The Guilt of William Hohenzollern/Chapter 12

by Karl Kautsky

CHAPTER XII
THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

THE DELIVERY OF THE NOTE

On July 23rd the Austrian Note was delivered in Belgrade. It was, in reality, an Ultimatum requiring the unconditional acceptance of Austria's demands within forty-eight hours. The Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron von Giesl, had accordingly characterized the Note as an "Ultimatum" in a telegram to Belgrade, whereupon he was informed it was only a "time-limited démarche," as its rejection was not to be answered by an immediate declaration of war, but at first only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations. With such petty splitting of hairs the State wiseacres of the Ballplatz hoped to keep up in Europe for a few days longer the appearance of their peaceful intentions.

On July 24th the Note was to be handed to the Powers, on the 25th Serbia had to reply. This indecent haste, after such long hesitation, was purposely demanded, so as to make it impossible for Serbia to confer with the Powers, or for the Powers to confer with one another, and in order to preclude all intervention.

Germany at once made haste to assure all the world, and also her own representatives abroad, that she had no knowledge of the Note, and had not influenced it in the slightest, and that it was as great a surprise to her as to the other Powers.

Thus Jagow telegraphed to the German Minister in Stockholm on July 23rd, 2 p.m.:

"According to all appearances, Austria-Hungary, who feels her existence threatened by the Greater Serbia agitation, has made very serious demands in Belgrade. These are not known to us; we regard them as Austria-Hungary's internal affair, in which we have no right to interfere."

On July 24th Zimmermann telegraphed to the Ambassadors in Paris, London and Petrograd:

"In local diplomatic circles opinion prevails that we instigated Austria-Hungary to send sharp Note to Serbia, and also helped to frame it. Rumoui appears to emanate from Cambon. If necessary, please counter him there. We exercised no influence whatsoever on the contents of the Note, and had just as little opportunity as other Powers of taking up any attitude in regard to it before publication."

In these edifying instructions only one statement is correct : that Cambon from the very outset did, indeed, smell a rat.

On July 24th he reported on an interview with Jagow:

"I asked him whether the Berlin Cabinet had really known nothing whatever of the Austrian demands before they were transmitted to Belgrade. When he affirmed this statement, I told him I was greatly surprised to see him take up the cudgels so zealously on behalf of claims of whose extent and range he was unaware.

"'Mind' interrupted Herr von Jagow, ' it is only because we are talking personally with each other that I allow you to say that to me.'" (French Yellow Book of 1914, No. 30.)

The same assurance was received from the virtuously indignant Jagow by the British Chargé d' Affaires, Sir H. Rumboldt, who reported thereon to London on July 25th:

"The State Secretary repeated very earnestly, that although he had been accused of having known the entire contents of the Note, he, as a matter of fact, had not had this knowledge." (Blue Book, 1914, No. 18.)

Cambon reported on this conversation on the same day:

"The British Chargé d' Affaires also inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I did yesterday, whether Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian Note before it was dispatched, and received such an unequivocal denial that he could not pursue the subject. But he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the complete carte blanche that Germany had given Austria." (Yellow Book, No. 41.)

Sir Horace Rumboldt, who received these assurances, was the same whose statements concerning "Germany's habitual mendacity" are quoted in the White Book of June, 1919, as we have already seen. Perhaps it was at the end of July, 1914, that he first came to this conclusion.

When the Berlin Foreign Office declared it "had exercised no influence whatever on the contents of the Austrian Note, and had had just as little opportunity as other Powers to take up any attitude in regard to it before publication"—i.e., before July 24th—it is clear from what has hitherto been communicated that it was uttering a conscious untruth. The German Government had known exactly that the Note would be framed in such a manner that no State that valued its self-determination would be able to accept it. The German Government was not only aware of this intention of Austria, but approved and encouraged it.

Afterwards, indeed, the Foreign Office expressed itself more cautiously concerning its knowledge of the Note. It denied only the knowledge of its wording. It had cognizance of this, it declared, no sooner than the other Powers—i.e., only after the Note had already been delivered in Belgrade.

Not even this excuse holds water.

Already on July 21st Tschirschky received a copy of the Note. He did not telegraph it to Berlin, perhaps so that the secret of the code-key might not be jeopardized.

He transmitted the Note by letter. It reached the Foreign Office, therefore, only on the afternoon of July 22nd. The other Powers, however, did not receive the Note until the 24th; so even if we take into account, not the contents of the Note, but only its final wording, it is false to say that the Note was not known to Germany sooner than to the other Great Powers.

Dr. Gooss must acknowledge this awkward fact; he tries to extricate himself, or rather the Bethmann Government, by declaring that the text of the Note had been able to reach the Foreign Office in Berlin

"Only at a time in which any influencing of the Vienna Cabinet by means of detailed conferences and propositions was no longer possible."

In his book on the outbreak of the world-war, Herr von Jagow states that Count Szogyeny came to him on July 22nd, between 7 and 8 p.m., bringing the Ultimatum.

" After Count Szogyeny' s visit, a notification of the Ultimatum from our Ambassador in Vienna, which had meanwhile arrived, was then handed to me." (Page 110.)

