The History of Slavery and the Slave Trade/Chapter 26

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3647905The History of Slavery and the Slave Trade — Chapter 261861William O. Blake

CHAPTER XXVI.

Political History of Slavery in the United States from 1801 to 1820.

Slave population in 1810. — Period of the war. — John Randolph's denunciations. — Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane to the slaves. — Treaty of Peace — arbitration on slave property. — Opinions of the domestic slave-trade by southern statesmen. — Constitution of Mississippi — slave provisions. — The African slave-trade and fugitive law. — Missouri applies for admission — proviso to prohibit slavery. — Debate — speeches of Fuller, Tallmadge, Scott, Cobb, and Livermore. — Proceedings, 1820. — Bill for organizing Arkansas Territory — proviso to prohibit slavery lost. — Excitement in the North. — Public meetings. — Massachusetts memorial. — Resolutions of State Legislatures of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Kentucky. — Congress — the Missouri struggle renewed. — The compromise. — Proviso to exclude slavery in territory north of 36° 30' carried. — Proviso to prohibit slavery in Missouri lost. — Opinions of Monroe's cabinet. Reflections of J. Q. Adams. — State Constitution of Missouri — final struggle. — Missouri admitted as a slave state.

In the period between 1800 and 1810, the slave population of the states and territories increased 298,323, exhibiting a total in 1810 of 1,191,364, a rate of increase of about 33 per cent.

CENSUS OF 1810. — SLAVE POPULATION.
District of Columbia 5,395 Georgia 105,218
Rhode Island 108 Maryland 111,502
Connecticut 310 North Carolina 168,824
Pennsylvania 795 South Carolina 196,365
Delaware 4,177 Virginia 392,518
New Jersey 10,851 Mississippi Territory 17,088
New York 15,017 Indiana Territory 237
Louisiana 34,660 Louisiana Territory 3,011
Tennessee 44,535 Illinois Territory 168
Kentucky 80,561 Michigan Territory 24

About this period the foreign relations of the country absorbed the attention of congress, and the subject of slavery was only incidentally alluded to. John Randolph, of Virginia, in a speech in opposition to the contemplated war with England, in his usual discursive style, thus denounces the slavery agitation and the "infernal principles" of the French democracy, as inconsistent with the safety of the south:

"No sooner was the present report laid on the table, than the vultures came flocking round their prey — the carcass of a great military establishment. Men of tainted reputation, of broken fortunes (if they ever had any), of battered constitutions, "choice spirits, tired of the dull pursuits of civil life." seeking after agencies and commissions, and wishing to light the public candle at both ends.

"Such a war might hold out inducements to gentlemen from Tennessee and Genesee (Grundy and Porter). "Western hemp would rise in the market, and western New York might grow rich by provisioning our armies; not to mention he political interest which that state had in the acquisition of Canada. But how absurd to commence a war for maritime rights by invading that province, while our whole sea-coast lay exposed to the enemy; not a spot on all the shores of Chesapeake bay, the city of Baltimore alone excepted, safe from attack or capable of defense 1

"If it were true that Britain had stimulated the late Indian hostilities, that might justify the proposed invasion; but that was a rash charge, with no foundation beyond suspicion and surmise. There was, indeed, an easy and natural solution of the events on the Wabash, without resort to any such conjecture. It was our own thirst for territory, our want of moderation that had driven those sons of nature to despair.

"But this Canadian campaign, it seems, is to be a holiday matter. There is to be no expense of blood or treasure on our part. Canada is to conquer herself — is to be subdued by the principles of French fraternity! We are to succeed by this French method! Our whole policy, indeed, is French! But how dreadfully might not this sort of warfare be retorted on our own southern states!

"During the war of the revolution, so fixed among the slaves was the habit of obedience, that while the whole country was overrun by the enemy, who invited them to desert, no fears were entertained of insurrection. But should we therefore be unobservant spectators of the progress of society with the last twenty years? Even the poor slaves have not escaped. The French revolution has polluted even them. Nay, there have not been wanting members of this house — witness our legislative Legendre, the butcher — [this referred to Sloan, who had proposed the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia] to preach upon this very floor the doctrine of imprescriptible rights to a crowded audience of blacks in the galleries; teaching them that they are equal to their masters; in other words, advising them to cut their masters' throats! Similar doctrines are spread throughout the south by Yankee peddlers; and there are even owners of slaves so infatuated, as by the general tenor of their conversation, by contempt of order, morality, and religion, unthinkingly to cherish these seeds of destruction. And what has been the consequence? Within the last ten years repeated alarms of slave insurrections, some of them awful indeed. By the spreading of this infernal doctrine, the whole south has been thrown into a state of insecurity. Men dead to the operation of moral causes have taken from the poor slave those habits of loyalty and obedience which lightened his servitude by a double operation, beguiling his own labors and disarming his master's suspicions and severity; and now, like true empirics in politics, you propose to trust to the mere physical strength of the shackle that holds him in bondage. You have deprived him of all moral restraint; you have tempted him to eat cf the tree of knowledge just enough to perfect him in wickedness; you have opened his eyes to his nakedness; you have roused his nature against the hand that has fed him, and has clothed him, and has cherished him in sickness — that hand which, before he became a pupil in your school, he was accustomed to press to his lips with respectful affection; you have done all this — and now you point him to the whip and the gibbet as incentives to a sullen, reluctant obedience. God forbid that the southern states should ever see an enemy on their shores with these infernal principles of French fraternity in the van! While talking of Canada, we have too much reason to shudder for our own safety at home. I speak from facts when I say that the night-bell never tolls, for fire in Richmond that the frightened mother does not hug her infant the more closely to her bosom, not knowing what may have happened. I have myself witnessed some of the alarms in the capital of Virginia."

The infernal principles spoken of by Randolph, were, it seems, reduced tc practice in 1814 by admiral Cochrane, of the Chesapeake blockading squadron, who issued a proclamation, addressed to the slaves, under the denomination of "persons desirous to emigrate." They were offered a reception, with their families, on board the British vessels of war, with the choice of entering into the service, or of being sent to the British possessions as free settlers. "There is reason, indeed, to believe," says Hildreth, "that a plan suggested by some of the British officers, for taking possession of the peninsula between Delaware and Chesapeake bays, and then training a black army, was only rejected because the British, being then slaveholders themselves, did not like to encourage insurrection elsewhere."

Subsecpient to the ratification of the treaty of peace, a question arose whether the United States were entitled, under the treaty, to compensation for slaves within the territory or places occupied by the British forces at the time of the making of the treaty, and directed by that treaty to be restored to the United States. The question was referred, by agreement, to the emperor of Russia, who gave his decision as follows:

"That the United States were entitled to indemnification for all the slaves carried away by the British forces from places and territories which the treaty stipulated to restore, in quitting these same places and territories: That all slaves were to be considered as having been so carried away, who had been transferred from these territories to British vessels within the said territories, and who for this reason had not been restored: But that for slaves carried away from territories which the treaty did not stipulate to restore, the United States are not entitled to indemnification. The emperor also appointed two of his privy councilors, Count Nesselrode and Count Capodistrias, together with Henry Middleton, the American minister at St. Petersburgh, and Chailea Bagot, the British minister at the same place, to provide the mode of ascertaining the value of the slaves, and of other private property unlawfully carried away, and for which indemnification was to be made.

The settlement of the southwest proceeded rapidly after the war. The great profits derived from the cultivation of cotton, kept the African slave-trade alive in spite of the prohibitory law's. The domestic slave-trade increased, and Washington became a great resort of the traders, who were engaged in buying up slaves in Maryland and Virginia for transportation to the southwest John Randolph, of Virginia, in congress denounced this new traffic as heinous and abominable, inhuman and illegal, and moved a committee of inquiry, whose report justified some of the epithets. Governor Williams, of South Carolina, in a message to the legislature, denounced "this remorsless and merciless traffic, this ceasless dragging along the streets and highways of a crowd of suffering victims to minister to insatiable avarice," as condemned alike by "enlightened humanity, wise policy and the prayers of the just." The legislature accordingly passed an act forbidding the introduction of slaves from abroad; which was repealed, however, in two years.

About this time the American Colonization Society sprung into existence, as related in a former chapter.

The new state of Mississippi was admitted into the Union December 10, 1817. By one of the provisions of its constitution, grand juries were dispensed with in the indictment of slaves; and slaves were not allowed trial by jury except in capital cases.

At the session of 1817-18, the Maryland Quakers sent in a petition to congress praying further provisions for the security of free persons of color against the increased danger of being kidnapped, growing out of the domestic slave-trade. The Quaker memorial was referred, and Burrell, of Rhode Island, moved instructions to the committee, also to inquire into the expediency of additional provisions for the suppression of the African slave-trade, and especially of concert with other nations for that purpose.

At this session, Pindall, of Virginia, obtained a committee, which brought in a bill to give new stringency to the old fugitive slave act. The bill provided for assimilating the proceedings in the case of fugitives from labor to those in the case of fugitives from justice. The claimant, having made out a title before some judge of his own state, was then to be entitled to an executive demand on the governor of the state where the fugitive was, with the imposition of heavy penalties upon those who refused to aid in the arrest.

Strong, Fuller, and Whitman, of Massachusetts, Williams, of Connecticut, Livermore, of New Hampshire, and several Pennsylvania representatives, warmly opposed this bill, as going entirely beyond the constitutional provision on the subject of fugitives from labor. The old law, in their opinion, went quite far enough already. The. personal rights of one class of citizens were not to be trampled upon to secure the rights of property of other citizens. The question of servitude ought to be tried in the state where the fugitive was. A motion was made by Sergeant to modify the bill in accordance with this idea; but it did not succeed. On the other hand, the bill was supported by Cobb, of Georgia, as a right of the slaveholders secured by the constitution, by Mr. Speaker Clay, and by Baldwin, of Pennsylvania. The bill was also supported by Holmes, of Massachusetts, by Storrs, of New York, who thought that, for the sake of union and harmony, northern men must learn to sacrifice their prejudices; and by Mason, the new Boston representative, who professed, indeed, a personal interest in the question, from his fear lest, if the bill failed to pass, his own town of Boston might be inconveniently infested by southern runaways. Thus sustained, the bill passed the house, 84 to 69. Among the yeas were ten from New York, still a slaveholding state, five from Massachussetts, four from Pennsylvania, and one from New Jersey, that of the late governor and general, Bloomfield, in his earlier days a most zealous member of the New Jersey society for the abolition of slavery.

Having reached the senate, this hill was referred to a committee, of which Crittenden was chairman. He reported it back with several amendments, one of which provided than the identity of the alleged fugitive, after being carried back, should be established by some testimony other than thai of the claimant. Thus amended, the bill was carried in the senate; but not without a very warm debate, of which, however, not a syllable has been preserved. The vote stood 17 to 13, the Delaware senators against it; Otis, of Massachusetts, Sanford, of New York, and Taylor, of Indiana, for it. But by the time the bill got back to the house, its northern supporters seem to have taken some alarm; and, in spite of repeated efforts of its authors to get some action upon it, it was suffered to lie and to die on the table.

Burrell's resolution in the senate, especially that part of it relating to cooperation with foreign nations, was strongly opposed by Barbour and Troup, as leading to foreign entanglements, and involving a pledge which congress had no right to give. Morrell, a new democratic senator from New Hampshire, launched out, in reply, into a most emphatic denunciation of slavery. King defended the resolution, since the concert which it suggested was one, not of arms, but of opinion, example, and influence, to prevail on Spain and Portugal to join in the abolition of the traffic; but he suggested that the debate had taken quite too wide a range, the subject of the resolution being, not slavery in general, a topic, as he remarked, always alluded to in the senate with very great reserve, but the abolition of the slave-trade, as to which they were all agreed. The resolution was adopted; and the committee to which it was referred reported a bill, which became a law, throwing the burden of proof, in all cases where negroes were found on board a ship, on those in possession; and extending the penalties of the prohibitory act to the fitting out of vessels for the slave-trade, or the transporting slaves to any country whatever.

At the session of 1818-19, an act was passed allowing a premium of fifty dollars to the informer for every illegally-imported African seized within the United States, and half as much for those taken at sea; with authority to the president to cause them to be removed beyond the limits of the United States, and to appoint agents on the coast of Africa for their reception. An attempt was also made to punish slave-trading with death, as had been contended for at the time of the original abolition act. Such a provision passed the house, but was struck out in the senate.

In March, 1818, the delegate from Missouri presented petitions from sundry inhabitants of that territory, praying for the admission of Missouri into the Union as a state. These petitions were referred to a select committee, which reported a bill to authorize the people of that territory to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the Union on an equal footing with the original states. The bill was read the first and second time and sent to the committee of the whole, where it slept the remainder of the session. At the next session, on the 13th February, 1819, the house went into committee of the whole, Gen. Smith, of Maryland, in the chair, and took up the Missouri bill, which was considered through that sitting, and also on Monday, the 15th. Gen. Tallmadge, of New York, moved the following amendment:

"And provided that the introduction of slavery, or involuntary servitude, be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party has been duly convicted, and that all children born within the said state, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be declared free at the age of twenty-five years."

Mr. Fuller, of Massachusetts, said, that in the admission of new states into the Union, he considered that congress had a discretionary power. By the 4th article and 3d section of the constitution, congress are authorized to admit them; but nothing in that section, or in any part of the constitution, enjoins the admission as imperative, under any circumstances. If it were otherwise, he would request gentlemen to point out what were the circumstances or conditions precedent, which being found to exist, congress must admit the new state. All discretion would, in such case, be taken from congress, Mr. Fuller said, and deliberation would be useless. The honorable speaker (Mr. Clay) has said that congress has no right to prescribe any condition whatever to the newly-organized states, but must admit them by a simple act, leaving their sovereignty unrestricted. [Here the speaker explained — he did not intend to be understood in so broad a sense as Mr. Fuller stated.] With the explanation of the honorable gentleman, Mr. Fuller said, I still think his ground as untenable as before. We certainly have a right, and our duty to the nation requires, that we should examine the actual state of things in the proposed state; and, above all, the constitution expressly makes a republican form of government in the several states a fundamental principle, to be preserved under the sacred guarantee of the national legislature. — [Art. 4, sec 4.] It clearly, therefore, is the duty of congress, before admitting a new sister into the Union, to ascertain that her constitution or form of government is republican. Now, sir, the amendment proposed by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tallmadge, merely requires that slavery shall be prohibited in Missouri. Does this imply anything more than that its constitution shall be republican? The existence of slavery in any state is, so far, a departure from republican principles. The Declaration of Independence, penned by the illustrious statesman then, and at this time, a citizen of a state which admits slavery, defines the principle on which our national and state constitutions are all professedly founded. The second paragraph of that instrument begins thus: we hold these truths to be self-evident — that all men are created equal — that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Since, then, it cannot be denied that slaves are men, it follows that they are, in a purely republican government, born free, and are entitled to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. [Mr. Fuller was here interrupted by several gentlemen, who thought it improper to question in debate the republican character of the slaveholding states, which had also a tendency, as one gentleman (Mr, Colston, of Virginia,) said, to deprive those states of the right to hold slaves as property, and he adverted to the probability that there might be slaves in the gallery, listening to the debate.] Mr. Fuller assured the gentleman that nothing was farther from his thoughts, than to question on that floor, the right of Virginia and other states, which held slaves when the constitution was established, to continue to hold them. With that subject the national legislature could not interfere, and ought not to attempt it. But, Mr. Fuller continued, if gentlemen will be patient, they will see that my remarks will neither derogate from the constitutional rights of the states, nor from a due respect to their several forms of government. Sir, it is my wish to allay, and not to excite local animosities, but I shall never refrain from advancing such arguments in debate as my duty requires, nor do I believe that the reading of our Declaration of Independence, or a discussion of republican principles on any occasion, can endanger the rights, or merit the disapprobation of any portion of the Union.

