The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898/Volume 9/Pacification of Mindanao
Letter from Juan de Ronquillo to Governor Tello
[This report of Ronquillo's is in places abridged, as he repeats many of his statements. He set sail (from Oton) on February 8, 1597, the earliest date possible after the receipt of supplies. Two virreys had been sent ahead under Francisco de Torres, with orders to coast from island to island, in order to avoid the dangers of the open sea; they had not yet been heard from. At the port of La Canela (i. e., "cinnamon;" modern Cáuit) Ronquillo found Captain Juan Pacho, who had gone for fish and salt for his command; and, as the men were scattered in Zamboanga and Taguima, there was a delay of three days in getting them together. Pilots from these forces were placed in each vessel to guide the ships to the river. Ronquillo then embarked on his fragata and ordered the Sangley vessel and those of the Indian chiefs from Danganlibor to follow. The brisas or northeasters were dead ahead, and to avoid the force of the winds he took his course inside of some islets. The Sangley vessel did not enter, as its draught was so great that the navigators feared to make the attempt. Since the Sangley vessel seemed to be in difficulties, he sent a captain to it; but he came back with the report that all was well. Ronquillo then sent directions as to their course. He had been informed by the sailor whom he sent as pilot in the Sangley vessel that there was water enough in the strait of Mangayao; but, if this should not be so, they were to keep outside. They remained outside, and the rest of the fleet sailed safely on to the point of Las Flechas ("the Arrows"), twelve leguas from the river (Rio Grande, in Mindanao, where the letter was written). The wind being heavy and the vessels old and deep in the water, he anchored in a river never before entered, so far as was known, cutting away trees and branches to do so. When the fragata was safe, he sent the master-of-camp for the galleys, which were sinking because of their rottenness. At the same time a virrey was sent to look for the Sangley vessel. The virrey returned without news; and though Ronquillo was very anxious he kept on to the river toward which he was sailing, all assuring him that he would find the Sangley ship here. A fire was seen at night, apparently a signal that the vessel would go to La Canela for water, being unable to make the river because of the winds. After taking in water they left port, and the next night the Chinese crew mutinied, and killed the Spaniards. The Chinese had been disarmed, and committed the deed with clubs and wooden hatchets. Ronquillo asserts that all possible care had been taken. The vessel carried the bulk of their provisions, clothing, tow, and some ammunition. In spite of this loss the expedition had been very successful. Upon reaching the river whence he writes, he spent five days in repairs upon the fleet; and then, after completing the fort of Tampaca (modern Tabaca) and storing the ammunition and food in it, he ascended the river, leaving a guard of thirty-four men under Sargento-mayor Diego de Chaves, one of whose legs had been cut off. The force which went up the river numbered two hundred and thirty, including sailors and gunners. The enemy retired behind some parapets as soon as the artillery opened upon them, and brought some artillery to bear on the flagship (one of the galleys), but could not retard the Spanish advance. Continuing, Ronquillo writes:]
I answered their fire with so great readiness that I forced them to withdraw their artillery. But, as if they were goblins, they remained here behind a bush or a tree, firing at us, without being seen. Thus did they keep us busy until one o'clock at night. I remained three days without landing, awaiting the arrival of Lumaquan—a chief of the tingues [i.e., hill-people], the best Indian of this island, and our best friend—and five hundred Indians, who were coming to aid us. On the very day of his arrival I landed in the following order. I formed a square of twelve ranks of thirteen men each, closing front, side, and rear guards with halberds and pikes. There were two captains in the van-guard, one in the rear-guard, and two at the sides, so that, wherever the enemy should attack, the soldiers could, by facing about, fight without at all breaking ranks. I detailed two files of forty arquebusiers and two captains to go ahead to discover ambushes. Under cover of their arquebuses went the pioneers to clear the way. As I heard, according to reports, that the enemy would halt upon this day, I went ashore and marched straight forward at the head of the squadron, at times going through the ranks to see if anything was needed. Upon that day, we busied ourselves until sunset in clearing the way as fully as great toil and diligence would allow, without the square being thrown into any confusion, or any man falling out. But as we could not come in sight of the fort, I returned