The Copyright Act, 1911, annotated/Section 1

by Evan James Macgillivray

PART I.

Imperial Copyright.

Rights.

§1 (1)
Copyright1.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, copyright^[1] shall subsist throughout the parts of His Majesty's dominions to which this Act extends^[2] for the term herein-after mentioned^[3] in every original literary dramatic musical and artistic work^[4], if—

(a) in the case of a published^[5] work, the work was first published within such parts of His Majesty's dominions as aforesaid^[6]; and

(b) in the case of an unpublished work^[7] the author^[8] was at the date of the making of the work a British subject or resident within such parts of His Majesty's dominions as aforesaid^[9];

but in no other works, except so far as the protection conferred by this Act is extended by Orders in Council thereunder relating to self-governing dominions to which this Act does not extend^[10] and to foreign countries^[11].

"His Majesty's dominions to which this act extends."The Act will be in force [with the exception of provisions expressly restricted to the United Kingdom^[12] and subject to the right of a British possession to pass supplemental legislation relating to (i) procedure and remedies^[13]; (ii) works of authors resident in such possession; (iii) works first published in such possession^[14]] in—

(1) The United Kingdom^[13];

(2) All British possessions other than self-governing dominions^[15];

(3) Self-governing Dominions, that is to say, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland, if the self-governing dominion has by its legislature declared the Act to be in force therein (and such declaration has not been repealed ^[16]);

(4) Protectorates, including Cyprus, to which the Act may be extended by Order in Council ^[17].

Existing law.—The Act of 1842 relating to books extends throughout the British dominions, and the rights and remedies conferred by the Act are not affected by any colonial legislation ^[18], except in so far as any British possession may have passed an Act or Ordinance relating to works first published in such possession ^[19]. The Act of 1862 relating to artistic works extends to the United Kingdom only; and paintings, drawings and photographs are accordingly unprotected throughout the British possessions, except in so far as they are protected by colonial legislation ^[20]. The Acts relating to engravings and probably that relating to sculpture are also confined in their operation to the United Kingdom. Pictures which are first published in a book are, however, protected as part of the book, and therefore it has always been possible to obtain protection for drawings, paintings and engravings throughout the British dominions by first publishing them in the form of a book ^[21].

"Every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work."An attempt was made in Grand Committee of the House of Commons to strike out the word "original" on the ground that derivative works such as translations or engravings would be excluded. It is clear that the adjective is properly inserted here. "Original" as applied to a work merely indicates that it must contain some substantial feature which is not copied from a previously existing work. If a work is derivative and there is some novel feature which distinguishes it from the work from which it is derived, that novel feature constitutes the originality and receives protection, and the novel feature alone is protected in so far as the derivative work is concerned.

The reproduction of spoken words in the form of a written report, and the recording of musical sounds upon a perforated roll or gramophone record constitute in each case the making of an original work, the originality consisting in the new form in which the words or music are produced^[22].

All works protected in whatever form they are produced.An important feature of the new Act is that every literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work is protected without making any specified physical form of production a condition precedent to protection and, indeed, without demanding that the work shall be clothed in any physical form at all. Thus, a literary work will no longer require to be embodied in the form of a "book" before receiving statutory protection, and it may be protected even although it exists only in the form of spoken words which the author has not committed to paper.

Summary of different classes of works specifically protected.The following are the classes of works which are specifically referred to as receiving protection, but the Act is so framed that the list is illustrative and not necessarily exhaustive. The classes of works indicated in italics receive protection for the first time:—

Literary works—

Maps.

Charts.

Plans.

Tables.

Records, perforated rolls, &c.

Lectures—

Addresses.

Speeches.

Sermons.

Dramatic works—

Pieces for recitation.

Choreographic works.

Entertainments in dumb show.

Cinematograph productions.

Records, perforated rolls, &c.

Musical works—

Records, perforated rolls, &c.

Artistic works—

Paintings.

Drawings.

Works of sculpture—

Casts.

Models.

Works of artistic craftsmanship.

Architectural works of art.

Engravings—

Etchings.

Lithographs.

Wood-cuts.

Prints.

Photographs.

Condition precedent to the protection of a published work.In the case of a published work the sole condition precedent to protection will be first publication, which includes simultaneous publication (that is, publication within fourteen days of publication elsewhere^[23]), and such first publication must be made either—

(1) Within His Majesty's dominions to which the Act extends;

(2) Within a self-governing dominion in respect of which the Secretary of State has given a certificate that such dominion gives to British subjects generally rights substantially identical with those conferred by the Act^[24];

(3) Within a self-governing dominion in respect of which an Order in Council has been made extending the benefit of the Act thereto^[25];

(4) Within a foreign country in respect of which an Order in Council has been made extending the benefit of the Act thereto^[26].

The Crown has power by Order in Council to exclude from protection, under the above provisions, the works of subjects or citizens of any foreign country which does not give adequate protection to the works of British authors^[27].

The right of foreign authors to demand protection by first publication is based on Article 6 of the Berlin Convention, which provides that authors of non-union countries shall be protected throughout the union if they first publish in a union country^[28].

If the Crown ever exercises the power conferred upon it by sect. 23, it will be violating the treaty obligation contained in Article 6 of the Berlin Convention and in Article 3 of the Berne Convention.

Existing law.—Statutory protection in the case of books depends upon first publication within the British dominions or within a foreign country in respect of which an Order in Council has been made^[29]. First publication includes simultaneous publication^[30], but there is no latitude of fourteen days. Publication must be on the same day in order to be deemed simultaneous with publication elsewhere^[31].

In the case of serial works each part must be first published in order to secure copyright in that part^[32].

In the case of published books first publication is the only condition precedent to protection^[33].

Under the Fine Arts Act, 1862, statutory protection in respect of paintings, drawings and photographs does not depend on publication^[34]. Copyright vests on making, and is conditional upon the author being a British subject or resident within the dominions of the Crown. The copyright will cease if the work is first published outside the British dominions, unless protection is then given by international provisions^[35]. Under the Berne Convention and Act of Paris foreign artists are entitled to copyright under the Fine Arts Act, 1862, (1) in an unpublished work if made by a subject or citizen of a foreign country which is a party to the copyright union; (2) in a published work if first published in a foreign country which is a party to the copyright union^[36].