My reason, Mr. Chairman, for recurring to the Declaration of our Independence, was to draw from an authority admitted in all parts of the Union, a definition of the basis of republican government If, then, all men have equal rights, it can no more comport with the principles of a free government to exclude men of a certain color from the enjoyment of "liberty and the pursuit of happiness," than to exclude those who have not attained a certain portion of wealth, or a certain stature of body, or to found the exclusion on any other capricious or accidental circumstance. Suppose Missouri, before her admission as a state, were to submit to us her constitution by which no person could elect, or be elected to any office, unless he possessed a clear annual income of twenty thousand dollars; and suppose we had ascertained that only five, or a very small number of persons had such an estate, would this be anything more or less than a real aristocracy, under a form nominally republican? Election and representation, which some contend are the only essential principles of republics, would exist only in name — a shadow without substance, a body without a soul. But if all the other inhabitants were to be made slaves, and mere property of the favored few, the outrage on principle would be still more palpable. Yet, sir, it is demonstrable that the exclusion of the black population from all political freedom, and making them the property of the whites, is an equally palpable invasion of right, and abandonment of principle. If we do this in the admission of new states, we violate the constitution, and we have not now the excuse which existed when our national constitution was established. Then, to effect a concert of interests, it was proper to make concessions. The states where slavery existed not only claimed the right to continue it, but it was manifest that a general emancipation of slaves could not be asked of them. Their political existence would have been in jeopardy; both masters and slaves must have been involved in the most fatal consequences.

To guard against such intolerable evils, it is provided in the constitution "that the migration or importation of such persons, as any of the existing states think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited till 1808." — Art. 1, sec. 9. And it is provided elsewhere, that persons held to service by the laws of any state, shall be given up by other states, to which they may have escaped, etc. — Art. 4, sec. 2.

These provisions effectually recognized the right in the states, which at the time of framing the constitution held the blacks in slavery, to continue so to hold them until they should think proper to meliorate their condition. The constitution is a compact among all the states then existing, by which certain principles of government are established for the whole, and for each individual state. The predominant principle in both respects is, that all men are free, and have an equal right to liberty, and all other privileges; or, in other words, the predominant principle is republicanism, in its largest sense. But, then, the same compact contains certain exceptions. The states then holding slaves are permitted, from the necessity of the case, and for the sake of union, to exclude the republican principle so far, and only so far, as to retain their slaves in servitude, and also their progeny, as had been the usage, until they think it proper or safe to conform to the pure principle, by abolishing slavery. The compact contains on its face the general principle and the exceptions But the attempt to extend slavery to the new states, is in direct violation of the clause, which guarantees a republican form of government to all the states. This clause, indeed, must be construed in connection with the exceptions before mentioned; but it cannot, without violence, be applied to any other states than those in which slavery was allowed at the formation of the constitution.

The honorable speaker cites the first clause in the 2d section of the 4th article, "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states," which he thinks would be violated by the condition proposed in the constitution of Missouri. To keep slaves, to make one portion of the population the property of another, hardly deserves to be called a privilege, since what is gained by the masters must be lost by the slaves. But, independently of this consideration, I think the observations already offered to the committee, showing that holding the black population in servitude is an exception to the general principles of the constitution, and can not be allowed to extend beyond the fair import of the terms by which that exception is provided, are a sufficient answer to the objection. The gentleman proceeds in the same train of reasoning, and asks if congress can require one condition, how many more can be required, and where these conditions will end? With regard to a republican constitution, congress are obliged to require that condition, and that is enough for the present question; but I contend, further, that congress has a right, at their discretion, to require any other reasonable condition. Several others were required of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Mississippi. The state of Louisiana, which was a part of the territory ceded to us at the same time with Missouri, was required to provide in her constitution for trials by jury, the writ of habeas corpus, the principles of civil and religious liberty, with several others, peculiar to that state. These, certainly, are none of them more indispensable ingredients in a republican form of government than the equality of privileges of all the population; yet these have not been denied to be reasonable, and warranted by the national constitution in the admission of new states. Nor need gentlemen apprehend that congress will set no reasonable limits to the conditions of admission. In the exercise of their constitutional discretion on this subject, they are, as in all other cases, responsible to the people. Their power to levy direct taxes is aot limited by the constitution. They may lay a tax of one million of dollars, or of a hundred millions, without violating the letter of the constitution; but if the latter enormous and unreasonable sum were levied, or even the former, without evident necessity, the people have the power in their own hands — a speedy corrective is found in the return of the elections. This remedy is so certain, that the representatives of the people can never lose sight of it; and, consequently, an abuse of their powers to any considerable extent can never be apprehended. The same reasoning applies to the exercise of all the powers entrusted to congress, and the admission of new states into the Union is in no respect an exception.

One gentleman, however, has contended against the amendment, because it abridges the rights of the slaveholding states to transport their slaves to the new states, for sale or otherwise. This argument is attempted to be enforced in various ways, and particularly by the clause in the constitution last cited. It admits, however, of a very clear answer by recurring to the 9th section of article 1st, which provides that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states then existing shall admit, shall not be prohibited by congress till 1808." This clearly implies that the migration and importation may be prohibited after that year. The importation has been prohibited, but the migration has not hitherto been restrained; congress, however, may restrain it when it may be judged expedient. It is, indeed, contended by some gentlemen, that migration is either synonymous with importation, or that it means something different from the transportation of slaves from one state to another. It certainly is not synonymous with importation, and would not have been used had it been so. It cannot mean exportation, which is also a definite and precise term. It cannot mean the reception of free blacks from foreign countries, as is alleged by some, because no possible reason existed for regulating their admission by the constitution; no free blacks ever came from Africa, or any other country to this; and to introduce the provision by the side of that for the importation of slaves, would have been absurd in the highest degree. What alternative remains but to apply the term "migration" to the transportation of slaves from those states where they are admitted to be held, to other states? Such a provision might have in view a very natural object. The price of slaves might be affected so far by a sudden prohibition to transport slaves from state to state, that it was as reasonable to guard against that inconvenience as against the sudden interdiction of the importation. Hitherto it has not been found necessary for congress to prohibit migration or transportation from state to state. But now it becomes the right and duty of congress to guard against the further extension of the intolerable evil and the crying enormity of slavery.

The expediency of this measure is very apparent. The opening of an extensive slave market will tempt the cupidity of those who, otherwise, perhaps, might gradually emancipate their slaves. We have heard much, Mr. Chairman, of the colonization society; an institution which is the favorite of the humane gentlemen in the slaveholding states. They have long been lamenting the miseries of slavery, and earnestly seeking for a remedy compatible with their own safety and the happiness of their slaves. At last the great desideratum is found — a colony in Africa for the emancipated blacks. How will the generous intentions of these humane persons be frustrated if the price of slaves is to be doubled by a new and boundless market? Instead of emancipation of the slaves, it is much to be feared that unprincipled wretches will be found kidnapping those who are already free, and transporting and selling the hapless victims into hopeless bondage. Sir, I really hope that congress will not contribute to discountenance and render abortive the generous and philanthropic views of this most worthy and laudable society. Rather let us hope that the time is not very remote, when the shores of Africa, which have so long been a scene of barbarous rapacity and savage cruelty, shall exhibit a race of free and enlightened people — the offspring, indeed, of cannibals or slaves; but displaying the virtues of civilization and the energies of independent freemen. America may then hope to see the development of a germ, now scarcely visible, cherished and matured under the genial warmth of our country's protection, till the fruit shall appear in the regeneration and happiness of a boundless continent.

One argument still remains to be noticed. It is said that we are bound, by the treaty of cession with France, to admit the ceded territory into the Union "as soon as possible." It is obvious that the president and the senate, the treaty-making power, cannot make a stipulation with any foreign nation in derogation of the constitutional powers and duties of this house, by making it imperative on us to admit the new territory according to the literal tenor of the phrase; but the additional words in the treaty, "according to the principles of the constitution," put it beyond all doubt that no such compulsory admission was intended, and that the republican principles of our constitution are to govern us in the admission of this, as well as all the new states in the national family.

Mr. Tallmadge, of New York, rose: Sir, said he, it has been my desire and my intention to avoid any debate on the present painful and unpleasant subject. When I had the honor to submit to this house the amendment now under consideration, I accompanied it with a declaration that it was intended to confine its operation to the newly acquired territory across the Mississippi; and I then expressly declared that I would in no manner intermeddle with the slaveholding states, nor attempt manumission in any one of the original states in the Union. Sir, I even went further, and stated that I was aware of the delicacy of the subject, and that I had learned from southern gentlemen the difficulties and the dangers of having-free blacks Intermingling with slaves; and, on that account, and with a view to the safety of the while population of the adjoining states, I would not even advocate the prohibition of slavery in the Alabama territory; because, surrounded as it was by slaveholding states, and with only imaginary lino of division, the intercourse between slaves and free blacks could not be prevented, and a servile war might be the result. While we deprecate and mourn over the evils of slavery, humanity and good morals require as to wish its abolition, under circumstances consistent with the safety of the white population. Willingly, therefore, will I submit to an evil which we cannot safely remedy. I admitted all that had been said of the danger of having free blacks visible to slaves, and therefore did not hesitate to pledge myself that I would neither advise nor attempt coercive manumission. But, sir, all these reasons cease when we cross the banks of the Mississippi, into a territory separated by a natural boundary — a newly acquired territory, never contemplated in the formation of our government, not included within the compromise or mutual pledge in the adoption of our constitution — a new territory acquired by our common fund, and ought justly to be subject to our common legislation.

Sir, when I submitted the amendment now under consideration, accompanied with these explanations, and with these avowals of my intentions and of my motives, I did expect that gentlemen who might differ from me in opinion would appreciate the liberality of my views, and would meet me with moderation, as upon a fair subject for general legislation. I did expect, at least, that the frank declaration of my views would protect me from harsh expressions, and from the unfriendly imputations which have been cast out on this occasion. But, sir, such has been the character and the violence of this debate, and expressions of so much intemperance and of an aspect so threatening have been used, that continued silence on my part would ill become me who had submitted to this house the original proposition. While this subject was under debate before the committee of the whole, I did not take the floor, and I avail myself of this occasion to acknowledge my obligations to my friends (Mr. Taylor and Mr. Mills) for the manner in which they supported my amendment, at a time when I was unable to partake of the debate. I had only on that day returned from a journey, long in extent and painful in its occasion; and from an affection of my breast I could not then speak. I cannot yet hope to do justice to the subject; but I do hope to say enough to assure my friends that I have not left them in the controversy, and to convince the opponents of the measure that their violence has not driven me from the debate.

Sir, the lion, gentleman from Missouri, (Mr. Scott,) who has just resumed his seat, has told us of the ides of March, and has cautioned us to "beware of the fate of Caesar and of Rome." Another gentleman, (Mr. Cobb,) from Georgia, in addition to other expressions of great warmth, has said that if we persist, the Union will be dissolved; and with a look fixed on me, has told us, "we have kindled a fire which all the waters of the ocean cannot put out, which seas of blood can only extinguish." Language of this sort has no effect on me; my purpose is fixed, it is interwoven with my existence; its durability is limited with my life; it is a great and glorious cause, setting bounds to a slavery the most cruel and debasing the world has ever witnessed; it is the freedom of man; it is the cause of unredeemed and unregenerated human beings.

If a dissolution of the Union must take place, let it be so! If a civil war, which gentlemen so much threaten, must come, I can only say, let it come! My hold on life is probably as frail as that of any man who now hears me; but while that hold lasts, it shall be devoted to the service of my country — to the freedom of man. If blood is necessary to extinguish any fire which I have assisted to kindle, I can assure gentlemen, while I regret the necessity, I shall not forbear to contribute my mite. Sir, the violence to which gentlemen have resorted on this subject will not move my purpose, nor drive me from my place. I have the fortune and the honor to stand here as the representative of freemen, who possess intelligence to know their rights — who have the spirit to maintain them. Whatever might be my own private sentiments on this subject, standing here as the representative of others, no choice is left me. I know the will of my constituents, and, regardless of consequences, I will avow it — as their representative, I will proclaim their hatred to slavery in every shape — as their representative, here will I hold my stand, till this floor, with the constitution of my country which supports it, shall sink beneath me — if I am doomed to fall, I shall, at least, have the painful consolation to believe that I fall, as a fragment, in the ruins of my country.

Sir, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Colston) has accused my honorable friend from New Hampshire (Mr. Livermore) of "speaking to the galleries," and by his "language endeavoring to excite a servile war; "and has ended by saying, "he is no better than Arbuthnot and Ambrister, and deserves no better fate." When I hear such language uttered upon this floor, and within this house, I am constrained to consider it as hasty and unintended language, resulting from the vehemence of debate, and not really intending the personal indecorum the expression would seem to indicate. [Mr. Colston asked to explain, and said he had not distinctly understood Mr. T. Mr. Livermore called on Mr. C. to state the expressions he had used. Mr. C. then said he had no explanation to give.] Mr. T. said he had none to ask — he continued to say, he would not believe any gentleman on this floor would commit so great an indecorum against any member, or against the dignity of this house, as to use such expressions, really intending the meaning which the words seem to import, and which had been uttered against the gentleman from New Hampshire. [Mr. Nelson, of Virginia, in the chair, called to order, and said no personal remarks would be allowed.] Mr. T. said he rejoiced the chair was at length aroused to a sense of its duties. The debate had, for several days, progressed with unequaled violence, and all was in order; but now, when at length this violence on one side is to be resisted, the chair discovered it is out of order. I rejoice, said Mr. T, at the discovery, I approve of the admonition, while I am proud to say it has no relevancy to me. It is my boast that I have never uttered an unfriendly personal remark on this floor; but I wish it distinctly understood, that the immutable laws of self-defense will justify going to great lengths, and that, in the future progress of this debate, the rights of defense would be regarded.