to pass the night in the fleet, for until the road should be open and known, and its distance, I did not care to land my artillery, as I had so few men. Besides those who were clearing the path, I had no men to fire the artillery. Immediately on the following day I continued my plans in the same order. As one of my legs pained me, because of a fall backward two days previously down the hatchway of the galley—and by good luck I did not break my neck—from which I am still suffering, I did not go ashore. Also, I thought that, since the enemy had not attacked us in the most dangerous places, they would not do so in places not to their advantage. Thus the path was cleared, upon this day, without encountering any enemy or sighting their fort. Again the men returned to the fleet for the night. On the third day, as the work of reconnoitering was proceeding, a large ambuscade of Indians attacked us in the open near a palm-grove. As was learned later, they numbered about two thousand. They attacked us with the greatest fury and determination, in small bodies of skilful troops. As the soldiers were ordered immediately to form their square, when the enemy arrived in front of it, and saw it so well ordered and bristling with halberds, they did not dare to break it, but turned and fled. In the assault five of their men were killed with arquebus-shots, and several others wounded. Among those killed were two of their bravest and most esteemed men. One was from Terrenate and was a casis[1] who instructed them in their religion. Of a truth, they showed clearly that they were brave; for I do not believe that there are many peoples who would attack with so gallant a determination, when they were armed with nothing but shields and canpilans. They killed five of my Indians who were clearing the path, who did not use good judgment in retiring. This took place quite near their fort. As soon as I was advised of this occurrence, for I had not gone ashore on this day also, I sent at once as many men as possible from the galleys, with axes, shovels, spades, and wicker baskets. I ordered them to entrench themselves in as advanced a position as possible.
They commenced to attack the fort. The enemy begged for peace on the second day.[2] The next day I landed my artillery, and went with it to attack the enemy's fort. As the distance was quite great, I moved my entrenchments nearer twice, and with great difficulty, for the enemy never ceased shooting at us. They wounded three gunners and several other men; surely they were very lucky shots. Finally I planted my battery of eight pieces somewhat over one hundred paces from the fort. Although I battered the fort hotly, I could not effect a breach through which to make an assault. All the damage that I did them by day, they repaired by night. Immediately on the following day they began to call from their walls. When I asked them what they wanted they said that they wished to be friends. I was very short of ammunition, for I had only three thousand arquebus-bullets left, and very few cannonballs; and both would be spent in one day's fighting, during which, should we not gain the fort, we would be lost—and with no power to defend ourselves while withdrawing our artillery and camp. At the same time, I reconnoitered the fort and its situation, for it is located at the entrance of a lagoon, thus having only water at the back, and swampy and marshy ground at the sides. It has a frontage of more than one thousand paces, is furnished with very good transversals, and is well supplied with artillery and arquebuses. Moreover, it has a ditch of water more than four brazas wide and two deep, and thus there was a space of dry ground of only fifteen paces where it was possible to attack; and this space was bravely defended, and with the greatest force of the enemy. The inner parts were water, where they sailed in vessels, while we had no footing at all. Again, I reflected that those who had awaited us so long, had waited with the determination to die in defense of the fort; and if they should see the contest ending unfavorably for them, no one would prevent their flight. Further, if they awaited the assault it would cost me the greater part of my remaining ammunition, and my best men; while, if the enemy fled, nothing would be accomplished, but on the contrary a long, tedious, and costly war would be entered upon. Hence, with the opinion and advice of the captains I negotiated for peace; and told them that I would admit them to friendship under the following conditions:
Treaty of peace and conditional covenants
First, that first and foremost, they must offer homage to his Majesty, and pay something as recognition.
Obligation to return their prisoners to his Maj- esty. That all the natives who had been taken from the Pintados Islands last year, must be restored.
To break friendship with Terrenate. That they must break the peace and confederation made with the people of Terrenate, and must not admit the latter into their country.
