The International Jew/Volume 2/Chapter 27

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With this article we shall dismiss Mr. Bernard M. Baruch for the present. His activities are not by any means to be construed as the main effort of Judah in the United States, nor is he himself to be regarded as an important factor in the Jewish World Program. Indeed, it is to be doubted that he has been entrusted with many of the secrets of the Elders. But he has been found to be a useful man, willing to play the Jewish game with Jews, and consciously bound as all Jews are by an obligation to see that Jewish interests get the better of the balance wherever possible.

Mr. Baruch, of course, is much pleased with the role he was permitted to play in the government of the United States during the war; but he probably has sense enough to know that he was chosen for other than mere personal reasons.

Indeed, one of the keys to the controlling part which a few Jews were permitted to play in American affairs during the war is to be found just here in the question, Why was Mr. Baruch chosen? What had he been, what had he done, that he should have been chosen as head and front of governmental power in the war? His antecedents do not account for it. Neither his personal nor commercial attainments account for it. What does?

There was no elected member of the United States Government who was closer, or even as close, to the President during the war as was this Jew out of Wall Street. No one whom the people sent to represent them at Washington ever came within leagues of the privileges accorded to Mr. Baruch. Plainly this is an unusual situation, not explainable by the emergency at all, certainly not explainable by anything that is as yet a matter of public knowledge.

As one man out of many, all together serving the country, Mr. Baruch, of course, would be perfectly explainable. But as the man, the man whose single committee was run up through the fabric of the Council of National Defense until it formed the focus of the war government, he is not explainable.

It was not only during the war, but also after the armistice, that these tokens of signal choice were showered upon Mr. Baruch. He went to the Peace Conference. Resigning as chairman of the War Industries Board on December 31, 1918—

“I went down to my place in South Carolina, and there received a wireless message from the President to come to Paris. I then went to Paris. I think I sailed about the first or second of January. I know one vessel broke down and I had to transfer from one to the other. But I had no further activities in connection with the government; that is, the War Industries Board.
Mr. Graham—“How long were you in Paris?”
Mr. Baruch—“I sailed, returning June 28 or 29. I came back on the George Washington.” (This means that he was a part of the President’s entourage.)
Mr. Graham—“What were you doing there, Mr. Baruch?”
Mr. Baruch—“I was economic advisor connected with the peace mission.”
Mr. Graham—“You stayed until the Peace Treaty was concluded?”
Mr. Baruch—“Yes, sir.”
Mr. Graham—“Did you frequently advise with the President while there?”
Mr. Baruch—“Whenever he asked my advice I gave it. I had something to do with the reparation clauses. I was the American Commissioner in charge of what they called the ‘Economic Section.’ I was a member of the Supreme Economic Council in charge of raw materials.”
Mr. Graham—“Did you sit in the council with the gentlemen who were negotiating the treaty?”
Mr. Baruch—“Yes, sir; sometimes.”
Mr. Graham—“All except the meetings that were participated in by the Five?” (Meaning the Big Five premiers.)
Mr. Baruch—“And frequently those also.”

This, then, is a sidelight on what has been called the “Kosher Conference,” a name given to the Peace Conference by Frenchmen who were astounded to see thousands of Jews from all parts of the world appear in Paris as the chosen counsellors of the rulers of the nations. Jews were so conspicuous in the American mission as to excite comment everywhere. A Persian representative left on record this protest: “When the United States delegation * * * accepted a brief for the Jews and imposed a Jewish semi-state on Rumania and Poland, they were firm as the granite rock, and no amount of opposition, no future deterrents, made any impression on their will. Accordingly, they had their own way. But in the case of Persia they lost the fight, although logic, humanity, justice, and the Ordinances solemnly accepted by the Great Powers were all on their side.”

The comment is rather humiliating. But it is true. The Jewish World Program was the only program that passed through the Peace Conference without hindrance or revision.

So numerous and ubiquitous were the International Jews in Paris, so firmly established in the inner councils, that the keen observer, Dr. E. J. Dillon, whose book, “The Inside Story of the Peace Conference” (Harper’s), is the best that has appeared, was constrained to say this:

“It may seem amazing to some readers, but it is none the less a fact, that a considerable number of delegates believed that the real influences behind the Anglo-Saxon peoples were Semitic.” (p. 496.)

And again:

“They confronted the President’s proposal on the subject of religious inequality, and, in particular, the odd motive alleged for it, with the measures for the protection of minorities which he subsequently imposed on the lesser states, and which had for their keynote to satisfy the Jewish elements in Eastern Europe. And they concluded that the sequence of expedients framed and enforced in this direction were inspired by the Jews, assembled in Paris for the purpose of realizing their carefully thought-out program, which they succeeded in having substantially executed. However right or wrong these delegates may have been, it would be a dangerous mistake to ignore their views, seeing that they have since become one of the permanent elements of the situation. The formula into which this policy was thrown by the members of the Conference, whose countries it affected, and who regarded it as fatal to the peace of Eastern Europe, was this: ‘Henceforth the world will be governed by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who, in turn, are swayed by their Jewish elements.’” (p. 497. The italics are ours.)