Sir, has it already come to this, that in the congress of the United States — that, in the legislative councils of republican America, the subject of slavery has become a subject of so much feeling, of such delicacy, of such danger, that it cannot safely be discussed? Are members who venture to express their sentiments on this subject to be accused of talking to the galleries, with intention to excite a servile war; and of meriting the fate of Arbuthnot and Ambrister? Are we to be told of the dissolution of the Union, of civil war, and seas of blood? And yet, with such awful threatenings before us, do gentlemen in the same breath insist upon the encouragement of this evil — upon the extension of this monstrous scourge of the human race? An evil so fraught with such dire calamities to us as individuals, and to our nation, and threatening, in its progress, to overwhelm the civil and religious institutions of the country, with the liberties of the nation, ought at once to be met, and to be controlled. If its power, its influence, and its Impending dangers have already arrived at such a point that it is not safe to discuss it on this floor, and it cannot now pass under consideration as a proper subject for general legislation, what will be the result when it has spread through your widely-extended domain? Its present threatening aspect, and the violence of its supporters, so far from inducing me to yield to its progress, prompt me to resist its march. Now is the time. It must now be met, and the extension of the evil must now be prevented, or the occasion is irrecoverably lost, and the evil can never be controlled.

Sir, extend your view across the Mississippi, over your newly-acquired territory — a territory so far surpassing, in extent, the limits of your present country, that that country which gave birth to your nation, which achieved your revolution, consolidated your Union, formed your constitution, and has subsequently acquired so much glory, hangs but as an appendage to the extended empire 07er which your republican government is now called to bear sway. Look down the long vista of futurity; see your empire, in extent unequaled, in advantageous situation without a parallel, and occupying all the valuable part of one continent. Behold this extended empire, inhabited by the hardy sons of American freemen, knowing their rights, and inheriting the will to protect them — owners of the soil on which they live, and interested in the institutions which they labor to defend; with two oceans laving your shores, and tributary to your purposes, bearing on their bosoms the commerce of our people; compared to yours, the governments of Europe dwindle into insignificance, and the whole world is without a parallel. But, sir, reverse this scene: people this fair domain with the slaves of your planters; extend slavery, this bane of man, this abomination of heaven, over your extended empire, and you prepare its dissolution; you turn its accumulated strength into positive weakness; you cherish a canker in your breast; you put poison in your bosom; you place a vulture preying on your heart — nay, you whet the dagger and place it in the hands of a portion of your population, stimulated to use it by every tie, human and divine. The envious contrast between your happiness and their misery, between your liberty and their slavery, must constantly prompt them to accomplish your destruction. Your enemies will learn the source and the cause of your weakness. As often as external dangers shall threaten, or internal commotions await you, you will then realize, that by your own procurement, you have placed amidst your families, and in the bosom of your country, a population producing at once the greatest cause of individual danger, and of national weakness. With this defect, your government must crumble to pieces, and your people become the scoff of the world.

Sir, we have been told, with apparent confidence, that we have no right to annex conditions to a state, on its admission into the Union; and it has been urged that the proposed amendment, prohibiting the further introduction of slavery, is unconstitutional. This position, asserted with so much confidence, remains unsupported by any argument, or by any authority derived from the constitution itself. The constitution strongly indicates an opposite conclusion, and seems to contemplate a difference between the old and the new states. The practice of the government has sanctioned this difference in many respects.

The third section of the fourth article of the constitution says, "new states may be admitted by the congress into this Union," and it is silent as to the terms and conditions upon which the new states may be so admitted. The fair inference from this is, that the congress which might admit, should prescribe the time and the terms of such admission. The tenth section of the first article of the constitution says, "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year 1808." The words "now existing" clearly show the distinction for which we contend. The word slave is no where mentioned in the constitution; but this section has always been considered as applicable to them, and unquestionably reserved the right to prevent their importation into any new state before the year 1808.

Congress, therefore, have power over the subject, probably as a matter of legislation, but more certainly as a right, to prescribe the time and the condition upon which any new state may be admitted into the family of the Union. Sir, the bill now before us proves the correctness of my argument. It is filled with conditions and limitations. The territory is required to take a census, and is to be admitted only on condition that it have 40,000 inhabitants. I have already submitted amendments preventing the state from taxing the lands of the United States, and declaring that all navigable waters shall remain open to the other states, and be exempt from any tolls or duties. And my friend (Mr. Taylor) has also submitted amendments prohibiting the state from taxing soldiers' lands for the period of five years. And to all these amendments we have heard no objection — they have passed unanimously. But now, when an amendment prohibiting the further introduction of slavery is proposed, the whole house is put in agitation, and we are confidently told it is unconstitutional to annex conditions to the admission of a new state into the union. The result of all this is, that all amendments and conditions are proper, which suit a certain class of gentlemen, hut whatever amendment is proposed, which does not comport with their interests or their views, is unconstitutional, and a flagrant violation of this sacred charter of our rights. In order to be consistent, gentlemen must go hack and strike out the various amendments to which they have already agreed. The constitution applies equally to all, or to none.

Sir, we have been told that this is a new principle for which we contend, never before adopted, or thought of. So far from this being correct, it is due to the memory of our ancestors to say, it is an old principle, adopted by them as the policy of our country. Whenever the United States have had the right and the power, they have heretofore prevented the extension of slavery. The states of Kentucky and Tennessee were taken off from other states, and were admitted into the Union without condition, because their lands were never owned by the United States. The territory northwest of the Ohio is all the land which ever belonged to them. Shortly after the cession of those lands to the Union, congress passed, in 1787, a compact, which was declared to be unalterable, the sixth article of which provides that "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment for crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted." In pursuance of this compact, all the states formed from that territory have been admitted into the Union upon various conditions, and, amongst which, the sixth article of this compact is included as one.

Let gentlemen also advert to the law for the admission of the state of Louisiana into the Union; they will find it filled with conditions. It was required not only to form a constitution upon the principles of a republican government, but it was required to contain the "fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty." It was even required, as a condition of its admission, to keep its records, and its judicial and its legislative proceedings in the English language; and also to secure the trial by jury, and to surrender all claim to unappropriated lands in the territory, with the prohibition to tax any of the United States' lands.

After this long practice and constant usage to annex conditions to the admission of a state into the Union, will gentlemen yet tell us it is unconstitutional, and talk of our principles being novel and extraordinary? It has been said that if this amendment prevails, we shall have a union of states possessing unequal rights. And we have been asked, whether we wished to see such a "checkered union?" Sir, we have such a union already. If the prohibition of slavery is a denial of a right, and constitutes a checkered union, gladly would I behold such rights denied, and such a checker spread over every state in the Union. It is now spread over the states northwest of the Ohio, and forms the glory and the strength of those states. I hope it will be extended from the Mississippi to the Pacific ocean.

Sir, we have been told that the proposed amendment cannot be received, because it is contrary to the treaty and cession of Louisiana. "Article 3 The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States, and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, their property, and the religion which they profess." I find nothing, said Mr. T., in this article of the treaty incompatible with the proposed amendment. The rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States are guaranteed to the inhabitants of Louisiana. If one of them should choose to remove into Virginia, he could take his slaves with him; but if he removes to Indiana, or any of the states northwest of the Ohio, he cannot take his slaves with him. If the proposed amendment prevail, the inhabitants of Louisiana, or the citizens of the United States, can neither of them take slaves into the state of Missouri. All, therefore, may enjoy equal privileges. It is a disability, or what I call a blessing, annexed to the particular district of country, and in no manner attached to the individual. But, while I have no doubt that the treaty contains no solid objection against the proposed amendment, if it did, it would not alter my determination on the subject, The senate, or the treaty-making power of our government, have neither the right nor the power to stipulate by a treaty, the terms upon which a people shall be admitted into the Union. This house have a right to be heard on the subject. The admission of a state into the Union is a legislative act,, which requires the concurrence of all the departments of legislative power. It is an important prerogative of this house, which I hope will never be surrendered.

The zeal and the ardor of gentlemen, in the course of this debate, have induced them to announce to this house, that, if we persist and force the state of Missouri to accede to the proposed amendment, as the condition of her admission into the Union, she will not regard it, and, as soon as admitted, will alter her constitution, and introduce slavery into her territory. Sir, I am not prepared, nor is it necessary, to determine what would be the consequence of such a violation of faith — of such a departure from the fundamental condition of her admission into the Union. I would not cast upon a people so foul an imputation, as to believe they would be guilty of such fraudulent duplicity. The states northwest of the Ohio have all regarded the faith and the conditions of their admission: and there is no reason to believe the people of Missouri will not also regard theirs. But, sir, whenever a state admitted into the Union shall disregard and set at naught the fundamental conditions of its admission, and shall, in violation of all faith, undertake to levy a tax upon lands of the United States, or a toll upon their navigable waters, or introduce slavery, where congress have prohibited it, then it will be in time to determine the consequence. But, if the threatened consequence were known to be the certain result, yet would I insist upon the proposed amendment. The declaration of this house, the declared will of the nation to prohibit slavery would produce its moral effect, and stand as one of the brightest ornaments of our country. Sir, it has been urged with great plausibility, that we should spread the slaves now in our country, and thus spread the evil, rather than confine it to its present districts. It has been said we should thereby diminish the clangers from them, while we increase the means of their living, and augment their comforts. But, you may rest assured, that this reasoning is fallacious, and that, while slavery is admitted, the market will be supplied. Our coast, and its contiguity to the West Indies and the Spanish possessions, render easy the introduction of slaves into our country. Our laws are already highly penal against their introduction, and yet it is a well-known fact, that about fourteen thousand slaves have been brought into our country this last year.

Since we have been engaged in this debate, we have witnessed an elucidation of this argument, of bettering the condition of slaves, by spreading them over the country. A slave-driver, a trafficker in human flesh, as if sent by providence, has passed the door of your capitol, on his way to the west, driving before him about fifteen of these wretched victims of his power, collected in the course of his traffic, and by their removal, torn from every relation and from every tie which the human heart can hold dear. The males, who might raise the arm of vengeance, and retaliate for their wrongs, were hand-cuffed and chained to each other, while the females and children were marched in their rear, under the guidance of the driver's whip! Yes, sir, such has been the scene witnessed from the windows of congress hall, and viewed by members who compose the legislative councils of republican America S

In the course of the debate on this subject, we have been told that, from the long habit of the southern and western people, the possession of slaves has become necessary to them, and an essential requisite in their living. It has been urged, from the nature of the climate and soil of the southern countries, that the lands cannot be occupied or cultivated without slaves. It has been said that the slaves prosper in those places, and that they are much better off there than in their own native country. We have ever been told that if we succeed and prevent slavery across the Mississippi, we shall greatly lessen the value of property there, and shall retard, for a long series of years, the settlement of that country.

Sir, said Mr. T., if the western country cannot be settled without slaves, gladly would I prevent its settlement till time shall be no more. If this class of arguments is to prevail, it sets all morals at defiance, and we are called to legislate on this subject as a matter of mere personal interest. If this is to be the case, repeal all your laws prohibiting the slave-trade; throw open this traffic to the commercial states of the east; and if it better the condition of these wretched beings, invite the dark population of benighted Africa to be transplanted to the shores of republican America. But I will not cast upon this or upon that gentleman an imputation so ungracious as the conclusion to which their arguments would necessarily tend. I do not believe any gentleman on this floor would here advocate the slave-trade, or maintain in the abstract the principles of slavery. I will not outrage the decorum, nor insult the dignity of this house, by attempting to argue in this place, as an abstract proposition, the moral right of slavery. How gladly would the "legitimates of Europe chuckle," to find an American congress in debate on such a question! As an evil brought upon us without our own fault, before the formation of our government, and as one of the sins of that nation from which we have revolted, we must, of necessity, legislate upon this subject. It is our business so to legislate as never to encourage, but always to control this evil; and, while we strive to eradicate it, we ought to fix its limits, and render it subordinate to the safety of the white population, and the good order of civil society

Sir, on this subject the eyes of Europe are turned upon you. You boast of the freedom of your constitution and your laws; you have proclaimed, in the Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights — that amongst these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;" and yet you have slaves in your country. The enemies of your government, and the legitimates of Europe, point to your inconsistencies, and blazon your supposed defects. If you allow slavery to pass into territories where you have the lawful power to exclude it, you will justly take upon yourself all the charges of inconsistency; but confine it to the original slaveholding states, where you found it at the formation of your government, and you stand acquitted of all imputation.

This is a subject upon which I have great feeling for the honor of my country. In a former debate upon the Illinois constitution, I mentioned that our enemies had drawn a picture of our country, as holding in one hand the Declaration of Independence, and with the other brandishing a whip over our affrighted slaves. I then made it my boast that we could cast back upon England the accusation — that she had committed the original sin of bringing slaves into our country. I have since received, through the post-office, a letter postmarked in South Carolina, and signed "A native of England," desiring that, when I had occasion to repeat my boast against England, I would also state that she had atoned for her original sin by establishing in her slave-colonies a system of humane laws, meliorating their condition, and providing for their safety, while America had committed the secondary sin of disregarding their condition, and had even provided laws by which it was not murder to kill a slave. Sir, I felt the severity of the reproof; I felt for my country. I have inquired on the subject, and I find such were formerly the laws in some of the slaveholding states; and that even now, in the state of South Carolina, by law, the penalty of death is provided for stealing a slave, while the murder of a slave is punished with a trivial fine. Such is the contrast and the relative value which is placed, in the opinion of a slaveholding state, between the property of the master and the life of a slave.

Sir, gentlemen have undertaken to criminate, and to draw odious contrasts between different sections of our country — I shall not combat such arguments; I have made no pretense to exclusive morality on this subject, either for myself or my constituents; nor have I cast any imputations on others. On the contrary, I hold that mankind under like circumstances are alike, the world over. The vicious and unprincipled are confined to no district of country; and it is for this portion of the community we are bound to legislate. When honorable gentlemen inform us we overrate the cruelty and the dangers of slavery, and tell us that their slaves are happy and contented, and would even contribute to their safety, they tell us but very little; they do not tell us that, while their slaves are happy, the slaves of some depraved and cruel wretch in their neighborhood may be stimulated to revenge, and thus involve the country in ruin. If we had to legislate only for such gentlemen as are now embraced within my view, a law against robbing the mail would be a disgrace upon the nation; and, as useless, I would tear it from the pages of your statute book; yet sad experience has taught us the necessity of such laws — and honor, justice, and policy teach us the wisdom of legislating to limit the extension of slavery.

In the zeal to draw sectional contrasts, we have been told by one gentleman, that gentlemen from one district of country talk of their morality, while those of another practice it. And the superior liberality has been asserted of southern gentlemen over those of the north, in all contributions to moral institutions, for bible and missionary societies. Sir, I understand too well the pursuit of my purpose, to be decoyed and drawn off into the discussion of a collateral subject* I have no inclination to controvert these assertions of comparative liberality. Although I have no idea that they are founded in fact, yet, because it better suits the object of my present argument, I will, on this occasion, admit them to the fullest extent. And what is the result? Southern gentlemen, by their superior liberality in contributions to moral institutions, justly stand in the first rank, and hold the first place in the brightest page in the history of our country. But turn over this page, and what do you behold? You behold them contributing to teach the doctrines of Christianity in every quarter of the globe. You behold them legislating to secure the ignorance and stupidity of their own slaves! You behold them prescribing, by law, penalties against the man that dares teach a negro to read. Such is the statute law of the state of Virginia. [Mr. Bassett and Mr. Tyler said that there was no such law in Virginia.]