Friendship with those who were friends formerly. That they must be friends with Danganlibor and Lumaquan, chiefs of this island, who have rendered homage to his Majesty; and must not make war on any of their vassals.
That all the chiefs must go to live in their old villages.
They accepted all the conditions, and Raxa Mura, Sala, Silonga, and the other chiefs swore to keep the peace on these conditions, and paid homage to his Majesty, paying a certain sum in gold as recognition. Inasmuch as they had taken the Vizcayans whom they had enslaved to a great distance, so that they should not escape, they paid another like sum of gold as pledges that they would deliver them to the Spaniards. As the friendly Indians said that the end for which I was making peace was, under pretext of it, to seize the chief men and hang them and separate them from the others, the chiefs did not venture to come immediately. However, they said that when they should ascertain our treaty, and if our purpose was not as aforesaid, they would come. Although such a thing had not even entered my mind, as I shall not make any promises in his Majesty's name that cannot be fulfilled, it was true that the friendly Indians said it; for they wished to break the peace, in order to see if they could not rob these people at our cost.
After making this treaty and securing this result (which, of a truth, your Lordship may regard as most felicitous and of great importance, and as the beginning of much good), I retired to my fleet. Next day the chiefs came to the river-bank, and I made them friends with Danganlibor and Lumaquan, and they embraced each other. Some of them boarded the galleys, and began thus to lose their fear gradually. Already some of the chiefs have started to go to their villages, and have collected their people in order to settle them. I hope, God willing, that everything will assume a settled and quiet condition. And albeit that my toil and my service rendered to your Lordship in this affair do not equal my desire, still your Lordship can represent it to his Majesty as one of the greatest that have been rendered in these islands. I am not going to leave them; so, when any greater opportunity arises, your Lordship may entrust it to me. I assert that if this occasion had not had the almost unexpected favorable ending, and if our Lord had not evidently been pleased to lend His aid, your Lordship would suffer great anxiety and all the islands would be in great straits; for, with the alliance that they had formed with Terrenate, there would be no safety in the entire district.
[The victorious troops were in the greatest need. There were many messes of four or five with only one shirt among them, which they wore by turns. There was only ammunition enough for two hours. There was only rice enough to allow fifteen gantas a month to Spaniards and ten to Indians; and even this ration would only last till the end of August. They had no meat or fish. Ronquillo had "set a dragnet," and taken the rice of all the people within reach, beginning with himself. Then he sent out officers in fragatas to search for rice, giving them four hundred pesos for the purpose, and directing them to pay as long as the money lasted, and then to take provisions in any way in which they could get them. They were, if necessary, to use force to obtain supplies from encomenderos or Indians, for their pay giving them orders on the charges of the land (situado), or the tribute, or to be paid when possible. As for the other parts of the island, the very chiefs were perishing of hunger, because of the war, and came daily to beg for rice. This they received, in order that they might be bound to the Spaniards. Accordingly Ronquillo asks for assistance and supplies from Manila until the stress should be over in Mindanao. He gives honorable mention to his officers and troops, many of whom were wounded. He looks forward to great difficulties as soon as any attempt shall be made to collect tributes. The leading chiefs collect tribute from their vassals; and the only demand hitherto has been for open friendship and the recognition of the sovereignty of Spain. If these men—Raxa Mura, Sala, Silonga, and Lumaquan—are now told that they must not collect tribute, but that all the tribute must be paid to his Majesty and to individuals, "it will be a very bitter draught for them to swallow." These Indians, Ronquillo says, are not like those in Luzon, but are accustomed to power and sovereignty. Some collect five or six thousand tributes. If the tributes are to be collected, two hundred more soldiers and a large quantity of ammunition will be necessary, or much additional time. The troops have not been paid what Figueroa owed them; and it is plain that no profit is to be expected in the island for a long time to come. When it does come, the encomenderos, who have fraudulently remained at leisure in Manila, will get it. Hence the soldiers have petitioned that the property of Figueroa in the island be sold and the proceeds applied to their payment. Fourteen hundred pesos of worked silver was sold; and the soldiers received six pesos each. The captains also asked and received some compensation. The discontent was so great that Ronquillo declares that no resolution can command men so ragged and starving, penniless and unpaid; and that they are already saying that they cannot eat good words. He concludes this section by asking for twenty thousand pesos and eight hundred Indian rowers, and for some exchanges of his men.]
