The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Review: Dewey - Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics

by Thomas Davidson (1840-1900)

Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. By John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor: Register Publishing Co. The Inland Press. 1891. — pp. viii, 253.

The author of this work tells us that though its "pages have taken shape in connection with class-room work, they are intended as an independent contribution to ethical science. ... The backbone of the theory here presented" is said to be "the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realized in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre, and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing." For this backbone the author acknowledges his indebtedness to Bradley, Edward Caird, and Alexander.

The work is divided into three parts: (I) Fundamental Ethical Notions — the Good, Obligation, Freedom; (II) The Ethical World — Social Relations, Moral Institutions; (III) The Moral Life of the Individual — Formation and Growth of Ideals, Moral Struggle, or the Realizing of Ideals, Realized Morality, or the Virtues. A "Conclusion" gives the gist of the whole.

It is somewhat difficult to restate the ethical theory propounded in this book. It is acknowledged in great measure Hegelian. The human will (and, indeed, the Divine Will) seems to be conceived as a sort of force or activity, whose nature it is to determine itself in accordance with ideas; and this determination is freedom. There seems to be no other difference between this will-activity and the "fire" (πῦρ, πρηστήρ) of Herakleitos than the name; for that philosopher conceived his fire as determining itself according to a Ao'yos, and as including both the divine and human minds. We are, accordingly, prepared for a statement like this: "To regard even a Divine Being as the author of obligation is to make it a form of external constraint, appealing to hope or fear [why not to love?], unless this Divine Being is shown to be organically [why not morally and affectively?], connected with the self"; that is, shown to be the total process of which the self is an essential part, member, or moment. It is easy enough to see what sort of ethics must result from a system like this, which may be called indifferently Panlogism or Cosmism. We find, indeed, "the ethical postulate" printed in capitals (p. 131) to be this: "In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons [why not individuals?] of which the individual is a member; and conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself." Here it is clear that the converse, if it is really to be a converse, must mean: in the realizatoin of any community of persons [individuals?] having individuals as its members, is found the needed realization of individuality—a statement which certainly no one will call in question, but which is, unfortunately, a mere tautology. Whence it follows that the original proposition is also a tautology; for that whose converse is a tautology is itself a tautology. This, no doubt, Professor Dewey would most readily admit, since to him 'individual' and 'member of a community of persons' are convertible terms. We may express this by saying that the individual, as such, lives and moves and has his being in a community of persons, and that without this he would have no individual life, motion, or being. The community, moreover, is a process, an activity, made up of the organized activities of all the individuals composing it, and the end or well-being (τὸ εὖ) of the community and its members means the highest possible amount of organized activity which they can be made to put forth. This organized activity is objective morality; it is the "chief end of man"; it is The Good; it is the only God there is.

In this system the terms Duty (or Obligation) and Freedom assume particular meanings. (1) Duty is determined by social needs. "The social needs give control, law, authority."—"Duty is simply the aspect which the good or moral end assumes, as the individual conceives of it" (p. 152). The more completely the actions of the individual correspond to these social needs, the more moral and dutiful he is. "So far as an act is done unwillingly, under constraint, so far the act is impure and undutiful" (p. 155). Of course, the social need is always a need for fuller activity, and dutiful acts are those which contribute to make this possible. "Morality is activity" (p. 220); immorality is inactivity. (2) Freedom Professor Dewey distinguishes into negative, potential, and positive. The second is what corresponds to the freedom of the will, or freedom of choice, of ordinary ethical treatises. According to Professor Dewey, this freedom is simply the power to conceive two ends, not the power to choose the one or the other at any given time. Such choice he holds to be a simple impossibility. Only, "after action, the agent calls to mind that there was another end open to him [in what sense?] and that if he did choose the other end, it was because of something in his character which made him prefer the one he actually chose" (p. 159). "Here we have the basis of moral responsibility or accountability (p. 160). The theory seems to be this: Given a man's realized character and his surroundings at any given moment, his choice of actions may be infallibly predicted. But having, in one instance, chosen a certain action, and discovering later that it is undesirable, that is, hindering, he is by this discovery made a different character from what he was before, and so necessarily makes a different choice next time. That this is Professor Dewey's meaning is clearly shown by his rejection of "alternate choice," and his reference to Martineau as its expounder (pp. 161, 166). We may conclude, I think, that he holds a species of determinism, in which consciousness is not merely a spectator, but a necessary link in the natural process whereby character is changed. In his treatment of character, or "realized character," Professor Dewey does not make it very clear whether he means it to exclude or include a man's "ideal of himself" On page 181, indeed, he seems to identify the two; but, if they are identical, it is difficult to see where remorse comes from; for remorse seems to be the judgment of the ideal self upon certain actions of the realized self. Or, does Professor Dewey mean to say that the character which chooses an action before its performance is no longer (thanks to that action) the character which judges it afterwards? If this be his meaning, it would be interesting to know just how the transforming influence is exerted. Is it due to outer or inner results, or both? To whom or to what does "the adopted end turn out not to be satisfactory, but, rather, unworthy and degrading"? Does the performance of certain acts awake in the performer a previously unrealized sense of dignity? If this be true, would it not follow that the way in which conscience is developed is by the performance of actions that are subsequently disapproved? in other words, that a man becomes good by doing evil? This is the exact reverse of the ordinary view.