No, said Mr. T., I have mis-spoken myself; I ought to have said, such is the statute law of the state of Georgia. Yes, while we hear of a liberality which civilizes the savages of all countries, and carries the gospel alike to the Hottentot and the Hindoo, it has been reserved for the republican state of Georgia, not content with the Care of its overseers, to legislate to secure the oppression and the ignorance of their slaves. The man who there teaches a negro to read is liable to a criminal prosecution. The dark, benighted beings of all creation profit by our liberality — save those of our own plantations. Where is the missionary who possesses sufficient hardihood to venture a residence to teach the slaves of a plantation? Here is the stain! Here is the stigma! which fastens upon the character of our country; and which, in the appropriate language of the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Cobb,) all the waters of the ocean cannot wash out; which seas of blood can only takeaway.

Sir. there is yet another, and an important point of view, in which this subject ought to be considered. We have been told by those who advocate the extension of slavery into the Missouri, that any attempt to control this subject by legislation is a violation of that faith and mutual confidence upon which our Union was formed, and our constitution adopted. This argument might be considered plausible if the restriction was attempted to be enforced against any of the slaveholding states which had been a party in the adoption of the constitution. But it can have no reference or application to a new district of country recently acquired, and never contemplated in the formation of government, and not embraced in the mutual concessions and declared faith upon which the constitution was adopted. The constitution provides that the representatives of the several states to this house shall be according to their number, including three-fifths of the slaves in the respective states. This is an important benefit yielded to the slaveholding states, as one of the mutual sacrifices for the Union. On this subject, I consider the faith of the Union pledged, and I never would attempt coercive manumission in a slaveholding state.

But none of these causes which induced the sacrifice of this principle, and which now produce such an unequal representation on this floor, of the free population of the country, exist as between us and the newly-acquired territory across the Mississippi. That portion of country has no claims to such an unequal representation, unjust in its results upon the other states. Are the numerous slaves in extensive countries, which we may acquire by purchase, and admit as states into the Union, at once to be represented on this floor, under a clause of the constitution, granted as a compromise and a benefit to the southern states which had borne part in the revolution? Such an extension of that clause in the constitution would be unjust in its operations, unequal iu its results, and a violation of its original intention. Abstract from the moral effects of slavery, its political consequences in the representation under this clause of the constitution, demonstrate the importance of the proposed amendment.

Sir, I shall bow in silence to the-will of the majority, on whichever side it shall be expressed; yet I confidently hope that majority will be found on the side of an amendment, so replete with moral consequences, so pregnant with important political results.

Mr. Scott, of Missouri, said he trusted that his conduct, during the whole of the time in which he had the honor of a seat in the house, had convinced gentlemen of his disposition not to obtrude his sentiments on any other subjects than those on which the interest of his constituents, and of the territory he represented, were immediately concerned. But when a question such as the amendments proposed by the gentlemen from New York, (Messrs. Tallmadge and Taylor,) was presented for consideration, involving constitutional principles to a vast amount, pregnant with the future fate of the territory, portending destruction to the liberties of that people, directly bearing on their rights of property, their state rights, their all, he should consider it a dereliction of his duty, as retreating from his post, nay, double criminality, did he not raise his voice against their adoption. After the many able and luminous views that had been taken of this subject, by the speaker of the house, and other honorable men, he had not the vanity to suppose that any additional views which he could offer, or any new dress in which he could clothe those already advanced, would have the happy tendency of inducing any gentleman to change his vote. But, if he stood single on the question, and there was no man to help him, yet, while the laws of the land and the rules of the house guaranteed to him the privilege of speech, he would redeem his conscience from the imputation of having silently witnessed a violation of the constitution of his country, and an infringement on the liberties of the people who had intrusted to his feeble abilities the advocation of their rights. He desired, at this early stage of his remarks, in the name of the citizens of Missouri territory, whose rights on other subjects had been too long neglected and shamefully disregarded, to enter his solemn protest against the introduction, under the insidious form of amendment, of any principle in this bill, the obvious tendency of which would be to sow the seeds of discord in, and perhaps eventually endanger the Union.

Mr. S. entertained the opinion that, under the constitution, congress had not the power to impose this, or any other restriction, or to require of the people of Missouri their assent to this condition, as a pre-requisite to their admission into the Union. He contended this from the language of the constitution itself, from the practice in the admission of new states under that instrument, and from the express terms of the treaty of cession. The short view he intended to take of those points would, he trusted, be satisfactory to all those who were not so anxious to usurp power as to sacrifice to its attainment the principles of our government, or who were not desirous of prostrating the rights and independence of a state to chimerical views of policy or expediency. The authority to admit new states into the Union was granted in the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, which declared that "new states may be admitted by the congress into the Union." The only power given to the congress by this section appeared to him to be that of passing a law for the admission of the new state, leaving it in possession of all the rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by the other states; the most valuable and prominent of which was that of forming and modifying their own state constitution, and over which congress had no superintending control, other than that expressly given in the fourth section of the same article, which read, "the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government." This end accomplished, the guardianship of the United States over the constitutions of the several states was fulfilled; and all restrictions, limitations, and conditions beyond this, was so much power unwarrantably assumed. In illustration of this position, he would read an extract from one of the essays written by the late President Madison, contemporaneously with the constitution of the United States, and from a very celebrated work: "In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other, and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into, should be substantially maintained. But this authority extends no further than to a guarantee of a republican form of government, which supposes a preëxisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the states, they are guaranteed by the federal constitution. Whenever the states may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guarantee for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance."

Mr. S. thought that those two clauses, when supported by such high authority, had they been the only ones in the constitution which related to the powers of the general government over the states, and particularly at their formation and adoption into the Union, could not but be deemed satisfactory to a reasonable extent; but there were other provisions in the constitution, to which he would refer, that beyond all doubt, to his mind, settled the question. One of those was the tenth article in the amendments, which said that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." He believed that, by common law and common usage, all grants giving certain defined and specific privileges or powers, were to be so construed as that no others should be intended to be given but such as were particularly enumerated in the instruments themselves, or indispensably necessary to carry into effect those designated. In no part of the constitution was the power proposed to be exercised, of imposing conditions on a new state, given, either in so many words, or by any justifiable or fair inference; nor in any portion of the constitution was the right prohibited to the respective states to regulate their own internal police, of admitting such citizens as they pleased, or of introducing any description of property that they should consider as essential or necessary to their prosperity; and the framers of that instrument seem to have been zealous, lest, by implication or by inference, powers might be assumed by the general government over the states and people, other than those expressly given: hence they reserve in so many terms to the states and the people, all powers not delegated to the federal government. The ninth article of the amendments to the constitution still further illustrated the position he had taken; it read that "the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Mr. S. believed it to be a just rule of interpretation, that the enumeration of powers delegated to congress weakened their authority in all cases not enumerated; and that beyond those powers enumerated they had none, except they were essentially necessary to carry into effect those that were given. The second section of the fourth article of the constitution, which declared that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," was satisfactory, to his judgment, that it was intended the citizens of each state, forming a part of one harmonious whole, should have, in all things, equal privileges; the necessary consequence of which was, that every man, in his own state, should have the same rights, privileges, and powers, that any other citizen of the United States had in his own state; otherwise discontent and murmurings would prevail against the general government who had deprived him of the equality.

For example, if the citizens of Pennsylvania, or Virginia, enjoyed the right, in their own state, to decide the question whether they would have slavery or not, the citizens of Missouri, to give them the same privileges, must have the same right to decide whether they would or would not tolerate slavery in their state; if it were otherwise, then the citizens of Pennsylvania and Virginia would have more rights, privileges, and powers in their respective states, than the citizens of Missouri would have in theirs. Mr. Scott said he would make another quotation from the same work he had before been indebted to, which he believed had considerable bearing on this question. "The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined; those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite; the former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce, with which last the powers of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state." The applicability of this doctrine to the question under consideration was so obvious, that he would not detain the house to give examples, but leave it for gentlemen to make the application. He would, however, make one otner reference to the constitution, before he proceeded to speak of the practice under it; in the second section of that instrument it was provided, that "representatives, and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." This provision was not restricted to the states then formed, and about to adopt the constitution; but to all those states which might be included within this Union, clearly contemplating the admission of new states thereafter, and providing, that to them, also, should this principle of representation and taxation equally apply. Nor could he subscribe to the construction, that as this part of the constitution was matter of compromise, it was to be limited in its application to the original states only, and not to be extended to all those states that might after its adoption become members of the federal Union; and a practical exposition had been made by congress of this part of the constitution, in the admission of Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi states, all of whom were slaveholding states, and to each of them this principle had been extended.

Mr. Scott believed, that the practice under the constitution had been different from that now contended for by gentlemen; he was unapprised of any similar provision having ever been made, or attempted to be made, in relation to any other new state heretofore admitted. The argument drawn from the states formed out of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, he did not consider as analogous; that restriction, if any, was imposed in pursuance of a compact, and only, so far as congress could do, carried into effect the disposition of Virginia in reference to a part of her own original territory, and was, in every respect, more just, because that provision was made and published to the world at a time when but few, if any, settlements were formed within that tract of country; and the children of those people of color belonging to the inhabitants then there have been, and still were, held in bondage, and were not free at a given age, as was contemplated by the amendment under consideration, nor did he doubt but that it was competent for any of those states admitted in pursuance of the ordinance of 1187, to call a convention, and so to alter their constitution as to allow the introduction of slaves, if they thought proper to do so. To those gentlemen who had in their argument, in support of the amendments, adverted to the instance where congress had, by the law authorizing the people of Louisiana to form a constitution and state government, exercised the power of imposing the terms and conditions on which they should be permitted to do so, he would recommend a careful examination and comparison of those terms with the constitution of the United States, when, he doubted not, they would be convinced that these restrictions were only such as were in express and positive language defined in the latter instrument, and would have been equally binding on the people of Louisiana had they not been enumerated in the law giving them authority to form a constitution for themselves.

Mr. Scott said he considered the contemplated conditions and restrictions, contained in the proposed amendments, to be unconstitutional and unwarrantable, from the provisions of the treaty of cession, by the third article of which it was stipulated, that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and, in the mean time, they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess."

This treaty having been made by the competent authority of government, ratified by the senate, and emphatically sanctioned by congress in the acts making appropriations to carry it into effect, became a part of the supreme law of the land, and its bearings on the rights of the people had received a practical exposition by the admission of the state of Louisiana, part of the same territory, and acquired by the same treaty of cession, into the Union. It was in vain for gentlemen to tell him that, by the terms of the treaty of cession, the United States were not bound to admit any part of the ceded territory into the Union as a state; the evidence of the obligation congress considered they were under, to adopt states formed out of that territory, is clearly deducible from the fact that they had done so in the instance of Louisiana. But, had no state been admitted, formed of a part of the territory acquired by that treaty, the obligation of the government to do so would not be the less apparent to him. "The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States." The people were not left to the wayward discretion of this, or any other government, by saying that they way be incorporated in the Union. The language was different and imperative: "they shall be incorporated," Mr. Scott understood by the term incorporated, that they were to form a constituent part of this republic; that they were to become joint partners in the character and councils of the country, and in the national losses and national gains; as a territory, they were not an essential part of the government; they were a mere province, subject to the acts and regulations of the general government in all cases whatsoever. As a territory, they had not all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States. Mr. Scott himself furnished an example, that, in their present condition, they had not all the rights of the other citizens of the Union. Had he a vote in this house? And yet these people were, during the war, subject to certain taxes imposed by congress. Had those people any voice to give in the imposition of taxes to which they were subject, or in the disposition of the funds of the nation, and particularly those arising from the sales of the public lands, to which they already had, and still would largely contribute? Had they a voice to give in selecting the officers of this government, or many of their own? In short, in what had they equal rights, advantages and immunities with the other citizens of the United States, but in the privilege to submit to a procrastination of their rights, and in the advantage to subscribe to your laws, your rules, your taxes, and your powers, even without a hearing? Those people were also "to be admitted into the Union as soon as possible." Mr. Scott would infer from this expression, that it was the understanding of the parties, that so soon as any portion of the territory, of sufficient extent to form a state, should contain the number of inhabitants required by law to entitle them to a representative on the floor of this house, that they then had the right to make the call for admission, and this admission, when made, was to be, not on conditions that gentlemen might deem expedient, not on conditions referable to future political views, not on conditions that the constitution the people should form should contain a clause that would particularly open the door for emigration from the north or from the south, not on condition that the future population of the state should come from a slaveholding or nonslaveholding state, "but according to the principles of the federal constitution," and none other. The people of Missouri were, by solemn treaty stipulation, when admitted, to enjoy all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States. Can any gentleman contend, that, laboring under the proposed restriction, the citizens of Missouri would have all the rights, advantages, and immunities of other citizens of the Union? Have not other new states, in their admission, and have not all the states in the Union, now, privileges and rights beyond what was contemplated to be allowed to the citizens of Missouri? Have not all other states in this government the right to alter, modify, amend, and change their state constitutions, having regard alone to a republican form? And was there any existing law, or any clause in the federal constitution, that prohibited a total change from a slaveholding to a non-slaveholding state, or from a non-slaveholding to a slaveholding state? Mr. Scott thought that if this provision was proper, or within the powers of congress, they also had the correlative right to say that the people of Missouri should not be admitted as a state, unless they provided, in the formation of their state constitution, that slavery should be tolerated. Would not those conscientious gentlemen startle at this, and exclaim, what! impose on those people slaves, when they do not want them? This would be said to be a direct attack on the state independence. Was it in the power of congress to annex the present condition, Mr. Scott deemed it equally within the scope of their authority to say what color the inhabitants of the proposed state should be, what description of property, other than slaves, those people should or should not possess, and the quantity of property each man should retain, going upon the agrarian principle. He would even go further, and say that congress had an equal power to enact to what religion the people should subscribe; that none other should be professed, and to provide for the excommunication of all those who did not submit.