Condition precedent to the protection of an unpublished work.An unpublished work is entitled to protection if at the date of making the work the author was—

(1) A British subject (not being resident within a self-governing dominion which has neither adopted the Act nor given adequate protection to the works of British subjects generally)^[37];

(2) Resident or domiciled within His Majesty's dominions to which the Act extends;

(3) Resident or domiciled within a self-governing dominion in respect of which the Secretary of State has given a certificate^[38];

(4) Resident or domiciled within a self-governing dominion in respect of which an Order in Council has been made extending the benefit of the Act thereto ^[39];

(5) A subject or citizen of a foreign country in respect of which an Order in Council has been made extending the benefit of the Act thereto^[40];

(6) Resident or domiciled within a foreign country in respect of which an Order in Council has been made extending the benefit of the Act thereto^[40].

In respect of unpublished works it is of great importance to note (a) that the Act consolidates the whole law relating to copyright, and that the old common law right in unpublished works is expressly taken away from the author; (b) that a statutory definition of publication has been adopted which brings this country into line with the Continental acceptance of the meaning of publication.

One remarkable result of the abrogation of the common law right is that foreigners who do not become entitled to statutory protection under this section will obtain no protection in the nature of copyright for their published manuscripts, however secret and confidential they may be.

Provided the author possesses the necessary qualification as above indicated, all unpublished works receive statutory protection from the time they are created, that is to say, from the date of uttering in the case of a work orally communicated and from the date of making in the case of a work produced in permanent form. Letters, speeches, and sermons all fall within this principle, and thus the difficulties under the old law of determining the rights of those who deliver or report speeches^[41] or who write or publish letters are almost entirely swept away^[42]. In each case a copyright, which includes the exclusive right of publishing or delivering a speech or of publishing a letter, vests in the speaker of the speech or the writer of the letter. That copyright can only be assigned in writing, and therefore there can be no question of abandonment to the public or to the recipient of a letter.

Existing law.—Unpublished works, whether the works of British subjects or foreigners, and wherever situate, are protected by the common law from infringement in the British dominions^[43]. This common law right is a proprietary right, and gives the author and his representatives the exclusive right of multiplying copies of or publishing the literary or artistic matter in the work^[44]. This principle has been applied so as to protect the author's right in unpublished manuscript^[45], unpublished plays^[46] and lectures^[47], letters^[48], collected news distributed from a news agency^[49], unpublished drawings^[50], and paintings^[51], and unpublished photographs^[52]. Where any such things are reproduced or published without the consent of the author or his representatives, he can recover damages, possession of copies, and an injunction from any person who has dealt with the infringements, and this notwithstanding that he was ignorant of the infringement^[51]. The proprietary common law right in an unpublished document does not give the author and his representative an exclusive right of making any use of it, but is apparently confined to the right of multiplying copies of and publishing the literary or artistic matter contained therein^[53]. That is to say, in so far as proprietary right is concerned the ambit of the common law right is probably much the same as the ambit of the statutory copyright. In addition to the proprietary right, the author of an unpublished document has the light to restrain any use of the document, or of the matter contained therein, which is a breach of contract or confidential relationship^[54], and to restrain any third party who proposes, knowing the illegal source, to make use of information so obtained^[55].

All common law proprietary right ceases on publication, and thereafter if the copyright statutes do not give protection, there is no property in the nature of copyright in the literary or artistic work^[56]. The proprietor cannot, by means of notice of reservation printed in a published work, reserve to himself any monopoly not given to him by statute^[57]. The utmost he can do in this direction is to contract with individual purchasers that they shall not make use of the work in a specified manner^[57].

Publication of a literary or artistic work in this connexion means communication to the public in general either orally or by means of exhibition, circulation of copies, or otherwise^[58]. The following acts of communication are, for instance, not deemed to be a publication so as to divest the common law right: (i) private or business letters sent to a correspondent or shown to friends or other interested persons^[59]); (ii) a manuscript or artistic work delivered or exhibited to a friend for his personal perusal or view, or to a publisher or other person or persons with a view to obtaining his or their opinion, or arranging for the publication or sale of the work^[60]; (iii) a book or artistic work printed or otherwise multiplied and distributed among a limited class, such as friends of the author or members of a society^[61]; (iv) a work of art exhibited in a place to which the public are admitted only upon payment and subject to rules prohibiting, inter alia, the making of any sketches or copies of the picture^[62]; (v) a dramatic or musical work performed in a theatre or other place to which the public are admitted for payment on the implied understanding that they are admitted solely for their entertainment and amusement^[63]; (vi) a lecture delivered to a class of students in a university, or to any other limited class of the public, or in a place to which the public are admitted for payment, in each case upon the implied understanding that the lecture is delivered solely for the instruction of those present^[64].

Meaning of "author." The author of a work is the person from whom emanates the general conception and design. Where, in order to achieve the final result, the author employ's other persons to prepare detailed portions, which will ultimately be worked into the main design, the work of the persons executing the details, under the instruction of the author, merges in the final work, and all becomes the property of the author as the principal designer^[65]. The mere suggestion, however, of a subject or idea which is then entirely designed and executed by another does not constitute the originator of the idea an author, even although the actual composer is his employee^[66]. In the case of photographs, records, perforated rolls and other contrivances by means of which a work may be mechanically performed or delivered, the Act sets up an arbitrary test of authorship by providing that the author shall be deemed to be the person who was the owner of the original negative or matrix at the time it was made^[67].

Joint authorship is now defined as a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors, in which the contribution of one is not distinct from the contribution of the other author or authors. This is probably merely a declaration of the existing law. There must be joint labour in the prosecution of a preconcerted joint design^[68]. From joint authorship there must be excluded, on the one hand, cases of the kind referred to in the last paragraph, where the whole work is the conception of one brain, and the work done by others is merely that of subordinate detail, and on the other hand, cases where the contribution of the different contributors is distinct.

§1 (2)
Copyright.(2) For the purposes of this Act, "copyright" means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatsoever^[69], to perform^[70], or in the case of a lecture^[71] to deliver^[72], the work or any substantial part thereof in public; if the work is unpublished^[73], to publish the work or any substantial part thereof; and shall include the sole right,—

(a) to produce, reproduce, perform, or publish any translation of the work;

(b) in the case of a dramatic work^[74], to convert it into a novel or other non-dramatic work;

(c) in the case of a novel or other non-dramatic work, or of an artistic work^[75], to convert it into a dramatic work, by way of performance in public or otherwise;

(d) in the case of a literary^[76], dramatic, or musical work, to make any record, perforated roll, cinematograph film^[77], or other contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered^[78],

and to authorise any such acts as aforesaid.