This delay is surely remarkable. The Ultimatum took over twenty-four hours to come from Vienna to Berlin! But even then there was time enough to prevent its delivery in Belgrade, if they had wanted to do so. Jagow asserts he at once said the Note was "amply sharp and overshot the mark." The Imperial Chancellor was, he declares, of the same opinion.

"Count Szögyeny replied that couldn't be helped now, as the Ultimatum had already been sent to Belgrade, and was to be delivered next morning."

And thereby Imperial Chancellor and State Secretary were reassured.

In a footnote after the statements in the text of his book Jagow casually remarks:

"Unless there had been indecision in Vienna as to the moment of delivery, the Ambassador must have been mistaken in this respect, for actually the Ultimatum was not delivered until 6 p.m."

This is tantamount to saying that Jagow was deceived by Szögyeny as to the time of the delivery of the Ultimatum! He would certainly have protested against the delivery had he known that it would take place only at 6 p.m. and not in the morning.

But did he not know this? We have just seen (page 64) how eagerly Jagow endeavoured to find out at what hour of the evening of the 23rd Poincaré was leaving Petrograd. And on the evening of the 22nd the Secretary of State telegraphed to Vienna a statement about this departure, which resulted in the postponement of the delivery from 5 to 6 p.m. And now he wants to make us believe he knew nothing at all about it, and thought the Note to Serbia was being delivered in the morning!

On August 11th, 1917, State Secretary Zimmermann wrote to the Under-Secretary of State, von der Bussche:

"Dear Bussche,

"Objectively speaking, the statement of the Evening News was correct, inasmuch as we did receive the Serbian Ultimatum some twelve hours before delivery. On the other hand, I certainly do not recollect having blurted out this fact to an American diplomat. A démenti may, therefore, be made. Whether, however, this appears expedient, in view of the fact of our knowledge, which, after all, cannot be concealed eternally, I leave an open question. Kindest regards,

"Yours,

"Zimmermann."

But why this eagerness to deny all knowledge of the Note, whose contents and wording was afterwards defended with all energy?

An underhand game was purposely being played, each being assigned his part. On July 20th the Note reached the Austrian Ambassadors, with injunctions to deliver it on July 24th to the Governments to which they were accredited.

Count Szögyeny thereupon took the liberty of remarking that an exception should be made in the case of Germany. To which Berchtold replied on July 22nd:

"The order in question had merely a formal significance in regard to Germany. The official delivery of our Note was to take place in Berlin with the same formalities as in the case of the other signatory Powers. The Note mentioned was communicated to Herr von Tschirschky already yesterday in strict confidence. At all events, it has already been transmitted to Berlin by the Ambassador."

Thus, in respect of the Note also Europe was to be deceived by deliberate lying.

THE LOCALIZATION OF THE WAR

The German Government had very good reasons for not letting it transpire that it had known of the Austrian Ultimatum, or, indeed, that it was conspiring with Austria.

It had, as we have seen, given its blessing to the war against Serbia on July 5th. It was also prepared to "risk" the war against Russia and France but wanted no more than that. It counted upon Italy's co-operation and England's neutrality. To be able to enter the war, it needed also the enthusiasm of its own people. Now it knew perfectly well that the great majority of this people was peace-loving to the highest degree, and that the sharpest opposition would spring up when it learned that the Austrian démarche against Serbia was not only known by the Kaiser and his Ministers, but also approved and encouraged. This would most seriously have jeopardized the whole scheme from the outset.

Immediately after the publication of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, the Committee of the German Social Democracy issued an appeal (July 25th), which ran:

"The dogs of war let loose by Austrian Imperialism are preparing to bring death and destruction upon all Europe. Although we condemn the doings of the Great Serbian Nationalists, the wanton war provocation of the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for the sharpest protest. Such brutal demands have never yet in the history of the world been made of an independent State, and can only be calculated positively to provoke war.

"The class-proud proletariat of Germany, in the name of humanity and culture, raises a flaming protest against the criminal doings of the war agitators. It imperatively demands of the German Government that it use its influence with the Austrian Government to maintain peace."

Had the German proletariat had an inkling of the real position of things, had it known that the "criminal doings of the war agitators" was a pre-arranged affair between Vienna and Berlin, it would not have been so naive as to call upon the German Government to influence the Austrian in the sense of peace, but would have attacked the German Government just as unanimously as the Austrian, and great masses of the non-proletarian working classes would also have joined it. With such a feeling, the German Government could not possibly have launched a great war. The German Social Democracy could have saved the peace of the world. Its prestige, and with it that of the German people, would have been infinitely enhanced by the defeat it prepared for the German Government.

To avoid this there was only one means: the cognizance and complicity of the German Government had to be carefully concealed.

This was no less necessary were Italy's help and England's neutrality to be won.

Both immediately turned against Austria, as, indeed, did all the world. It was now up to Germany to play the part of the surprised, peaceable neighbour, whom loyalty to her alliance summoned to the side of the friendly Power, whose extremity the iniquitous outrage of Serajevo had revealed, but a neighbour who was ready to mediate and to maintain peace. Should she thus come into conflict with the insatiable Russia—oh, well, everybody knows the best-intentioned person cannot live in peace if it doesn't please the wicked neighbour.

It was only unfortunate that Germany insisted upon saving the peace in a peculiar way: viz., by demanding the localization of the point at issue. Could anything have been more reasonable? One had to strive to keep the conflict within local limits and to prevent it assuming larger dimensions.