That the country is not such as it has been painted, and not so excellent as has been reported. Hitherto it has not been possible to tell your Lordship anything certain of this country, except that it will be of but little advantage to his Majesty, but a source of great expense. It has far fewer inhabitants than was reported, and all are very poor, so that their breakfast consists only in cleaning their arms, and their work in using them, and not in cultivating the land, which is low and swampy in this river. There is no chief who can raise twenty taes of gold. Rice is very scarce; in the tingues is found a small amount, which is used for food by the chiefs only. They are some swine, and a few fowls that are very cunning, and less fruit. It abounds in fish in some districts, but this river contains only eels. They are as good as those of España. They are not found all the year round, but only during the rainy season. The climate does not differ much from that there. It has very dense fogs. I have been unable to make a complete map of the island. I am sending your Lordship only that of this river, made with exactness, with all its arms and estuaries, and their settlements. The arithmetical symbols represent the number of people in each, and the letters the names of the chiefs. I have corrected it with all care. We have already examined almost everything from the coast of La Canela, Dapitan, and Botran [Butúan?]. There is a full report there which may be filed with this map.
The island of Matheo is excellent, and a better expedition could be made there. Concerning the island of Matheo, I have been able to learn from men who have been there that it is very fertile, thickly populated, and rich in food products, including rice. The inhabitants are not very warlike. Would to God that your Lordship had expended there what was left here, for with less effort we would have gained more. Terrenate has some dealings with this island. [I say this] in case anything is to be done before it has more. Of Maluco I have not ascertained anything new, except that things are in their usual condition.
He has not effected a settlement, as he has not found a convenient site. He is awaiting the pleasure of your Lordship, and [a more favorable] season. As yet I have not effected any settlement, as I have not found a suitable and convenient location for it, for all the river above is swampy; and, if we were to look for dry land along its course, it is so far away that it would take a week to reach it from the mouth of the river. Although beyond this river, toward La Canela, there is a good place for a settlement, yet it is not advisable to leave this river now until matters are more settled and quiet. This river is the residence of the chief men of the island. Accordingly I shall wait the result of this rainy season; and if the discomfort be not too great, I shall settle on the site where I am now established, which is in a very good position, and here I shall await your Lordship's decision.
That the Indians are warlike and have fortified themselves, with their forces now there, and others that they will collect, when the proposal is made that they must pay tribute. Hence, reënforcements of soldiers, ammunition and food are necessary, and time. Although things have so fortunate a beginning as I have related, it is by way of peace. All the chiefs retain their full complements of artillery and arquebuses, so that, whenever they wish to defend themselves, they may do so. Beyond any doubt, on the day that tribute is demanded from them, not only our new friends, but Danganlibor and Lumaquan as well, who rendered homage of their own free will, will rebel. For the speedy subjection of them all, we need a large force. Hence I repeat to your Lordship, in order that you may not be deceived by certain opinions of persons who have not seen this region for many years—for it is not as of yore, and they did not know it, and the inhabitants are Indians only in name—that a great force of soldiers is needed, as well as ammunition, in order to make them pay tribute. This matter is of prime importance. I would not be complying with my obligation unless I entreated your Lordship to consider this matter deeply. You should consider whether this enterprise must be given up or sustained, for it is very costly, and we must not allow odds to be taken of us when we have our best opportunity. Thus I think that we can finish this matter at one time, and that your Lordship should send two hundred men in one summer. With this number we can overrun all districts, take away the natives' artillery, and collect tribute. This manner of proceeding would be very economical.
All the men, counting those maimed, number two hundred and sixty. The number of men that I found in this island and those who should be brought from Zibu fell far short of what I expected. All that I could gather together—gunners, sailors, and maimed men—do not number more than two hundred and sixty-four men. Some of them have died. I am sending there the crippled and maimed, who are useless, so that I shall have left in this river a trifle above two hundred men, many of whom are sick, because of past hardships and their wretched existence.