Meaning of "copyright."This sub-section puts every work which is protected by the Act upon the same basis, and defines the author's right therein in very generous terms. Copyright, it will be noticed, now includes all the author's proprietary rights in his work, and has, in fact, become the droit d'auteur of the Frenchman, or the urheberrecht of the German. It includes all the rights formerly known as (1) common law proprietary right in unpublished works; (2) statutory copyright; (3) statutory performing right or play right. The definition is framed so as to secure that, whatsoever medium the author may select for giving expression to his work, the essential elements of the work which he a^ an author has created shall be protected from reproduction in the same or any other medium. Thus, the author who uses no other medium for the expression of his literary conception than that of oral utterance is protected not only against the repetition of it in that form. but against the production or reproduction of it in any material form, as, for instance, in the form of a newspaper report or gramophone record. On the other hand, the author who first expresses his literary conception, through the medium of pen and ink is protected against acoustic repetition as well as against all forms of material production or reproduction. The only exception to the generality which is contained in this sub-section is that the exclusive right of performance is confined to performance in public. Other more specific exceptions are contained in sect. 2 of the Act. The enumeration at the end of the sub-section of certain specific forms of reproduction are for the purpose of making it clear that such things were in the mind of the Legislature at the time, and to prevent the generality of the first part of the subsection being cut down by reference to previously decided cases, and by any possible suggestion that the definition of copyright was intended to be merely declaratory. It is conceived that the specific enumeration does not in any way restrict the meaning of the general words, but has, in effect, a contrary tendency showing that the general words must be construed with sufficient liberality to include the matters specified as well as matters ejusdem generis.

Meaning of "to produce or reproduce in any material form"These words relate to the recording of the work or any of the essential elements thereof in any physical and more or less permanent form. These, and the complementary words "to perform" are intended to include every possible user of a work by which the commercial value of it may be realised. Copyright in a book may be infringed by the making of records or similar mechanical devices, or by the setting up of type or by the making of stereotype or linotype. Copyright in a drawing or picture may be infringed by the making of a work of sculpture, or the erection of an architectural work.

Statutory exceptions from the sole right of reproduction.The exclusive nature of the right of reproduction is modified—

(1) By the provisions in sect. 2 (1) relating to—

(i) Fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper summary;

(ii) An artist's use of his models and studies;

(iii) Reproductions in the flat of—

(a) Sculpture or artistic work situate in a public place or building;

(b) Architectural works;

(iv) Reproduction of extracts in school books;

(v) Newspaper report of a lecture delivered in public.

(2) By the provisions of sect. 20 permitting a newspaper report of any political speech delivered at a public meeting;

(3) By the provisions in sect. 19 (2) relating to the right to manufacture records and perforated rolls upon payment of a royalty to the composer;

(4) By the provisions in the proviso in sect. 3 relating to the right to reproduce any work after the expiration of twenty-five (or thirty) years after the author's death.

(5) By the provisions of sect. 4 relating to the granting of compulsory licences by the Privy Council at any time after the death of the author.

Existing law.—Under the legislation now in force the author's exclusive right in a book is limited to the right of multiplying copies. So long as a copy of the book is not made, the literary production may be utilised in other material forms. A perforated roll for the pianola^[79], a gramophone or phonograph record^[80], a cinematograph film, are not infringements of the copyright in a book or sheet of music.

Copyright in a book may be infringed by reproduction otherwise than in print. Copies produced by writing^[81], lithography^[82], typewriting^[83] or photography^[84],are copies within the meaning of the Copyright Act, 1842.

Copyright in engravings, paintings, drawings and photographs may be infringed by any reproduction of the artistic design in the flat although not in the same form of art. Copyright in an engraving may be infringed by a photograph^[85]. Copyright in a painting may be infringed by a photograph or pencil sketch^[86].

It is doubtful whether a reproduction in the round of an artistic work on the flat or vice versa can be an infringement; that is to say, whether copyright in a painting can be infringed by the reproduction of the design in the form of a work of sculpture or whether copyright in a work of sculpture can be infringed by a painting, drawing, or photograph^[87].

The representation of a painting in the form of a tableau vivant is not an infringement of the copyright in the painting^[88].

Meaning of "any substantial part thereof."The words "any substantial part thereof" express what has been decided under the Copyright Act, 1842, upon the construction of the phrase, "multiplying copies." The sole right of making copies is held to include the sole right of making copies of any part. This deduction, coupled with the maxim, de minimis non curat lex, resulted in the decisions to the effect that it was an infringement to take a substantial part, but that it was not an infringement to take an insignificant particle^[89]. The question as to what is substantial is not altogether one of quantity, it is, perhaps, mainly one of quality, and depends on the character of the work and the relative value of the material taken^[90]. The following are among the considerations which are relevant on the question of substantiality; what proportion does the material taken bear to (i) the work infringed, (ii) the infringing work^[91]; will the infringing work compete with the work infringed^[92]; was there an intention to appropriate, or was the appropriation casual and inadvertent^[93].

Similarly, in the case of paintings and other works of art, it is an infringement to copy any substantial part of the work or the design thereof^[94]. It is not an infringement when nothing is taken but that which is trivial and unimportant^[95].

The taking of a general scheme or idea is not an infringement either of a literary^[96] or artistic work^[97] where such scheme or idea is applied and worked out independently by the author of the second work from his own materials.

"To perform in public." By the definition clause, "performance" means any acoustic representation of a work and any visual representation of any dramatic action in a work including such a representation made by means of any mechanical instrument.