The report of the Bavarian Legation in Berlin, published by Eisner, of July 18th, runs:

"With a view to the localization of the war, the Imperial administration will, immediately after the delivery of the Austrian Note in Belgrade, initiate a diplomatic action with the Great Powers.

"Pointing out that the Kaiser is cruising in the North, while the Chief of the Great General Staff and the Prussian Minister for War are on furlough, it will allege that Germany was just as much taken by surprise by Austria's démarche as were the other Powers. (Its aim will be to bring the Powers to the view that the settlement of accounts between Austria and Serbia is the peculiar affair of these two States.)"

The passages in brackets are missing in Eisner's publication. They belong to those by the omission of which Eisner is said to have distorted the meaning of the report in a way. unfavourable to Germany. This can only be said by someone who imagines that the efforts to localize the war had been a serious peace scheme. In reality, it meant the derangement and sabotage of every scheme for peace. The assertion that Serbia's overthrow by Austria concerned these two States alone implied nothing less than that in future Austria alone had any say in the Balkans; implied that Russia was required to consent voluntarily to her elimination there, to declare herself beaten before she had fired a shot. By this striving after localization of the conflict, Russia was faced with the alternative: either to submit or to declare war on Austria.

The demand for localization was, therefore, just the very way to force Russia to war.

The alternative to the localization of the conflict was its solution through the intervention of Europe, i.e., either through a Court of Arbitration or through the mediation of the Great Powers not directly concerned. Only this Europeanizing of the problem afforded the prospect of the local war not becoming a European war. But, of course, it did not afford Austria the prospect of being left a free hand in the military crushing of Serbia. And so the highly dangerous method of localization had to be insisted upon with all obduracy. It signified now, as in the annexation crisis of 1909, a speculation on Russia's weakness and on the peaceableness of England and of France. The Bavarian report, indeed, continues:

"Herr Zimmermann assumes that both England and France, to whom a war would hardly be desirable at present, will influence Russia in a peaceable sense; in addition, he is building on the fact that bluff is one of the most popular desiderata of the Russian policy, and that the Russian, although fond of brandishing his sword, is not, at the decisive moment, fond of drawing it for others."

If, however, things turned out differently, the demand for the "localization" of the war still afforded great advantages. It could only fail through Russia's claims, so that one stood before the world, or at least before one's own people, as the Power that had wanted peace—and hereby had encountered Russia's resistance. Now it was attempted to denounce this Power as the disturber of the peace.

The demand for the localization of the war was another factor that required the strictest concealment of the understanding between Germany and Austria. For it is clear that Germany could not declare that the whole conflict concerned only Austria and Serbia, to the exclusion of every other Power, when she herself had co-operated most energetically in the preparation of this conflict.

We see that both Germany and Austria had every reason to hide from the world their co-operation, from the Potsdam decisions on July 5th down to the delivery of the Ultimatum in Belgrade on July 23rd.

THE SABOTAGE OF THE PEACE EFFORTS

It was not easy to appear seriously concerned about the peace and, at the same time, to secure Austria "her" war with Serbia, as also to " localize " it—i.e., to place before Russia the alternative, either to declare war on Austria or to submit to her without a struggle.

The chief thing to be done was not to allow the Powers to come to reason and to an understanding, but continually to create new, accomplished facts before an intervention could gain ground.

On the evening of July 23rd the Austrian Minister delivered his Government's Note in Belgrade. Not till the following day was it transmitted to the Governments of France, England, Italy and Russia. And on the 25th Serbia's answer was demanded! Paschitsch, nevertheless, gave this answer at the desired time. It was a detailed document that, contrary to expectations, consented in the main to all the Austrian Government's demands, in spite of their unheard-of severity. And Austria? It was officially reported from Vienna:

"The Premier, M. Paschitsch, appeared at the Austrian Legation in Belgrade a few minutes before six, and gave an inadequate answer to the Austro-Hungarian Note. Baron Giesl thereupon notified him of the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and left Belgrade with the Legation staff at 6.30 p.m."

So a whole thirty minutes after delivery of the Note the Austrian Legation was already on the way to Vienna. Baron Giesl had announced the rupture of diplomatic relations even before he could have properly read the Serbian answer, to say nothing of examining it.

While Vienna seized upon this speed to bring about the longed-for war with Serbia before Europe had grasped what was afoot, Berlin displayed not the slightest haste to enlighten Europe as to her views on these events.

On July 27th, Herr von Jagow had the nerve to tell the French Ambassador in Berlin that he had not yet found time to read the Serbian answer.

It was not easy for the Great Powers to feel their way, in view of this procedure. But, however little time they had to come to an understanding among themselves, one thing was immediately clear: the world-peace was threatened in the extreme if it came to a war between Austria and Serbia. As much as Austria urged on this war (and Germany along with her, which, of course, nobody knew at the time), just as much did Russia, France and England try to prevent it. Not because their rulers were unmitigated angels of peace but because Russia and France were inadequately equipped for war. And England, too, was hampered by her Irish affairs. So far, therefore, the Central Powers had been right in their calculations. Hence the Powers unanimously agreed to seek to obtain from Austria an extension of the time-limit fixed for the answer on the one hand, and, on the other, to advise Serbia to yield. France, as well as Italy and England—nay, even Russia herself—exerted themselves in this direction as far as it was possible with the shortness of the time.

