The American Democrat/On Commerce

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2255575The American Democrat — On Commerce1838James Fenimore Cooper

ON COMMERCE.

Commerce, in a general sense, is trade, but it is also usual to apply the word particularly to the traffick between nations. Navigation is not commerce, but a means of conducting commerce.

Commerce is merely an incident of civilized society, though there is always a strong disposition in commercial communities to treat it as a principal. The interests of commerce, in a general sense, depend on certain great principles, which ought always to be respected; but, as these interests, by their nature, are also liable to be influenced by the constant vicissitudes arising out of the fluctuations of trade, there is a strong disposition in those connected with commerce, to sacrifice all governing rules, to protect the interests of the day. This disposition is common to man, but it is more active in merchants, on account of the magnitude and precarious nature of the risks they run. The agriculturist who loses a crop, suffers an injury, more or less serious, that another year will repair; but the merchant who loses his adventures, is usually ruined.

It follows, that a community governed by men in trade, or which is materially influenced by men in trade, is governed without any fixed principles, every thing being made to yield to the passing interests of the hour, those interests being too engrossing to admit of neglect, or postponement.

It is a mistake to suppose commerce favorable to liberty. Its tendency is to a monied aristocracy, and this, in effect, has always been the polity of every community of merchants. Commerce is an enemy of despotic power in the hands of a prince, of church influence, and of hereditary aristocracies, from which facts it has obtained its reputation of sustaining freedom; but, as a class, merchants will always be opposed to the control of majorities.

The true office of commerce is to facilitate exchanges of articles between men, to the amount that their wants and interests require; but as every transfer of property leaves a profit with the merchant, he has a disposition to increase his gains, by pushing his transactions beyond the just limits of trade. This disposition is best checked by the penalties of bankruptcies, but, in a country like this, in which no such penalty exists, the consequence is to produce an unbroken succession of commercial reverses, that affect the value of all the property in the nation, almost periodically.

Commerce is entitled to a complete and efficient protection in all its legal rights, but the moment it presumes to control a country, or to substitute its fluctuating expedients for the high principles of natural justice that ought to lie at the root of every political system, it should be frowned on, and rebuked.

The merchant who is the immediate agent in paying the duties on goods, has no more claims than another, as the money eventually comes from the pocket of the consumer, and the factor is amply paid for his services in his profits.

All legislation affecting the currency, commerce and banking, in a country like this, ought to be limited, as far as circumstances will allow, to general and simple provisions, the nature of the institutions forbidding the interference that is elsewhere practised with advantage. A familiar example will show our meaning. In all commercial communities there is a commercial mart, or a capital, where exchanges are effected, cargoes disposed of in gross, and where all the great interests of trade concentrate, as the blood flows to and from the heart. In identified governments, like that of England, for instance, legislation may respect this natural tendency to concentration in commerce, and enact laws for its especial benefit and protection. Thus an English law may have an especial relation to the interests of London, as the mart that regulates the entire currency of the kingdom. But, on the other hand, in a government like that of America, there is a principle of diffusion, which requires that the legislation should be general in its application. New York and New Orleans, for instance, regulate the currency and exchanges of the whole country; but congress cannot pass a law to aid these legitimate efforts of trade, since any legislation that should favor New York at the expense of Philadelphia, in appearances even, would be opposed to the controlling principle of the compact. It follows, that the interference of the government with all such questions, in this country, should be unfrequent and cautious, since it possesses a power to injure, with very little power to benefit.

The real merchant is a man of a high pursuit, and has need of great general knowledge, much firmness of character, and of far-sighted views, to succeed in his objects. He is a principal agent in extending knowledge and civilization, and is entitled to a distinguished place in the scale of human employments. But the mere factor, who is the channel of communication between the producer and the consumer, in what is called a regular trade, has no more claims to this character, than the clerk who copies a treaty has a claim to be considered a negotiator.