These words are intended to bring under protection all forms of user which are transitory and fleeting and do not consist in the making of any permanent record of the work. Performing right is no longer confined to dramatic and musical works, but is extended to all classes of works protected by the Act, so that wherever any original element in a work can be turned to profit by some form of transitory representation, the exclusive right of making such use of the work is primâ facie vested in the author as part of his copyright. The exclusive right of representing a work in some transitory form is, however, and almost necessarily so, confined to public representation. Performances of dramatic or musical works, recitations, cinematograph shows, and all similar transitory representations of a work are not infringements of copyright where the entertainment is obviously domestic and private. In order to constitute a public performance there must be present members of the public admitted as such. Admission by payment is not the test of publicity or non-publicity. The performance of a dramatic or musical work may be gratuitous, and yet, if it is performed in the presence of members of the general public, it is a public performance. Where a dramatic piece was represented in a room in Guy's Hospital for the entertainment of the medical officers, nurses, students and attendants, and some of their friends, it was held that there was no infringement of performing right under the Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833^[98]. The tests applied in that case are equally applicable to the new law in so far as the distinction between public and private representation is concerned.

Where the makers of cinematograph films exhibited them in thieir business premises to intending customers, it was held, under the Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833, that there was no performance in a place of dramatic entertainment within the meaning of that Act^[99], and, similarly, such a representation would not be a public performance within the meaning of the new Act.

The exclusive right of representation in public is modified by the provisions of sect. 2 (1) (vi) relating to the reading or recitation in public by one person of any reasonable extract from a published work. Under sect. 3 (3), proceedings for infringement of performing right may be taken against any person who, for private profit, permits a theatre or other place of entertainment to be used for an unlawful performance.

"In the case of a lecture to deliver."The specific reference to the delivery of a lecture is inserted to make it clear that this is part of the author's copyright. As, however, this right would be included in the right to perform as that is now defined, it is a little out of place as part of the general definition. The reference to the right of delivering lectures would have come more appropriately among the matters specifically mentioned in the paragraphs following the definition as being part of the copyright. Even as it stands, however, it is conceived that it will not affect the generality of the right of "performance" in respect of all other works. Thus, subject to the limitation contained in sect. 2 (1) (vi) as to the reading or recitation of reasonable extracts, it is submitted that it is an infringement of copyright under the Act to read any literary work in public, even although such work does not come within the definition of the word "lecture."

Existing law.—There is no statutory exclusive right of delivering a lecture. The Lectures Copyright Act, 1835^[100], protects the right of printing and publishing only. A lecture is protected at common law so long as it is unpublished^[101]. It is not published merely by delivery to a class of students in a university or college, and if any one were to publish or deliver such lecture without the author's consent, the author could stop him under the common law right^[101]. But if the lecture is delivered by the author in a public place his common law right is divested. As such delivery did not vest copyright under the statutes isolating to books, some protection was required until such time as the author should publish his lecture in print, and the Lectures Copyright Act, 1835^[100], was devised so as to preserve to the author, who had delivered his lecture in public, the exclusive right of afterwards printing and publishing it. A condition precedent to protection under the Act IS the delivering of a written notice to two justices living within five miles of the place where the lecture is to be delivered, at least two days before the delivery of the lecture, and the Act does not apply to any lecture or lectures delivered in any public school or college, or in accordance with any gift, endowment, or foundation. The delivery, however, of the last-mentioned class of lecture is not necessarily a delivery in public so as to divest the common law right, and therefore the publication of such lectures may be restrained at common law^[102].

"If the work is unpublished to publish the work." The meaning of publication is defined in the next subsection as being the issue of copies of the work to the public. Thus, ,in an unpublished work, the proprietary right includes the exclusive right of (1) production or reproduction; (2) performance in public; (3) issue of copies to the public. It will be observed that it does not include (a) exhibition of the work in public, (b) the issue of photographs and engravings of works of sculpture and architectural works of art; if such acts are complained of as being done without the permission of the author or other proprietor of the copyright in an unpublished work, no action will lie for infringement of a proprietary right, since the common law right is abrogated. The only ground upon which such unauthorised acts can be stopped is breach of contract or breach of trust arising from confidential relationship.

Existing law.—The ambit of the common law proprietary right in unpublished works has always been a matter of some doubt. In Philip v. Pennell^[103], Kekewich, J., came to the conclusion that the common law proprietary right in letters went no further than to protect the proprietor from the multiplication of copies and publication of the literary composition contained in the letters. In his view there was no property in the information or facts contained in the letters, and although under certain circumstances it might be a breach of contract or trust to divulge such information or facts, it was no infringement of the common law right of property to do so or to use the information or facts for the purpose of compiling and publishing an independent publication such as a biography of the person who wrote the letters. On the other hand, there is some authority in support of the proposition that the proprietary right in an unpublished document or work of art was a much wider right than the statutory copyright or the mere right of multiplying and publishing copies, and that it did include an exclusive right to make any public use of the facts or information contained therein, except in so far as the author of the document or work of art had expressly or impliedly permitted such use^[104]. In many of the cases, however, there is a want of clear distinction between the right to an injunction on the ground of property and the right to an injunction on the ground of breach of trust, and most of the decisions could be supported on the latter ground alone, and are, therefore, not very strong authorities in support of the theory of the wider common law right of property.

"Any translation of the work."The object of paragraph (a) is to make it clear that the author of any work shall have the exclusive translating right for the full term of the copyright in the original. This is in accordance with Articles VIII. and XI. of the Berlin Convention.

Existing law.—Apart from the International Copyright Acts, the existence of any exclusive right of translation has always been open to doubt. There are several dicta to be found in the earlier decisions to the effect that a translation is not an infringement under the Copyright Act, 1842^[105]. These were followed by two decisions in India, where it was held that a translation into an Indian language of an English school book was not an infringement of the copyright^[106]. The principle upon which these were decided seems to depend on the theory that if the ipsissima verba are not extracted from a literary work, the whole selection and arrangement of subject-matter can be taken with impunity. This theory is quite contrary to recent English decisions, and it is conceived that if the Indian decisions had been appealed against they would have been reversed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council^[107].

With regard to works protected under the International Copyright Acts, the foreign author receives a definite but conditional translating right. The Berne Convention, Article V., demanded an exclusive translating right for ten years. The International Copyright Act, 1886, was, however, more generous to the foreign author, and gave him an exclusive translating right for the full term of the copyright provided the author did, within ten years after the first production of his work, cause a translation to be produced in the English language^[108]. If a full and substantial translation^[109] is not produced within the prescribed period, the work becomes free as far as the English language is concerned, and can be reprinted or performed in English either in whole or in part^[110]. The Act of Paris, 1896, Article I. 3, demanded similar protection, that is, full translating right conditional upon the exercise of the right within ten years. This, however, entailed no change in the English law, as the international demand had already been satisfied by the Act of 1886.