With Germany's tacit co-operation, Austria refused any extension of time. Serbia's answer, however, as already mentioned, turned out to be extremely accommodating. Nevertheless, on the 25th Austria broke off diplomatic relations, began immediately to mobilize, and declared war on July 28th. On the 29th she bombarded Belgrade. Each of these steps was a fresh provocation, each added something to the general excitement, and raised fresh obstacles to every peaceful solution. Nevertheless, Austria unwaveringly pursued the path she had taken, and was therein supported by Germany, who, at the same time, was overflowing with protestations of peace.

Austria rejected all mediation proposals that were made, none of which emanated from Germany. The latter was satisfied with simply transmitting the proposals of others, or else refusing them at the very outset as incompatible with Austria's independence. Even the most urgent questioning could not lure a proposal from her, whilst England and Russia vied with each other in trying to find a way out of the muddle.

Prince Lichnowsky has described the situation very well:

"It had, of course, needed but a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to be satisfied with a diplomatic success, and to be reassured with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, the war was urged on. It would have been too fine an achievement! ...

"The impression is becoming more and more firmly established that we wanted the war in any circumstances. No other interpretation could be placed upon our attitude in a question that did not concern us directly at all. The earnest pleadings and definite declarations of M. Sasonow, later on the positively humble telegrams of the Tsar, Sir Edward Grey's repeated proposals, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent advice—all were useless; Berlin stuck to her resolution: Serbia must be massacred." (Pages 29, 30.)

The Tsar's telegrams may, indeed, be called "humble." He virtually implored that he should be spared the dreadful alternative between war or unconditional submission, both of which he equally feared, because either threatened him with catastrophe, with ruin.

But did not precisely these humble telegrams permit one to expect that Russia would again, as in 1909, be forced to her knees, and this time still more thoroughly, if one only remained firm?

Thus everything appeared to be going on swimmingly for the Central Powers.

William, in those days, still appeared aggressive and in high spirits.

What he thought of the Austrian Note before he had read the Serbian reply is shown by his comments on a telegram from Belgrade of July 24th, read by him on the 25th. It announces:

"The energetic tone and the precise demands of the Austrian Note have taken the Serbian Government completely by surprise." [William: "Bravo! We had not thought the Viennese were still capable of that."]

The telegram continues:

" Since early morning the Ministerial Council has been sitting under the presidency of the Crown Prince-Regent."

William:

"His Majesty [King Nicholas] seems to have made himself scarce!"

His exalted German Majesty did not dream how one day many a "Majesty" would "make himself scarce" in a very different fashion!

Telegram:

"The Ministerial Council is, however, unable to come to a decision."

William :

"The haughty Slavs!"

At the conclusion of the telegram he observes:

"How hollow appears the whole of this so-called Great-Serbian State business! Thus it is with all Slavonic States. Just stamp on the rabble!"

Such was the language of the Peace Kaiser immediately before the outbreak of the war.

Far from being unfavourably impressed by the brusqueness of Austria, he condemned even the outward appearance of a conciliatory spirit, even a gesture of politeness, on the part of his ally.

On July 24th Tschirschky telegraphed from Vienna:

"To show Russia his disposition to be reasonable, Count Berchtold sent this morning for the Russian Chargé d' Affaires."

To which William remarked on July 26th:

"Quite unnecessary! Looks weak and apologetic; which is quite the wrong impression to give to Russia/and must be avoided. Austria is on firm ground; she has taken her measures, and these cannot now, as it were, be made a subject for discussion."

Tschirschky further quotes Berchtold :

"Austria will make no claims on Serbian territory."

This prompts William to exclaim :

"Donkey! She must take the Sandjak, or the Serbians will get to the Adriatic."

Berchtold:

"Austria desires no displacement of the balance of power in the Balkans."

William:

"But that must and will come of itself. Austria must have the preponderance of power in the Balkans, in regard to the other smaller nations, and she must have it at Russia's expense, or there will be no peace."

At the close of the report he adds the comment:

"Weak."

He chafed under the necessity of restraining himself, at least outwardly—as required by the role assigned to Germany.

On July 26th, as William was preparing to set foot again on German soil, Bethmann telegraphed to him :

"Should Russia prepare for conflict with Austria, England means to attempt mediation, and hopes to do so with French support. So long as Russia attempts no hostile act, I believe that we must keep quiet and aim at localization of the conflict. General von Moltke returned from Carlsbad to-day, and shares this view."

After the word "localization" William makes an exclamation-mark, and on the expression about keeping quiet he observes sarcastically:

"Quiet is the first duty of a citizen! Keep quiet only keep quiet ! But a quiet mobilization is indeed something new!"

When it really came to mobilization, William's sarcasm vanished.

Quite in keeping with all this is a telegram which Count Szögyeny sent from Berlin to Vienna on July 25th. It runs:

"It is generally assumed here that in the event of a negative reply from Serbia, our declaration of war, combined with belligerent operations, will immediately follow. Any delay in the beginning of military operations is regarded here as very dangerous, in view of the intervention of other Powers. We are urgently advised to take action at once, and to confront the world with a fait accompli."