There are other matters pertaining to Mr. Baruch which must await the development of this study, but it is worth while just now to possess ourselves of the information at hand regarding his peculiar handling of the copper situation during the war.

Mr. Baruch is known as a copper man. Copper is Jewish. That metal, throughout the world, is under Jewish domination. The Guggenheims and the Lewisohns, two Jewish families, are the copper kings of the planet—not that they confine themselves to copper; for example, their output of silver throughout the world is one-fourth more than is produced in the entire United States.

By his own testimony, Mr. Baruch was interested in copper concerns. What his holdings were during the war he did not disclose. But what his actions were has been very clearly set forth bit by bit in various inquiries.

Before the United States entered the war, Mr. Baruch rounded up the copper kings.

“I went to New York and saw there Mr. John D. Ryan and Mr. Daniel Guggenheim,” he said in his testimony. This was in February or March, 1917, he wasn’t sure which, but he said it was “before we went into the war.”

Now, who were these gentlemen? Mr. Ryan was apparently in charge of the reorganized Lewisohn properties, while Mr. Guggenheim was chief of the seven Guggenheims who form “a business family and a family business.” They divided business during the war. The United Metals Selling Company, which sold the United States Government its copper during the war, was the Lewisohn business reorganized, of which Tobias Wolfson was vice president; and the American Smelting and Refining Company was, apparently, the Guggenheim interests.

There was no competition between these two during the war!

How did it come about that these two worked together? Their case is clear on paper: their answer is that Mr. Baruch asked them to! And Mr. Baruch is clear, too; was he not a government official? And did they not show patriotism in doing as the government official bade them?

It came to this: the “Government” made a rule that it would do business only through the American Metals Selling Company as the representative of the copper producers of the United States. This meant, of course, that if the few competitors of this Jewish copper combine were to do business with the government, they too had to make arrangements with the American Metals Selling Company.

Mr. Graham—“But how did it happen that you were representing the other companies who were your competitors?”
Mr. Wolfson—“Well, at the request of the War Industries Board, we offered a copper producers’ committee.”
Mr. Graham—“Who requested that?”
Mr. Wolfson—“Mr. Eugene Meyer, Jr., representing Mr. B. M. Baruch.”
Mr. Graham—“Now let us find out who Mr. Eugene Meyer, Jr. was. Do you know him?”

It develops that Mr. Eugene Meyer, Jr., is another Wall Street man who “had large investments in copper,” though whether he retained them during the war, Mr. Wolfson did not know.

Mr. Graham—“Then Eugene Meyer, Jr., went into the War Industries Board and took up with the copper producers the question of furnishing copper, did he?”
Mr. Wolfson—“Yes, sir.”

As a result of that request a meeting was held at 120 Broadway, at which were present, among a few others, S. S. Rosenstamm, L. Vogelstein, Julius Loeb, T. Wolfson, G. W. Drucker and Eugene Meyer, Jr.

Mr. Graham—“Any army officers there?”
Mr. Wolfson—“No.”

The witness here quoted, Tobias Wolfson, was one of the most active instruments in the actual passage of business, but the Washington representative was a Mr. Mosehauer. The interesting thing about Mr. Mosehauer is that he represented both the American Metals Selling Company and the American Smelting and Refining Company—the Lewisohns and the Guggenheims—and by order of Baruch, with the approval of the government, the business was done with these two corporations.

How did they divide? It was very simple. Mr. Wolfson euphoniously describes it as a division of labor: the Lewisohn group took the trade with the United States; the Guggenheim group took over the foreign business with the Allies.

Now, the next interesting point is the special committee through which Baruch’s board dealt with the copper producers. This committee, representing the government, consisted of three persons: Pope Yeatman, chief; E. C. Thurston, assistant; Andrew Walz, assistant.

Pope Yeatman was a mining engineer employed by the Guggenheims at $100,000 a year.

E. C. Thurston was Pope Yeatman’s assistant in that private employment.

Andrew Walz was consulting mining engineer for the Guggenheims.

Everything was all set. The Jewish metal monopoly was assured of control on both sides of the Atlantic.

It was perhaps thought desirable, in view of the bad political odor which had accompanied the copper power in several states, mostly in connection with the “copper Senators,” like Clarke, of Nevada (readers of this series will remember, in connection with the name of Guggenheim, that it was Senator Simon Guggenheim who fought against the census enumeration of Jews as once proposed by the census officials), that something be done to gild the arrangement.

