The New York Times/1918/11/11/Saw Surrender in First Peace Plea
SAW SURRENDER IN FIRST PEACE PLEA
English Writer Said Note Was Confession of Impending Collapse in Germany.
FEARS OF A REVOLUTION
Thought Bolshevist Activity Would Stir Unrest in a Nation Humiliated by Defeat.
In the issue of the magazine, The New Europe, of Oct. 24, published in London, there appeared as a leading article a paper entitled, "Germany and the Revolution," in which the anonymous author predicted the cataclysm that shakes the German Empire. An explanatory note says that the article was written before Prince Max sent his first note to President Wilson on Oct. 6, in which Germany for the first time expressed a willingness to make peace on the conditions laid down by the President. Of far greater importance than President Wilson's communications, the writer added, was his statement "that until peace is concluded he will continue to send over each month 250,000 fresh American troops."
"The nation became divided into two great sections," says the article. "On the one side was the whole fabric of the State-maintaining parties, which included practically all the upper classes and all the middle classes who aimed at public life or a career in any of what we call the liberal professions; the public service, local administration, church, and education, were all enlisted as part of the Government machine. On the other side were the great mass of the working men who had been brought into the great organization of Social Democracy, the ultimate object of which was to overthrow the fabric of Government. There can be little doubt that the very unwholesome conditions of internal affairs was one of the chief factors which brought about the war; people began to feel that things could not go on much longer as they were, and the governing classes had to face the dilemma of meeting an acute internal crisis or of making some great coup by which once for all they should establish their authority upon the people. There was one specific for meeting this emergency. A successful war which would extend German authority over the other countries of Central Europe would have as its result to establish the authority of the army, the Crown, the Prussian aristocracy, and the great industrials in Germany itself.
"How right they were was seen by the course of evens in Germany during the first years of the war. Had the war ended in a German success, had Mittel-Europa been established, then the conquest of Europe would have been accompanied by the conquest of the German people themselves.
Collapse of the Nation.
"But in the last three months, with a rapidity as dramatic as it has been unexpected, the whole plan has collapsed. Germany has not won but has lost the war; she will not emerge from it with extended power over other nations; the German nation are confronted by the imminent possibility of that, the very possibility of which they have always refused to contemplate, not only absence of victory but absolute defeat. The effect of this on the internal situation has been immediate. The Government have lost the intellectual and moral influence on which their real power depended, and they are confronted with the necessity of settling these constitutional problems which have been so long delayed, and doing this in the hour of national defeat and disaster.
"The problem is one of the most serious by which any Government could be confronted, for all history tells us that a change of the kind which is now inevitable is one to which limits and barriers cannot be set. In a country such as Germany revolutions do not come from below. they do not begin until the Government itself has begun to break up, but when they begin they are more far-reaching, both in their objects and in their methods, than those who begin them anticipate. A change which begins with the demand for moderate constitutional reform easily degenerates into the overthrow of all government; when we look for a political revolution we find ourselves on the verge of social anarchy.
"We can have no doubt that the German Government are acutely aware of the danger that is in front of them, and we may be sure that this was one of the chief reasons why, as soon as they recognized that military victory was impossible, they saw that their only way of salvation was to bring about peace, immediate peace, peace before there had been any great military disaster. They saw that constitutional changes were inevitable; they could not afford to risk carrying through these changes under the influence of some great catastrophe.
"We can be sure that this was one of the motives which influenced them in making their offer of peace on Oct. 4, and in particular, that this gave their peace offer its particular form. The surrender—for it was in fact a surrender—was more rapid and more complete than the military situation alone seems to have required. We speak of it as a surrender, for what other name can we give to this combined request for an armistice and acceptance of President Wilson's fourteen points? The Germans are thoroughly acquainted with what we may call the etiquette of military matters. They know that the request for an armistice is and must be interpreted as a recognition of defeat."
First Note Meant Defeat.
The dispatch of Prince Max's note also indicated, the writer added, that Germany recognized two basic principles of peace, which no German Government would ever discuss—the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and giving up Prussian Poland to a new Polish State.
"No Government in Germany could possibly have gone so far unless it felt that it was confronted with a catastrophe worse than that involved in the acceptance of the fourteen points, a catastrophe worse than any military defeat, viz., not only a political but a social revolution at home."
"We know that the Bolshevists, who are extending their authority in Russia, are deliberately using every means to extend their influence abroad and are rejoicing at the prospect of German anarchy. Is it, men will say, to our advantage to see a Commune arise, not only in one city, but in every city upon the Continent? We want, indeed, the Government to be transferred from the hands which have hitherto held the reins, but we want the transference to be executed in an orderly and legal manner. We want, above all, to have a recognized and constituted German Government, with which we can settle details of peace and from whom we can demand the reparation which we desire. If Germany were to go the way of Russia, then all the talk of indemnities and punishment and reparation would be futile.
Saw Sincerity in Pleas.
"On the whole we are included to believe that there has been a real change of view in Germany, in the nation and in the Government alike. The old system has fallen; it has done so because it has failed. The national believed in it because it brought to Germany wealth and power; now they see that it has brought to it discredit and disaster. It has been judged by its own acts. It is not a question of justice, of honesty, of moral reform. It is a question of competence and wisdom.
"The fundamental principle of the old system was that the conduct of foreign affairs was a matter so delicate, required such superior wisdom, that is could not be entrusted to the German nation themselves. This contention can no longer be upheld. For the old system has brought the German nation into a situation which every loyal German would especially wish to avoid. When the great war, so long talked of, came about, it came under circumstances most unfavorable to Germany, in a war not with one or two States, but with practically the whole of the rest of Europe. It was the common-place of diplomacy that it was necessary to avoid the formation of a great coalition against Germany. This coalition was, in fact, formed.
"The best hope for the world," the article concludes, "is that the defeat of the Germany Army should come as rapidly as possible, and that the German nation should, without any mist of negotiation to obscure its outlook, realize that it has come to the condition to which defeated nations come, to which France came in 1871. Best for the world and ultimately best for Germany itself. Far more important than the negotiations which President Wilson is conducting is the statement which has made that until peace is concluded he will continue to send over each month 250,000 fresh American troops."