Surely this meant the most urgent pressure to strike with all speed.

In their statements concerning the origin of the war (White Book, June, 1919), Professors Hans Delbriick, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Max Weber, with Count Montgelas, give to this telegram a far more innocent interpretation. They say:

"The telegram of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szogyeny, of July 25th, 1914, urging the prompt beginning of military operations in the event of a declaration of war, is in accordance with the view already discussed that a localized and therefore also a speedy settlement of this dispute is the best measure to avert the spread of the conflagration." (Page 39.)

The telegram demands in plain terms immediate declaration of war, combined with military operations. The commentary of the four gentlemen transforms this unobtrusively into a demand for belligerent operations in the event of a declaration of war! And the demand that the world should be confronted with a fait accompli becomes a desire for "a speedy settlement of the dispute."

Such an interpretation of the telegram requires an incredible amount of goodwill, and outside Germany this will be hard to find. By this very free interpretation, Count Szögyeny' s telegram of July 25th was sought to be deprived of its inconvenient contents. But this expedient wholly fails to work in the case of another telegram of the same diplomat, dated July 27th.

Both telegrams came into the hands of the "Commission of the Allied and Associated Governments (formed in January, 19 19) for fixing the responsibility of the originators of the war and the penalties to be imposed," and were published in its Report, which gives a sketch of the origin of the war as brief as it is, in the main, correct.

On this Report the German Government had two courses before it. It could either have kept silence, or it could have replied with the publication of the documents of the Foreign Office concerning the responsibility for the war. It did neither, but commissioned the four gentlemen named above to reply to the Report of the Commission with a criticism, as "independent Germans." We have just had in their treatment of Szögyeny's telegram a glimpse of their methods of work. Perhaps it would have been more to the purpose had "German Independents," instead of "independent Germans," been entrusted with this task. The second telegram of July 27th received no better treatment. It is addressed by Szogyeny to Berchtold, and runs as follows:

" State Secretary declared to me explicitly in strict confidence that England's proposals for mediation would very shortly be brought to the cognizance of Your Excellency by the German Government.

"The German Government most explicitly states that it in no way identifies itself with these proposals, is even decidedly against their consideration, and transmits them only in deference to the request of England."

This telegram is surely a very serious matter. It behoved the four "independent Germans" to examine, above all, whether it was in unison with the policy pursued by Germany up to the 27th. It recalls Jagow's telegram of July 18th, in which he stated that the mild language of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was only intended to mislead "European diplomacy" and must not influence Berchtold. The four historians preferred to adopt a different sort of procedure. They say:

"The Commission has applied both to the former Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and to the State Secretary, von Jagow, and has obtained from both the identical information that the dispatch [of Szögyeny, of July 27th] could not possibly be correct. We consider the statements of these two men to be worthy of credence."

But we may ask whether this assurance given by the accused alone is sufficient to inspire the rest of humanity with the same confidence in their innocence. The trustworthiness of these two persons is precisely what is called in question by the evidence of a man by no means hostile to them, who had every interest in stating the truth, and who immediately after the interview with Jagow wrote down his statements in the most definite form. And he wrote them repeatedly. The passage quoted above stands at the beginning of Szögyeny 's dispatch. It ends as follows:

"In conclusion, State Secretary reiterated his attitude, and begged me, so as to prevent any misunderstanding, to assure Your Excellency that should he, as above contemplated, step forward in the character of mediator, he was absolutely not in favour of a consideration of the wishes of England."

Definite testimony of this kind cannot be summarily disposed of on the vague statement of the accused, that "it could not possibly be correct.'

But help comes to the Rescue Commission. At the right moment Dr. Gooss throws it a plank to cling to, and through it the Commission feels justified in declaring that Szögyeny's most definite testimony is untrustworthy, because he—"had aged beyond his years!" (Page 39.)

It is not precisely in this way that the old regime can rehabilitate its honour. Consider the situation at this period. The German and Austrian Governments were preparing a war which might turn out a matter of life and death for these States. It was essential that the posts of cardinal importance should be filled by men of the highest powers. It was imperative that the two Allied Governments should perfectly understand each other, and that each should be accurately informed of the other's intentions. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin formed the connecting link between the two States. On his sagacity, clear-headedness and accuracy depended the lives of nations and of governments. Thus there are only two possibilities before us. Was Count Szögyeny really the senile dullard that the white-washers of William and his understrappers now make him out? In this case the Austrian Government acted in an incredibly wanton and reckless manner in leaving a dull-witted driveller in this highly important post, while the German Government showed itself no less wanton and reckless in entrusting, at such a crisis, the most difficult and important functions to an idiot who did not know what people were telling him. A more serious indictment against both Governments is not conceivable. The exculpation is in this case worse than the offence, for it is better for any nation to be directed by sagacious and well-informed rogues than by honest imbeciles. The former, at any rate, will not lead the country into situations that imperil not only the whole State but its leaders too. Only a blockhead would do that. The worst case of all is, of course, where dishonesty, frivolity and stupidity are united. The first alternative, therefore, the senility of Szögyeny, if a fact, does not exculpate the German Government; it merely transfers the guilt to another field of its operations.