The people of Missouri were, if admitted into the Union, to come in on an equal footing with the original states. That the people of the other states had the right to regulate their own internal police, to prescribe the rules of their own conduct, and, in the formation of their constitution, to say whether slavery was or was not admissible, he believed was a point conceded by all. How, then, were the citizens of Missouri placed on an equal footing with the other members of the Union? Equal in some respects — a shameful discrimination in others. A discrimination not warranted by the constitution, nor justified by the treaty of cession, but founded on mistaken zeal, or erroneous policy. They were to be bound down by onerous conditions, limitations, and restrictions to which he knew they would not submit. That people were brave and independent, and willing to risk their own happiness and future prosperity on the legitimate exercise of their own judgment and free will. Mr. Scott protested against such a guardianship as was contemplated now to be assumed over his constituents. The spirit of freedom burned in the bosom of the freemen of Missouri, and if admitted into the national family, they would be equal, or not come in at all. With what an anxious eye have they looked to the east, since the commencement of this session of congress, for the good tidings, that on them you had conferred the glorious privilege of self-government and independence. What seeds of discord will you sow, when they read this suspicious, shameful, unconstitutional inhibition in their charter? Will they not compare it with the terms of the treaty of cession, that bill of their rights, emphatically their magna charta? And will not the result of that comparison be a stigma on the faith of this government? It had been admitted by some gentlemen, in debate, that, were the people of Missouri to form a constitution conforming to this provision, so soon as they were adopted into the Union it would be competent for them to call a convention and alter their constitution on this subject. Why, then, he would ask gentlemen, would they legislate; when they could produce no permanent, practical effect? Why expose the imbecility of the general government to tie up the hands of the state, and induce the people to an act of chicanery, which he knew from principle they abhorred, to gel dear of an odious restriction on their rights? Mr. Scott had trusted that gentlemen who professed to be actuated by motives of humanity and principle would not encourage a course of dissimulation, or, by any vote of theirs, render it necessary for the citizens of Missouri to act equivocally to obtain their rights. He was unwilling to believe that political views alone led gentlemen on this or any other occasion; but from the language of the member from New York, (Mr. Taylor,) he was compelled to suspect that they had their influence upon him. That gentleman has told us, that if ever he left his present residence, it would be for Illinois or Missouri; at all events, he wished to send out his brothers and his sons. Mr. Scott begged that gentleman to relieve him from the awful apprehension excited by the prospect of this accession of population, lie hoped the house would excuse him while he stated, that he did not desire that gentleman, his sons, or his brothers, in that land of brave, noble, and independent freemen. The member says that the latitude is too far north to admit of slavery there. Would the gentleman cast his eye on the map before him, he would there see that a part of Kentucky, Virginia, and Maryland, were as far north as the northern boundary of the proposed state of Missouri. Mr. Scott would thank the gentleman if he would condescend to tell him what precise line of latitude suited his conscience, his humanity, or his political views, on this subject. Could that member be serious, when he made the parallel of latitude the measure of his good will to those unfortunate blacks? Or was he frying how far he could go in fallacious argument and absurdity, without creating one blush even on his own cheek, for inconsistency? What! starve the negroes out, pen them up in the swamps and morasses, confine them to southern latitudes, to long, scorching days of labor and fatigue, until the race becomes extinct, that the fair land of Missouri may be tenanted by that gentleman, his brothers, and sons? lie expected from the majority of the house a more liberal policy, and better evidence that they really were actuated by humane motives.

Mr. S. said he would trouble the house no longer; he thanked them for the attention and indulgence already bestowed; but he desired to apprise gentlemen, before he sat down, that they were sowing the seeds of discord in this Union, by attempting to admit states with unequal privileges and unequal rights; that they were signing, sealing, and delivering their own death-warrant; that the weapon they were so unjustly wielding against the people of Missouri, was a two-edged sword. From the cumulative nature of power, the day might come when the general government might, in turn, undertake to dictate to them on questions of internal policy; Missouri, now weak and feeble, whose fate and murmurs would excite but little alarm or sensibility, might become an easy victim to motives of policy, party zeal, or mistaken ideas of power; but other times and other men would succeed; a future congress might come, who, under the sanctified forms of constitutional power, would dictate to them odious conditions; nay, inflict on their internal independence a wound more deep and dreadful than even this to Missouri. The house had seen the force of precedent, in the mistaken application of the conditions imposed on the people of Louisiana anterior to their admission into the Union. And, whatever might be the ultimate determination of the house, Mr. S. considered this question big with the fate of Cæsar and of Rome.

Mr. Cobb, of Georgia, observed that he did not rise for the purpose of detaining the attention of the house for any length of time. He was too sensible of the importance of each moment which yet remained of the session, to obtrude many remarks upon their patience. But, upon a measure involving the important consequences that this did, he felt it to be an imperious duty to express his sentiments, and to enter his most solemn protest against the principle proposed for adoption by the amendment. Were gentlemen aware of what they were about to do? Did they foresee no evil consequence likely to result out of the measure if adopted? Could they suppose that the southern states would submit with patience to a measure, the effect of which would be to exclude them from all enjoyment of the vast region purchased by the United States beyond the Mississippi, and which belonged equally to them as to the northern states? He ventured to assure them that they would not. The people of the slaveholding states, as they are called, know their rights, and will insist upon the enjoyment of them. He should not now attempt to go over ground already occupied by others, with much more ability, and attempt to show that, by the treaty with France, the people of that territory were secured iu the enjoyment of the property which they held in their slaves. That the proposed amendment was an infraction of this treaty, had been most clearly shown. Nor would he attempt, to rescue from slander the character of the people of the southern states, in their conduct towards, and treatment of, their black population. That had also been done with a degree of force and eloquence, to which he could pretend no claim, by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Barbour), and the honorable speaker. He was, however, clearly of opinion that congress possessed no power under the constitution to adopt the principle proposed in the amendment. He called upon the advocates of it to point out, and lay their fingers upon that clause of the constitution of the United States, which gives to this body the right to legislate upon the subject. Could they show in what clause or section this right was expressly given, or from which it could be inferred? Unless this authority could be shown, congress would be assuming a power, if the amendment prevailed, not delegated to them, and most dangerous in its exercise. What is the end and tendency of the measure proposed? It is to impose on the state of Missouri conditions not imposed upon any other state. It is to deprive her of one branch of sovereignty not surrendered by any other state in the Union, not even those beyond the Ohio; for all of them had legislated upon this subject; all of them had decided for themselves whether slavery should be tolerated, at the time they framed their several-constitutions. He would not now discuss the propriety of admitting slavery. It is not now a question whether it is politic or impolitic to tolerate slavery in the United States, or in a particular state. It was a discussion into which he would not permit himself to be dragged. Admit, however, its moral impropriety, yet there was a vast difference between moral impropriety and political sovereignty. The people of New York or Pennsylvania may deem it highly immoral and politically improper to permit slavery, but yet they possess the sovereign right and power to permit it, if they choose. They can to-morrow so alter their constitutions and laws as to admit it, if they were so disposed. It is a branch of sovereignty which the old thirteen states never surrender in the adoption of the federal constitution. Now, the bill proposes that the new state shall be admitted upon an equal footing with the other states of the Union. It is in this way only that she can be admitted under the constitution. These words can have no other meaning than that she shall be required to surrender no more of her rights of sovereignty than the other states, into a union with which she is about to be admitted, have surrendered. But if the proposed amendment is adopted, will not this new state be shorn of one branch of her sovereignty, one right, which the other states may and have exercised, (whether properly or not, is immaterial,) and do now exercise whenever they think fit?

Mr. C. observed that he did conceive the principle involved in the amendment pregnant with danger. It was one, he repeated, to which he believed the people of the region of country which he represented, would not quietly submit. He might, perhaps, subject himself to ridicule, for attempting the display of a spirit of prophecy which he did not possess, or of zeal and enthusiasm for which he was entitled to little credit. But he warned the advocates of this measure against the certain effects which it must produce — effects destructive of the peace and harmony of the Union. He believed that they were kindling a fire which all the waters of the ocean could not extinguish. It could be extinguished only in blood!

Mr. Livermore, of New Hampshire, said: I am in favor of the proposed amendment. The object of it is to prevent the extension of slavery over the territory ceded to the United States by France. It accords with the dictates of reason, and the best feelings of the human heart; and is not calculated to interrupt any legitimate right arising either from the constitution or any other compact. I propose to show what slavery is, and to mention a few of the many evils which follow in its train; and I hope to evince that we are not bound to tolerate the existence of so disgraceful a state of things beyond its present extent, and that it would be impolitic and very unjust to let it spread over the whole face of our western territory. Slavery in the United States is the condition of man subjected to the will of a master, who can make any disposition of him short of taking away his life. In those states where it is tolerated, laws are enacted, making it penal to instruct slaves in the art of reading, and they are not permitted to attend public worship, or to hear the gospel preached. Thus the light of science and of religion is utterly excluded from the mind, that the body may be more easily bowed down to servitude. The bodies of slaves may, with impunity, be prostituted to any purpose, and deformed in any manner by their owners. The sympathies of nature in slaves are disregarded; mothers and children are sold and separated; the children wring their little hands, and expire in agonies of grief, while the bereft mothers commit suicide in despair. How long will the desire of wealth render us blind to the sin of holding both the bodies and souls of our fellow-men in chains! But, sir, I am admonished of the constitution, and told we cannot emancipate slaves. I know we may not infringe that instrument, and therefore do not propose to emancipate slaves. The proposition before us goes only to prevent our citizens from making slaves of such as have a right to freedom. In the present slaveholding states, let slavery continue, for our boasted constitution connives at it; but do not, for the sake of cotton and tobacco, let it be told to future ages that, while pretending to love liberty, we have purchased an extensive country, to disgrace it with the foulest reproach of nations. Our constitution requires no such thing of us. The ends for which that supreme law was made, are succinctly stated in its preface. They are, first, to form a more perfect Union, and insure domestic tranquility? Will slavery effect this? Can we, sir, by mingling bond with free, black spirits with white, like Shakspeare's witches in Macbeth, form a more perfect Union, and insure domestic tranquility? Secondly, to establish justice. Is justice to be established by subjecting half mankind to the will of the other half? Justice, sir, is blind to colors, and weighs in equal scales the rights of all men, whether white or black. Thirdly, to provide for the common defense, and secure the blessings of liberty. Does slavery add anything to the common defense? Sir, the strength of a republic is in the arm of freedom. But, above all things, do the blessings of liberty consist in slavery? If there is any sincerity in our profession, that slavery is an ill, tolerated only from necessity, let us not, while we feel that ill, shun the cure, which consists only in an honest avowal that liberty and equal rights are the end and aim of all our institutions, and that to tolerate slavery beyond the narrowest limits prescribed for it by the constitution, is a perversion of them all.

Slavery, sir, I repeat, is not established by our constitution; but a part of the states are indulged in the commission of a sin from which they could not at once be restrained, and which they would not consent to abandon. But, sir, if we could, by any process of reasoning, be brought to believe it justifiable to hold others to involuntary servitude, policy forbids that we should increase it. Even the present slaveholding states have an interest, I think, in limiting the extent of involuntary servitude; for, should slaves become much more numerous, and, conscious of their strength, draw the sword against their masters, it will be to the free states the masters must resort for an efficient power to suppress servile insurrection. But we have made a treaty with France, which, we are told, can only be preserved by the charms of slavery.

Sir, said Mr. L., until the ceded territory shall have been made into states, and the new states admitted into the Union, we can do what we will with it. We can govern it as a province, or sell it to any other nation. A part of it is probably at this time sold to Spain, and the inhabitants of it may soon not only enjoy the comforts of slavery, but the blessings of the holy inquisition along with them. The question is on the admission of Missouri, as a state, into the Union. Surely it will not be contended that we are bound by the treaty to admit it. The treaty-making power does not extend so far. Can the president and senate, by a treaty with Great Britain, make the province of Lower Canada a state of this Union? To be received as a state into this Union, is a privilege which no country can claim as a right. It is a favor to be granted or not, as the United States may choose. When the United States think proper to grant a favor, they may annex just and reasonable terms; and what can be more reasonable than for these states to insist that a new territory, wishing to have the benefits of freedom extended to it, should renounce a principle that militates with justice, morality, religion, and every essential right of mankind? Louisiana was admitted into the Union on terms. The conditions, I admit, were not very important, but still they recognize the principles for which I contend.

An opportunity is now presented, if not to diminish, at least to prevent the growth of a sin which sits heavily on the soul of every one of us. By embracing this opportunity, we may retrieve the national character, and, in some degree, our own. But if we suffer it to pass unimproved, let us at least be consistent, and declare that our constitution was made to impose slavery, and not to establish liberty. Let us no longer tell idle tales about the gradual abolition of slavery; away with colonization societies, if their design is only to rid us of free blacks and turbulent slaves; have done also with bible societies, whose views are extended to Africa and the East Indies, while they overlook the deplorable condition of their sable brethren within our own borders; make no more laws to prohibit the importation of slaves, for the world must see that the object of such laws is alone to prevent the glutting of a prodigious market for the flesh and blood of man, which we are about to establish in the west, and to enhance the price of sturdy wretches, reared, like black cattle and horses, for sale on our own plantations.

On coming out of the committee, the yeas and nays were called on the question of agreeing to the first part of the amendment, which reads,

"And provided also, that the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall be duly convicted;"

Yeas, 87; only one from a slave state, the state of Delaware—nays, 76; ten from free states, and sixty-six from slave states. The house proceeded to vote on the residue of the proposed amendment, which reads, —"and that all children of slaves, born within the said state, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be declared free at the age of twenty-five years."

Yeas, 82; one vote from Maryland—nays, 78; fourteen from free states. So the whole amendment—as moved by Gen. Tallmadge in committee of the whole, and there carried—was sustained when reported to the house.

Mr. Storrs, of New York, (opposed to the restriction,) now moved the striking out of so much of the bill as provides that the new state shall be admitted into the Union "on an equal footing with the original states" — which, he con tended, was nullified by the votes just taken. The house negatived the motion.

Messrs. Desha, of Ky., Cobb, of Ga., and Rhea, of Tenn., declared against the bill as amended.

Messrs. Scott, of Mo., and Anderson, of Ky., preferred the bill as amended to none.

The house ordered the bill, as amended, to a third reading; yeas, 98; nays, 56. The bill thus passed the house next day, and was sent to the senate.

The house bill thus passed, reached the senate Feb. 17th, when it was read twice and sent to a select committee already raised on a like application from Alabama, consisting of Messrs. Tait, of Ga., Morrow, of Ohio, Williams, of Miss., Edwards, of 111., Williams, of Tenn.

On the 2 2d, Mr. Tait, from this committee, reported the bill with amendments, striking out the anti-slavery restrictions inserted by the house. The bill was taken up in committee of the whole on the 27th, when Mr. Wilson, of N. J., moved its postponement to the 5th of March — that is, to the end of the session — negatived: yeas, 14; nays, 23.

The senate then proceeded to vote on agreeing to the amendments reported by the select committee, viz.: 1. to strike out of the house bill the following:

"And that all children of slaves born within the said state, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be free, but may be held to service_until the age of twenty-one years."

This clause was struck out, by a vote of 27 to 7; eleven free state senators voting in favor of striking it out; the seven senators who voted for the restriction were all from free states. The senate then proceeded to vote on the residue of the house restriction, as follows:

"And provided also, that the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

For striking out this restriction, 22 — five of whom were from free states: against striking out, 16 — all from free states.

The bill thus amended was ordered to be engrossed, and was (March 2d — last day but one of the session) read a third time, and passed without a division. The bill was on that day returned to the house, and the amendments of the senate read; whereupon, Mr. Tallmadge, of N. Y., moved that the bill be postponed indefinitely. Yeas, 69; nays, 74.

The vote was then taken on concurring in the senate's amendments, as aforesaid, and the house refused to concur Yeas, 76; nays, 78.

The bill was now returned to the senate, with a message of non-concurrence; when Mr. Tait moved that the senate adhere to its amendment, which was carried without a division The bill being thus remanded to the house, Mr. Taylor, of N. Y., moved that the house adhere to its disagreement, which prevailed. Yeas, 18; nays, 66. So the bill fell between the two houses, and was lost.

