Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Company

United States Supreme Court

257 U.S. 1

Smietanka  v.  Indiana Steel Company

No. 214  Argued: Oct. 14, 1921. --- Decided: Oct 24, 1921

SMIETANKA, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, v. INDIANA STEEL COMPANY.

ON CERTIFICATE FROM THIS CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

1. An action against a collector of internal revenue to recover taxes erroneously exacted by him, is based upon his personal liability and cannot be maintained against his successor in office who had no part in the assessment, collection or disbursement of the taxes. P. 4. Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33.
2. The statutory provisions for defence by the district attorney and for withholding execution against the collector and paying the judgment from the Treasury where the judgment contains a certificate of probable cause, etc., (Rev. Stats., §§ 771, 989) do not create a new statutory liability attached to the office and passing to successors. P. 4.
3. The Act of February 8, 1899, c. 121, 30 Stat. 822, providing that a suit against an officer of the United States in his official capacity shall not abate by reason of his death or the expiration of his term of office but may be allowed to be maintained against his successor, supposes a suit already begun against the officer in his lifetime. P. 5.

Certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals propounding questions arising upon the review of a judgment against Smietanka in an action to recover taxes exacted by his predecessor as Collector of Internal Revenue.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Ottinger, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for Smietanka.

Mr. William Beye, with whom Mr. K. K. Knapp and Mr. R. W. Campbell were on the brief, for Indiana Steel Company.

The action was properly brought against the collector who was in office at the time of the commencement of the suit. The United States has "enacted a system of corrective justice" by which the taxpayer is permitted "to sue the Government through its collector," and if the tax "was wrongfully exacted the courts will give him relief by a judgment which the United States pledges herself to pay." Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 85, 88; Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 720, 733.

The statute requiring the collector to pay the moneys collected by him into the Treasury took away the common-law action theretofore existing, and provided only a purely statutory remedy, which, while not in form, is in substance against the United States. Hubbard v. Collector, 12 Wall. 1, 11, 13; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236; Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 720, 732; Schoenfeld v. Hendricks, 152 U. S. 691; Kinney v. Connat, 166 Fed. 720; United States v. Frerichs, 124 U. S. 315; Kings County Savings Institution v. Blair, 116 U. S. 200, 205; Amson v. Murphy, 115 U. S. 579.

The proper defendant is the collector in office at the time suit is commenced. Armour v. Roberts, 151 Fed. 846.

The pertinent statutes are, §§ 3220, 3219, 3224, 3226, 3227, 3228, 3210, 771, 3689, 989, Rev. Stats., and Act of February 8, 1899, c. 121, 30 Stat. 822. These remedial statutes should be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of their enactment.

In cases of this kind, the collector is merely the nominal defendant, and it would seem immaterial whether the suit was brought against the collector who collected the money or his successor in office, so long as the Government has an opportunity to defend. The question before the court is whether the United States has received moneys which properly belong to the plaintiff.

The ailments advanced in the opinions in Roberts v. Lowe, 236 Fed. 604; Philadelphia, H. & P. R. R. Co. v. Lederer, 242 Fed. 492; 239 Fed. 184, are not well founded.

 

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.