That medicines and delicacies be provided. The master-of-camp is sick, and I fear lest, with the advance of the rainy season, the sickness will continue to increase; for it cannot be alleviated by medicines and delicacies, because we have none. This is a great pity. I entreat your Lordship to have medicines and some delicacies provided for the sick, and clothing for the hospital.
That religious are not going there to furnish instruction. Father Chirinos[3]came to this island with the sargento-mayor, and on his first sight of it was so discontented that for no other reason, he turned his back upon it, and was in so great a hurry to return that he declared that if a vessel were not given him immediately in which to leave, he would swim away. He went away speaking ill of this place, and has caused great annoyance and wrong to these poor soldiers. If a religious who ought to be happy with a hard life, and who ought to seek hardships in which to serve God better, refused those which might be offered him here, the soldiers, who are less perfect and less filled with God, will do but little. Father Juan de Sanlucar asked me for leave likewise to go there with this vessel, in order to go to get a companion, as he could not stay here alone. I did not grant it him. If the fathers of the Society are to have this place in charge, it will be right for them to send religious. If not, then they should say so, and your Lordship should request the ecclesiastical government to provide ministers. The one here at present has labored to our great approbation and has set a good example. But he is greatly grieved at being alone, and he is not without reason, for he has no one to whom to make his confession.
The ration given to these people is so small that it can only be endured in times of great stress. Indeed it is doubtful whether a Spaniard could live on only one-half ganta of rice, without anything else; and even the Indian is unable to do so without having some fish with it. For the future we need abundance of provisions; for, as I have noted, we cannot expect this land to furnish them, because it does not have
any. Your Lordship must have them provided in accordance with the accompanying memorandum.
That it is advisable to send hither the encomenderos, and from there to give the soldiers and captains some gratification and pay. All the captains and soldiers of this camp perform their duties grumblingly, since the encomenderos enjoy the fruits of their labor. Through false representations the encomenderos have remained behind, instead of coming here on this pacification. If each encomendero has to live on his encomienda, and the heirs of Estevan Rodriguez in some part of the island, there is nothing left for the captains and soldiers. The owners should come, therefore, to reduce their encomiendas to subjection, since they take the gain. They do not go very far upon the road, and it is not a good argument to say that each one will pacify his own encomienda; for so long as this river is unpacified, nothing is pacified. Your Lordship should order all of them, without any exception, to come in person, and to bring some soldiers at their own cost, with sufficient food for a year's maintenance. In this way, something will be done; for an encomienda cannot be pacified with only one soldier, paid by an encomendero. I entreat your Lordship to decide quickly upon the course to be taken, and, with the same haste, to send me immediate advice by a birey. The route is open, and the virey can come here any time in June; thus I may be advised in advance of your Lordship's orders as to the course to pursue here, and this needy people may be encouraged with the hope of speedy relief. Your Lordship should write to them, thanking them for their labors, and encouraging them with their pay, to continue their work. May God preserve your Lordship many years, with the increase of dignities that we your servants desire. Tanpaca, May 10, 97. Your Lordship's most humble servant.
Don Juan Ronquillo
[Endorsed: "Mindanao, 1597. General Don Juan Rronquillo."]
The campaign
The sargento-mayor of the city of Manila left for Mindanao on the thirtieth of December of ninety-six, and arrived at the city of Zebu on the fourteenth of January. He left there for La Caldera[4] on the twenty-ninth of the said month, and arrived at La Caldera on the second of February, where he found the fleet of Mindanao, which had gone away for lack of supplies. The whole fleet left La Caldera on the sixth of said month, in the direction of Mindanao; and on the eleventh Captain Torivio de Misa was sent forward with a galliot and two lapis, as he suspected that the unfriendly Indians had surrounded the friendly natives from Tanpacon. On the fourteenth he sent Sargento-mayor Diego de Chaves with two galleys, and other light vessels, to follow up Torivio de Miranda; and he remained behind with the three fragatas, which, as they were heavy vessels, could not follow the rest of the fleet.