The southern portion of the then territory of Missouri was excluded from the proposed state of Missouri, and organized as a separate territory, and entitled the Arkansas territory. This bill being under consideration, Mr. John W. Taylor, of New York, moved that the foregoing restriction be applied to it also. In the course of the debate, Mr. Taylor said: "How often and how eloquently have I heard southern gentlemen deplore the existence of slavery! What willingness, nay, what solicitude have they not manifested to be relieved from this burden! How have they wept over the unfortunate policy that first introduced slaves into this country! How have they disclaimed the guilt and shame of that original sin, and thrown it back on their ancestors 1 I have heard with pleasure this avowal of regret, I have confided in its sincerity, and nave hoped to see its effects in the advancement of the cause of humanity. Gentlemen have now an opportunity of putting their professions into practice. If they have tried slavery, and found it to be a curse; if they desire to dissipate the gloom with which it covers their land, I call upon them to exclude it from the territory in question. Plant not its seeds in this uncorrupt soil I Let not our children, in looking back to the proceedings of this day, say of them, as we have been constrained to say of our fathers, we wish their decision had beeu different; we regret the existence among us of this unfortunate population; but we found them here; we know not what to do with them; it is our misfortune; we must bear it with patience!

"To the objection that the amendment, if adopted, will diminish the value of a species of property in one portion of the Union, and thereby operate unequally, I reply, that if, by depriving slaveholders of the Missouri market, the business of raising slaves should become less profitable, it would be, not the object of this measure, but an effect incidentally produced. The law prohibiting the importation of foreign slaves was not passed to enhance the value of those then in the country, yet it incidentally produced that effect to a very great degree. The exclusion of slavery from Missouri may operate, perhaps, to some extent, to retard a further advance. But surely, when gentlemen consider the present demand, and the vast extent of country in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama requiring a supply, they ought not to oppose its exclusion from the territory in question.

"But it is further objected that the amendment is calculated to disfranchise our brethren from the south by discouraging their emigration to the country west of the Mississippi. If it were proposed to discriminate between citizens of the different sections of our Union, and to allow a Pennsylvanian to hold slaves there while that power was denied to a Virginian, the objection might very properly be made. But when we place all upon an equal footing, denying to all what we deny to one, I am unable to discover the injustice or inequality of which honorable gentlemen have thought proper to complain. The description of immigrants may in some measure be affected by the amendment. If slavery shall be tolerated, the country will be settled by rich planters with their slaves. If it shall be rejected, the emigrants will chiefly consist of the poorer and more laborious classes of society. If it be true that the prosperity and happiness of a country ought to constitute the great object of its legislators, I can not hesitate for a moment which species of population deserves most to be encouraged. In their zeal to oppose the amendment, gentlemen seem to have considered but one side of the case. If the prohibition of slavery will tend to discourage migration from the south, will not its admission have the same effect with relation to the north and east? Whence came the people, who, with a rapidity never before witnessed, have changed the wilderness between the Ohio and the Mississippi into fruitful fields, erecting there, within a period almost too short for the credence of future ages, three of the freest and most flourishing states of the Union? They came, sir, from the eastern hive, from that source of population, which, in the same time, has added more than a hundred thousand inhabitants to my own native state, besides furnishing seamen for a large portion of the navigation of the world; seamen who have unfurled your banner in every port to which the enterprise of man has gained admittance, and who, though poor themselves, have drawn rich treasures for the nation from the bosom of the deep. Do you believe that these people will settle in a country where they must take rank with negro slaves? Having neither the will nor the ability to hold slaves themselves, they labor cheerfully while labor is honorable. Make it disgraceful, they will despise it. You can not degrade it more effectually than by establishing a system whereby it shall De performed principally by slaves. The business in which slaves are principally engaged, be it what it may, soon becomes debased in public estimation. It is considered low, and unfit for freemen. Can I better illustrate this truth than by referring to a remark of the gentleman from Kentucky (Clay)? I have often admired the liberality of his sentiments. He is governed by no vulgar prejudices. Yet with what abhorrence did he speak of the performance by our wives and daughters of those domestic duties which he was pleased to call servile! What comparison did he make between the black slaves of Kentucky and the white slaves of the north, and how instantly did he strike the balance in favor of the condition of the former! If such opinions and expressions can fall, even in the ardor of debate, from that gentleman, what ideas do you suppose are entertained of laboring men by the generality of slaveholders? A gentleman from Virginia replies that they are treated with confidence and esteem, and their rights respected. I did not imagine that they were put out of the protection of the law. Their persons and property are doubtless secure from violence, or, if injured, the courts of justice are opeu to them. But in a country like this, where the people are sovereign, and every citizen is entitled to equal rights, the mere exemption from flagrant wrongs is no great privilege. No class of freemen should be excluded in this country, either by law, or by the ostracism of public opinion, more powerful than law, from competing for offices and political distinctions. A humane master will respect the rights of his slave, and, if worthy, will honor him with confidence and esteem. And it is this same measure, as I apprehend, that is dealt out in slaveholding states to the laboring class of their white population. But whom of that class have they ever railed to fill stations of any considerable responsibility? When have we seen a representative on this door from that section of our Union who was not a slaveholder? Who but slaveholders are elected to their state legislatures? Who but they are appointed to fill their executive or judicial offices? I appeal to gentlemen whether the selection of one who labors with his own hands, however well educated, would not be considered an extraordinary event? For this I do not reproach my brethren of the south. They doubtless choose those to represent them in whom they most confide, and far be it from me to intimate that their confidence is ever misplaced. But my objection is to the introduction of a system which can not but produce the effect of rendering labor disgraceful."

The clause proposing that slaves born in the territory after the passage of the act shall be free at twenty-five years of age, was carried, February 17, by a vote of 15 yeas to 73 nays. The clause providing against the farther introduction of slaves into the territory was lost by a vote of 70 yeas to 71 nays. On the next day, however, the clause adopted was stricken out, and the bill finally passed without any allusion to slavery. When the bill reached the senate, Roberts, of Pennsylvania, moved to insert a prohibition of slavery, which failed by a vote of 19 to 14. Arkansas became a slave territory and ultimately a slave state in 1836.

The discussions in congress on the extension of slavery beyond the Mississippi aroused the anti-slavery sentiment of the north. Public meetings were held in Trenton, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Salem, and other northern cities and towns, democrats and federalists coöperating, and committees were appointed to address the people. The state legislatures freely expressed their opinions. Pennsylvania made a solemn appeal to the states "to refuse to covenant with crime," and by a declaration that it was the duty as well as the right of congress to prohibit slavery west of the Mississippi. New Jersey and Delaware followed, both also unanimously. New York, Ohio, and Indiana indorsed the same doctrine. The New England legislatures remained silent, but memorials were sent to congress from towns and cities in favor of freedom. Virginia, Kentucky, and Maryland were as earnest on the other side. The city of Baltimore, however, memorialized congress against the extension of slavery, at a meeting over which the mayor presided.

At a meeting of the citizens of Boston and vicinity, held at the state house, in December, 1819, a vote was passed to memorialize congress on the subject of "restraining the increase of slavery in new states to be admitted into the Union." In pursuance of the vote the following memorial, drawn up by Daniel Webster, was presented to congress:

"To the senate and house of representatives of the United States in congress assembled:

"The undersigned, inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, beg leave most respectfully and humbly to represent: that the question of the introduction of slavery into the new states to be formed on the west side of the Mississippi river, appears to them to be a question of the last importance to the future welfare of the United States If the progress of this great evil is ever to be arrested, it seems to the undersigned that this is the time to arrest it. A false step taken now, cannot be retraced; and it appears to us that the happiness of unborn millions rests on the measure which congress on this occasion may adopt. Considering this as no local question, nor a question to be decided by a temporary expediency, but as involving great interests of the whole United States, and affecting deeply and essentially those objects of common defense, general welfare, and the perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, for which the constitution itself was formed, we have presumed, in this way, to offer our sentiments and express our wishes to the national legislature. And as various reasons have been suggested against prohibiting slavery in the new states, it may perhaps be permitted to us to state our reasons, both for believing that congress possesses the constitutional power to make such prohibition a condition, on the admission of a new state into the Union, and that it is just and proper that they should exercise that power.

"And in the first place, as to the constitutional authority of congress. The constitution of the United States has declared 'that congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice the claims of the United States or of any particular state.' It is very well known that the saving in this clause of the claims of any particular state was designed to apply to claims by the then existing states, of territory which was also claimed by the United States as their own property. It has, therefore, no bearing on the present question. The power, then, of congress over its own territories, is, by the very terms of the constitution, unlimited. It may make all 'needful rules and regulations,' which of course include all such regulations as its own views of policy or expediency shall, from time to time, dictate. If, therefore, in its judgment it be needful for the benefit of a territory to enact a prohibition of slavery, it would seem to be as much within its power of legislation as any other act of local policy. Its sovereignty being complete and universal as to the territory, it may exercise over it the most ample jurisdiction in every respect. It possesses, in this view, all the authority which any state legislature possesses over its own territory; and if any state legislature may, in its discretion, abolish or prohibit slavery within its own limits, in virtue of its general legislative authority, for the same reason congress also may exercise the like authority over its own territories. And that a state legislature, unless restrained by some constitutional provision, may so do, is unquestionable, and has been established by general practice. *****

"The creation of a new state is, in effect, a compact between congress and the inhabitants of the proposed state. Congress would not probably claim the power of compelling the inhabitants of Missouri to form a constitution of their own, and come into the Union as a state. It is as plain, that the inhabitants of that territory have no right of admission into the Union, as a state, without the consent of congress. Neither party is bound to form this connection. It can he formed only by the consent of both. What, then, prevents congress, as one of the stipulating parties, to propose its terms? And if the other party assents to these terms, why do they not effectually bind both parties 1 Or if the inhabitants of the territory do not choose to accept the proposed terms, but prefer to remain under a territorial government, has congress deprived them of any right, or subjected them to any restraint, which, in its discretion, it had do authority to do? If the admission of new states be not the discretionary exercise of a constitutional power, but in all cases an imperative duty, how is it to be performed? If the constitution means that congress shall admit new states, does it mean that congress shall do this on every application and under all circumstances? Or if this construction cannot be admitted, and if it must be conceded that congress must in some respects exercise its discretion on the admission of new states, how is it to be shown that that discretion may not be exercised in regard to this subject as well as in regard to others?

"The constitution declares, 'that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year 1808.' It is most manifest that the constitution does contemplate, in the very terms of this clause, that congress possesses the authority to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves; for it limits the exercise of this authority for a specific period of time, leaving it to its full operation ever afterward. And this power seems necessarily included in the authority which belongs to congress, 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.' No person has ever doubted that the prohibition of the foreign slave-trade was completely within the authority of congress since the year 1808. And why? Certainly only because it is embraced in the regulation of foreign commerce; and if so, it may for the like reason be prohibited since that period between the states. Commerce in slaves, since the year 1808, being as much subject to the regulation of congress as any other commerce, if it should see fit to enact that no slave should ever be sold from one state to another, it is not perceived how its constitutional right to make such provision could be questioned. It would seem to be too plain to be questioned, that congress did possess the power, before the year 1808, to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves into the territories (and in point of fact it exercised that power) as well as into any new states; and that its authority, after that year, might be as fully exercised to prevent the migration or importation of slaves into any of the old states. And if it may prohibit new states from importing slaves, it may surely, as we humbly submit, make it a condition of the admission of such states into the Union, that they shall never import them. In relation, too, to its own territories, congress possesses a more extensive authority, and may, in various other ways, effect the object. It might, for example, make it an express condition of its grants of soil, that its owners shall never hold slaves; and thus prevent the possession of slaves from ever being connected with the ownership of the soil. "As corroborative of the views which have been already suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the attention of congress to the history of the national legislation, under the confederation as well as under the present constitution, on this interesting subject. Unless the memorialists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the nation, at every period of its legislation, to have been, that the prohibition of slavery was no infringement of any just rights belonging to free states, and was not incompatible with the enjoyments of all the rights and immunities which an admission into the Union was supposed to confer.

"The memorialists, after this general survey, would respectfully ask the attention of congress to the state of the question of the right of congress to prohibit slavery in that part of the former territory of Louisiana which now forms the Missouri territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the treaty of the 30th of April, 1803. The third article of that treaty is as follows: 'The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.'

"Although the language of this article is not very precise or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import and intent cannot be mistaken. The first clause provides for the admission of the ceded territory into the Union, and the succeeding clause shows this must be according to the principles of the federal constitution; and this very qualification necessarily excludes the idea that congress were not to be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such admission which were consistent with the principles of that constitution, and which had been, or might justly be, applied to other new states. The language is not by any means so pointed as that of the resolve of 1780; and yet it has been seen that that resolve was never supposed to inhibit the authority of congress, as to the introduction of slavery. And it is clear, upon the plainest rule of construction, that in the absence of all restrictive language, a clause, merely providing for the admission of the territory into the Union, must be construed to authorize an admission in the manner, and upon the terms, which the constitution itself would justify. This construction derives additional support from the next clause. The inhabitants "shall be admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.' The rights, advantages, and immunities here spoken of, must, from the very force of the terms of the clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by the constitution of the United States; such as are common to all citizens, and are uniform throughout the United States. The clause cannot be referred to rights, advantages, and immunities derived exclusively from the state government, for these do not depend upon the federal constitution. Besides, it would be impossible that all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, could be at the same time enjoyed by the same persons. These rights.are different in different states; a right exists in one state which is denied in others, or is repugnant to other rights enjoyed in Others. In some of the states, a freeholder alone is entitled to vote in the elections; in some a qualification of personal property is sufficient; and in others, age and freedom are the sole qualifications of the electors. In some states, no citizen is permitted to hold slaves; in others, he possesses that power absolutely; in others, it is limited. The obvious meaning, therefore, of the clause is, that the rights derived under the federal constitution, shall be enjoyed by the inhabitants of Louisiana in the same manner as by the citizens of other states. The United States, by the constitution, are bound to guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government; and the inhabitants of Louisiana are entitled, when a state, to this guarantee. Each state has a right to two senators, and two representatives according to a certain enumeration of population, pointed out in the constitution. The inhabitants of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, are also entitled to these privileges. The constitution further declares, "that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' It would seem as if the meaning of this clause could not well be misinterpreted. It obviously applies to the case of the removal of a citizen of one state to another state; and in such a case it secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the state to which he removes. It cannot surely be contended, upon any rational interpretation, that it gives to the citizens of each state all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of every other state, at the same time, and under all circumstances. Such a construction would lead to the most extraordinary consequences. It would at once destroy all the fundamental limitations of the state constitutions upon the rights of their own citizens; and leave all those rights to the mercy of the citizens of any other state, which should adopt different limitations. According to this construction, if all the state constitutions, save one, prohibited slavery, it would be in the power of that single state, by the admission of the right of its citizens to hold slaves, to communicate the same right to the citizens of all the other states within their own exclusive limits, in defiance of their own constitutional prohibitions; and to render the absurdity still more apparent, the same construction would communicate the most opposite and irreconcilable rights to the citizens of different states at the same time. It seems, therefore, to be undeniable, upon any rational interpretation, that this clause of the constitution communicated no rights in any state which its own citizens do not enjoy; and that the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not enjoy higher or more extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio. It would communicate to the former no right of holding slaves except in states where the citizens already possessed the same right under their own state constitutions and laws.