"In the case of a dramatic work to convert it into a novel or other non-dramatic work."The exclusive right to turn a dramatic work into a non-dramatic work is probably vested in the author under existing law. It has never actually been decided that it would be an infringement of the copyright in a play to take the plot and characters and principal situations and write a novel based thereon. It has been said that so long as there is no copying of the words there is no infringement. Probably, however, it is an infringement, even under existing law, to take a plot and re-write the story, and there is no doubt that under the Act the stealing from a play of a substantial portion of a plot and the utilisation of it as the basis of a non-dramatic work of fiction would be an infringement.

"In the case of a novel to convert it into a dramatic work."Copyright will include performing right, and every work will be protected in respect of performing right notwithstanding the absence of dramatic form in the work as first produced. Paragraph (c) merely emphasizes this principle by giving the most common case, dramatisation of a novel for the stage, as a specific instance of the exclusive right which every author has of turning to account, for his own profit, any dramatic element which the work contains.

Existing law.—The representation on the stage of a dramatic version of a novel is not an infringement of the author's right in the novel^[111]. Copyright under the Act of 1842 does not include performing right, and unless the author produces his work in the form of a, dramatic piece he gets no protection under the Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833^[112]. Printing, typing, or writing a dramatic version of a novel may infringe the copyright. It has been doubted whether it does so, if nothing but the plot is taken and the dialogue is entirely original ; but if any substantial passages from the novel are introduced into the play as part of the dialogue the printing, typing, or writing such play is undoubtedly an infringement of the copyright in the novel. In Warne v. Seehohm^[113], a novel was dramatised without the author's consent and four typed copies of the dramatic version were made. It was held there was an infringement of copyright, and an injunction was granted. As a copy of every dramatic work must be sent to the Lord Chamberlain before it is produced on the stage the decision in Warne v. Seehohm^[113] did in substance confer uiion the author of novels the exclusive right of dramatisation.

"To make any record, perforated roll, cinematograph film."The exclusive right to make any record, perforated roll, or cinematograph film is, again, merely a specific instance of the author's exclusive right to all forms of user. All forms of mechanical instruments appear to be included in the specific words of paragraph (d). It was stated in Grand Committee on the Bill that it was not intended to give a musical composer the exclusive right of making a barrel organ upon which his composition could be performed. It is submitted that both the general words of the sub-section and the specific words of this paragraph do give the musical composer the monopoly of making barrel organs and similar instruments. There is nothing which can be construed as confining the author's right to the making of interchangeable parts.

Existing law.—A literary work is only protected as a book, and the exclusive right of the author is limited to making copies of the book. The author of a dramatic or musical work has the exclusive right of making copies if it is published as a book or sheet of music, and he has the exclusive right of public performance. A record, perforated roll, or cinematograph film is not a copy of the book or sheet of music, even although it reproduces the whole dramatic or musical element contained in the book or sheet of music. The making of such things is therefore not an infringement of copyright^[114]. Neither does the person who makes such things infringe the performing right in the dramatic or musical work notwithstanding that he sells them to persons whom he knows will use them for giving public performances. He does not. by making and selling the record or film, cause the public performance^[115]; neither does he infringe the performing right by exhibiting the films in his business premises to his customers and possible purchasers^[116].

"And to authorise any such acts as aforesaid."The last words of sub-sect. 1 (2) appear to be superfluous. It is clear that if a person has the sole right to certain acts, no other person can have the right to authorise such acts. The words are therefore unnecessary in so far as they are intended to exclude third persons from any enjoyment of the work. If they are intended to accentuate the fact that the owner of the copyright may authorise other people to exercise his exclusive right, the words are equally unnecessary, as the power to license others is obviously incidental to the exclusive right of doing the acts in question.

§1 (3).(3) For the purposes of this Act, publication^[117], in relation to any work, means the issue of copies of the work to the public, and does not include the performance in public of a dramatic or musical work, the delivery in public of a lecture, the exhibition in public of an artistic work, or the construction of an architectural work of art, but, for the purposes of this provision, the issue of photographs and engravings of works of sculpture and architectural works of art shall not be deemed to be publication of such works.

Meaning of "publication."This definition of publication brings the provisions of our law upon this point into substantial conformity with the definition in the Berlin Convention. As the international right of the author may depend upon whether or not his work has been published, and, if published, where it was first published, it is important that all the countries of the union should adopt the same definition. The proviso at the end of the sub-section is a modification of the definition in the Berlin Convention. The Convention is silent upon the question as to how far the publication of a derivative work is to be deemed a publication of the original work from which it is derived. The principle which the proviso is intended to express is that where, in the case of an artistic work, the original is in three dimensions, a derivative work in the flat shall not be deemed to be a publication of the original. It is, perhaps, a little unfortunate that this modification has been introduced into the definition agreed upon at Berlin. Where a derivative work such as a photograph or engraving of a painting or work of sculpture is published, there is in either case a publication of the greater part, but not of the whole of the artistic elements which go to make up the original work. There is a residuum of the artistic elements which is left unpublished, but that residuum may be just as important in the case of a photograph of a picture as in the case of a photograph of a work of sculpture. It is therefore extremely arbitrary and artificial to provide that the publication of a photograph of a picture shall be deemed to be a publication of the picture, but that the publication of a photograph of a work of sculpture shall not be deemed to be a publication of the work of sculpture. It is submitted that it would have been much more satisfactory if the last three lines in the sub-section had been omitted. The result would have been that each artistic element in an original work would have stood by itself and would be protected as being published or unpublished according to whether it was or was not reproduced in the published photograph or other derivative work. Probably, even as the definition stands, this is the only way in which it can be applied. It is practically impossible to provide that every original work must either be deemed to be published or unpublished in its entirety. Where certain features only of an original work are published in a derivative work, and other features are left unpublished, it would be impossible to lay down a rule by which it could be determined in all cases whether or not the original work was published. Probably the best construction to put upon the words of the proviso is that they do not contain an exception from the general definition of publication, but are merely an attempt to express the consequences of its application to the specific subjects dealt with, and even so that they do not completely express such consequences. It is submitted that, although the issue of a photograph or engraving of a work of sculpture or architectural work is not a publication of such work, meaning thereby the entire work, it is a publication of some essential elements of the work, and to that extent the work must be deemed to be published.