It was apparently necessary to do something to disarm the protest that might arise against this thorough Judaizing of the war metals, therefore a very fine show of patriotism was made. This is worthy of notice in view of the “show institutions” mentioned in the Protocols. The American public is becoming accustomed to these “show institutions”—proposals which promise everything and then fade away into nothingness. It is one of the most effective methods of destroying the morale of a people.

When Mr. Baruch saw the heads of the two copper families, he says he found them willing to think of nothing but giving copper to the government—money was of no consideration whatever.

Mr. Baruch—“They said that so far as the United States Government itself was concerned they would give Uncle Sam all the copper he wanted for his preparedness campaign * * * at any price that was decided upon. In order to arrive at some price we took the average price for 10 years which was about 16 2-3 cents; and that is how the price happened to be arrived at. At the time that they said this, copper was selling somewhere around 32 and 35 cents a pound.”

There, then, was a magnanimous thing! The government was to be given copper at half the market price. But did the government get it at this price? Wait—the story is a good one.

This unheard-of sacrifice of profits for pariotism was extensively advertised. The secretary of the Council of National Defense wrote a stirring story for one of the best magazines, in which he said:

“Mr. Baruch first announced his presence in the tremendous task of mobilizing American industry by procuring 45,000,000 pounds of copper for the army and navy at about half the current market price, saving the government in the neighborhood of $10,000,000.”

Mr. Baruch himself, in his testimony, expanded with the generosity of it all. In an apparent mood of “help yourself to all you want” he said:

“On inquiry we found that * * * the army and navy * * * wanted only 45,000,000 pounds, which used to be a lot of copper before we got to dealing in astronomical figures; and they were given all the opportunity to consider what they wanted. They could just as well have had 450,000,000 pounds as 45,000,000 pounds, because there was an open offer.”

Now for the effect which this produced on the country at large:

“The effect of that offer of the copper producers was electrical,” said Mr. Baruch. “It showed that there was in this country a desire to set aside selfishness, so far as our government was concerned in its need * * * ‘Make us any price you want.’ So that was practically the attitude that the producers took.”

But the government did not get copper at that much-advertised patriotic price.

Mr. Graham—“They did not pay 16 2-3 cents for the 45,000,000 pounds?”
Mr. Baruch—“Oh, no; not these other large quantities of materials.”

He said that the copper was furnished to the government without receiving money for it; price-fixing was yet in the future. “Then we came to the point, ‘Well, what about the civilian population?’ So we made a rule that became a policy, that whatever price was fixed it should be for everybody; that what was fair for the army and navy was fair for the civilian population.”

There seems to have been a rapid cooling of generosity under the prospect of colossal sales. And the upshot of it was that, after all the hurrah, the government really paid about 27 cents.

What these figures mean, can be deduced from the fact that during the war the government bought 592,258,674 pounds of copper.

If the reader is not already staggered by the import of these facts, there remains one more for him to consider—

After the armistice the surplus copper was sold back to the copper producers. In April and May, 1919, the American Metals Selling Company received from the United States Government over 16,500,000 pounds of copper at a fraction over 15 cents. This was less than the boasted patriotic price of 16 2-3 cents at the beginning. Not counting what they had received from the government for the copper in the first place, their profits on the difference between the price they paid for the surplus copper and the price for which they sold it again, were beyond counting.

This is what occurred under the triple copper monarchy of the Baruchs, the Lewisohns and the Guggenheims, and their Jewish assistants and Gentile fronts. However, “Gentile fronts” were boldly dispensed with to a very large degree during the war. The real powers behind the throne themselves stood out, and did not hesitate to set their own people at every crossroads along the line of war business.

It is not to be supposed that the Baruch influence began or ceased with copper, nor with any of the multitudinous industrial powers which he possessed. A man like Baruch makes the most of such opportunities as were then his. In matters political, personal and even military, there were many openings for the use of his influence, and well-informed people about Washington did not doubt his facility in these things.

Once, however, Mr. Baruch felt he was skating on thin ice with regard to the law. He had gone ahead on his own plan, but in such a way that he would exercise the power without taking the responsibility. That seems to have been a very clear ideal with him—power without responsibility. Everything was fixed, all the conditions within which every contract would have to be made were carefully determined, but Mr. Baruch never permitted himself or his board to make a contract. After having consulted with numbers of his associates in business, an agreement was reached, and only then were the responsible officers of the government told, “Go ahead and make contracts.” The officials took the responsibility, but the Baruch coterie made the conditions and then remained aloof.

Even this plan, however, had a questionable aspect which came to trouble Mr. Baruch, and the manner in which he manipulated the matter shows either a very shrewd mind or else very shrewd advice. The latter undoubtedly went with the former: there were plenty of Jewish advisors about.