Was it a fact? In 1914 Szögyeny was undoubtedly an old man, seventy-three years of age, into whose dispatches an error might occasionally creep. Much of what he states has been proved to be entirely correct. In the present instance, as we have already seen, his evidence is remarkably definite. It surely, therefore, calls for examination.

And on closer examination we discover that very important points of his report are confirmed by the German documents.

We find, too, that the motives attributed to Jagow, on which he based his questionable utterance of the 27th July, correspond accurately with the direction of the German Government's thoughts at that period. Szogyeny reproduces their words:

"The German Government considered it of the greatest importance that at the present moment England should not make common cause with Russia and France. Everything must therefore be avoided that might snap the wire hitherto functioning so well between Germany and England. Were Germany to tell Sir Edward Grey plainly that she declined to transmit his wishes to AustriaHungary, which England believes will pay more consideration to Germany's mediation, then the above-mentioned situation, which we must absolutely avoid, would arise."

One sees that the Count was certainly not a brilliant stylist. But as regards the matter of the communication, Bethmann-Hollweg expressed himself on the same day to just the same substantial effect, although not from precisely the same standpoint. In a telegram to Tschirschky he announces Grey's proposals, and continues:

"Having already rejected England's proposal for a conference, we cannot possibly turn down à limine this English suggestion too. If we reject every mediatory movement, the whole world will hold us responsible for the conflagration, and we shall be represented as the true instigators of the war. This would also have the effect of making impossible our position in the country, where we must appear in the light of having the war forced on us. Our position is all the more difficult as Serbia has apparently yielded to so great an extent. We cannot, therefore, refuse the role of mediator, and must submit the English proposal to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet, more especially as London and Paris continue to make their influence felt in Petersburg. Will you obtain Count Berchtold's views on the English suggestion and also on Herr Sasonow's desire to negotiate direct with Vienna."

This strange mediator saw in the yielding of the Serbs one of the difficulties of the situation—a difficulty only if one was bent on war and at the same time wished to pose as the party attacked. Nor does he recommend the English proposal, he merely transmits it, and apologizes for the fact that circumstances oblige him to do so

To London, however, he telegraphs:

"We have at once undertaken mediation-movement in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey."

The result of the "mediation-movement" was that Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28th.

England, nevertheless, made another effort to save the peace of the world. On the 29th Lichnowsky reported in a telegram which we shall deal with in detail in another connection:

"Sir E. Grey repeated his suggestion already reported that we should take part in a mediation à quatre, such as we had already accepted in principle. Should, however, Your Excellency undertake the mediation, of which I was able to show a prospect early this morning, he would be equally well-pleased."

The two sentences printed in italics are missing in the copy of the telegram prepared for William. Can that have been accidental? It permits the assumption that it was desired to conceal from the Kaiser that this kind of mediation " had been accepted in principle." This would be quite in keeping with Jagow's policy, concerning which Szögyeny reported.

Whatever may have been the state of the case in regard to this report, at all events German policy in the first days after the delivery of the Ultimatum aroused even among neutrals a justified and growing mistrust in its honesty and love of peace.

But on the 28th July we see in preparation a change in its determined sabotage of every effort for peace.

THE BEGINNING OF UNCERTAINTY IN GERMANY

We have already learned that the German Government did, indeed, desire war with Serbia, and did not shrink from war with Russia and eventually with France; but at the same time it urgently needed to have its own people behind it, Italy by its side, and England not against it.

This was made uncommonly difficult by the clumsiness and obstinacy of Austria on the one hand, and by the sagacity of Serbia on the other.

When William read the reply given by Serbia to the Austrian Ultimatum of the 25th, he had to confess that thereby his cause was put very much in the wrong. At this he was visibly displeased.

He read the reply of the Serbian Government on July 28th, and added the comment:

"A brilliant achievement for a time-limit of only forty-eight hours! This is more than one could have expected. A great moral success for Vienna, but it removes every ground for war, and Giesl might have stayed quietly in Belgrade. On this score I should never have advised mobilization."

Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from declaring in his speech from the Throne on August 4th:

"My exalted Ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph, was compelled to take up arms.'"

Very different was the view expressed and that not in a casual observation—on July 28th. On that day William wrote a letter to Bethmann-Hollweg, already printed in the Deutsche Politik of July 18th, 1919. On account of its importance we reproduce it here. The two very noteworthy phrases printed by us in parentheses are omitted in the text as given by the Deutsche Politik.

The letter runs:

"Your Excellency,

"After reading the Serbian reply, which I received this morning, I am convinced that the desires of the Danube Monarchy are substantially fulfilled. The few reservations which Serbia has made on particular points can, in my judgment, be cleared up by negotiation. But her capitulation (one of the most submissive kind) is here proclaimed to all the world, and with it every reason for war falls to the ground.