Existing Law.—Publication is of one of two kinds—either that which divests the common law right or that which invests some statutory right. With regard to divestitive publication, the issue of copies to the public is not an essential element. Any communication of the work to the public is a publication, whether oral or otherwise^[118]. There is, however, no communication to the public in this sense if the communication is to a strictly limited class, or is made to members of the public upon conditions imposed by contract express or implied, or by some confidential relationship existing between the parties^[119]. It has been held that a lecture delivered to a class of students at a public university is not a publication of the lecture^[120]. It has also been held that a drama or musical work is not published by being publicly performed in a theatre or concert room, since the communication is limited tothose who have paid the price of admission, and that such persons are admitted under an implied contract that they will not make any use of what they hear except for their own entertainment or instruction^[121]. The distribution of copies of a work to a limited class, such as the friends of the author or the subscribers to some club or society, is not a publication^[122]. Neither is there a publication if each individual member of the public to whom the work is delivered undertakes expressly or impliedly not to publish, but to keep the work for his own private use only^[123].

The International Copyright Act, 1844, s. 19, provides that the author of any work first published out of the British dominions shall have no copyright or performing right otherwise than such as he may be entitled to under the International Copyright Acts. Under this provision it has been held that an otherwise unpublished play which was first performed outside the British dominions was "first published" out of the British dominions within the meaning of the section and that the performing right in this country was lost^[124]. These decisions, however, do not appear to affect the question as to whether public performance of a play does or does not divest the common law right.

Investitive publication depends on the terms of the different statutes. A literary work must be published in the form of a book as defined by the Copyright Act, 1842^[125]. Engravings and sculpture acquire copyright upon publication, provided the name of the author and date is placed upon every copy published^[126]. Paintings, drawings and photographs acquire statutory copyright although unpublished^[127]. It is still a moot point whether or not public performance of a play or music is a condition precedent to statutory performing right. Probably it is not, and such rights run from first composition of the play or music and are independent of publication or public performance^[128].