To begin with, Mr. Baruch says: “The members of that committee were picked out by myself; the industries did not pick them out.” Which means, in fact, that Mr. Baruch picked out a group from a group that had previously been chosen by the producers, although plainly Mr. Baruch was desirous of modifying this impression. And again: “It is true that these great copper producers were on the committee, and I selected them because they were great men * * *”

Now, these men, as members of a government committee, were to all appearances selling to themselves as members of the government committee, and, apparently, buying from themselves as owners and controllers of the great producing combinations. Not necessarily in any discreditable way, but in a very unusual way.

In the face of this condition, Mr. Baruch had the coolness to say, “So you can see that the government was as much in the saddle as it was possible to be.“ The producer-members of the committee, headed by Baruch, were the government, so far as this statement is concerned. Time and again it was shown that the responsible officials of the government were not even visible until this extra-government had determined all the conditions.

Mr. Garrett—“Did any troubles arise with the committees growing out of the legal situation, that you remember of?”
Mr. Baruch—“The committees of the trade, especially some of those that I had asked to serve, were very much disturbed about their standing in reference to the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Is that what you refer to?”
Mr. Garrett—“Yes.”
Mr. Baruch—“And also in regard to the Lever Act, on the point that ‘no man could serve two masters.’ * * * There was no basis for it * * * because these men were not serving two masters. They did not make trades with themselves, but, with the instrumentality provided, carried out the government’s wishes or orders or suggestions with reference to the particular industry which they represented.”

The “instrumentality” with which the copper men dealt, for example, was the American Metals Selling Company, which, together with the American Smelting and Refining Company, was represented at Washington by Mr. Mosehauer. The special copper committee, composed of Guggenheim employes, did business pertaining to the “instrumentality“ which carried on the business of the combined copper companies.

It was dangerous. Some of the members seem to have felt it before Mr. Baruch did. Mr. Baruch never seems to have questioned anything that he did. Why should he? He “had more power than any other man in the war” and he had the most powerful and autocratic backing that a man ever had. But the others, the non-Jewish members, were thinking of the law.

So Mr. Baruch solved it very nicely. He took the committees, comprising the same men, and had them named as committees of the United States Chamber of Commerce for their various industries, and although the process was not changed in the least, the legal aspect of it was changed. It was rather clever. It was more, it was typical.

And after that, Mr. Baruch who had previously insisted that he himself had picked those men and that the industries had not, thus clearly encouraging the inference that these men did not represent the industries’ side, but the government side of the matter, he now insists that they represented the industry.

Mr. Graham—“* * * you changed and took these advisory committes and had the National Chamber of Commerce reappoint them, so that they then were direct representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and not of the officials of the United States or connected with any governmental machinery?”
Mr. Baruch—“I never considered them officials of the government, Mr. Graham.”
Mr. Graham—“They were as much officials of the government as the rest of you, were they not?”
Mr. Baruch—“I do not think so * * * (after several questions) * * * I asked them to serve so that when the government wanted anything they could go to one small, compact body, rather than to send out to I do not know how many people. You see?”
Mr. Graham—“Let us see about that. They were serving under you, were they not? You were the head?”
Mr. Baruch—“I appointed them and asked them to do this so that I could have a compact body to deal with.”
Mr. Graham—“You did not think for a minute that they were representing the government, but did you not think you were?”
Mr. Baruch—“I was doing the best I knew how.”
Mr. Graham—“But you had authority to bring these men in, Mr. Baruch, and appoint them as committeemen under you, and you did so. Surely, if they were representing anybody it was the government, was it not?”
Mr. Baruch—“I do not think so.”
Mr. Graham—“Am I right in assuming that you thought they represented the industries?”
Mr. Baruch—“Yes.”

A great deal, of course, can be overlooked in men who were working under stress and endeavoring to do things the best way. It does not follow that because a business man serves the government in matters pertaining to his own business, he is necessarily dishonest. But so frequent is dishonesty under such conditions, or, if not dishonesty, then a loss to the government because of a divided interest, that laws have been framed to regulate such matters. These laws were on the books at the time.

This is a fact, whatever else may be true, that “copper” made tens and hundreds of millions out of the war and it is not at all inconceivable that if “copper” had not been so completely in control of the government operations of purchase, the profits might not have been so great, and the burdens which the people bore through taxation, high prices and Liberty bonds might not have been so heavy.

Mr. Baruch is but one illustration of the clustering of Jewry about the war machinery of the United States. If the Jews were the only people left in the United States who were able enough to be put in the important places of power, well and good; but if they were not, why were they there in such uniform and systematized control? It is a definite situation that is discussed. The thing is there and is unchangeably a matter of history. How can it be explained?

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published before January 1, 1923. It may be copyrighted outside the U.S. (see Help:Public domain).