"All the same, we can only attach a limited value to this scrap of paper and its contents so long as it is not translated into action. The Serbs are Orientals, and therefore sly, false, and masters of evasion. In order that these fine undertakings may be realized in truth and fact, it will be necessary to exercise a douce violence. This could be managed by Austria taking a pledge (Belgrade) for the compulsion and execution of the undertakings, and retaining it until the demands are actually fulfilled. This is also necessary in order to afford to the army, which would be a third time mobilized for nothing, an external satisfaction d'honneur, a show of success in the eyes of foreign countries and the consciousness of having at least stood on foreign territory. Apart from this, if there is no campaign it will give rise to a very bad feeling towards the dynasty, and this would be an extremely serious matter. In case Your Excellency shares these views, I propose that we address Austria to the following effect: The withdrawal of Serbia (in a very submissive form) has been compelled, and we offer our congratulations. In consequence of this, there is naturally no longer any reason for war. A guarantee is, however, very necessary in order that the undertakings shall be executed. This could be obtained by the temporary military occupation of a part of Serbia. Just as in 1871 we kept our troops in France until the milliards had been paid. On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace in Austria. Should there be any contrary proposals or protests on the part of other States, I would uncompromisingly reject them, all the more since all of them are more or less openly appealing to me to help to preserve peace. I shall do this, but in my own fashion, and shall be as considerate as possible of Austria's national sentiment and the military honour of her army. The latter has been appealed to by its highest War Lord, and stands ready to obey the summons. Therefore it must absolutely have a visible satisfaction d'honneur, and this is a preliminary condition of my mediation. Will Your Excellency, therefore, prepare a proposal in the sense outlined above for communication to Vienna? I have written in the same sense, through Plessen, to the Chief of the General Staff,^[1] who entirely shares my opinion,

"William I. R."

On this the Deutsche Politik comments:

"All this incontestably shows that the Kaiser did not desire even the Austro-Serbian war."

In reality, the most one could say is that he did not desire it at that moment. We have seen that up to this he had been agreed as to the necessity for war, and even urged it on. On July 25th he was still of the opinion that one must " trample on the feet of this rabble."

Even on July 28th William was not fully aware of the gravity of the situation. He is still playing with fire when he demands a douce violence, a gentle pressure on the Serbians, who, in such striking contrast to the fanatical truth-worshippers among the Germans and Austrians, are "sly and false." And it is very characteristic of his military bias and also of his play-acting propensities that he says: "The Army, mobilized the third time for nothing, must now at last be given an outward satisfaction d'honneur, a show of success." This is " the preliminary condition of my mediation," on which the peace of the world depends! The satisfaction of the officers' vanity stands higher with him than the peace of the world. In any case, his acknowledgment of the 28th did not materialize into any serious pressure on Austria, who declared war on Serbia that very day, and bombarded Belgrade the next, in order that they might not for the third time have mobilized for nothing.

Now, as formerly, William rejected the best proposals for getting out of the strained situation. This is shown by his remarks on a report of July 28th from Chelins, the German Military Plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg, which William read on the 29th. It runs:

"For His Majesty: Prince Trubetzkoi, of the Tsar's suite, made the following statement to me to-day: 'Now that Serbia's reply has , been published, one must acknowledge her good-will [One might have expected that!—W.] to meet Austria's wishes fully and completely; otherwise Serbia would never have answered Austria's unprecedentedly sharp Note in so friendly and neighbourly a tone, but would have simply [word unintelligible]. The two points in dispute could not have been simply accepted by Serbia without danger of a revolution, and the desire to submit them to arbitration [Austria cannot enter upon that.—W.]. This is a thoroughly loyal position, and Austria would take on herself a heavy responsibility should she bring about a European war by not recognizing the attitude of Serbia. [That is what makes me anxious after reading the Serbian reply.—W.]

"When I replied that the responsibility would fall on Russia, who, after all, was outside the sphere of conflict [Right!—W.], Prince Trubetzkoi said: '... We cannot leave our brothers in the lurch. [Murderers of Kings and Princes!—W.] Austria might annihilate them [Doesn't want to.—W.], and we cannot allow that. ... We believe that the German Emperor will give his ally, Austria, sound advice not to strain the bow too far [These are vague phrases intended to shift the responsibility on to my shoulders. I repudiate it.—W.], to recognize Serbia's good-will in the undertakings given, and to let the disputed points go for decision before the Powers or the Hague Arbitration Court. [Idiotic. W.] Your Kaiser's return has greatly reassured us all, for we trust H.M. and desire no war, nor does the Tsar Nicolas. It would be well if the two monarchs were to come to an understanding by telegram.' [Has been done. Whether an understanding will result, I doubt.—W.] This is the view of one of the most influential men at head-quarters, and no doubt the view of the whole environment."

We see that also on the 2Qth William still persisted in denouncing an appeal to the Hague or a conference of the Powers as "idiotic." On the other hand, he is himself doubtful whether direct negotiations of Germany with Russia offer any prospect of success. Accordingly he seems to anticipate a general war as something inevitable, and is anxious, as his comments reveal, not about this fact, but lest through Austria's stupidity he may be burdened with the odium of having brought it about. Nor is it always clear from Bethmann's statements whether he really had the maintenance of peace at heart, or whether, after Bismarck's fashion in 1871, he was anxious that the others should appear as the lamb that had troubled the water. Recollect the telegram of July 27th to Tschirschky, in which he says that we "must appear in the light of having the war forced on us."

The telegram which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th is pitched in the same key. He complains that, in spite of repeated inquiries, Austria has left Germany in the dark concerning her intentions.

"The Serbian Government's reply to the Austrian Ultimatum, now to hand, shows that Serbia is willing to meet the Austrian demands to such a comprehensive extent that in the case of a completely intransigeant attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government a gradual estrangement from her of public opinion throughout Europe must be reckoned with.

