district that the enemy will be compelled to divert a large force from their army to oppose me.' As his words bore promise of action, I sent him away on his promised errand." (H. A., Ben. MS. 84b.)
But there was a deeper reason for this step, as we learn from Jai Singh's secret correspondence. The unexpected failure before the fort of Bijapur gave rise to dissensions in the Mughal camp. The party hostile to Jai Singh, which was led by Dilir Khan,*[13] ascribed his ill-success to the lukewarmness or treachery of Shivaji, and demanded that he should be imprisoned as a punishment. Jai Singh saw the danger in which Shiva stood among the defeated and sullen Mughal soldiery. To safeguard the liberty of the Maratha chief, and send him out of the reach of his enemies, he gladly accepted the proposal that the Maratha contingent should make a diversion in the western provinces of Bijapur. (H. A., l95a, 84b, 192a; hints only.)
Shiva left Jai Singh about 11th January, 1666. Five days later he reached the environs of Panhala, and delivered an assault on it three hours before sunrise. But the garrison were on the alert and offered a stubborn defence. A thousand of Shiva's followers fell down, killed and wounded. When the rising sun lit up the scene, Shiva at last recognised that it was madness to continue the struggle, and drew back sullenly to his own fort of Khelna [ Vishalgarh] , about 25 miles westwards. But his troops continued to ravage that quarter and succeeded in drawing and detaining there a force of 6,000 Bijapuris under Siddi Masaud and Randaula Khan. (H. A. 84b— 85a.)
The news of Shivaji's failure at Panhala reached Jai Singh on 20th January. The evil was aggravated by the desertion of Netaji. Taking offence with Shiva for some reason or other, — probably because he deemed his valuable services and gallant feats of arms inadequately rewarded, — Neta accepted the Bijapuri bait of 4 lakhs of hun and, deserting to Adil Shah, raided the Mughal territory with great vigour and effect. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such a man; and so he lured Netaji back (20th March) with many persuasive letters and the granting of all his high demands, viz., the mansab of a Commander of Five Thousand in the Mughal peerage, a jagir in the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire (as distinct from the ill-conquered, unsettled, ever- ravaged recent annexations in the Deccan), and Rs. 38,000 in cash. (H. A. 193.)
Netaji's defection at the end of January, 1666 coming so soon after the recent reverses, greatly alarmed Jai Singh. If Shiva were to do the same, the entire Maratha army would swell the enemy's ranks and the Mughal invaders would be crushed between the two. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Adil Shah and Qutb Shah have united in mischief, it is necessary to win Shiva's heart by all means and to send him to Northern India to have audience of Your Majesty." (94a.) The Emperor having consented to this proposal, Jai Singh set himself to induce Shiva to visit the imperial Court.
- ↑ * My account of this war is based upon Jai Singh's copious letters (Haft Anjwnan, Benares and Paris MSS., with a few extra letters in Faiyyaz-ul-qawanin), Aurangzib's letters (given in Paris MS. Suppl. 476, with two stray letters in a
- ↑ * Probably Mello, 'a family living in the Mughal country,' according to Manucci (ii. 144.)
- ↑ * The words Shivappa and Basavapattan are doubtful, the Persian MS. is incorrect.
- ↑ * In the Persian MS. the word may also be read as Tardurg or Taldurg. Not found in the map. I doubtfully suggest Talegaon Dabhada, at the eastern end of the ridge on which Lohgarh and Visapur stand.
- ↑ * The Persian MS. reads "Tubi (or Tupi) 5 kos from Puna towards Saswad, on the hill of the fort of Purandar." This would give some village near the Bapdeo Ghat, but there is none of the name in the map. I read Loni, which is about 12 miles east of Puna, but in a plain.
- ↑ * Molesworth, 2nd ed. 192, explains Khadkal as 'a rocky plateau.'
- ↑ * The Alamgir-namah gives Ur-drug. I suggest Urouda, 11 miles west of Puna. It may also have been Udai-durg.
- ↑ * Sabhasad, 42 — 43, gives this number, which is evidently an underestimate. Alamgir-namah, 903, says that the fort had 4,000 combatants left in it at capitulation.
- ↑ * "After the arrived of the imperial army near Pabal. Shiva's agents began to visit me, and by the time of my arrival at Puna they had brought two letters from him. But I gave no answer and sent them back in disappointment.... Then he sent a long Hindi letter with a trusted servant named Karmaji, who repeatedly entreated me to read the contents only once. In it Shiva offered to be loyal and to help us in a war with Bijapur as more likely to succeed than a war in his hilly and intricate country.... In reply I asked him... to enter the Emperor's service if he desired his life and safety." (Ben. MS. 54a.)
- ↑ * Shiva's next move was to send the Pandit Rao back with an offer to send his son to make the submission. Jai Singh declined. (Ben. MS. 55a.)
- ↑ * The invasion of Bijapur by Jai Singh and Shivaji: Hajt Anjuman, (Ben. MS.) 78a— 94a, 138b, 172b— 173b, 190b, 192a— 193b, 201b— 202a, 214a— 215a, 231a— 233b; Storia, ii. 141-142; A. N. 988-1021; B. S. 378-392; the narrative in Tarikh-i-Ali II. is useless, the sense being completely buried under the flowers of rhetoric. The Maratha writers are totally silent. For details about the war, see my History of Aurangzib, vol. iv. ch. xli.
- ↑ * In the Persian MS. the name may be read either as Makhanah or as Nagthana. The latter is a village 8 miles n. n. e. of Bijapur.
- ↑ * Manucci attests that Dilir Khan several times urged Jai Singh "to take Shivaji's life, or at least to give him (Dilir Khan) leave to do so. He would assume all responsibility, and see that the Rajah was held blameless." (Storia, ii. 137.) The English factory records state, "In a battle between the Mughals and this country people, Shivaji ran away, being afraid that Dilir Khan would put him to death, he having told the said wazir [Dilir] that he would take Bijapur in 10 days' time, upon which persuasion he set forwards with 20,000 horse, but to his cost he found the contrary, being forced quickly to retire." (Deccan News in F. R. Surat, vol. 104.)