On the fifteenth of December, Captain Graviel Gonzales, who was on board one of the lapis which accompanied Torivio de Miranda, was drowned while passing Las Flechas, at the edge of the river of Mindanao. On the seventeenth, Captain Torivio de Miranda entered the river, where he found that the enemy had drawn a blockade about our friends of Tanpacon, and had killed more than seventy of them; but at his arrival they raised the blockade, and retired to their fort in flight.
On the eighth of January, Captain Chaves arrived with his fragatas at the river, and on the twelfth planned and founded the fort of Tanpacan near this settlement of our friends. On the twenty-fifth, the sargento-mayor sailed for the river of Simay to capture certain vessels belonging to the enemy, in which they were going to seek aid from Terrenate. During a certain battle which they had there with the enemy, he had a leg cut off, well toward the thigh, and recived a shot in the helmet above the ear. One of his comrades, who was fighting at his side, had his right leg cut off. On the tenth of March, the master-of-camp arrived; and, on the twenty-first, General Don Juan Ronquillo.
On the tenth of April the enemy's fleet came up, and on the seventeenth they landed, sweeping along the allies in front of them, together with forty arquebusiers, who were escorting them in their line, and on their right wing. A few days ago the enemy made an attack from ambuscade, with more than two thousand men. They came on, closing in until they reached the squadron, where they encountered the resistance of arms to their advance, and retired fleeing. They left some of their bravest dead, together with a few Terrenatans, without doing any damage to us, except killing five Visayans. Accordingly our squadron, which consisted of a hundred and sixty-nine men, on the fourth day intrenched themselves as best they could; and little by little moved the intrenchments forward until they were a hundred and sixty-six paces from the enemy. During this time the enemy defended themselves with a park of small artillery and two large guns. On the twenty-fifth, the general sent to consult Sargento-mayor Diego de Chaves, who was in the fleet; and by his opinion a traverse was built as a half-moon, where were stationed seven pieces of artillery, with which they battered the fort of the enemy.
On the twenty-eighth, when the enemy saw the damage which our artillery was doing them, they rendered obedience and sued for peace; and on the twenty-ninth peace was agreed upon with the following conditions: They were to return the Visayan slaves whom they hold, and pay tribute, and must not receive Terrenatans in their country. They were to give obedience to his Majesty, and the chiefs were to give oath; and in pledge of this they gave a golden chain. They are all going back to their villages, and gathering up the Visayan slaves. It will be well to reënforce the Spaniards with troops and money this year, so that matters may remain settled and they shall not try to create a disturbance again.
- ↑ A title given among Mahometans to certain persons of religious profession.
- ↑ This and other italic headings to paragraphs in this document are, in the original MS., marginal notes in another handwriting—probably made by a clerk, for convenience of reference.
- ↑ When Figueroa began the conquest of Mindanao (1596) he was accompanied thither by two Jesuits—Juan del Campo, a priest; and Gaspar Gómez, a lay brother. The former was carried off by a fever, dying on August 10, 1596, at the age of thirty years, after little more than a year's stay in the islands. In his place, Juan de Sanlúcar and Pedro de Chirino accompanied Ronquillo's expedition in the following year. Sanlúcar entered the Jesuit order in 1570, and came to the Philippines in time to join the Mindanao expedition; he died at Palápag, April 26, 1612.
Pedro de Chirino entered the Jesuit order in 1580, and arrived at Manila ten years later. He died there on September 16, 1635, at the age of seventy-eight. His noted work, Relacion de las Islas Filipinas (Roma, 1604), will be presented in subsequent volumes of this series. La Concepcion says of him (Hist. de Philipinas, v, p. 198): "A man of great industry and of studious habits, who devoted to study and books all the time which was not occupied by his ministry to souls." - ↑ La Caldera, "the Caldron"—a port in the extreme southwest of Mindanao, not far from Zamboanga; its primitive name, Cauite.