"According to the statements of the Austrian General Staff, an active military advance against Serbia will not be possible until August 12th. The Imperial [German] Government is therefore placed in the extraordinarily difficult position of being exposed, in the meantime, to the mediation and conference proposals of the other Cabinets, and (if she adheres to her present attitude of reserve in respect of such proposals) of being covered before the world, and ultimately also in the eyes of the German people, with the odium of having caused a world- war. Now on such a basis we cannot launch a successful war on three fronts. It is imperative that the responsibility for any extension of the conflict to those not directly concerned should, in all circumstances, devolve upon Russia."

Bethmann-Hollweg, therefore, advised Vienna to reiterate her definite declaration that she did not seek territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and desired to occupy Belgrade and several points in Serbia only temporarily as guarantee for the fulfilment of the Austrian demands.

"Should the Russian Government not recognize the justice of this standpoint, it would have against it the public opinion of all Europe, which is turning against Austria. As a further consequence the general diplomatic and, probably, also the military situation would shift very materially in Austria-Hungary's favour.

"Your Excellency will, by return, make an explicit statement to this effect to Count Berchtold, and suggest a corresponding démarche in St. Petersburg. In doing so, you must carefully avoid arousing the impression that we wished to hold Austria back. It is solely a question of finding a modus operandi that will facilitate the realization of Austria-Hungary's aim, to undermine the foundations of the Great-Serbian propaganda, without at the same time letting loose a world-war; and, if it cannot be finally averted, to improve for us, as far as feasible, the conditions under which it is to be waged."

It maybe acknowledged that it is difficult to decide what the Imperial Chancellor had more at heart on July 28th: whether to avoid the world- war or "to improve for us, as far as feasible, the conditions under which it is to be waged."

William himself did not take a very accommodating attitude in respect of the appeal for help addressed to him by the Tsar in his first telegram of July 2gth. It runs in the German translation:

"To H.M. The Kaiser.

" Neues Palais.

"I am glad that you are back. In this so grave moment I implore you to help me. A discreditable war [!!—W.] has been declared on a weak country. The indignation, which I entirely share, is tremendous in Russia. I foresee that very soon the pressure brought to bear upon me will overpower me, and I shall be forced to take far-reaching measures, which will lead to war. In the endeavour to avert such a disaster as a European war, I beg of you, in the name of our old friendship, to do what you can to prevent your ally from going too far. [In what does that consist ? W.]—Niky."

In view of the fact that William himself had just declared there existed no cause for war against Serbia, one might assume that this reference to the terrible consequences of Austria's belligerent action must prompt William to speedy intervention. Nothing of the sort. Nicolas begs him to leave nothing undone to prevent Austria from going too far; William asks: "In what does that consist?"

William considers war against Serbia to be entirely unwarranted, and yet protests by two exclamation marks against this war being called discreditable (discreditable^[2] in German White Book translated by schmählich, ignominious, which is too strong).

But William is not satisfied with this. In addition, he appends to the telegram the following reflections:

"Confession of his own weakness and attempt to shift responsibility on to me. The telegram contains a veiled threat, and a request amounting to a command to hold our ally's arm. Should your Excellency have sent off my telegram last night, it must have crossed this one.^[3]

"We shall now see the effect of mine. The expression 'discreditable war' (unwürdiger Krieg.—K.) does not argue a feeling that monarchs must support one another on the part of the Tsar, but a pan-Slav view, which means fear of a capitis diminutio in the Balkans in case of Austrian successes. The general effect of these could be calmly awaited before anything is done. Later, there will still be plenty of time to negotiate, and, if necessary, to mobilize, to do which Russia has not the slightest cause at present. Instead of summoning us to stop the Allies, His Majesty ought to apply to the Emperor Francis Joseph and negotiate with him, in order to learn His Majesty's views.

"Ought not copies of both telegrams to be sent to London for the information of H.M. the King?

"The 'Sozi'^[4] are making anti-militarist demonstrations in the streets. This must not be tolerated, at the present moment least of all.

"In the case of a repetition, I shall proclaim a state of siege and have the leaders, all and sundry, tutti quanti, interned. Instruct Loebell and Jagow to this effect. We can no longer tolerate Soz. propaganda at the present juncture!"

This propaganda was directed against Austria's war with Serbia, which William himself described as completely unjustified. In place of restraining his ally, who is endangering the peace of the world, the Kaiser wants "to intern tutti quanti" those who protest against the war, and he demands that Austria should be allowed a free hand to wage war and that the " general effect " of her successes should be awaited before anything is done.

1. General von Moltke.
2. Unwürdig.
3. This was, in fact, the case. The Tsar's telegram reached Berlin on July 29th at 1 a.m.; the Kaiser's telegram to the Tsar was prepared, according to a draft of Stumm's, at 10.45 p.m. on the 28th, and handed in at the Head Telegraph Office, Berlin, at 1.45 a.m. It went off, therefore, after the Tsar's telegram was already in Berlin ; the latter is not an answer to the Kaiser's telegram, as one would have to assume according to the German White Book, William's telegram being there dated the 28th at 10.45 p.m., and the Tsar's the 29th at 1p.m.—K.
4. Common German abbreviation for Socialists.