"Upon the whole, the memorialists would most respectfully submit that the terms of the constitution, as well as the practice of the government under it, must, as they hnmbly conceive, entirely justify the conclusion that congress may prohibit the further introduction of slavery into its own territories, and also make such prohibition a condition of the admission of any new state into the Union.

"If the constitutional power of congress to make the proposed prohibition be satisfactorily shown, the justice and policy of such prohibition seem to the undersigned to be supported by plain and strong reasons. The permission of slavery in a new state, necessarily draws after it an extension of that inequality of representation, which already exists in regard to the original states. It cannot be expected that those of the original states, which do not hold slaves, can look on such an extension as being politically just. As between the original states, the representation rests on compact and plighted faith; and your memorialists have no wish that that compact should be disturbed, or that plighted faith in the slightest degree violated. But the subject assumes an entirely different character, when a new state proposes to be admitted. With her there is no compact, and no faith plighted; and where is the reason that she should come into the Union with more than an equal share of political importance and political power? Already the ratio of representation, established by the constitution, has given to the states holding slaves twenty members of the house of representatives more than they would have been entitled to, except under the particular provision of the constitution. In all probability, this number will be doubled in thirty years. Under these circumstances, we deem it not an unreasonable expectation that the inhabitants of Missouri should propose to come into the Union, renouncing the right in question, and establishing a constitution prohibiting it for ever. Without dwelling on this topic, we have still thought it our duty to present it to the consideration of congress. We present it with a deep and earnest feeling of its importance, and we respectfully solicit for it the full consideration of the national legislature.

"Your memorialists were not without the hope that the time had at length arrived when the inconvenience and the danger of this description of population had become apparent in all parts of this country, and in all parts of the civilized world. It might have been hoped that the new states themselves would have had such a view of their own permanent interests and prosperity as would have led them to prohibit its extension and increase. The wonderful increase and prosperity of the states north of the Ohio is unquestionably to be ascribed, in a great measure, te the consequences of the ordinance of 1787; and few, indeed, are the occasions, in the history of nations, in which so much can be done, by a single act, for the benefit of future generations, as was done by that ordinance, and as may now be done by the congress of the United States. We appeal to this justice and to the wisdom of the national councils to prevent the further progress of a great and serious evil. We appeal to those who look forward to the remote consequences of their measures, and who cannot balance a temporary or trifling convenience, if there were such, against a permanent, growing, and desolating evil. We cannot forbear to remind the two houses of congress that the early and decisive measures adopted by the American government for the abolition of the slave-trade, are among the proudest memorials of our nation's glory. That slavery was ever tolerated in the republic is, as yet, to be attributed to the policy of another government. No imputation, thus far, rests on any portion of the American confederacy. The Missouri territory is a new country. If its extensive and fertile fields shall be opened as ti market for slaves, the government will seem to become a party to a traffic which, in so many acts, through so many years, it has denounced as impolitic, unchristian, inhuman. To enact laws to punish the traffic, and, at the same time, to tempt cupidity and avarice by the allurements of an insatiable market, is inconsistent and irreconcilable. Government, by such a course, would only defeat its own purposes, and render nugatory its own measures. Nor can the laws derive support from the manners of the people, if the power of moral sentiment be weakened by enjoying, under the permission of government, great facilities to commit offenses. The laws of the United States have denounced heavy penalties against the traffic in slaves, because such traffic is deemed unjust and inhuman. We appeal to the spirit of these laws; we appeal to this justice and humanity; we ask whether they ought not to operate, on the present occasion, with all their force? We have a strong feeling of the injustice of any toleration of slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on a portion of our community, which cannot be immediately relieved from it without consequences more injurious than the suffering of the evil. But to permit it in a new country, where yet no habits are formed which render it indispensable, what is it, but to encourage that rapacity, and fraud, and violence, against which we have so long pointed the denunciations of our penal code? What is it, but to tarnish the proud fame of the country? What is it, but to throw suspicion on its good faith, and to render questionable all its professions of regard for the rights of humanity and the liberties of mankind?

"As inhabitants of a free country — as citizens of a great and rising republic — as members of a Christian community — as living in a liberal and enlightened age, and as feeling ourselves called upon by the dictates of religion and humanity, we have presumed to offer our sentiments to congress on this question, with a solicitude for the event far beyond what a common occasion could inspire."

On the 17th January, 1820, the legislature of New York passed the following resolutions unanimously:

"Whereas, The inhibiting the further extension of slavery in these United States is a subject of deep concern among the people of this state; and whereas, we consider slavery as an evil much to be deplored; and that every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its further extension; and that the constitution of the United States clearly gives congress the right to require of new states, not comprised with the original boundaries of these United States, the prohibition of slavery, as a condition of its admission into the Union: therefore, "Resolved, That our senators be instructed, and our representatives in congress be requested, to oppose the admission, as a state, into the Union, any territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making the prohibition of slavery therein an indispensable condition of admission: therefore,

"Resolved, That measures be taken by the clerks of the senate and assembly of this state, to transmit copies of the preceding resolution to each of our senators and representatives in congress."

The following resolutions of the state of New Jersey were communicated to congress, by Mr. Wilson, of N. J., on the 24th January, 1820:

"Whereas, A bill is now depending in the congress of the United States, on the application of the people in the territory of Missouri for the admission of that territory as a state into the Union, not containing provisions against slavery in such proposed state, and a question is made upon the right and expediency of such provision.

"The representatives of the people of New Jersey, in the legislative council and general assembly of the said state, now in session, deem it a duty they owe to themselves, their constituents, and posterity, to declare and make known the opinions they hold upon this momentous subject: and,

"1. They do resolve and declare, That the further admission of territories into the Union, without restriction of slavery, would, in their opinion, essentially impair the right of this and other existing states to equal representation in congress (a right at the foundation of the political compact), inasmuch as such newly-admitted slaveholding state would be represented on the basis of their slave population; a concession made at the formation of the constitution in favor of the then existing states, but never stipulated for new states, nor to be inferred from any article or clause in that instrument.

"2. Resolved, That to admit the territory of Missouri as a state into the Union, without prohibiting slavery there, would, in the opinion of the representatives of the people of New Jersey aforesaid, be no less than to sanction this great political and moral evil, furnish the ready means of peopling a vast territory with slaves, and perpetuate all the dangers, crimes, and pernicious effects of domestic bondage.

"3. Resolved, As the opinion of the representatives aforesaid, that inasmuch as no territory has a right to be admitted into the Union, but on the principles of the federal constitution, and only by a law of congress, consenting thereto on the part of the existing states, congress may rightfully, and ought to refuse such law, unless upon the reasonable and just conditions, assented to on the part of the people applying to become one of the states.

"4. Resolved, In the opinion of the representatives aforesaid, that the article of the constitution which restrains congress from prohibiting the migration or importation of slaves, until after the year 1808, does, by necessary implication, admit the general power of congress over the subject of slavery, and concedes to them the right to regulate and restrain such migration and importation after that time, into the existing, or any newly to be created state.

"5. Resolved, As the opinion of the representatives of the people of New Jersey aforesaid, that inasmuch as congress have a clear right to refuse the admission of a territory into the Union, by the terms of the constitution, they ought, in the present case, to exercise that absolute discretion in order to preserve the political rights of the several existing states, and prevent the great national disgrace and multiplied mischiefs which must ensue from conceding it, as a matter of right, in the immense territories yet to claim admission into the Union, beyond the Mississippi, that they may tolerate slavery.

"6. Resolved, (with the concurrence of council), That the governor of this state be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to each of the senators and representatives of this state in the congress of the United States."

The following preamble and resolutions were unanimously adopted in the legislature of Pennsylvania, Dec. 16, 1819:

"The senate and house of representatives of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, while they cherish the right of the individual states to express their opinion upon all public measures proposed in the congress of the Union, are aware that its usefulness must in a great degree depend upon the discretion with which it is exercised; they believe that the right ought not to be resorted to upon trivial subjects or unimportant occasions; but they are also persuaded that there are moments when the neglect to exercise it would be a dereliction of public duty.

"Such an occasion, as in their judgment demands the frank expression of the sentiments of Pennsylvania, is now presented. A measure was ardently supported in the last congress of the United States, and will probably be as earnestly urged during the existing session of that body, which has a palpable tendency to impair the political relations of the several states; which is calculated to mar the social happiness of the present and future generations; which, if adopted, would impede the march of humanity and freedom through the world; and would transfer from a misguided ancestry an odious stain and fix it indelibly upon the present race — a measure, in brief, which proposes to spread the crimes and cruelties of slavery from the banks of the Mississippi to the shores of the Pacific. When a measure of this character is seriously advocated in the republican congress of America, in the nineteenth century, the several states are invoked by the duty which they owe to the Deity, by the veneration which they entertain for the memory of the founders of the republic, and by a tender regard for posterity, to protest against its adoption, to refuse to covenant with crime, and to limit the range of an evil that already hangs in awful boding over so large a portion of the Union.

"Nor can such a protest be entered by any state with greater propriety than by Pennsylvania. This commonwealth has as sacredly respected the rights of other states as it has been careful of its own; it has been the invariable aim of the people of Pennsylvania to extend to the universe, by their example, the unadulterated blessings of civil and religious freedom; and it is their pride that they have been at all times the practical advocates of those improvements and charities anion": men which are so well calculated to enable them to answer the purposes of their Creator; and above all, they may boast that they were foremost in removing the pollution of slavery from among them.

"If, indeed, the measure against which Pennsylvania considers it her duty to raise her voice, were calculated to abridge any of the rights guaranteed to the several states; if, odious as slavery is, it was proposed to hasten its extinction by means injurious to the states upon which it was unhappily entailed, Pennsylvania would be among the first to insist upon a sacred observance of the constitutional compact. But it cannot be pretended that the rights of any of the states are at all to be affected by refusing to extend the mischiefs of human bondage over the boundless regions of the west, a territory which formed no part of the Union at the adoption of the constitution; which has been but lately purchased from an European power by the people of the Union at large; which may or may not be admitted as a state into the Union at the discretion of congress; which must establish a republican form of government, and no other; and whose climate affords none of the pretexts urged for resorting to the labor of natives of the torrid zone; such a territory has no right, inherent or acquired, such as those states possessed which established the existing constitution. When that constitution was framed in September, 1787, the concession that three-fifths of the slaves in the states then existing should be represented in congress, could not have been intended to embrace regions at that time held by a fereign power. On the contrary, so anxious were the congress of that day to confine human bondage within its ancient home, that on the 13th of July, 1787, that body unanimously declared that slavery or involuntary servitude should not exist in the extensive territories bounded by the Ohio, the Mississippi, Canada and the Lakes; and in the ninth article of the constitution itself, the power of congress to prohibit the emigration of servile persons after 1808, is expressly recognized; nor is there to be found in the statute book a single instance of the admission of a territory to the rank of a state in which congress have not adhered to the right, vested in them by the constitution, to stipulate with the territory upon the conditions of the boon.

"The senate and house of representatives of Pennsylvania, therefore, cannot but deprecate any departure from the humane and enlightened policy pursued not only by the illustrious congress which framed the constitution, but by their successors without exception. They are persuaded that to open the fertile regions of the west to a servile race, would tend to increase their numbers beyond all past example, would open a new and steady market for the lawless venders of human flesh, and would render all schemes for obliterating this most foul blot upon the American character useless and unavailing.

"Under these convictions, and in the full persuasion that upon this topic there is but one opinion in Pennsylvania —

"Resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, That the senators of this state in the congress of the United States be, and they are hereby instructed, and that the representatives of this state in the congress of the United States be, and they are hereby requested, to vote against the admission of any territory as a state into the Union, unless said territory shall stipulate ami agree that 'the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be prohibited; and that all children born within the said territory, after its admission into the Union as a state, shall be free, but may be held to service until the age of twenty-five years.'

"Resolved, That the governor be, and he is hereby requested to cause a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolution to be transmitted to each of the senators and representatives of this state in the congress of the United States."

In the senate of the United States, early in 1820, Mr. Van Dyke communicated the following resolutions of the legislature of the state of Delaware, which were read:

"Resolved, by the senate and house of representatives of the state of Delaware, in general assembly met, That it is, in the opinion of this general assembly, the constitutional right of the United States, in congress assembled, to enact and establish, as one of the conditions for the admission of a new state into the Union, a provision which shall effectually prevent the further introduction of slavery into such state; and that a due regard to the true interests of such state, as well as of the other states, require the same should be done.

"Resolved, That a copy of the above and foregoing resolution be transmitted, by the speaker of the senate, to each of the senators and representatives from this state in the congress of the United States."

In senate, January 24th, 1820, Mr. Logan communicated the following preamble and resolutions of the legislature of the state of Kentucky, which were read:

"Whereas, The constitution of the United States provides for the admission of new states into the Union, and it is just and proper that all such states should be established upon the footing of original states, with a view to the preservation of state sovereignty, the prosperity of such new state, and the good of their citizens; and whereas, successful attempts have been heretofore made, and are now making, to prevent the people of the territory of Missouri from being admitted into the Union as a state, unless trammeled by rules and regulations which do not exist in the original states, particularly in relation to the toleration of slavery.

"Whereas, also, if congress can thus trammel or control the powers of a territory in the formation of a state government, that body may, on the same principle, reduce its powers to little more than those possessed by the people of the District of Columbia; and whilst professing to make it a sovereign state, may bind it in perpetual vassalage, and reduce it to the condition of a province; such state must necessarily become the dependent of congress, asking such powers, and not the independent state, demanding rights. And whereas, it is necessary, in preserving the state sovereignties in their present rights, that no new state should be subjected to this restriction, any more than an old one, and that there can be no reason or justice why it should not be entitled to the same privileges, when it is bound to bear all the burdens and taxes laid upon it by congress. "In passing the following resolution, the general assembly refrains from expressing any opinion either in favor or against the principle of slavery; but to support and maintain state rights, which it conceives necessary to be supported and maintained, to preserve the liberties of the free people of these United States, it avows its solemn conviction, that the states already confederated under one common constitution, have not a right to deprive new states of equal privileges with themselves. Therefore,

"Resolved, by the general assembly of the commonwealth of Kentucky, That the senators in congress from this state be instructed, and the representatives be requested, to use their efforts to procure the passage of a law to admit the people of Missouri into the Union, as a state, whether those people will sanction slavery by their constitution or not.

"Resolved, That the executive of this commonwealth be requested to transmit this resolution to the senators and representatives of this state in congress, that it may be laid before that body for its consideration."

A new congress had assembled on the 6th of December, 1819. Mr. Clay was again chosen speaker. On the 8th, Mr. Scott, delegate from Missouri, moved that the memorial of her territorial legislature, as also of several citizens, praying her admission into the Union as a state, be referred to a select committee. Carried, and Messrs. Scott, of Mo., Robertson, of Ky, Ten-ell, of Ga., Strother, of Va., and De Witt, of N. Y., were appointed said committee. Mr. Strong, of N. Y., that day gave notice of a bill "to prohibit the further extension of slavery in the United States."