In treating of "The Ethical World" (Part II), Professor Dewey deprecates " the habit of conceiving moral action as a certain kind of action, instead of all action so far as it really is action," and goes on to assert that "the moral world is, here and now" (p. 167). But when we speak of a certain kind of actions as moral, do we not employ "moral" in a sense different from that implied by it in the expression "moral world"? Few persons would deny that the "moral world is here and now"; but most persons would deny that all actions are moral, unless, indeed, 'action' be used in a very unusual sense, — as moral action. When we say 'moral world,' we mean a world in which moral action is possible; when we say ' moral action,' we mean action in which morality is realized. Realized morality is virtue. Now there are such things as virtuous acts; but no one would say that the world is virtuous.

The type of the moral world is a great co-operative factory, and is maintained "by the free participation therein of individual wills." This maintenance is the common good, which gives concreteness to freedom. A moral law stands on the same footing as a natural law, being "no more merely a law of what ought to be than is the law of gravitation. As the latter states a certain relation of moving masses to one another, so the law of justice states a certain relation of active wills to one another" (p. 175). "A moral law ... is the principle of action, which, acted upon, will meet the needs of the existing situation as respects the wants, powers, and circumstances of the individuals concerned." Could we similarly say: 'The law of gravitation is the principle of motion, which [if] acted upon, will meet the needs of the existing situation, as respects the wants, powers, and circumstances of the bodies concerned'? Is there any 'if' implied in the latter case at all? And does not the necessity for this 'if' in the former show clearly that there is a fundamental difference, — the difference between freedom and determinism, — between the moral law and the law of gravitation? And does not the attempt to represent them as of the same nature show that Professor Dewey's ethical system is deterministic?

This comes out still more clearly in Part III, where he treats of "The Moral Life of the Individual." Here we read: "Intelligence deals with the nature and relations of things, and we call it understanding; intelligence deals with the relations of persons and deeds, and it is termed conscience" (p. 184). But may not the relations of persons and deeds be understood? Is there no science of sociology or of economics? Or is it by means of the conscience that these sciences are evolved? Let sociologists and economists answer!

In treating of the relations of "The Reflective Conscience and the Ethical World," Professor Dewey agrees with Hegel in maintaining that "to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country," and with Bradley in holding that "the wish to have a morality of one's own better than that of the world [as it is?] is to be on the threshold of morality" (p. 189). Would not this justify the suttee of the Hindoos, the child-murder of the Spartans, the prostitution of the Babylonian women (Herod. I, 199)? To be sure, Professor Dewey says: "Reflective intelligence cross-questions the existing morality, and extracts from it the ideal which it pretends to embody, and thus is able to criticise the existing morality in the light of its own ideal" (p. 190). But were not the horrors alluded to part of the ideal of the peoples named, and should we not, nevertheless, admire the Spartan mother who protected her feeble child with her own life, despite the Spartan ideal? Should we not consider her moral just because she refused "to live in accordance with the moral traditions of her country"?

There are other points in the book that deserve consideration; but I have perhaps said enough to give a notion of its contents and tendency. I have allowed Professor Dewey, in the main, to speak for himself, drawing only a few obvious corollaries from his principles, and putting a few questions. Criticism would be out of place, unless it addressed itself to his fundamental principle, from which all the rest follows logically enough. Those who hold this principle will accept its results, as set forth by Professor Dewey those who do not, will reject them.

Thomas Davidson.