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1. Sect. 1 (2).
2. Sects. 25 (1), 26 (1), 27, 28, 35 (1) ("Self-governing dominion").
3. Sects. 3, 16 (1), 17, 19 (1), 21.
4. Sect. 35 (1) ("'Literary work," "Dramatic work," "Artistic work").
5. Sects. 1 (3), 31, 35 (2).
6. Sects. 23, 25 (2), 35 (3).
7. Sects. 1 (3), 31, 35 (2).
8. Sects. 16 (2), 19 (1), 21.
9. Sect. 25 (2), 26 (3), 35 (4) (5).
10. Sect. 26 (3).
11. Sect. 29.
12. Sect. 25. These are sects. 11–13 (Summary Remedies) and sect. 15 (Delivery of Books to Libraries).
13. Sect. 25.
14. Sect. 27.
15. Sects. 25, 26, 35 (1) (" Self-governing dominion").
16. Sects. 25, 26, 35 (1) (" Self-governing dominion ").
17. Sect. 28.
18. Smiles v. Belford (1876), 1 Out. A. R. 436; Macmillan v. Shamsul, &c. (1895), Ind. L. R. 19 Bomb. 557.
19. Int. Cop. Act, 1886, s. 8 (4).
20. Graves v. Gorrie, [1903] A. C. 496.
21. Bogue v. Houlston (1852), 5 De G. & S. 267; Maple v. Junior Army and Navy Stores (1882), 21 Ch. D. 369; Davis v. Benjamin, [1906] 2 Ch. 491.
22. Walker v. Lane, [1900] A. C. 539.
23. Sect. 35 (3).
24. Sect. 25 (2).
25. Sect. 26 (3).
26. Sect. 29 (1) (a).
27. Sect. 23.
28. Berlin. Art. VI.
29. Routledge v. Low (1868), L. R. 3 H. L. 100; Jefferys v. Boosey (1854), 4 H. L. C, 815: Boosey v. Purday (1849), 4 Ex. 145; Lover v. Davidson (1856), 1 C. B. (N. S.) 182: Chappell v. Purday (1845), 14 M. & W. 303; Cocks v. Purday (1848), 5 C. B. 860; Int. Cop. Act, 1886, s. 8 (1); Int. Cop. Act, 1844. s. 19.
30. Cocks v. Purday (1848), 5 C. B. 860; Buxton v James (1851), 5 De G. & S. 80.
31. Boosey v. Parday (1849), 4 Ex. 145, 158.
32. Reid v. Maxwell (1886), 2 T. L. R. 790.
33. The law was so stated in the opinion given by the law officers in this country when, in 1891, the United States asked for an assurance that American subjects received satisfactory protection in England. Doubts had previously existed (1) as to whether printing within the dominions was necessary (Jeffreys v. Boosey) (1854), 4 H. L. C. 815, 983 : Clementi v. Walker (1824), 2 B. & C. 861, 867); (2) as to whether British nationality or residence on the part of the author was necessary (Jeffreys v. Boosey) (1854), 4 H. L. C. 815; Routledge v. Low (1868), L. R. 3 H. L. 100; Low v. Ward (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 415).
34. Fine Arts Act, 1862, s. 1; Bowden Bros. v. Amalgamated Pictorials, [1911] 1 Ch. 386.
35. Int. Cop. Act, 1844, s. 19.
36. Berne, Arts. II., III.; Act of Paris, Arts. II., III.; Int. Cop. Act, 1886, Preamble, s. 2; Order in Council, 1887, s. 1: Order in Council, 1898, s. 1; Sarpy v. Holland, [1908] 2 Ch. 198; Hanfstaengl v. American Tobacco Co., [1895] 1 Q. B. 347.
37. Sect. 26 (3).
38. Sect. 25 (2).
39. Sect. 26 (3).
40. Sect. 29.
41. Walter v. Lane, [1900] A. C. 539.
42. Macmillan v. Dent, [1907] 1 Ch. 107; Philip v. Pennell [1907] 2 Ch. 577.
43. Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303. 2379; Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), 2 Bro. P. C. 129; Cob. Pari. Hist., Vol. 17, p. 954.
44. Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303, 2379; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 1 M^cN. & G. 25: 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 691, 693; Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 441.
45. Forrester v. Walker (1741), 4 Burr. 2408; Webb v. Pose (1732) Amb. 694.
46. Macklin v. Richardson (1770), Amb. 694.
47. Abernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 209; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Nicols v. Pitman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 374.
48. Pope v. Curl (1741). 2 Atk. 342; Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare (1758), 2 Eden, 329; Thompson v. Stanhope (1774), Amb. 737; Earl of Granard v. Dunkin (1809), 1 Ball & B. 207; Lord Perceval v. Phipps (1813), 2 V. & B. 19. 24; Gee v. Pritchard (1818), 2 Swans. 402; Oliver v. Oliver (1861), 11 C. B. (N. S.) 139; Howard v. Gunn (1863), 32 Beav. 462; Hopkinson v. Lord Burghley (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 447; Earl of Lytton v. Devey (1884), 54 L. J. Ch. 293.
49. Exchange Telegraph v. Gregory, [1896] 1 Q. B. 147; Exchange Telegraph v. Central News, [1897] 2 Ch. 48.
50. Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 1 M^cN. & G. 25; 2 De G. & Sm. 652.
51. Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 441.
52. Bowden Bros. v. Amalgamated Pictorials, [1911] 1 Ch. 386.
53. Philip v. Pennell, [1907] 2 Ch. 577. See, however, Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 2379; Tonson v. Walker (1752), 3 Swans. 672; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 691, 693.
54. Jovatt v. Winyard (1820), 1 Jac. & W. 394; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & Sm. 652; Renter's Telegram Co. v. Byron (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 661; Lamb v. Evans, [1893] 1 Ch. 218; Merryweather v. Moore, [1892] 2 Ch. 518; Louis v. Smellie (1895), 11 T. L. R. 515; Robb v. Green, [1895] 2 Q. B. 315; Gilbert v. Star Newspaper (1894), 11 T. L. R. 4; Tack v. Priester (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 629; Murray v. Heath (1831), 1 B. & Ad. 804; Mayall v. Higbey (1862), 1 H. & C. 148; Pollard v. Photographic Co. (1888), 40 Ch. D. 345.
55. Jeffreys v. Boosey (1854), 4 H. L. C. 815; Tipping v. Clarke (1843), 2 Hare, 383, 393; Abernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. (0. S.) Ch. 209; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & Sm. 652; Exchange Telegraph v. Central News, [1897] 2 Ch. 48; Bridgman v. Green (1755), 2 Ves. sen. 627; Wilmot's Cases, 58; Morison v. Moat (1851), 9 Hare, 241; Barfield v. Nicholson (1824), 2 Sim. & Stu. 1.
56. Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), 2 Bro. P. C. 129; Cob. Pari. Hist., Vol. 17, p. 954; Coleman v. Wathen (1793), 5 T. R. 245; Murray v. Elliston (1822), 5 B. & Aid. 657; Jeffreys v. Boosey (1854), 4H. L. C. 815; Reade v. Conquest (1861), 9 C. B. N. S. 755; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326, 343, 344; Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 441, 447.
57. Monckton v. Gramophone Co. (1910), The Times, Dec. 6; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Snellenburg (1904), 131 Fed. Rep. 530; M^cGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 306; Taddy v. Sterious, [1904] 1 Ch. 354.
58. Caird v. Sime (1887). 12 A. C. 32G; Macmillan v. Dent, [1907] 1 Ch. 107; Jewellers v. Jewellers (1895), 84 Hun. 12.
59. Pope v. Carl (1741), 2 Atk. 342.
60. Caird v. Sims (1887), 12 A. C. 326. See, however, Blank v. Footman (1888), 39 Ch. D. 678; Southey v. Sherwood (1817), 2 Mer. 435.
61. Prince Albert v. Strange (1849). 2 De G. & Sm. 652; Kenrick v. Danube Collieries (1891), 39 W. R. 473; Exchange Telegraph v. Central News, [1897] 2 Ch. 48.
62. Werckmeister v. American Lithograph Co. (1904), 134 Fed. Rep. 321; Turner v. Robinson (1860), 10 Ir. Ch. 121, 510.
63. Macklin v. Richardson (1770) Amb. 694; D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835), 1 Y. & C, Ex. 288.
64. Abernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 209; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Nicols v. Pitman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 374.
65. Scott v. Stanford (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 718: Barfield v. Nicholson (1824), 2 Sim. & Stu. 1; Hatton v. Kean (1859), 7 C. B. (N. S.) 268; Wallerstein v. Herbert (1867), L. T. 453.
66. Shepherd v. Conquest (1856), 17 C. B. 427; Nottage v. Jackson (1883). 11 Q. B. D. 627.
67. Sects. 19 (1), 21.
68. Levi v. Rutley (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 523; Tree v. Bowkett (1896), 74 L. T. 77.
69. Sects. 2 (1) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v), 3, 4, 19 (2), 20.
70. Sects. 2 (1) (vi), 35 (1) ("Performance").
71. Sect. 35 (1) ("Lecture").
72. Sect. 35 (1) (" Delivery").
73. Sects. 1 (3), 31, 35 (2).
74. Sect. 35 (1) ("Dramatic work").
75. Sect. 35 (1) ("Artistic work").
76. Sect. 35 (1) ("Literary work").
77. Sect. 35 (1) ("Cinematograph").
78. Sect. 19.
79. Boosey v. Whight, [1900] 1 Ch. 122; Mabe v. Connor, [1909] 1 K. B. 515.
80. Monckton v. The Gramophone Co. (1910), Cop. Cas. 1905–10, p. 304; The Times, December 6; Newmark v. National Phonograph Co. (1907), 23 T. L. R. 439.
81. White v. Geroch (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 298; Lindley, M. R., in Boosey v. Whight, [1900] 1 Ch. 122, 123.
82. Novello v. Sudlow (1852), 12 C. B. 177.
83. Warne v. Seebohm (1888), 39 Ch. D. 73.
84. Lindley, M.R., in Boosey v. Whiqht, [1900] 1 Ch. 122. 123.
85. Graces v. Ashford (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 410; Gambart v. Ball (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 306; Guggenheim v. Leng (1896), 12 T. L. R. 491.
86. Beal, Ex parte (1868), 3 Q. B. 387; Bolton v. Aldin (1895), 65 L, J. Q. B. 120.
87. See Hanfstaengl v. Baines, [1895] A. C. 20; Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 2 Ch. 1; [1894] 3 Ch. 109.
88. Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 2 Ch. 1.
89. Chatterton v. Cave (1878), 3 A. C. 483, 498; (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 572, 575; Sweet v. Benning (1855), 16 C. B. 469, 481; Bohn v. Bogue (1846), 10 Jur. 420; Jarrold v. Heywood (1870), 18 W. R. 279; Baily v. Taylor (1829), 1 R. & M. 73; Planché v. Braham (1837), 8 C. & P. 68; Beere v. Ellis (1889), 5 T. L. R. 330.
90. Leslie v. Young, [1894] A. C. 335, 341, 342; Tinsley v. Lacey (1863) 1 H. & M. 747; Bramwell v. Halcomb (1836), 3 My. & Cr. 7.57, 738; Bradbury v. Hotten (1872), L. R. S Ex. 1; Cooper v. Stephens, [1895] 1 Ch. 567; Scott v. Stanford (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 718; Murray v. Bogue (1852), 1 Drew. 353, 369; Cary v. Kearsley (1802), 4 Esp. 168; Lennie v. Pillans (1843). 5 D. 416.
91. Mawman v. Tegg (1826), 2 Russ. 385, 394; Neale v. Harmer (1897), 13 T. L. R. 209; Kelly v. Hooper (1841), 1 Y. & C. Ch. C. 197; Cooper v. Stephens, [1895] 1 Ch. 567.
92. Trade Auxiliary v. Middlesborough (1889), 40 Ch. D. 426; Cate v. Devon (1889), 40 Ch. D. 500; Weatherby & Sons v. International Horse Agency, [1910] 2 Ch. 297.
93. Jarrold V. Houlston (1857), 3 K. & J. 708; Reade v. Lacey (1861). 1 J. & H. 524; Spiers v. Brown (1858). 6 W. R. 352.
94. Brooks v. Religious Tract Society (1897), 45 W. R. 476; West v. Francis (1822), 5 B. it Aid. 737; London Stores v. Kelly (1888), 5 T. L. R. 169; Bolton v. London Exhibitions (1898). 14 T. L. R. 550.
95. Guggenheim v. Leng (1896), 12 T. L. R. 491.
96. Lindley, L. J., in Hollinrake v. Truswell, [1894] 3 Ch. 420, 427; Jarrold v. Houlston (1857), 3 K. & J. 708; Morris v. Ashbee (1868), L. R. 7 Eq. 34; Lennie v. Pillans (1843). 5 D. 416; Mawman v. Tegg (1826), 2 Russ. 385; Lamb v. Evans, [1893] 1 Ch. 218, 224; Pike v. Nicholas (1869), L. R. 3 Ch. 251, 200.
97. Hanfstaengl v. Baines, [1895] A. C. 20; Moore v. Clarke (1842), 9 M. & W. 692.
98. Duck v. Bates (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 843.
99. Glenville v. Selig Polyscope Co. (1911), The Times, July 20.
100. 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 65.
101. Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Abernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 209; Nicols v. Pitman (1881), 20 Ch. D. 374.
102. Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326.
103. [1907] 2 Ch. 577.
104. Millar V. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 2379; Tonson v. Walker (1752), 3 Swans. 672; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 691, 693.
105. Burnett v. Chetwood (1720), 2 Meriv. 441; Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2348; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & M. 693; and see Wyatt v. Barnard (1814), 3 V. & B. 77; Murray v. Bogue (1852), 1 Drew. 353.
106. Munshi v. Mirza (1890), Ind. L. R. 14 Bomb. 586; Macmillan v. Shamsul (1894), Ind. L. R. 19 Bomb. 557.
107. Moffat and Paige v. Gill & Sons (1902), 86 L. T. 465.
108. Int. Cop. Act, 1886, s. 5.
109. Wood v. Chart (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 193; Lauri v. Renad, [1892] 3 Ch. 402, 414.
110. Gandillot v. Edwardes (1908), The Times, June 3, Cop. Cas. 1905–10, p. 169.
111. Tinsley v. Lacy (1863), 1 H. & M. 747; Murray v. Elliston (1822), 5 B. & Ald. 657; Reade v. Conquest (1861), 9 C. B. (N. S.) 755: Toole v. Young (1874). L. R. 9 Q. B. 523.
112. 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15.
113. (1888), 39 Ch. D. 73.
114. Boosen v. Whight [1900] 1 Ch. 122; Newmark v. National Phonograph Co. (1907), 23 T. L. R. 439: Mabe v. Connor, [1909] 1 K. B. 515; Monckton v. Gramophone Co. (1910), The Times, Dec. 6; Cop. Cas. 1905–10, p. 304.
115. Karno v. Pathé Fréres (1909), 25 T L. R. 242.
116. Glenville v. Selig Polyscope Co. (1911), The Times, July 20.
117. Sects. 31, 35 (2).
118. Walter v. Lane, [1900] A. C. 539; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Turner v. Robinson (1860), 10 Ir. Ch. R. 121, 132; Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 23C3, 2417.
119. Macmillan v. Dent, [1907] 1 Ch. 107, 117; Jefferys v. Boosey (1854), 4 H. L. C. 815.
120. Abernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 309; Caird v. Sime (1887), 12 A. C. 326; Nicols v. Pitman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 374.
121. Macklin v. Richardson (1770), Amb. 694; D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 288, 299. But see Boucicault v. Chatterton (1876), 5 Ch. D. 267.
122. Kenrick v. Danube Collieries (1891), 39 W. R. 473; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 2 De G. & Sm. 652.
123. Exchange Telegraph v. Gregory, [1896] 1 Q. B. 147; Exchange Telegraph v. Central News, [1897] 2 Ch. 48.
124. Boucicault v. Chatterton (1876), 5 Ch. D. 267; Boucicault v. Delafield (1863), 1 H. & M. 597.
125. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 2, 3.
126. 8 Geo. II. c. 13, s. 1; 51 Geo. III. c. 56, s. 1.
127. Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 441.
128. Hardacre v. Armstrong (1905), 21 T. L. R. 189; Reichardt v. Sapte, [1893] 2 Q. B. 308.