On the 14th, Mr. Taylor, of N. Y., moved a select committee on this subject, which was granted; and the mover, with Mesers. Livermore, of N. H., P. P. Barbour, of Ya., Lowndes, of S. O, Fuller, of Mass., Hardin, of Ky., and Cuthbert, of Ga., were appointed such committee. A majority of this committee being pro-slavery, Mr. Taylor could do nothing; and on the 28th the committee was, on motion, discharged from the further consideration of the subject.

On the same day, Mr. Taylor moved "that a committee be appointed with instructions to report a bill prohibiting the further admission of slaves into the territories of the United States west of the river Mississippi."

On motion of Mr. Smith, of Md., this resolve was sent to the committee of the whole, and made a special order for Jan. 10th; but it was not taken up, and appears to have slept the sleep of death.

In the senate, the memorial of the Missouri territorial legislature, asking admission as a state, was presented by Mr. Smith, of S. C, Dec. 29th, and referred to the judiciary committee.

The bill authorizing Missouri to form a constitution, etc., came up in the house as a special order, Jan. 24th. Mr. Taylor, of N. Y., moved that it be postponed for one week: lost; yeas, 81; nays, 88. Whereupon the house adjourned. It was considered in committee the next day, as also on the 28th and 30th, and thence debated daily until the 19th of February, when a bill came down from the senate "to admit the state of Maine into the Union but with a rider authorizing the people of Missouri to form a state constitution, etc., without restriction on the subject of slavery.

The house, very early in the session, passed a bill providing for the admission of Maine as a state. This bill came to the senate, and was sent to its judiciary committee aforesaid, which amended it by adding a provision for Missouri as above. After several days' debate in senate, Mr. Roberts, of Penn., moved to recommit, so as to strike out all but the admission of Maine, which was defeated, (Jan. 14th, 1820;) yeas, 18; nays, 25. Hereupon, Mr. Thomas, of Ill., (who voted with the majority, as uniformly against any restriction on Missouri,) gave notice that he should "ask leave to bring in a bill to prohibit the introduction of slavery into the territories of the United States north and west of the contemplated state of Missouri," which he accordingly did on the 19th, when it was read and ordered to a third reading.[1]

The Maine admission bill, with the proposed amendments, was discussed through several days, until, Feb. 16th, the question was taken on the judiciary committee's amendments, (authorizing Missouri to form a state constitution, and saying nothing of slavery,) which were adopted by the following vote: Yeas, 23 against restriction — 20 from slave states, 3 from free states. Nays, 21 in favor of restriction — 19 from free states, 2 from Delaware.

Mr. Thomas, of 111., then proposed his amendment, as follows:

"And be it further enacted, that the sixth article of compact of the ordinance of congress, passed July 13th, 1187, for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, shall, to all intents and purposes, be, and hereby is, deemed and held applicable to, and shall have full force and effect in and over, all that tract of country ceded by France to the United States under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, north latitude, excepting only such part thereof as is included within the limits contemplated by this act."

On the following day, Mr. Thomas withdrew the foregoing and substituted the following:

"And be it further enacted, that in all the territory ceded by France to the United States under the name of Louisiana which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, north latitude, excepting only such part thereof as is included within the limits of the state contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be and is hereby forever prohibited. Provided always, that any person escaping into the same, from where labor or service is lawfully claimed in any state or territory of the United States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."

Mr. Trimble, of Ohio, moved a substitute for this, somewhat altering the boundaries of the region shielded from slavery, which was rejected. Yeas, 20, (northern;) nays, 24, (southern, with Noble, Edwards, and Taylor.)

The question then recurred on Mr. Thomas's amendment, which was adopted as follows: Yeas, for excluding slavery from all the territory north and west of Missouri, 34 — 20 from free states, 14 from slave states. Nays, against such restriction, 10 — 2 from Indiana.

The bill, thus amended, was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, by a vote of 24 to 20.

The bill was thus passed, (Feb. 18th) without further division, and sent to the house for concurrence. In the house, Mr. Thomas's amendment (as above) was at first rejected by both parties, and defeated by the strong vote of 159 to 18. Prior to this vote, the house disagreed to the log-rolling of Maine and Missouri, into one bill, by the strong vote of 93 to 72.

The house also disagreed to the remaining amendments of the senate (striking out the restriction on slavery in Missouri) by the strong vote of 102 yeas to 68 nays. Nearly or quite every representative of a free state voted in the majority of this division, with four from slave states.

So the house rejected all the senate's amendments, and returned the bill with a corresponding message.

The senate took up the bill on the 24th, and debated it till the 28th, when, on a direct vote, it was decided not to recede from the attachment of Missouri to the Maine bill: yeas 21 (19 from free states and 2 from Delaware); nays 23, (20 from slave states, with Messrs. Taylor, of Indiana, Edwards and Thomas, of Illinois.)

The senate also voted not to recede from its amendment prohibiting slavery west of Missouri, and north of 36° 30' north latitude. (For receding, 9 from slave states, with Messrs. Noble and Taylor, of Indiana;) against it 33; (22 from slave states, 11 from free states.) The remaining amendments of the senate were then insisted on without division, and the house notified accordingly.

The bill was now returned to the house, which, on motion of Mr. John W. Taylor, of New York, voted to insist on its disagreement to all but section 9 of the senate's amendments, by yeas 97 to nays 76; all but a purely sectional vote; Hugh Nelson, of Virginia, voting with the north; Baldwin, of Pennsylvania, Bloomfield, of New Jersey, and Shaw, of Massachusetts, voting with the south.

Section 9, (the senate's exclusion of slavery from the territory north and west of Missouri,) was also rejected — yeas 160, nays 14, (much as before.) The senate thereupon (March 2nd) passed the house Missouri bill, striking out the restriction of slavery by yeas 27 to nays 15, and adding without a division the exclusion of slavery from the territory west and north of said state. Mr. Trimble again moved the exclusion of slavery from Arkansas also, but was again voted down, yeas 12, nays 30.

The senate now asked a conference, which the house granted without a division. The committee of conference was composed of Messrs. Thomas, of Illinois, Pinkney, of Maryland, and Barbour, of Virginia, (all anti-restrictionists), on the part of the senate, and Messrs. Holmes, of Massachusetts, Taylor, of New York, Lowndes, of South Carolina, Parker, of Massachusetts, and Kinsey, of New Jersey, on the part of the house. John Holmes, of Massachusetts; from this committee, reported that, 1. The senate should give up the combination of Missouri in the same bill with Maine. 2. The house should abandon the attempt to restrict slavery in Missouri. 3. Both houses should agree to pass the senate's separate Missouri bill, with Mr. Thomas's restriction or compromising proviso, excluding slavery from all territory north and west of Missouri. The report having been read, the first and most important question was put, viz: "Will the house concur with the senate in so much of the said amendments as proposes to strike from the fourth section of the [Missouri] bill the provision prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude in the contemplated state, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes?" On which question the yeas and nays were demanded and were as follows:

Yeas, for giving up restriction on Missouri. — Massachusetts, 4; Rhode Island, 1; Connecticut, 2; New York, 2; New Jersey, 3; Pennsylvania, 2; Delaware, 1; Maryland, 9; Virginia, 22; North Carolina, 12; South Carolina, 9; Georgia, 6; Alabama, 1; Mississippi, 1; Louisiana, 1; Kentucky, 8; Tennessee, 5. Total from free states, 14; from slave states, 76 — in all 90.

Nays, against giving up the restriction on slavery in Missouri. — New Hampshire, 6; Massachusetts, including Maine, 16; Rhode Island; Connecticut, 4; Vermont, 6; New York, 22; New Jersey, 3; Pennsylvania, 21; Ohio, 6; Indiana, 1; Illinois, 1. Total 87 — all from free states.

Mr. Taylor, of New York, now moved an amendment, intended to include Arkansas territory under the proposed inhibition of slavery west of Missouri; but this motion was cut off by the previous question, and the house proceeded to concur with the senate in inserting the exclusion of slavery from the territory west and north of Missouri, instead of that just stricken out, by 134 yeas to 42 nays, (the nays being from the south). So the bill was passed in the form indicated above; and the bill admitting Maine as a state, (relieved, by a conference, from the Missouri rider,) passed both houses without a division, on the following day.

Thus was consummated a measure which, while it opened the door to slavery in Missouri, was to exclude it "forever" from all that territory lying north of 36° 30' north latitude. Randolph, the leader of the ultra southern party, indignantly denounced it as a "dirty bargain," and the northern men who voted for it, as "dough-faces." Before signing the bill, President Monroe submitted the question to his cabinet, "Has congress the constitutional power to prohibit slavery in a territory? "All the cabinet declared themselves in the affirmative, though neither Crawford, Calhoun, nor Wirt could see any express authority. The president submitted another question: Was the term "forever" in the prohibition clause of the Missouri bill to be understood as referring only to the territorial condition of the district, or was it intended to extend the prohibition of slavery to such states as might be erected therefrom? Adams thought that the term "forever" must be understood to mean forever, and that the prohibition would extend to any states that might at any time be erected from the territory. The others, including Thompson, of New York, were all of opinion that the term "forever" was only a territorial forever, not interfering with the right of any state that might at any time be organized within the district referred to, to establish or prohibit slavery. The second question was modified into the inquiry, Was the proviso, as it stood in the bill, constitutional? To this they all replied, yes, and Monroe signed the bills. This account is from the unpublished diary of John Quincy Adams, quoted by Hildreth.

"The impression produced on my mind," so Adams wrote at the time in his diary, "by the progress of this discussion is, that the bargain between freedom and slavery contained in the constitution of the United States is morally and politically vicious, inconsistent with the principles upon which alone our revolution can be justified; cruel and oppressive, by riveting the chains of slavery, in pledging the faith of freedom to maintain and perpetuate the tyranny of the master; and grossly unequal and impolitic, by admitting that slaves are at once enemies to be kept in subjection, property to be secured and restored to their owners, and persons not to be represented themselves, but for whom their masters are privileged with nearly a double share of representation. The consequence has been, that this slave representation has governed the Union. Benjamin, portioned above his brethren, has ravined as a wolf, in the morning he has devoured the prey, and at night he has divided the spoil. It would be no difficult matter to prove, by reviewing the history of the Union under this constitution, that almost every thing which has contributed to the honor and welfare of the nation has been accomplished in despite of them; and that every thing unpropitious and dishonorable, including the blunders and follies of their adversaries, maybe traced to them."

Governor Wolcott, in his address shortly after to the Connecticut legislature, in reference to a very elaborate disquisition on state rights in their bearing on the Missouri question, which the Virginia legislature had sent, in the form of a circular, to all the states, thus expressed himself: "It can not hare escaped your attention, that a diversity of habits and principles of government exist in this country; and I think it is evident that slavery is gradually forming those distinctions, which, according to invariable laws of human action, constitute the characteristic difference between aristocratical and democratical republics.

"Where agricultural labor is wholly or chiefly performed by slaves, it must constitute the principal revenue of the community. The owners if slaves must necessarily be the chief owners of the soil, and those laborers who are too poor to own slaves, though nominally free, must be dependent on an aristocratical order, and remain without power or political influence. It has been urged, as a compensation for the admitted evils of slavery, that the spirit of liberty is more elevated and persevering among the masters of slaves, than in states where liberty is a common blessing. We may admit that our southern brethren are as firmly attached to liberty as ourselves, but we can not concede that they are in any respect our superiors, without submitting to humiliation and reproach. Probably the claim has no other just foundation than in the well known ardor, tenacity of opinion, and strict concert of action with which the members of a privileged order invariably pursue a separate and exclusive interest. Even a tacit admission of inferiority by habitual concessions would imply, on our part, a secret preference of aristocratical over democratical institutions."

On the 16th of November, 1820, Missouri applied for admission, into the Union, with a state constitution containing the following provisions:

"The general assembly shall have no power to pass laws, first, for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their owners, or without paying them, before such emancipation, a full equivalent for such slaves so emancipated; and, second, to prevent bona fide emigrants to this state, or actual settlers therein, from bringing from any of the United States, or from any of their territories, such persons as may there be deemed to be slaves, so long as any persons of the same description, are allowed to be held as slaves by the laws of this state.

"It shall be their duty, as soon as may be, to pass such laws as may be necessary,

"First, to prevent free negroes and mulattoes from coming to, and settling in, this state, under any pretext whatever."

The last requirement was considered a palpable violation of that clause of the constitution which gives to the citizens of each state the rights of citizens in every state. In several of the free states the class referred to were considered citizens, and not only a determined resistance to any such exclusion was manifested in congress, but a portion of the northern members evinced a disposition to renew the struggle against the further introduction of slaves into Missouri. The first vote in the house on her admission, stood yeas, 79; nays, 93. A second attempt was made to admit her, on condition that she would expunge the last quoted obnoxious clause of her constitution, which was voted down by a vote of 156 to 6.

The house now rested, until a joint resolve, admitting her with but a vague and ineffective qualification, came down from the senate, where it was passed by a vote of 26 to 18 — six senators from free states in the affirmative. Mr. Clay, who had resigned in the recess, and been succeeded, as speaker, by John W. Taylor, of New York, now appeared as the leader of the Missouri admissionists, and proposed terms of compromise, which were twice voted down by the northern members, aided by John Randolph and three others from the South, who would have Missouri admitted without condition or qualification. At last, Mr. Clay proposed a joint committee on this subject, to be chosen by ballot — which the house agreed to by 101 to 55; and Mr. Clay became its chairman. By this committee it was agreed that a solemn pledge should be required of the legislature of Missouri, that the constitution of that state should not be construed to authorize the passage of any act, and that no act should be passed, "by which any of the citizens of either of the states should be excluded from the enjoyment of the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the constitution of the United States." The joint resolution, amended by the addition of this proviso, passed the house by 86 yeas to 82 nays; the senate concurred (February 27th, 1821,) by 26 yeas to 15 nays; (all northern but Macon, of North Carolina,) Missouri complied with the condition, and became an accepted member of the Union. Thus closed the last stage of the fierce Missouri controversy which seemed at times to threaten the existence of the Union. "So true it is," says Hildreth, "and let it not be forgotten, that no class can exist in any community so helpless and despised that it may not become the very hinge on which the fate of the nation shall turn."

  1. Great confusion and misconception exists in the public mind with regard to "the Missouri restriction," two totally different propositions being called by that name. The original restriction, which Mr. Clay vehemently opposed, and Mr. Jefferson in a letter characterized as a "fire-bell in the night," contemplated the limitation of slavery in its exclusion from the state of Missouri. This was ultimately defeated, as we shall see. The second proposed restriction was that of Mr. Thomas, just cited, which proposed the exclusion of slavery, not from the state of Missouri, but from the territories of the United States north and west of that state. This proposition did not emanate from the original Missouri restrictionists, but from their adversaries, and was but reluctantly and partially accepted by the former. — Greeley's Slavery Extension.